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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
The recent financial crisis has been extraordinarily costly: It triggered sharp and persis-
tent declines in economic activity and a rise in unemployment in almost any advanced
economy. Central banks across the world continue to struggle with economic slack and
weak inflation while the scope for conventional stimulus is constrained by the zero-
lower bound on nominal interest rates. Moreover, fiscal stabilization programs for the
financial sector led to substantial increases in government debt burdens. In the spe-
cial case of the Euro Area, the financial crisis has contributed to the unfolding of the
sovereign debt crisis which still impedes a noticeable economic recovery.
Understandably, the crisis experience has brought a well-known question back on
top of the agenda of both researchers and policymakers: Are financial markets inherently
unstable and do we need to rethink their regulation? Simultaneously, heterodox theories
such as the "Financial Instability Hypothesis" advocated by Minsky (1986, 1992) have
experienced a revival. This appeared reasonable, as mainstream economic theory was
perceived to be unable to explain the root causes of the crisis, not to mention that only
few did manage to predict the events which unfolded after August 2007.
Indeed, the recent eventsmake it hard to deny that financial systems are inefficiently
vulnerable in the absence of proper regulation. Fortunately, the fields of macroeco-
nomics and finance have made substantial progress within the last years in explaining
this phenomenon. A quickly increasing strand of literature relates financial crises to
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the presence of systemic externalities. If market participants do not internalize the conse-
quences of their actions with respect to the stability of the system as such, systemic risk
on financial markets may become excessive, which calls for regulatory responses being
usually summarized under the term macroprudential regulation.
Notwithstanding the evolution of the regulatory paradigm for financial markets,
there is another question: Should monetary policy pursue a more active role in financial
market stabilization? This issue has already been debated in the aftermath of the dotcom-
bubble, when most economists and central bankers agreed that such a policy would be
undesirable (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001). Yet with respect to the recent crisis,
Taylor (2007) claims that the Federal Reserve kept interest rates "too low for too long,"
thereby contributing to the build-up of the American housing bubble. On the other
hand, Bernanke (2010) and Greenspan (2010) defend the US policy stance in the run-up
to the crisis as being justified by downside risks to inflation.
Thus, the role of monetary policy in ensuring financial stability is again subject to a
lively debate. The literature on the interplay of monetary policy and financial markets
has made progress as well. Borio and Zhu (2008, 2012) have proposed a risk-taking chan-
nel of monetary policy transmission. The concept of the risk-taking channel holds that
an accommodative policy stance with low interest rates enhances risk-taking within
the financial sector through various mechanisms, giving rise to a nexus between mon-
etary policy and the evolution of systemic risk. Hence, central banks possibly need to
account for the impact of their policy stance on systemic risk.
As a general objective, my thesis aims to contribute to the analysis of the two afore-
mentioned key questions. I try to illustrate the evolution in the understanding of the
processes which yield an undesirable build-up of systemic risk. In particular, I seek to
shed light on the potential role of monetary policy in that respect. For that purpose, I
extensively discuss both the theory of systemic risk and the concept of the risk-taking
channel of monetary policy transmission. Merging important results from these dif-
ferent research areas allows me to analyze the interplay between monetary policy and
systemic risk on financial markets and its policy implications in a coherent fashion.
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1.2 Non-Technical Summary
The thesis is divided in two parts. The first part seeks to provide the foundations for
the concept of (excessive) systemic risk. The second part elaborates on the mechan-
ics of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission and discusses potential
implications for the conduct of monetary policy.
Apart from organizing and categorizing the current state of research in the afore-
mentioned areas, I try to contribute to the literature in several respects. First, I pro-
vide a selective survey of the theoretical literature on systemic externalities. Second,
I develop a simple framework which clarifies the distinction between the risk-taking
channel and the traditional understanding of monetary policy transmission. Third, I
estimate a vector autoregression model of the US economy which is augmented with a
set of risk-taking indicators and find supportive evidence for the existence of a signifi-
cant risk-taking channel. Fourth, I construct a simple macro-financial model in order to
explore the macroeconomic implications of the risk-taking channel as well as optimal
policy responses.
Part One: Systemic Risk and Macroprudential Regulation
Somewhat tautologically, systemic risk can be defined as the risk of the occurrence of
a severe financial crisis. It can be decomposed into the crisis probability and the losses
conditional on the crisis outbreak. Both components may evolve over time. I claim that
both the probability and the conditional loss implied by a financial crisis are endoge-
nous variables. If this holds true, the phenomenon of systemic risk calls for a regulatory
response for three main reasons. First, the macroeconomic costs of financial crises are
typically large. Second, traditional financial supervision fails to acknowledge threats to
the stability of the financial system as such. Third, the emerging level of systemic risk
under the absence of proper regulation is inefficiently high. The necessity to carefully
substantiate the latter proposition leads over to my analysis of possible determinants of
systemic risk. I distinguish between two approaches.
On the one hand, there are various theories which explain the existence of boom-
bust cycles on financial markets with limited rationality. I briefly present three loosely
related concepts: (i) The Financial Instability Hypothesis of Hyman P. Minsky, (ii) the
Behavioral-Finance Approach and (iii) Agent-Based Financial Market Models. These
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approaches have in common that they explain boom-bust cycles with the formation of
overoptimistic expectations during the boom. These systematic expectation errors are
attributed to the presence of cognitive limitations and mechanisms of expectation for-
mation under bounded rationality. However, I conclude that these theories have little
to offer for the analysis of systemic risk. Dismissing the rationality postulate tends to
go hand in hand with a loss in analytical precision and theoretical stringency. These
shortcomings make it especially problematic to analyze appropriate regulatory inter-
ventions.
On the other hand, a relatively recent and in my view superior approach highlights
the role of systemic externalities for the build-up and the materialization of systemic risk.
An excessive level of systemic risk emerges endogenously, as financial market partici-
pants do not internalize the consequences of their actions with respect to the stability of
the system. Presuming the existence of market imperfections such as private informa-
tion is sufficient to make the case for an inherent fragility of the financial system. Very
importantly, this hold true even when assuming strict rationality. My understanding
of the literature lets me distinguish five different areas in which systemic externalities
matter:
(1) Interconnectedness: Financial intermediaries engage in risk sharing via the accumu-
lation of reciprocal claims and liabilities. While risk sharing is useful from a microeco-
nomic perspective, the emerging financial networks are often inefficiently vulnerable
and enhance the risk of financial contagion.
(2) Strategic Complementarities: Banks’ decisions to expose themselves to certain risks
are influenced by the behavior of their peers. For example, banks have the incentive
to deliberately correlate their investments. As they consequently tend to fail jointly in
adverse states, bailout measures to prevent a systemic crisis become more likely. The
downside risk for banks is thus contained, however at the expense of systemic stability.
(3) Fire Sales: If a bank is forced to sell assets at short notice in a distressedmarket, this is
likely to happenwith a steep discount. Other bankswith similar positions consequently
suffer from an adverse valuation effect, which may trigger a vicious circle of falling
asset prices and the need for deleveraging. Ex ante, banks do not internalize their own
contribution to potential fire-sale dynamics. Hence, they take too much risk.
(4) Liquidity Externalities: While liquidity hoarding under adverse market conditions
makes sense from an individual perspective, it maymagnify the intensity of an ongoing
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crisis. Intermediaries have the incentive to hoard liquidity for both precautionary and
speculative reasons. Yet this very behavior aggravates systemic liquidity shortages.
(5) Adverse Selection: Asymmetric information can lead to the collapse of important
financial market segments. The interbank market for short-term liquidity can break
down in a crisis, if the solvency of participating banks is not publicly observable. Sim-
ilar phenomena may occur on secondary markets for complex assets since the value of
the latter is private information.
Thus, inherent and excessive fragility of financial markets can be explained with
orthodox methods and assumption sets. There is no need to recur to approaches fea-
turing limited rationality. Thinking about excessive systemic risk as an outcome of
systemic externalities facilitates an analytically precise view on the underlying market
failures. This allows to deduce theoretically well-founded assertions on appropriate
regulatory measures. I conclude that strict capital requirements are particularly well-
suited to contain systemic risk. They should be complemented with adequate liquidity
requirements. After that, I give a brief overview on the practical implementation of
macroprudential supervision and its potential instruments in the Euro Area. Moreover,
I discuss practical methods for measuring and forecasting systemic risk.
To complete the first part, I finish with an evaluation of the regulatory measures
which were adopted in response to the crisis. I argue that these measures are hardly
sufficient to contain systemic risk in the future. Especially capital requirements con-
tinue to be inadequately low. Hence, systemic risk ultimately becomes a concern for
monetary policy, as the central bank is the only remaining actor who is capable to sta-
bilize financial markets.
Part Two: Monetary Policy and Systemic Risk
The second part of my thesis analyzes the impact of monetary policy on the evolution
of systemic risk. As a start, I highlight why systemic risk should be a general concern
for monetary policy by illustrating how the recent financial crisis caused a massive
violation of traditional monetary policy objectives.
After that, I address the question how monetary policy influences the build-up of
systemic risk. To do so, I first sketch out the traditional understanding of monetary
policy transmission and show that it neglects the potential interplay between monetary
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policy and systemic risk. Consequently, I introduce the concept of the risk-taking chan-
nel. It argues that a tighter (looser) policy stance leads to less (more) risk-taking within
the financial sector. I explore the implications of the risk-taking channel within a simple
graphical exposition of the credit market.
In what follows, I distinguish between long-term and short-term effects of mone-
tary policy on systemic risk. I argue that both the objectives and the strategy of mon-
etary policy may have long-term effects on systemic risk. For that purpose, I recur on
the Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) as laid out in Cochrane (2001)
in conjunction with the New Keynesian Model (NKM) for monetary policy analysis
(Gertler et al., 1999; Gali, 2008). The CCAPM predicts that the pricing of risk in an
economy critically depends on macroeconomic volatility. In turn, the NKM highlights
that macroeconomic volatility is dependent on the relative importance of inflation and
output stabilization objectives and the general strategy of monetary policy. Thus, there
is a direct link between monetary policy and the pricing of risk. If monetary policy
manages to reduce macroeconomic volatility, the price of risk declines. In that respect,
some authors point out the possibility of a so-called paradox of credibility (Borio and
Lowe, 2002; Borio and White, 2004). The very success of monetary policy in contain-
ing macroeconomic volatility may induce financial market participants to take unsus-
tainable amounts of risk, such that systemic risk increases despite successful macro-
stabilization.
The short-term relationship between the actual stance of monetary policy and sys-
temic risk needs to be examined in a different way. In recent years, various models have
been developed that depict the impact of the policy rate on risk-taking within the bank-
ing sector. Ideally, it is possible to distinguish between three dimensions of bank risk-
taking. First, there is the riskiness of the asset portfolio. Second, banks decide upon the
stability of their refinancing structure. And third, banks choose their leverage, which is
the ratio of total assets to capital. I discuss several models, which consistently predict
that a looser policy stance leads banks (i) to engage in riskier assets, (ii) to operate with
higher leverage and (iii) to increase their reliance on potentially unstable funding.
Subsequently, I perform an empirical analysis which essentially confirms these the-
oretical results. I estimate a vector autoregression model for the US economy and find
that an unexpected decline in the policy rate decreases the sensitivity of banks towards
credit risk and increases their reliance on unstable funding. Thus, I find supportive ev-
idence for the risk-taking channel in the US and hence, more generally, for a link from
monetary policy to the evolution of systemic risk.
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After that, I investigate the implications of the risk-taking channel within a reduced-
formmacro model which is augmented by a stylized financial sector. The latter actively
adjusts its aggregate balance sheet to changes in market conditions, which gives rise to
a procyclical relationship between the policy stance, lending activity and risk premia.
In this sense, it serves as a simplified description of the risk-taking channel. Model
simulations reveal that the behavior of the financial sector amplifies macroeconomic
shocks and is a source of macroeconomic volatility in its own right. Tightening capital
constraints for the intermediation sector weakens the risk-taking channel within the
model and is generally beneficial. The analysis of optimal rule-based monetary policy
shows that the central bank should react systematically to balance sheet dynamics in
the financial sector. With respect to the coordination of monetary policy and capital
regulation, it is shown that a dominant role for monetary policy in financial market
stabilization delivers the best results.
The second part of the thesis is completed by a discussion of the question howmon-
etary policy needs to be adjusted in practice in the light of the previous findings. Tak-
ing for granted that the actual setup of financial regulation is not sufficient to contain
systemic risk at an acceptable level, monetary policy needs to include financial sta-
bility considerations in the decision-making process. However, this is not a desirable
outcome per se, it is rather a consequence of inadequate financial regulation: Mone-
tary policy may be burdened with an additional trade-off if macroeconomic conditions
and financial stability considerations deliver diverging recommendations for the policy
stance. I argue that such a trade-off may arise in the case of benign shocks to inflation
and if financial booms lead to asset price inflation whereas goods prices remain sta-
ble. After that, I sketch out the arguments made for and against active financial market
stabilization by the central bank during the 2000s ("leaning-versus-cleaning debate"). I
argue that the financial crisis has strengthened the case for monetary policy preemp-
tively counteracting build-ups of systemic risk and subsequently discuss the model of
Woodford (2012) which provides a formal treatment of monetary policy taking account
of systemic risk.
Afterwards, I try to explore how systemic risk considerations could be incorporated
in practical policy frameworks. As it is close to impossible to estimate macroeconomic
costs of a future financial crisis with sufficient precision, monetary policy should pur-
sue an intermediate-target approach, under which central banks react to the evolution
of financial market variables with predictive power for a future crisis. The collected ev-
idence in my thesis shows that these variables exist and that monetary policy is capable
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to influence them. As proposed by De Grauwe and Gros (2009) and Galí (2010), such an
approach could be implemented as a modification of the two-pillar framework of the
European Central Bank (henceforth ECB). The monetary pillar would serve the pur-
pose of systemic risk diagnosis, whereas the economic pillar would continue to cover
macroeconomic determinants of the policy stance. Moreover, I briefly discuss possi-
bilities to equip the central bank with a second policy instrument as well as to rely on
measures of economic activity which account for the stage of the financial cycle. In
a last step, I focus on potential coordination problems between monetary policy and
macroprudential regulation. Under some circumstances and in absence of coordina-
tion, both policies may work against each other which delivers suboptimal outcomes.
Hence, I conclude that macroprudential supervision authorities should be assigned to
the central bank to ensure a high degree of coordination.
Finally, I provide concluding remarks which summarize my results and give an
outlook for future avenues of research as well as for the development of practical poli-
cymaking.
Part I
Systemic Risk and Macroprudential
Regulation

Chapter 2
What is Systemic Risk?
Grasping the phenomenon of systemic risk in a comprehensive fashion is a difficult
task. This is mirrored in the vagueness of its common definitions. For example, in ECB
(2009) systemic risk is broadly defined as the risk "that financial instability becomes
so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where
economic growth and welfare suffer materially." The crisis-related G20-Report (2009)
defines systemic risk in a similar fashion as "a risk of disruption to financial services that
is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and has the potential
to have serious negative consequences for the real economy." And the Global Financial
Stability Report of the International Monetary Fund (henceforth IMF) acknowledges
that "[systemic risk] is a term that is widely used, but is difficult to define and quantify.
Indeed, it is often viewed as a phenomenon that is there "when we see it," reflecting
a sense of a broad-based breakdown in the functioning of the financial system, which
is normally realized, ex post, by a large number of failures of [financial institutions]."
(IMF, 2009)
At least, the aforementioned definitions share that systemic risk can be regarded as
the risk of experiencing a severe financial crisis. However, neither of these definitions
elaborates on the dimension, the nature and, most importantly, on the potential sources
of systemic risk. Hence, three important questions are left open. How and in which
dimension should we measure systemic risk? Is systemic risk an endogenous or an
exogenous phenomenon? And what are potential sources of systemic risk? In what
follows, I will try to contribute to the clarification of these questions.
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2.1 The Dimension of Systemic Risk
How should one measure systemic risk in an appropriate dimension? I propose to
define systemic risk as the expected costs of a financial crisis at a given point in time.
Thus, systemic risk can be divided into two components, namely crisis probability and
the costs which the crisis is likely to produce if it actually materializes. Thus, a crude
(and somewhat tautological) expression of systemic risk in a certain period t is
SRt = ptCt (2.1)
where SRt denotes the level of systemic risk, pt denotes the crisis probability and Ct
stands for the costs of the crisis. In this sense, systemic risk can be regarded as a stock.
Of course, systemic risk may evolve dynamically over time if the crisis probability or
crisis costs change. Potential mechanisms will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4. For example, financial intermediaries tend to take more risk during a boom
which leads to a gradual increase in pt.1 Moreover, increasing risk exposures are likely
to make a crisis particularly severe, thereby increasing Ct. Hence, the gradual build-
up of systemic risk tends to occur when economic and financial conditions appear to
be relatively benign. There are various possibilities to actually measure the expected
costs of a financial crisis. Most obviously, expected losses of the financial sector come to
mind, for instance expressed in percentage points of total financial assets. Alternatively,
it is conceivable to measure SRt in macroeconomic terms, for example by the crisis-
related decline in GDP per capita.
Systemic risk can be broken down further in two categories (Caruana, 2010; Galati
and Moessner, 2013). The cross-sectional dimension captures the distribution of risk in
the financial system at a given point of time. Put differently, this dimension covers the
individual contribution of single institutions to SRt. The time dimension captures the
dynamic evolution of SRt in aggregate.
However, the practical real-time quantification of both pt and Ct is intrinsically dif-
ficult. Given the enormous complexity of modern financial systems and their various
interlinkages with the real economy, it is unrealistic to expect that systemic risk can be
1 The terms "banks" and "financial intermediaries" will be used interchangeably throughout the re-
mainder, unless specified otherwise.
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adequately captured by one single indicator. Furthermore, each financial crisis is differ-
ent. Currency crises in emerging markets follow different patterns than a banking crisis
in advanced countries. Moreover, assessing the costs of a crisis requires the formulation
of a counterfactual. It is therefore necessary to not only forecast the path of the economy
in the crisis case, but also to forecast economic performance for the case in which the
crisis does not materialize. It is hard to imagine that such exercises could be carried out
with sufficient precision. Hence, the operationalization of the definition given above is
extremely challenging. Indeed, practical attempts at systemic risk measurement (to be
discussed at a later stage in Chapter 5) pursue a more humble approach and tend to
focus on detecting specific types of vulnerabilities within the financial sector instead of
trying to quantify crisis probabilities and crisis costs up to the last farthing.
Thus, my definition efforts should be regarded as a (trivial) conceptual exercise
rather than as valuable guidance for reality. Nevertheless, I believe that explicitly defin-
ing the dimension of systemic risk is important in order to coherently gather the phe-
nomenon of systemic risk from a theoretical perspective in the first place.
2.2 The Nature of Systemic Risk
Is a financial crisis a genuinely exogenous event or the natural and inevitable conse-
quence of an endogenous build-up of financial vulnerabilities? Put differently, is sys-
temic risk driven by market-immanent forces or by factors beyond the control of both
market participants and regulators?
The traditional way to approach systemic risk assumed that financial crises emerge
from exogenous shocks (de Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). While it was emphasized that
the propagation and the amplification of shocks within the system is ultimately an en-
dogenous process, the shock as the root cause was nevertheless treated as an event
mostly beyond the control of both market participants or regulators. According to this
traditional view, the crisis probability pt in Equation (2.1) would be treated as exogenous
from the perspective of market participants and regulators, whereas the costs of a crisis
Ct are endogenously determined by the capability of the financial system to withstand
adverse shocks.
The potential costs of a crisis are inter alia determined by the system’s vulnerabil-
ity to contagion. Hellwig (2014) distinguishes between three forms of contagion. First,
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contagion can occur due to physical exposures, i.e., if banks are interconnected via re-
ciprocal claims and liabilities. The bankruptcy of one institution affects all institutions
holding claims on the defaulting entity. At worst, a cascade of domino-like defaults
may arise. Second, contagion can also be information-based: If imperfectly informed
creditors infer from the default of one institution that other (similar) institutions are
likewise prone to failure, this could give rise to a systemic run. And third, contagion
can occur via markets and prices. If a distressed bank is fire-selling assets, the asso-
ciated downward pressure on market prices may trigger the need for write-downs at
institutions with similar exposures. Then, these institutions may face the need to sell
assets themselves, which gives rise to a vicious spiral.
Indeed, it is hard to deny that the stability of the financial system may be adversely
affected by events which are for the most part exogenous from the perspective of mar-
ket participants and regulators. According to de Bandt and Hartmann (2000, p. 11),
such exogenous shocks can be either idiosyncratic or systematic. On an idiosyncratic
level, the failure of an individual bank, for instance due to fraudulent practices or unau-
thorized speculation, may serve as an example. On the other hand, a recession emerg-
ing due to non-financial factors exemplifies a systematic shock.
However, allowing for exogenous shocks does not imply that financial crises can
not arise due to endogenous reasons. Put differently, it is unrealistic to treat the crisis
probability pt as a variable which is not influenced by the behavior of the financial sec-
tor. It is more reasonable to assume that exuberance during the boom - both increasing
the crisis probability and the potential for adverse contagion - inevitably sows the seeds
for the subsequent bust. Both the probability and the severity of a crisis are ultimately
an endogenous market outcome. This is the novel view on systemic risk.
According to this view, systemic risk is an entirely endogenous phenomenon. The
role of exogenous shocks is greatly de-emphasized. They are regarded as mere trig-
ger events, which eventually reveal the fragility that has built up in the system during
good times. However, they do not constitute the root cause of financial distress. Brun-
nermeier et al. (2009, p. 6) put it as follows:
"[F]inancial crises are predominantly caused by market dynamics, not
just by external shocks, though such shocks, e.g. the downturn in the US
housing market in 2006, the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973/74, the Stock
Market collapse in 1929, may well have been the trigger."
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If systemic risk has built up gradually, its materialization is only a matter of time.
The actual trigger event is of minor relevance, as it is in fact interchangeable. Put differ-
ently, a rise in pt (most likely accompanied by an increase in Ct) decreases the resilience
of the financial system against exogenous shocks. However, the latter are inevitable by
nature and at some stage even small disturbances are sufficient to uncover the under-
lying fragility of the system. In that respect, Borio et al. (2014, p. 3) declare that
"[f]inancial crises are not like meteorite strikes from outer space. They
resemble volcanic eruptions or earthquakes: they reflect the sudden and
violent release of pressure that has built up gradually over time. The pres-
sure takes the form of protracted financial booms, which often straddle busi-
ness cycle fluctuations until they become unsustainable, thereby sowing the
seeds of their subsequent demise. The build-up of such financial imbalances
gives rise to endogenous boom-bust processes, or "financial cycles" [.]"
Table 2.1 tries to highlight the differences between the traditional and the novel ap-
proach towards systemic risk. Both views acknowledge the presence of endogenous
amplification via a variety of contagion channels. Yet the traditional approach stresses
the importance of exogenous shocks as the genuine source of a financial crisis whereas
the novel approach recognizes that both the build-up of financial vulnerabilities as well
as their realization are market outcomes, with inevitable shocks acting as mere triggers.
In comparison, I consider the novel approach towards systemic risk to be the more re-
Components of Systemic Risk Traditional View Novel View
Crisis Probability pt Exogenous Endogenous
Crisis Costs Ct Endogenous Endogenous
Role of Exogenous Shocks Genuine Source Interchangeable Trigger
Table 2.1: Systemic Risk: A Comparison of Different Views
alistic one. The example of the recent financial crisis illustrates the shortcomings of
the traditional approach. The latter would treat the initial turmoil on the market for
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the United States as an exogenous event, which
was endogenously amplified within the system and finally led to a catastrophic finan-
cial crisis.
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This is arguably a misleading perception. As emphasized by Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2012) and Justiniano et al. (2015) among others, financial intermediaries fueled the
boom-bust cycle on US housing markets through the erosion of lending standards and
the accumulation of large common exposures. Put differently, the expansion of credit
supply has to be regarded as one of the key drivers of the US housing boom. Thus, the
collapse of the MBS market has not been a "meteorite strike from outer space," it was
rather an unavoidable consequence of imprudent lending behavior, which gradually
increased both the probability and the costs of a crisis.
Furthermore, it is telling that apparently unspectacular rating downgrades of some
mortgage-backed securities acted as a trigger event, as highlighted by Brunnermeier
(2009) in a comprehensive account of the recent crisis. And even though losses on MBS
tranches were large in absolute terms, this market comprised a relatively small part of
the financial system (Hellwig, 2009). So it needs to be explained why the collapse of a
relatively small market subsequently developed into a full-blown financial crisis.
The reason is that the financial system has developed into a state of fragility during
the previous years, despite that (or probably precisely because) macroeconomic condi-
tions looked extraordinarily benign. Banks operated with little equity and large matu-
rity mismatches, relied to a great extent on unstable refinancing and extended high-risk
lending (Hellwig, 2009). The turmoil on US housing markets did nothing but to reveal
these vulnerabilities. A magnitude of losses which could have been easily absorbed
by a healthy system now brought the financial sector close to a catastrophic meltdown.
The novel approach of systemic risk seeks to describe the build-up of fragility before
the crisis as an endogenous process. In what follows, I will examine potential market-
immanent explanations for the endogenous build-up of systemic risk.2
2 To be sure, there is also a lively debate on whether secular trends may have contributed to the crisis.
Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010) argue that rising inequality and the associated weakening of aggregate
demand may have led monetary policy to pursue a policy stance with an expansive bias. Holmstrom
(2015) points out that strong global demand for (seemingly) safe assets - probably stemming from
countries like China with large wealth positions but relatively weakly developed financial markets
- may have contributed to the extraordinary and unsustainable growth of the MBS-issuing shadow
banking industry, and the financial sector in advanced economies in general. This complements the
famous savings-glut hypothesis by Bernanke (2005), who argued that various secular factors such
as demographic change increased the global supply of savings and hence demand for US assets.
However, the detailed examination of these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this work.
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2.3 Systemic Risk as a Policy Issue
Before turning to the potential sources of systemic risk, it is necessary to clarify why
(and if at all) systemic risk on financial markets does represent a policy issue. Put dif-
ferently, it is necessary to reflect on the optimal level of systemic risk. Optimal systemic
risk is certainly not zero, since exogenous drivers of systemic risk are neither control-
lable nor insurable.3 Furthermore, risk allocation and risk sharing are the key functions
of a modern financial system which should not be constrained without good reason.
Following Brunnermeier et al. (2009), I argue that three conditions have to hold in or-
der to render systemic risk a relevant policy issue.
Condition 1: The macroeconomic costs of financial crises are extraordinarily high.
It is straightforward to make the case for the first condition, both from a theoretical
and an empirical perspective. A healthy financial system is important to ensure the
provision of funding for investment in any sector of the real economy. Disruptions of
financial intermediation may therefore dramatically lower aggregate investment and
economic activity in general. By contrast, crises in other sectors are unlikely to create
such powerful and adverse spillovers to the entire economy. The special property of the
financial sector is the enormous degree of interconnectedness between market partici-
pants through reciprocal claims and liabilities, a feature which is arguably less present
in other sectors. Somewhat paradoxically, the failure of a financial institution tends to
weaken its competitors instead of strengthening them. Thus, a modern financial sys-
tem is not only of utmost importance for economic welfare but is also suffering from
particular vulnerability.
Empirical evidence confirms that themacroeconomic fallout which follows systemic
financial crises is especially painful. For instance, Jorda et al. (2013) study over 200
recessions in advanced countries between 1870 and 2008 and find that recessions which
were preceded by a financial crisis involve larger output losses than recessions during
which the financial system has been relatively stable. Similar results are delivered by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), who additionally emphasize that financial crises trigger
persistent increases in unemployment and government debt burdens.4
3 In that respect, risks stemming from natural disasters or geopolitical tensions come to mind.
4 See Claessens and Kose (2013) and the references therein for further empirical evidence on the
macroeconomic costs of financial crises.
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Condition 2: Traditional financial supervision with its aim to secure the individual sound-
ness of financial institutions is insufficient to contain systemic risk.
Traditional microprudential supervision seeks to prevent distress at individual in-
stitutions and pursues the ultimate objective to protect bank creditors (Borio, 2003).
However, the claim that securing individual soundness implies systemic stability suf-
fers from a fallacy of composition. Microprudential supervision may turn out as in-
sufficient (or even counterproductive) for delivering systemic stability since there are
plausible circumstances where individually prudent behavior of financial institutions
may exacerbate systemic risk.
For instance, diversification may weaken the resilience of the financial sector. This
might appear as a bold claim since diversification lies at the core of financial interme-
diation and is, in principle, a beneficial strategy enjoying regulatory support. On the
other hand, while diversification fosters risk sharing, it creates common exposures and
therefore the danger of contagion. For example, in the run-up to the sub-prime crisis,
European banks invested into US mortgage securities, not least to improve their ge-
ographical diversification. While individual institutions indeed managed to improve
diversification, the entire system became commonly exposed towards turmoil on the
US housing market (Wagner, 2010).
Another mechanism of overwhelming importance is the phenomenon of deleverag-
ing. Suppose that several banks within the system report substantial losses which eat
into their capital.5 Hence, they possibly violate the capital requirement imposed by the
microprudential supervisor. In order to fulfill capital requirements (and since raising
capital in a distressed environment is difficult) banks scale back their balance sheet by
selling assets, such that the ratio of capital to total assets recovers. However, this indi-
vidually prudent behavior may trigger an adverse feedback loop of falling asset prices,
further losses and the need to sell even more assets. Microprudential regulation with
its narrow focus on enforcing capital requirements does not account for the systemic
implications of deleveraging (Hanson et al., 2011). In that respect, Hellwig (2009, pp.
179-180) claims that "the currently existing regime of prudential regulation of banks
through capital adequacy requirements [...] is highly procyclical, allowing banks to ex-
pand in goods times and forcing them to contract in bad times. Such behavior of the
5 The terms "capital" and "equity" will be used interchangeably throughout the remainder, unless spec-
ified otherwise.
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bank reinforces fluctuations in the rest of the financial and economic system." Similar
concerns have been expressed by Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Repullo and Suarez
(2008), who argue that Basel II, the internationally applicable capital adequacy frame-
work, may exert substantial procyclical effects.
Moreover, physical contagion and deleveragingmay powerfully reinforce each other,
as highlighted in the simple example in Figure 2.1. Bank A is assumed to be exclusively
invested in Asset 1, while Bank B is exclusively exposed to Asset 2. Asset prices are fun-
damentally uncorrelated. Bank A and Bank B have accumulated reciprocal interbank
claims to achieve some degree of diversification. Now, if Asset 1 delivers low payoffs,
its price declines which puts pressure on the balance sheet of Bank A.
Figure 2.1: Risk Sharing, Deleveraging and Contagion
If Bank A subsequently defaults on its obligation to Bank B, distress is propagated
to the latter. So far, this process is the outcome of pure risk sharing. However, the
distress of Bank B induces contagious higher-order propagation effects. Facing losses
from its exposure to Bank A, Bank B may be forced to sell its holdings of Asset 2 or
will likewise default on its obligations. This behavior harms additional agents that are
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only indirectly exposed to Bank A and a systemic crisis may develop. Formally, risk
sharing implies a higher correlation of banks’ portfolio returns. If risk sharing induces
contagion, however, fundamentally unrelated asset prices become correlated and it is
the latter phenomenonwhich ultimately triggers a systemic crisis (Gallegati et al., 2008).
Note that microprudential supervision does little to contain these effects.
Another shortcoming of the microprudential view is the missing distinction be-
tween individual and aggregate maturity mismatches (Hellwig, 1995). While maturity
transformation of individual institutions may seem moderate, the degree of systemic
maturity transformation may be substantial which enhances the risk of sudden liquid-
ity shortages. This may especially occur in a regime with long intermediation chains
and pronounced interbank linkages. In Figure 2.2, it is supposed that some ultimate
saver places a deposit at the first bank of the chain. This bank (Bank 1) subsequently
uses the deposit for interbank lending with a maturity of one month. The borrowing
bank (Bank 2) in turn uses the deposit to finance interbank lending to a third bank with
a maturity of two months and so on. The case can be extended to N banks and the
last bank in the chain lends to some ultimate borrower for N months. The individual
maturity mismatch of each bank amounts to one month.
However, the systemic maturity mismatch amounts to N months and a deposit
withdrawal by the ultimate saver can trigger a disordered unwinding of the inherently
fragile structure of short-term claims and liabilities. Moreover, the system is heavily ex-
posed to interest rate risk, as rising rates may compress thin interbank intermediation
margins very quickly. Nevertheless, financial supervisors with a narrow view centered
on individual institutions may form the mistaken belief that risks from maturity trans-
formation are moderate.
Figure 2.2: Individual and Aggregate Maturity Mismatch
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The previous examples tried to clarify that focusing on the individual soundness of
financial institutions is not enough. In order to achieve systemic stability, traditional
supervision needs to be complemented with macroprudential regulation, which seeks to
limit the risk of systemic crisis episodes.6
Condition 3: The level of systemic risk is excessive under the absence of appropriate macro-
prudential measures.
The question whether the third condition is fulfilled is certainly the most interesting
one. It is not clear at first sight (at least from a theoretical perspective) whether the
prevalence of a certain level of systemic risk impairs aggregate welfare in the sense that
policy intervention may deliver a superior outcome. After all, it is equally conceivable
that the financial system endogenously trades off efficiency and stability and ends up
with a socially efficient level of systemic risk as an outcome of private optimization. In
order to analyze whether the prevailing level of systemic risk is indeed excessive, it is
necessary to highlight potential sources of systemic risk in greater detail. As briefly laid
out in my introductory remarks in Chapter 1, there are two paradigms which deliver a
potential explanation for excessive systemic risk.
On the one hand, there are various theories which attribute the existence of boom-
bust cycles on financial markets to limited rationality. These approaches have in common
that they explain boom-bust cycles with the formation of overoptimistic expectations
during the boom. These systematic expectation errors occur due to the presence of cog-
nitive limitations and expectation formation under bounded rationality. Overoptimism
leads financial institutions to take too much risk, and as soon as their expectations be-
come disappointed (which is inevitable given enough time), the painful correction of
financial imbalances is set in stage.
On the other hand, a relatively recent approach highlights the role of systemic exter-
nalities in the build-up and the materialization of systemic risk. An excessive level of
systemic risk emerges endogenously, as financial market participants do not internalize
the consequences of their actions with respect to the stability of the system.
6 See Borio (2003) for an extensive discussion of the differences between micro- and macroprudential
regulation approaches. Potential macroprudential instruments will be discussed in detail on a later
stage in Chapter 5.
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The next Chapters will be devoted to the extensive review of both the abovemen-
tioned concepts. I will argue that especially the concept of systemic externalities pro-
vides a convincing explanation of excessive systemic risk and the need for macropru-
dential regulation. In that sense, I consider each of the three previously mentioned
conditions as fulfilled. Systemic risk is an important issue which needs to be tackled
using appropriate macroprudential measures.
Chapter 3
Limited Rationality and Systemic
Risk
Limited rationality is a potential driver of excessive systemic risk. If agents form expec-
tations in a way which is inconsistent with economic fundamentals, financial boom-
bust cycles may be driven by waves of optimism and pessimism. Probably the most
famous account of the general possibility of such behavioral patterns is the notion of
"animal spirits," highlighted by John Maynard Keynes in his General Theory:
"[T]here is the instability due to the characteristic of human nature that
a large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous opti-
mism rather than mathematical expectations, whether moral or hedonistic
or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the
full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can
only be taken as the result of animal spirits - a spontaneous urge to action
rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quan-
titative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities." (Keynes, 1936, pp.
161-162)
The notion of waves of optimism and pessimism is also present in Irving Fisher’s
debt-deflation theory (Fisher, 1932, 1933). He stresses that the presence of new and
profitable investment opportunities generates overoptimistic expectations for the fu-
ture and gives rise to a self-reinforcing boom of debt-financed investment and specu-
lation, where the accumulation of eventually unsustainable debt burdens during the
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boom sows the seeds for a vicious circle of falling prices and rising real debt burdens
during the bust. The following quotations illustrate these points:
"No debt is so excessive as one based on mistaken hopes, but when dis-
illusionment comes, the adventure is denounced as a "bubble" that has been
pricked." (Fisher, 1932, p. 48)
"[O]ver-investment and over-speculation are often important; but they
would have far less serious results were they not conducted with borrowed
money. [...] The same is true as to over-confidence. I fancy that over-
confidence seldom does any great harm except when, as, and if, it beguiles
its victims into debt. [...]" (Fisher, 1933, p. 341)
The idea of favorable supply-side developments developing into unsustainable booms
driven by both overoptimism and unsustainable debt accumulation is also at the heart
of the "Financial Instability Hypothesis" developed by Minsky (1986, 1992), which will
be discussed in Section 3.3. It is also noteworthy that the famous historical analysis of
financial crises by Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) recurs to Minskyian ideas to a great
extent.
To sum up, the notion that exaggerated optimism may contribute to the build-up of
financial crises appears to be well-known in economic theory.1 Yet it remains unclear
how andwhy overoptimistic expectation patterns arise in the first place. Put differently,
the mechanism of expectation formation with its potential flaws deserves closer exami-
nation. In what follows, I will briefly discuss two approaches which offer explanations
for the cyclical interplay of optimism and pessimism and its potential contribution to
the build-up of excessive systemic risk. I will first elaborate on the Behavioral Finance
Approach in Section 3.1. After that, Section 3.2 will outline the merits of Agent-Based
Financial Market Models in this respect. Lastly, I will discuss Minsky’s Financial In-
stability Hypothesis and the question whether it implicitly incorporates motives which
are formalized within the former two approaches.
1 Clearly, my treatment of these venerable theories is superficial and intentionally stylized. For a much
more thorough discussion of the historical role of psychological factors in the theory of business
cycles in general, see Geiger (2016) and the references therein.
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3.1 The Behavioral Finance Approach
Behavioral Finance parts with the assumption of Rational Expectations, which is at the
heart of traditional finance models.2 The properties of Rational Expectations are neatly
described by Barberis and Thaler (2003, p. 1055), who write:
"[T]he Rational Expectations Equilibrium framework (REE) [...] assumes
not only individual rationality but also consistent beliefs [...]. Consistent be-
liefs means that agents’ beliefs are correct: the subjective distribution they
use to forecast future realizations of unknown variables is indeed the distri-
bution that those realizations are drawn from. This requires not only that
agents process new information correctly, but that they have enough infor-
mation about the structure of the economy to be able to figure out the correct
distribution for the variables of interest."
Obviously, the concept of Rational Expectations makes stark assumptions on the
ability of agents to collect and to process information. Thus, it is perhaps not com-
pletely surprising that work in the field of empirical finance has discovered several
asset pricing anomalies which are hard to explain in the context of traditional finance
models.3 Motivated by the empirical shortcomings of rational asset pricing models, Be-
havioral Finance approaches take issue with the notion of Rational Expectations in two
possible ways:
"Behavioral finance departs from REE by relaxing the assumption of in-
dividual rationality. An alternative departure is to retain individual ratio-
nality but to relax the consistent beliefs assumption: [...] [Agents] lack the
information required to know the actual distribution variables are drawn
from. This line of research is sometimes referred to as the literature on
bounded rationality[.]" (Barberis and Thaler, 2003, p. 1055)
2 As will become apparent from the references, my overview on Behavioral Finance heavily relies on
the insightful survey of Barberis and Thaler (2003). Nevertheless, the subsequent discussion is delib-
erately brief and inevitably incomplete.
3 With respect to the US stock market, Barberis and Thaler (2003) distinguish three empirical puzzles.
The Equity Premium Puzzle, detected by Mehra and Prescott (1985), shows that US stocks display
historical excess returns which are not explainable in a plausibly calibrated rational asset pricing
model. The Volatility Puzzle, first stressed by Shiller (1981), implies that stock prices are far more
volatile than predicted by rational asset pricing models. And finally, the Predictability Puzzle, as for
instance documented by Fama and French (1988), consists of the fact that stock prices can be (to some
extent) forecasted over the longer-term, which is at odds with the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
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However, it is not clear how agents departing from individual rationality and/or
with model-inconsistent beliefs should manage to survive. Agents with systematically
incorrectly expectations will inevitably lose their capital and finally vanish from the
market, as rational agents with "correct" expectations can exploit non-fundamental de-
velopments in asset prices by taking essentially riskless arbitrage positions.
Yet this argument overlooks that arbitrage in the real world is risky and compli-
cated by various frictions. This imposes limits to arbitrage. According to Barberis and
Thaler (2003, pp. 1058-1061), risks and frictions associated with arbitrage can be broken
down into four categories. First of all, arbitrageurs face fundamental risk which for in-
stance arises if the price of a presumably underpriced asset drops further in the wake of
bad news. Second, noise trader risk creates the danger that non-rational traders further
deepen the mispricing of an asset which may cause temporary but significant losses for
the arbitrageur. Third, arbitrage entails considerable implementation costs for example
through fees and commissions but also through the costs of learning about the mispric-
ing of a certain asset. Fourth, arbitrage may be limited by institutional constraints such
as a ban of short-selling.
In a well-known paper, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) formally show that noise trader
risk may lead to limited arbitrage and persistent deviations of asset prices from their
fundamental value. Rational investors who know the fundamental price of an asset
may refrain from betting against its mispricing if they fear that noise traders magnify
the mispricing in subsequent periods. The reason is that in this case, financiers would
possibly withdraw funds due to (temporarily) negative return performance such that
liquidation losses associated with withdrawals exceed the expected gains from arbi-
trage.
3.1.1 Cognitive Biases and Irrational Beliefs
If limited arbitrage indeed allows for the viability of non-rational behavior on financial
markets, the next step would be to try to classify potential types of irrational behav-
ior and the associated implications for expectation patterns.4 According to Avgouelas
4 A different approach is to question whether standard preferences in economic models featuring de-
cisions under risk, as first introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) in their expected-
utility framework, really reflect human behavior. In this respect, the prospect theory of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) is an important alternative. For instance, experimental evidence has shown that peo-
ple tend to form decisions under risk with a particular aversion towards losses and overly focus on
outcomes with small probabilities. See for instance Barberis et al. (2001) for an asset pricing model
based on preferences rooted in prospect theory.
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(2009), one important pillar of human decision making is the use of heuristics or rules
of thumb. Heuristics may be useful to cope with situations which are characterized
by informational complexity and uncertainty. However, heuristics may exhibit severe
cognitive biases giving rise to non-rational beliefs. Biases result from of the use of heuris-
tics if they come along with systematic estimation errors of known (statistical) quanti-
ties and systematic deviations of individual, intuitive judgments from the principles of
probability theory.
Extensive research in the field of cognitive psychology has shown that people in-
deed tend to use biased heuristics, which explains observed departures from rational
decision-making in both experimental and (to a lesser extent) empirical studies.5 Bar-
beris and Thaler (2003, pp. 1065-1069) provide an extensive list of cognitive biases. I
subsequently provide a selective list of them, dependent on their potential contribution
to excessive systemic risk.
(1) Overconfidence: People overstate the precision of their estimates of future outcomes
and potential forecast errors are greatly underestimated. Additionally, people tend to
believe that high-probability outcomes occur almost with certaintywhile low-probability
outcomes are neglected. Naturally, this comes along with an overly optimistic bias to-
wards favorable outcomes and a neglect of seldom but particularly detrimental out-
comes.
(2) Availability: The probability of outcomes is estimated with respect to their imagin-
ability. Rare and unprecedented events are consequently underestimated. In that sense,
the availability bias can be viewed as a complement to the overconfidence bias.
(3) Anchoring: Estimation processes usually require an initial value as a "starting point"
fromwhich agents depart by adjusting to newly available information. However, agents
rely too heavily on initial values and adjustments do not take place at all or occur in a
very sluggish fashion.
(4) Representativeness: Generally speaking, when people try to infer the probability that
an object A belongs to a class B, the probability is estimated according to whether A
reflects defining characteristics of B. While such a heuristic is useful, it may give rise to
two biases. The first one is base rate neglect, implying that agents put too much weight
on whether an object is representative of B, and too less weight on the unconditional
5 See Kahneman and Tversky (2000) for an overview.
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probability that an object belongs to class B in the first place.6 The second and closely
related bias is sample size neglect: People tend to prematurely infer general characteris-
tics from a sample after few observations.
3.1.2 Representativeness and Distorted Loan Pricing
Representativeness per se is a useful heuristic to assess the probability of an outcome
A given the observation of an Event B. Bayes’ law helps to calculate the respective
conditional probability as follows:
P(A|B) =
P(B|A)P(A)
P(B)
(3.1)
where P(A|B) denotes the conditional probability of an outcome A conditional on
the occurrence of outcome B, P(B|A) denotes the respective conditional probability vice
versa and P(A) and P(B) denote unconditional a priori probabilities of events A and B.
Applying Bayes’ law is particularly helpful if P(B|A) is easily observable while P(A|B)
is not.
Consider now a bank which can lend either to some safe borrower A or some risky
borrower B where the type of a borrower is private information and unknown to the
bank. The probability of repayment R from borrower A is given by P(R|A) = 1 and
the probability of repayment from borrower B is given by P(R|B) = 0.8, implying
that lending to A is essentially riskless and (ceteris paribus) more profitable. Assume
further that the pool of potential borrowers consists of A and B in equal number so that
P(A) = P(B) = 0.5. The ex ante repayment probability when lending to an unknown
borrower is then given by
P(R) = P(A)P(R|A) + P(B)P(R|B) = 0.5× 1+ 0.5× 0.8 = 0.9 (3.2)
6 Consider the following example. Suppose that an object A is described as follows: "A is a young
man struggling with self-doubts." People need to assess the probability that A belongs to the class B,
where B is defined as "PhD students close to finishing their thesis." Intuitively, people will consider
it very likely that A ∈ B, as the description of A is (unfortunately) representative of class B. Yet
this intuitive judgment overlooks the base rate, i.e. the general (and arguably rather low) probability
that the young man is a PhD student in the first place. Technically, this means that people tend to
disregard Bayes’ law (see Equation (3.1)). Not every young man struggling with self-doubts is a PhD
student close to finishing his thesis.
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Naturally, banks have a vital interest in revealing the type of a borrower as soon as
possible, especially when the question of renewing the credit contract arises. As laid
out in Sharpe (1990), the only possible way to obtain this information in such a stylized
setting is to gradually deduce it from the actual performance of the borrower with the
help of Bayes’ law. Hence, banks seek to estimate P(A|R), which is the probability that
a borrower is safe given a successful repayment. Applying Bayes’ law yields:
P(A|R) =
P(R|A)P(A)
P(R)
=
1× 0.5
0.9
≈ 0.55 (3.3)
Note that this is a perfectly rational learning strategy under limited information,
where banks do not know the true type. The bank updates the probability that its spe-
cific borrower is safe to 55%, conditional on the obtained information that repayment
actually occurred. Hence, the updated repayment probability P(R)∗ which is assigned
to this specific borrower is given by
P(R)∗ = P(A|R)P(R|A) + (1− P(A|R))P(R|B)
= 0.55× 1+ (1− 0.55)× 0.8 = 0.91.
(3.4)
However, banksmaymisapply Bayes’ law due to the representativeness bias. Banks
neglect the base rate P(A) and weigh P(R|A) overly prominent which would imply
P(A|R) = P(R|A) in the extreme. Successful repayment leads the bank to overestimate
the possibility that the borrower is of type A, just because successful repayment is rep-
resentative of a safe borrower. Referring to the example, the bank feels certain that the
borrower is safe (as P(R|A) = 1), thereby overlooking the fact that risky borrowers may
also succeed in repayment, albeit with a lower probability. Base rate neglect may con-
sequently lead to severe errors in calculating conditional repayment probabilities and
the associated required risk compensation. Specifically, the falsely assumed repayment
probability under extreme base rate neglect would amount to
P(R|A)2 + (1− P(R|A))P(R|B) = 1. (3.5)
Hence, banks cease to demand any default risk compensation. The representative-
ness bias makes them negligent towards credit risk. Favorable states where repayment
is successful lead to a relaxation of credit conditions. Yet if the borrower turns out to be
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of type B and will fail to repay, the bank is ill-prepared. After all, accumulated interest
rate revenues can be loosely regarded as a cushion against future defaults. If interest
rate charges haven been too low, this cushion might easily turn out to be insufficient.
Hence, biased heuristics are generally capable to provide a formalization of emerging
overoptimism and the associated increase of systemic risk during a boom.7 A formally
more rigorous treatment of the role of the representativeness bias for the emergence of
boom-bust cycles is given in Gennaioli et al. (2015). In their model, investors overreact
to a series of good news as they (incorrectly) perceive them to be representative of a
good state, which leads to excessive debt issuance and overoptimistic return expecta-
tions. Vice versa, bad news can induce pronounced pessimism which gives rise to a
crisis.
The other biases may play an equally important role in shaping boom-bust cycles.
For example, the overconfidence bias may lead to the underestimation of the probabil-
ity of rare but disastrous events, such as the joint repayment failure of a large amount
of USmortgage borrowers or the breakdown of important markets for short-term fund-
ing. Sample size neglect may give rise to extrapolative expectations, such that agents
expect asset prices to rise simply because they have increased in previous periods. In
this respect, Barberis (2013) argues that extrapolationmay have played a role in shaping
beliefs of steadily growing US house prices prior to the crisis.
3.2 Agent-Based Financial Market Models
To start with a semantic quibble, I consider the term "Agent-Based Financial Market
Models" to be a slightmisnomer. After all, themechanics of almost any economicmodel
are in some sense based on the decisionmaking of agents. However, while the majority
of models in both finance and macroeconomics assume a representative agent, Agent-
Based Financial Market Models are firmly based on the concept of heterogeneous agents.
Specifically, agents are often modeled to be different with respect to their expectation
7 It should be noted, however, that Bayesian Learning per se tends to be inherently procyclical. Even if
Bayes’ law is applied correctly, successful repayment triggers a relaxation of credit conditions (albeit
to a lesser extent). Indeed, a critical question in the learning literature is whether agents are able
to uncover objective probability distributions with the help of enough observations. Put differently,
the question is whether learning models converge to the Rational Expectations Equilibrium. See for
instance Adam andMarcet (2011) for an asset pricingmodel with Bayesian Updatingwhich is capable
of generating boom-bust cycles and Evans and Honkapohja (2009) for a survey on macroeconomic
learning models.
3.2. AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODELS 49
formation.8 For example, there may be diverging opinions towards future asset prices.
While some agents perceive that asset prices will equal some specific value ("funda-
mentalists"), others extrapolate past price developments into the future ("chartists").
Very importantly, the shares of agents pursuing certain beliefs can vary endoge-
nously over time (Brock and Hommes, 1997, 1998). In the absence of model-consistent
rational expectations, agents evaluate expectation formation mechanisms according to
their past forecast performance. If asset prices rise for several successive periods, the
forecast performance of an extrapolative expectation rule may turn out as superior.
Hence, agents who were sticking to the expectation of some constant asset price be-
come disappointed by its forecast performance. They will consequently switch to the
chartist expectation pattern. Since the expectation of continuous price increases fos-
ters asset demand, the expectation of rising asset prices becomes self-fulfilling. Hence,
Agent-Based Financial Market Models are capable to explain boom-bust cycles in asset
prices by endogenous expectation cycles. Put more simply, these models are able to
capture endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism and their asset-pricing impli-
cations (Hommes, 2006).
It is noteworthy that such patterns are not entirely irrational. Agents do not know
the true model, which of course can be justified with the cognitive inability of agents
to collect and process every relevant information for the Rational Expectation Equi-
librium.9 Yet they are individually rational in the sense that they compare available
expectation heuristics with respect to their past forecast performance. Hence, in line
with the categorization of Barberis and Thaler (2003), agents can be characterized as
acting under bounded rationality. They fail to generate model-consistent beliefs but are
nevertheless individually rational.
8 There is a rich literature analyzing the implications of heterogeneity with respect to characteristics
besides expectation formation. For example, Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) extend a New-Keynesian
model with an (endogenously arising) credit market. They do so by assuming that agents are het-
erogeneous in their time preference. Aiyagari (1994) emphasizes the importance of heterogeneity
if agents face idiosyncratic and non-insurable shocks. See also Krusell and Smith (2006) for a gen-
eral survey highlighting applications of heterogeneous agents in both a macroeconomic and an asset
pricing context.
9 Sims (2003, 2010) puts forward the alternative concept of rational inattention. While agents are ba-
sically capable of processing every relevant information, the cost of doing so is prohibitively high.
Hence, it is optimal to abstain from forming rational expectations.
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3.2.1 A Simple Example
In order to illustrate the mechanics of Agent-Based Financial Market Models, I review
the simple asset market model proposed by Westerhoff (2008). In the model, agents
have three alternative trading strategies. They can trade according to a fundamentalist
strategy F which assumes that the fundamental asset price is constant. Alternatively,
agents can follow a chartist trading strategy C, which extrapolates expected asset prices
from past price movements. Moreover, agents can stay out of the market and choose to
not trade at all (strategy 0). Hence, agents have three potential heuristics at hand. The
asset price evolves according to a price impact function given by
Pt+1 = Pt + a(W
C
t D
C
t +W
F
t D
F
t ) + αt (3.6)
where Pt denotes the log of the asset price in the respective period t, a is a positive
price adjustment coefficient, DCt andD
F
t reflect asset demand by chartist and fundamen-
talist traders, respectively, WCt and W
F
t denote the weights of agents pursuing these
trading rules and αt is a normally distributed stochastic disturbance with zero mean
and finite variance. Hence, the asset price (ceteris paribus) increases if DCt + D
F
t > 0,
which represents an excess demand constellation. If DCt + D
F
t < 0, the asset price de-
clines. The latter can be thought of as an excess supply constellation, where negative
values of DCt and/or D
F
t indicate the desire to sell the asset. Demand functions are
determined by trading rules. Demand by the chartist trader is given by
DCt = b(Pt − Pt−1) + βt (3.7)
where b > 0 denotes a reaction parameter and βt is another stochastic disturbance
term. The chartist increases (decreases) its asset demand if the asset price increased
(decreased) in the past as he implicitly assumes that prices will continue to rise (decline)
further. By contrast, fundamentalists follow a trading strategy of
DFt = c(Ft − Pt) + γt (3.8)
where Ft denotes the log of the perceived fundamental value of the asset. If Ft is
lower than (exceeds) Pt, the asset is considered as expensive (cheap) and fundamen-
talists adjust their demand accordingly. The fundamentalist trading rule is likewise
augmented with a stochastic disturbance term γt.
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Agents decide on which trading rule to follow by comparing their past attractive-
ness according to so-called fitness functions. The fitness function for the chartist trading
rule is given by
ACt = (exp[Pt]− exp[Pt−1])D
C
t−2 + dA
C
t−1 (3.9)
fromwhich it is apparent that the attractiveness of a certain trading rule is governed
by its past profits, depicted by past asset demand multiplied with past price changes.10
Moreover, evaluation is assumed to exhibit persistence, such that agents not only ac-
count for current but also for past profitability of the trading strategy. Hence, past
profits ACt−1 enter the fitness function and are weighed with some memory parame-
ter 0 ≤ d ≤ 1. The fitness function for the fundamentalist trading strategy is written
analogously as
AFt = (exp[Pt]− exp[Pt−1])D
F
t−2 + dA
F
t−1. (3.10)
The fitness function for the strategy to stay out of the market is normalized to zero,
i.e., A0t = 0. Agents permanently compare the relative attractiveness of each strategy.
As a result, the share of agents pursuing a certain strategy S ∈ {C, F, 0} is given by the
following function:
WSt =
exp{eASt }
exp{eACt }+ exp{eA
F
t }+ exp{eA
0
t }
(3.11)
where e is the so-called intensity-of-choice parameter. If e = 0, each strategy is
constantly pursued by a third of traders, regardless of differences in fitness function
values. If e → ∞, even small changes in relative attractiveness induce agents to switch
collectively to the best-performing strategy. Intermediate values of e ensure gradual
adjustment towards the best strategy over time. In any case, it holds that ∑WSt = 1.
In this setup, an endogenous asset-price boom can emerge as follows: If the asset
price increases due to some random disturbance, the fundamentalist strategy appears
10 The timing assumption of the model is as follows: Orders submitted in t− 2 are executed with a lag
of one period in t− 1. Thus, the ex-post profitability of a trade is determined by the price difference
between t and t− 1. The timing assumption is not innocuous. When simulating this very model as
preparatory work for a similar approach laid out in Scheffknecht and Geiger (2011), we found that
this timing assumption is critical to ensure dynamic stability. If orders are executed without a time
lag, asset prices frequently explode.
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to perform worse. By contrast, the chartist strategy appears profitable and agents will
gradually switch towards the latter. The corresponding increase in demand fuels the
asset price boom and the chartist strategy becomes self-validating. In the end, almost
every agent is a chartist and the asset price apparently increases without bounds. How-
ever, at some stage a negative disturbance will inevitably interrupt the boom. Agents
then recognize that the chartist strategy has become unprofitable. Hence, they switch
to the fundamentalist strategy and try to sell their asset holdings altogether such that
the asset price collapses.11
Figure 3.1: Price and Return Dynamics in an Agent-Based Financial Market Model
Figure 3.1 gives an impression of the model dynamics from a simulation over 5000
periods, where the log of the fundamental asset price was normalized to zero. The up-
per left panel depicts the evolution of the log asset price. The asset price displays strong
fluctuations and booms which are ended by sharp price collapses. The upper right
panel displays per-period returns, indicating that pronounced boom-bust episodes go
along with clustered return volatility. The bottom panel depicts the weights of agents
in each period, where the black area denotes chartists, the grey area denotes funda-
mentalists and the white area corresponds to the weight of agents following the no-
trade strategy. It is observable that in each boom episode the overwhelming majority
11 See also DeGrauwe (2010, 2011) for an application of a similar expectation switching mechanism to a
macroeconomic model. Similar to the model under consideration, it is found that small macro shocks
can trigger persistent business cycles driven by the endogenously emerging predominance of chartist
expectations.
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of agents follow the chartist strategy, in line with the verbal description given above.
Hence, this simple model is capable to generate boom-bust cycles on financial markets
out of the endogenous interaction between heterogeneous agents and their respective
trading rules.
3.2.2 Systemic Risk Applications
The previously described model example is without doubt highly stylized. It takes
a partial-market perspective and is silent on potential repercussions between finan-
cial markets and the real economy. Moreover, trading rules would certainly deserve
a somewhat more rigorous analytical foundation, especially with respect to potential
financing constraints traders might face. Nevertheless, it is remarkable how well such
a simple model can replicate some empirical regularities of asset prices such as clus-
tered return volatility and fat tails, whereas traditional asset pricing models continue
to struggle with this task.12
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, several authors developed agent-based mod-
els which try to highlight key channels of the endogenous build-up of systemic risk.
For instance, Geanakoplos et al. (2012) built an agent-based model of the US hous-
ing market, whose calibration is based on a rich set of micro-level data on housing
units in the Washington DC area, such as demographics, income, loan characteristics
and attributes of houses as such. Both house sellers and prospective house buyers are
modeled according to behavioral rules which for instance describe pricing decisions of
sellers and financing decision of buyers. Interestingly, even though the model is cal-
ibrated on data from only one specific state, it matches the behavior of the aggregate
US housing market from 1997-2009 remarkably well. Moreover, counterfactual analysis
suggests that a relaxation of lending standards has been the key driver for the boom in
US house prices.
Thurner et al. (2012) developed an agent-based model of leveraged asset purchases.
It includes four types of agents. First, there are noise traders with random demand be-
havior causing random fluctuations of the asset price. Second, there are funds which
12 In the jargon, fat tails mean that extreme asset returns occur more frequently than implied by a Gaus-
sian normal distribution. Mandelbrot (1963, 1967) is widely regarded to be the first author who con-
sistently highlighted this empirical regularity. A formal statistical model of clustered volatility has
first been provided by Engle (1982). Cont (2001) provides a more recent overview on stylized empir-
ical facts of asset price behavior, broadly confirming the existence of fat tails and volatility clusters.
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seek to exploit mispricings. Hence, their demand turns positive if the asset price is be-
low its perceived fundamental value. They obtain financing by investors, who allocate
their wealth to funds according to their past performance. Investors thus act under
bounded rationality and rely on extrapolative expectations. Moreover, funds can lever-
age their positions by obtaining loans from the banking sector. Loans have to be collat-
eralized with the respective assets and banks insist that fund leverage does not exceed
some maximum threshold. Put differently, funds are subject to a leverage constraint
which may become occasionally binding.
Funds differ with respect to their "aggressiveness." Aggressive funds are willing to
exploit asset mispricings to the maximally feasible extent. For that purpose, they in-
crease their position in the asset with the help of bank loans, thereby realizing a high
degree of leverage. On the other hand, there also somewhat more conservative funds,
which refrain from the aggressive use of leverage in a mispricing situation. The pres-
ence of leverage and collateralized loans introduces fragility. For example, consider a
highly indebted fund being close to the maximum leverage threshold. If the asset price
falls due to random noise trader actions, the fund realizes losses on its assets which eat
into its equity position. Its leverage consequently increases. If the maximum threshold
for leverage is hit, banks will demand a partial repayment of their loans (margin call).
In order to ensure repayment, the fund has to sell assets in a situation of falling prices,
which exacerbates the downturn.
The general model dynamics are as follows: Consider an initial mispricing situation.
Aggressive funds will accumulate a comparably large position in the asset financed by
deposits of investors and collateralized loans. The former can be regarded as equity
in that respect.13 If the mispricing is corrected, the associated price increase creates
large profits for aggressive funds, especially due to the heavy use of leverage. In gen-
eral, leverage amplifies profits in favorable states but also magnifies losses in adverse
situations. Investors with deposits at other, less aggressive funds consequently reallo-
cate their funds to the most aggressive funds, given their superior return performance.
Hence, leveraged funds gain in market share and start to dominate market dynamics.
Therefore, their investment strategy may become partly self-validating, because their
13 To avoid semantic confusion, it is important to recall that making deposits at a fund is fundamentally
different from making deposits at a bank. The value of the former fluctuate with the asset price,
whereas the latter are fixed in value. Technically speaking, deposits at a fund deliver state-contingent
payoffs while deposits at a bank deliver state-non-contingent payoffs. Hence, the payoff profile of
the former resembles the characteristics of equity whereas bank deposits are debt titles.
3.2. AGENT-BASED FINANCIAL MARKET MODELS 55
demand affects asset prices to a greater extent now. However, at some point, there will
be a random decrease in the asset price which makes the leverage constraint binding.
Funds consequently have to deleverage and the asset price collapses. Simulations show
that this behavior gives rise to clustered volatility and fat tails. Interestingly, individ-
ually prudent behavior by funds, such as adjusting maximally acceptable leverage in-
versely with observed asset-price volatility, makes the system as such more vulnerable,
since leverage constraints bind more frequently.
Figure 3.2: Wealth Dynamics of Funds with Heterogeneous Aggression Parameters
Figure 3.2 depicts simulation results for the evolution of equity/wealth Wh for ten
different funds h = 1, 2 . . . 10 which differ in their willingness to leverage asset po-
sitions, as indicated by the aggressiveness parameter βh. It is apparent that highly
leveraged funds with a comparably large βh gain in wealth during booms, partly at the
expense of conservative funds with a lower βh. Hence, market dynamics in the boom
become almost entirely driven by leveraged funds. However, at some stage, the asset
price randomly declines and these funds realize large leveraged losses. Their wealth
consequently collapses to zero. The red triangles located at the x-axis depict situations
where the leverage constraint becomes binding. These constellations are almost always
accompanied by sharp deleveraging and the erosion of wealth.
Figure 3.3 depicts the behavior of asset returns r conditional on the presence of a
mispricing signal m > 0 for two constellations. The left panel depicts returns if funds
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are not allowed to take additional leverage, i.e., the maximum ratio of total assets to
equity is constrained to λMAX = 1. The right panel plots returns if funds are allowed
to leverage their positions (λMAX = 10). Apparently, the presence of leverage makes
extreme return realizations more frequent. Moreover, they tend to coincide with con-
stellations where the leverage constraint becomes binding, as again indicated by the
red triangles.
Figure 3.3: Comparison of Return Behavior With and Without Leverage
Hence, the model highlights that the presence of leverage in conjunction with ex-
trapolative expectation patterns of fund investors creates powerful non-linearities and
endogenous crises. In its spirit, it is closely related to the limited-arbitrage model of
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Funds, which essentially pursue an arbitrage strategy by
investing in underpriced assets, always face noise trade risk, especially when leverage
is high. The latter is the inevitable outcome of evolutionary market dynamics, because
highly leveraged funds realize the largest returns when the asset price increases. Hence,
they gain in market share.
Aymanns and Farmer (2015) present a similar model emphasizing the important
role of leverage. Banks, who act as stock investors, manage risks using a Value-at-Risk
constraint.14 Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a measure of how much losses a portfolio maxi-
14 This is not an arbitrary assumption. Most banks tend to manage asset risk with Value-at-Risk models.
Their use enjoys particular regulatory support.
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mally produces with a pre-specified probability p. Hence, the 95%-VaR is the fore-
casted amount of losses the respective portfolio will not exceed with a probability of
95%. Conversely, this loss is exceeded with a probability of 5%. If the equity position of
a bank equals the 95%-VaR, its default probability - the probability of a large loss which
wipes out its entire equity cushion - is consequently 5%.
Technically, the VaR corresponds to the 1 − p quantile of the return distribution
multipliedwith the investment amount C. As inter alia shown in Franke andHax (2004,
pp. 601-602), the VaR under normally distributed returns with mean µ and standard
deviation σ is given by
VaRp = C(µ+ z(1− p)σ) (3.12)
where z(1− p) is the 1− p quantile of the standard normal distribution.15 Suppose
that a bank invests an amount C = 1000 in an asset portfolio with expected net return
µ = 0.05 and standard deviation σ = 0.05. Since z(1− 0.95) = −z(0.95) ≈ −1.64, the
95%-VaR is then given by
VaR95% = 1000× (0.05+ (−1.64× 0.05)) = −32 (3.13)
implying that a loss of −32 is not exceeded with a probability of 95%. Of course,
the portfolio VaR depends critically on return volatility. If the latter declines, the VaR
decreases as well. At a given equity endowment of E = 32, the bank is now capable to
acquire additional assets and to increase its leverage while maintaining some constant
default probability potentially required by its creditors. Put differently, the decrease in
σ facilitates an increase in C at a constant VaR level.
Aymanns and Farmer (2015) show that such risk management practices magnify
booms and busts and give rise to a leverage cycle. Banks operate under bounded ra-
tionality in two ways. First, they extrapolate expected stock returns from past returns.
Second, the VaR is calculated based on historical return volatilities from a short time
window. If stock prices increase randomly, banks will start to increase their demand
for stocks. This puts further upward pressure on stock prices. Importantly, continu-
ous price increases lead to a decline of measured return volatility and an increase in
15 The quantiles of the standard normal can be read off from readily available tables, such as inHamilton
(1994, pp. 751-752) or virtually any other econometrics textbook.
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measured returns so that the VaR declines. Banks can thus take more leverage and
buy additional assets, further fueling the boom. At some stage, a negative noise-trader
shock inevitably leads to a decline in asset prices. Banks face leveraged losses and a
tightening of the VaR constraint due to elevated return volatility as well as a decrease
in measured returns. This gives rise to a powerful spiral of falling asset prices, elevated
return volatility and systemic deleveraging. Exogenously imposed leverage limits or
countercyclical leverage restrictions (implying that permitted leverage declines in the
boom and is raised in the downturn) can dampen stock price fluctuations consider-
ably.16
As a conclusion, it can be conjectured that agent-based models are capable of mod-
eling the endogenous build-up of systemic risk quite satisfactory. Hence, they offer
a more formal approach to the notion of animal spirits and debt-driven booms. In
what follows, I review Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, highlighting that it
implicitly incorporates concepts from Behavioral Finance as well as the Agent-Based
approach.
3.3 The Financial Instability Hypothesis
The Financial Instability Hypothesis of Hyman P. Minsky has experienced a revival
in the wake of the current crisis.17 For instance, McCulley (2009) has coined the term
"Minsky Moment" referring to the beginning of the recent financial crisis in August
2007. Minsky was relentless in emphasizing that financial instability is an endoge-
nous phenomenon. He attributes boom-bust cycles of financial and economic variables,
most notably aggregate credit and investment, to an inherent indeterminacy of a mar-
ket economy which gives rise to self-fulfilling investment and credit booms. In my
view, Minsky’s work is similar in spirit to the approaches pursued in both the Behavo-
rial Finance and the Agent-Based literature, since expectation formation of firms and
bankers, albeit not modeled explicitly, is subject to limited rationality.
16 Importantly, managing risks with the Value-at-Risk approach is inherently procyclical even when
banks are fully rational and use model-consistent return and volatility measures. This is highlighted
in Adrian and Shin (2010b) as well as Zigrand et al. (2010). The former model will be discussed
extensively in Section 8.4.
17 See for example Kregel (2008) and Wray (2012) for examinations of the current crisis through the lens
of Minskyian ideas.
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3.3.1 The Taxonomy of Financing Regimes
As clarified in Minsky (1992), the Financial Instability Hypothesis rests on two theo-
rems. The first theorem states that the economy is characterized by different financing
regimes, which either act stabilizing or destabilizing. In this context, Minsky famously
defined three possible financial states of economic units. The term "economic unit"
should be understood globally as it includes firms, households, financial intermedi-
aries but also governments. In Minsky (1986, pp. 371-379), it is distinguished between
Hedge Units, Speculative Units and Ponzi Units. They differ in their ability to meet the
contractually fixed repayments implied by their liability structure. Hedge Units are able
to entirely meet their liabilities out of operating cash flows which is typically associ-
ated with a relatively low level of leverage. A Hedge Unit is thus characterized by the
following proposition
CC = τ(Q− λσ2Q) (3.14)
where CC stands for contractual cash liabilities, Q for expected cash flows and σ2Q
for their expected variance. The value of the parameter λ is chosen such as to assign a
sufficiently low probability to the event that Q falls short of CC, while τ < 1 measures
the so-called margin of safety, which has to be regarded as a cushion against erroneous
and overoptimistic expectations of cash flows and their variance, respectively. If τ in-
creases, the margin of safety becomes smaller and vice versa.
In contrast, Speculative Units are basically solvent entities which face a short-term
funding gap. Put differently, they operate with a liquidity mismatch. Banks are an
obvious example. The presence of short-term liquidity needs implies that such entities
are dependent on the willingness of creditors to provide revolving short-term loans. In
the short-term for some period i < t it holds that
CC > Q− λσ2Q (3.15)
implying that cash liabilities CC exceed cash flows Q, and the funding gap needs to
be covered by raising short-term external funds. Conversely, in the long-term for i ≥ t
it is still ensured that
CC ≤ Q− λσ2Q. (3.16)
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Alternatively, by using Equation (3.14) as a reference point, it can be stated that
speculative units realize τ > 1 for i < t and τ ≤ 1 otherwise. Hence, τ can be regarded
as a measure for the liquidity risk exposure of a Speculative Unit.
The cash flows of Ponzi Units are insufficient to cover their external liabilities, nei-
ther in the short-term nor in the long-term, implying that CC > Q and τ > 1 for any
period t. In order to guarantee repayments, Ponzi Units need to rely on additional bor-
rowing or available liquidity balances, which is only feasible under narrow conditions
such as moderate interest rates. Yet the long-term solvency of a Ponzi unit is highly
questionable and is only maintained if some favorable event in the future improves its
financial condition.18 Minsky (1986, p. 379) notes that
"[t]he viability of the [Ponzi] unit depends upon a big event occurring
[...]. Indeed, the emergence of a skeptical attitude toward the big event
materializing leads to funds not being available to keep the project afloat."
(Minsky, 1986, p. 379)
Minsky claims that the predominance of Hedge Units implies a stable financing
regime and fosters economic stability. If, however, the majority of economic units op-
erates under a speculative or even a Ponzi regime, the financing regime is unstable and
economic instability occurs. Specifically, he notes that
"[a]n increase in the ratio of Ponzi, [sic!] finance, so that it is no longer a
rare event, is an indicator that the fragility of the financial structure is in a
danger zone for a debt-deflation." (Minsky, 1986, p. 379)
It is also interesting that by using the term debt-deflation, he recurs to Fisher (1932,
1933). Minsky in fact embraces Fisher’s debt-deflation theory and regards is as an im-
portant cornerstone for the explanation of prolonged slumps.
18 As an example, one might think of the debt-financed exploration of an oil field with highly uncer-
tain output. Minsky (1986, p. 378) asserts that "Ponzi schemes are often, but not always, quests for
an El Dorado. Micawber’s belief that something will turn up might characterize a Ponzi-financing
promoter, who, in his own mind, is not committing a fraud."
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3.3.2 Endogenous Transition towards Financial Fragility
The second theorem of the Financial Instability Hypothesis states that the prolonged pres-
ence of benign macroeconomic conditions induces a transition from formerly stable to
unstable financing regimes, that is, an economy which was predominantly character-
ized by Hedge Units moves towards a higher share of Speculative and Ponzi Finance.
This may happen via a gradual erosion of the margin of safety τ but also through the
(erroneous) perception of a decreasing variance of expected cash flows.
The transition process is governed by an endogenously emerging investment boom
and is described extensively in Minsky (1986, ch. 8). In a Minskyian economy, fluctua-
tions in investment are regarded as the main driver of the business cycle. The amount
of investment, in turn, critically depends on financial conditions. In Minsky (1986, pp.
160-165), this point is introduced within a highly stylized example. Consider a simple
static economy with two sectors producing consumption and investment goods. Re-
garding only direct labor costs and assuming that workers spend their wages entirely
on consumption goods implies that revenues of the consumption sector equal the ag-
gregate wage bill, such that
PCQC = WCNC +WINI (3.17)
where PC denotes the price level of consumption goods, QC denotes their respective
amount, WC and WI denote wages in the consumption and the investment sector and
NC and NI denote the amount of hours worked in the respective sector. Profits in the
consumption sector are given by
πC = PCQC −WCNC = WINI . (3.18)
Aggregate investment equals revenues of the investment sector, which in turn equal
the sum of wage bill and profits. Hence, it holds that
I = PIQI = WINI + πI = πC + πI (3.19)
which establishes the result that aggregate profits equal aggregate investment. In
general, investment depends on the expectation of profits. Since aggregate profits and
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aggregate investment are inextricably linked, any investment level is feasible. Invest-
ment is self-validating in a sense that the investment process as such generates the
amount of profits which is necessary to make an investment worthwhile. In an in-
tertemporal setting, investment today depends on future expected profits and thus on
future investment. In that respect, (Minsky, 1986, p. 163) notes that:
"[i]nvestment and financing are undertaken only in the expectation that
profits over a run of future periods - years - will reach or exceed some level.
But profit equals investment. Thus, in a capitalist economy, investment
takes place now because it is expected that investment will take place in
the future."
To speak with technical terms, it seems that Minsky implicitly assumes that invest-
ment is characterized by indeterminacy. If investment today depends on expectations
on future investment, any arbitrary sequence of expectations can generate some corre-
sponding amount of current investment. The mere expectation of benign investment
conditions in the future increases investment today.19
If the desired amount of investment is dependent on arbitrary but self-fulfilling
profit expectations, the availability of external finance represents the ultimate constraint
which finally determines the actual amount of investment. However, Minsky assumes
that external finance constraints tend to vary procyclically, so that an investment boom
goes hand in hand with increasingly fragile financing schemes. The inevitable end of
the boom leads to a painful unwinding of financial imbalances and a depression of
aggregate investment and economic activity in general.
Consider again the simple economy from above. If investment increases, both the
wage bill WINI and profits πI of the investment sector will rise. Increasing wage bills
in the investment sector translate into higher profits for the consumption sector. The
latter can be seen by solving Equation (3.17) for PC, which yields
PC =
WCNC
QC
(
1+
WINI
WCNC
)
. (3.20)
19 Consider extrapolative expectations as the most simple case. If Et It+1 = Etπt+1 = It, it holds that
on expectation, any investment amount today is ex ante justified by the expectation of tomorrow’s
profits. It is also interesting to note that indeterminacy can arise even under rational expectations,
if the no-bubble condition is violated (Blanchard, 1979; McCallum, 1983). However, I believe that
Minsky’s ideas are more consistent with an expectation pattern showing limited rationality.
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The price level of consumption goods increases (ceteris paribus) as rising labor in-
come WINI in the investment sector boosts demand for consumption goods. This fi-
nally increases profits in the consumption sector as well.20 Upward revisions of profit
expectations may now trigger further increases in investment and give rise to a self-
reinforcing spiral. At one point in time, profit expectations will be disappointed as they
cannot be justified perpetually if fundamental drivers are lacking. This inevitable out-
come will reverse the spiral towards diminishing profit expectations and decreasing
investment.
The financial system fails to provide a binding budget constraint since bankers fol-
low the same expectation schemes as firms, which yields a gradual relaxation of lending
standards and an expansion of credit supply in the upswing. Put differently, banks are
willing to accept that borrowing firms increase their leverage and gradually become
Speculative or even Ponzi Units. The following quotation (emphasis added) illustrates
that Minsky traces the emergence of booms back to endogenous expectation cycles:
"In an economy in which the debt financing of positions in capital and
financial assets is possible, there is an irreducible speculative element, for
the extent of debt-financing of positions and the instruments used in such
financing reflect the willingness of businessmen and bankers to speculate on
future cash flows and financial market conditions. Whenever full employment
is achieved and sustained, businessmen and bankers, heartened by success, tend to
accept larger doses of debt-financing." (Minsky, 1986, pp. 198-199)
Moreover, as pointed out in Wray (2015), Minsky regarded the money supply as en-
dogenous andmoney creation as a process which is primarily conducted by commercial
banks. Hence, quantitative monetary constraints are absent. Procyclical risk tolerance
in the banking sector thus accommodates and amplifies self-feeding investment booms.
Minsky’s theory is a close cousin of behavioral-finance approaches insofar as profit
expectations of both borrowers and lenders show apparent signs of limited rationality.
It would be reasonable to suppose that firms and bankers form profit expectations ac-
cording to some Bayesian learning rule. While Bayesian updating is procyclical per se,
fluctuations may be further amplified by the previously highlighted cognitive biases
such as base rate neglect. Alternatively, it is conceivable to model profit expectations in
20 Incorporating the government sector and allowing for savings of workers and consumption of firm
owners leaves the qualitative results unchanged (Minsky, 1986, pp. 165-171).
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an extrapolative way, as it is popular in the agent-based literature. Hence, the financial
instability hypothesis can be regarded as a predecessor of these approaches, whereas
the latter seek to formalize the mechanisms which Minsky describes merely on a verbal
level.
A more detailed look on a Minskyian boom is possible when examining his graph-
ical exposition of the market for capital assets (Minsky, 1986, p. 210-218). He distin-
guishes between supply and demand prices of capital assets which form a "two-price
system." The demand price PK equals expected discounted profits of existing capital as-
sets. The supply price PI primarily reflects production costs of capital assets, i.e., their
replacement costs. If PK exceeds PI , investment conditions are favorable since replace-
ment costs are lower than the price of existing assets (and vice versa), which closely
resembles the q-theory of Tobin (1969).
Figure 3.4: Investment Determination without External Finance
The relative price PK/PI is the key determinant of investment conditions and thus
of business cycle dynamics. Figure 3.4 illustrates the determination of investment in a
world without external finance. Demand for capital assets is infinitely elastic and con-
stitutes a horizontal line at the level of the demand price PK. For low and intermediate
levels of investment, supply for capital assets is likewise infinitely elastic and horizon-
tal at the supply price PI . Since PK > PI and hence PK/PI > 1, investment conditions
are favorable. If the level of investment becomes sufficiently high, the slope of the sup-
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ply curve turns positive. From there on, PI increases in investment due to now binding
capacity constraints and hence higher production costs. Aggregate investment is finally
determined by the intersection of supply and demand prices, i.e., new investment takes
place as long as it holds that PK/PI ≥ 1.
The introduction of external finance now allows to illustrate Minsky’s second theo-
rem, the transition towards fragile financing regimes in periods of prolonged prosper-
ity. It is depicted in Figure 3.5 and will be explained extensively in the remainder.
Figure 3.5: The Transition of Financing Regimes
The (expected) availability of internal funds is depicted by the hyperbolic curve
QNQN . If internal funds QN are used for investment, it holds that QN = PIQI and a
hyberbolical curve emerges, displaying feasible combinations of PI and the amount of
investment QI for a given amount of internal cash flows QN . Its intersection with the
supply curve for capital assets determines the amount of investment that can be funded
internally.
Additional investment can only be conducted with the help of external finance. Ob-
taining external finance comes along with the borrower risk to default, i.e., the risk of
being unable to meet contractual repayments in bad states and to be forced to exit the
market so that future profits are lost. Facing this risk as soon as external finance comes
into play, investors are only willing to acquire capital assets at a lower demand price
and the demand curve of investment PK(QN) hence becomes downward-sloping with
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a further increase in investment, since the latter comes along with an increasing reliance
on external finance.
Moreover, granting external financing to investors also carries a lender risk of not
getting repaid. Lenders seek to get compensated through interest-rate payments which
increase in the share of external funding. Since increasing interest-rate payments are
costs associated with the acquisition of capital assets, they can be regarded as a fac-
tor which increases their supply price. Hence, the supply curve PI becomes positively
sloped, where the positive slope now reflects both cost pressure due to capacity con-
straints and financing costs increasing in the amount of external funding. As in the
case without financing considerations, the intersection of supply and demand deter-
mines aggregate investment I(QN), the price for capital assets and also the share of
external funding.
In the case of prolonged prosperity, (expected) cash flows will increase. This trig-
gers an upward shift of the demand curve to PK(Q′N), since increasing cash flows boost
the profitability of capital assets and hence their demand price. Simultaneously, the
curve depicting internal fund availability shifts to the right to Q′NQ
′
N (see the dashed
lines in Figure 3.5). In addition, the slopes of both supply and demand curve in the
external finance region become flatter, implying that the elasticity of supply and de-
mand prices with respect to additional exposures to lender and borrower risk declines.
Both borrowers and lenders become increasingly insensitive towards the risks of exter-
nal finance. Hindsight indicates that previous risk assessments have putatively been
overcautious, and both lenders as well as borrowers are willing to engage in financing
patterns with a lower margin of safety and higher debt-to-equity ratios.21
The dashed lines in Figure 3.5 now represent the new outcome. Aggregate invest-
ment has increased (to I(Q′N)), and so have the total level as well as the share of external
finance. Since investment is self-validating at least in the short-term, profits (and hence
PK), investment and the share of external finance will rise further. The financing regime
will thus become increasingly fragile with a higher portion of Speculative and Ponzi
finance. Banks nevertheless continue to provide financing since they are satisfied with
the past performance of their debtors.
While the ultimate disappointment of profits expectations appears to be the most
natural expectation for the end of the boom, Minsky rather stresses the importance of
21 Higher expected cash flows Q, a decrease in their perceived variance σ2Q and lowered margins of
safety τ may each contribute to a rise in outstanding liabilities CC. This can be easily seen when
going back to Equation (3.14).
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the endogenous adjustment of interest rates: The investment boom almost naturally
comes to a halt, as a continuously rising demand for external finance - potentially ac-
companied by stabilization attempts of the monetary authority - increases interest rates
over the entire maturity spectrum. This development decreases PK and increases PI
such that investment conditions and profits deteriorate. Deteriorating profits are then
no longer sufficient to serve existing debts, companies eventually default on their loans
and the economy gets stuck in a spiral of deleveraging, decreasing investment and de-
creasing profits.
It is quite obvious that Minsky’s analysis cannot be reconciled with the presence
of model-consistent rational expectations. After all, agents equipped with rational ex-
pectations would (on average) correctly forecast the interest rate increases that make
investment unprofitable later on. Moreover, the presumed prevalence of Ponzi Finance
is also at odds with rational expectations.22 Hence, the Minskyian cycle is in fact a cycle
of expectations, where exuberance in the boom is inevitably followed by sharp crises.
What has the Financial Instability Hypothesis got to offer with respect to the anal-
ysis of the sources of systemic risk? Just like virtually any other approach stressing
limited rationality, it traces boom-bust cycles back to overoptimism in conjunction with
excessive investment and unsustainable debt accumulation. Hence, Minsky provides
an explanation of the build-up of systemic risk in the time dimension during a period
of prolonged economic prosperity. Like Irving Fisher, Minsky emphasizes the critical
role of debt as the all-important amplifier of the cycle.
However, to my best knowledge, Minsky never formalized his thoughts in an an-
alytically rigorous way. His analysis, despite sporadically enriched with graphical ex-
positions and simple analytical examples, remains qualitative. In a recent attempt ex-
plicitly recurring to Minsky, Bhattacharya et al. (2011) provide a banking model which
depicts the transition of financing regimes during benign macroeconomic conditions.
Agents are modeled as Bayesian learners. Recent realizations of a good state yield a
more optimistic assessment of future economic conditions (and vice versa). Sequences
of good states induce banks to (i) increasingly engage in risky projects and (ii) to in-
crease borrowing and hence their leverage. If a sequence of good states is followed by
22 Indeed, rational expectation models typically rule out unsustainable debt accumulation by imposing
an appropriate no-Ponzi-condition, which states that discounted revenues cannot exceed discounted
expenditures. Put differently, the no-Ponzi condition ensures that budget constraints are binding for
the infinite time horizon such that net worth cannot become asymptotically negative. The no-Ponzi-
condition is important to guarantee a unique equilibrium (Acemoglu, 2008, ch. 8), which seems to be
implicitly ruled out in a Minskyian economy.
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a bad state, banks suffer from dramatic losses and default on a large part of their obli-
gations. Importantly, the possibility of such outcomes is not reflected in banks’ funding
costs ex ante, since depositors have an identical expectation pattern and hence share
the optimism of banks.
3.4 Shortcomings of the Limited Rationality Approach
It is very tempting to embrace the Limited Rationality Approach. Everyday life seems
to be filled with examples of humans making non-rational decisions. As generally
pointed out by Akerlof and Shiller (2009), limited rationality matters for economic out-
comes and should therefore be incorporated into economic models. Moreover, the pre-
sented approaches are very well capable of showing how systemic risk endogenously
emerges from behavior that is subject to limited rationality. Furthermore, it is obvious
that rational expectations presume an unrealistic amount of information processing ca-
pabilities.
However, there are various important objections which render the Limited Ratio-
nality Approach problematic for thinking about the appropriate regulation of a crisis-
prone financial system. First of all, limited rationality is not necessary to explain en-
dogenous systemic risk properly. It is equally possible to explain the vulnerability of
financial systems within a framework of optimizing, rational agents.23 The presence of
financial frictions, for example due to asymmetric information, may give rise to constel-
lations in which individually optimal behavior leads to an excessive level of systemic
risk.24 Put differently, excessive systemic risk can be explained by the presence of exter-
nalities, or more generally, by the presence of market failures. The potential advantages
of this approach are highlighted by De Nicoló et al. (2012, p. 7):
"[R]egulation needs to be justified by market failures. This approach
clarifies that macroprudential policies are justified by the need to correct
23 Furthermore, as highlighted by Sims (2003) and Levine (2009) among others, imperfect learning or,
more generally, the presence of a constraint on the information processing capability of agents, is
often equally able to explain phenomena which are superficially attributed to irrational behavior.
24 Scheinkman (2013) stresses that even the apparently irrational emergence of overoptimism can be
rationalized. In the model of Hong et al. (2008) for example, investors seek assistance from advisors
of unknown type who differ in their ability to understand new technologies. Advisors who are tech-
nology experts issue overoptimistic forecasts on technology assets to signal their competence, i.e.,
their ability to understand the potential of a new technology. If some investors do not account for the
incentive of competent advisors to issue forecasts with an upward bias, an asset price bubble may
emerge as a result.
3.4. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE LIMITED RATIONALITY APPROACH 69
market failures, and not simply because the financial system is "fragile." It
also provides a justification for specific forms of regulation, and a frame-
work to analyze the economics behind recent policy proposals."
Moreover, as shown previously, the literature on limited rationality offers plenty
of potential behavioral patterns. Observed behavior may be explained with a variety
of behavioral biases, which may all generate the same facts. In that respect, Driscoll
and Holden (2014) admit that behavioral economics suffers from the problem of "ob-
servational equivalence." Maybe even worse, results from behavioral economics are
sometimes contradicting each other. For example, as discussed in Section 3.1, prospect
theory suggests that humans overweigh small probabilities in their decisionmaking.
On the other hand, availability and overconfidence biases suggest systematic underes-
timation of small-probability events. Under these circumstances, the strategy to explain
economic phenomena with specific behavioral biases can be easily criticized for its de-
pendence on questionable assumptions. Moreover, as mentioned in Geanakoplos et al.
(2012), behavioral rules may need to be revised if circumstances are changing. The pres-
ence of a large number of different and sometimes contradictory forms of irrationality is
very likely to prevent the development of a persuasive andwidely accepted benchmark
model of an economic agent operating under limited rationality.
In contrast, the rationality approach is timeless and unique. While there are many
ways to model limited rationality, there is essentially only one way to model rational
agents, namely as agents maximizing a utility function representing axiomatic prefer-
ences subject to a set of constraints. This approach is nicely summarized in the Nobel
Lecture of Sargent (2012, p. 8):
"In economic theory, an agent is a constrained optimization problem. A
model consists of a collection of constrained optimization problems."
In my view, on of the key advantages of this approach is that it imposes discipline
by defining a reference paradigm. The quality of a model can be (more or less) objec-
tively judged by whether it complies with a common set of rationality assumptions and
whether it is able to explain real-world phenomena. If a model is rejected by the data,
its failure is attributed to omitted constraints and omitted frictions, but not to a funda-
mentally flawed representation of human behavior. Sims (2003, p. 666) notes that for
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economists, the "comparative advantage has been in using the optimization assump-
tion to sweep aside psychological detail in modeling behavior[.]" Generally speaking,
the rationality assumption acts as a convenient filter which allows to focus on the im-
plications of economic incentives instead of struggling with the peculiarities of human
behavior.
Moreover, Levine (2009) emphasizes that psychology and economics differ in their
objectives, which casts doubts on the strategy of incorporating findings out of psycho-
logical studies into economic models:
"The key difference between psychologists and economists is that psychol-
ogists are interested in individual behavior while economists are interested
in explaining the results of groups of people interacting. Psychologists also
are focused on human dysfunction - much of the goal of psychology [...] is
to help people become more functional. In fact, most people are quite func-
tional most of the time. Hence the focus of economists on people who are
‚rational‘." (Levine, 2009, pp. 14-15)
Furthermore, the use of behavioral economics for assessing whether the financial
system can and should be regulated in a potentially welfare-improving way is likely
to be limited due to a very simple argument: If agents are characterized by limited ra-
tionality, so are regulators. After all, it would be highly questionable to assume that
regulators have some superior cognitive abilities.25 Yet if regulators suffer from the
same limitations as market participants, it is very doubtful whether regulation is able
to do any good. Put differently, it is questionable whether a social planner subject to
limited rationality can act in a benevolent manner. An example is given in the model
of Bhattacharya et al. (2011), which was briefly discussed in Section 3.3. If the regula-
tor sets capital requirements according to perceived credit risk, he is prone to the same
overoptimism which is prevalent on the market. Besides, it is difficult to define a wel-
fare criterion as such.26 If agents act according to heterogeneous and distorted beliefs
it is unclear which belief should be chosen as the relevant benchmark, especially if the
25 Notwithstanding these objections, several models employing agents with limited rationality perform
welfare analysis as if the regulator knew objective probability distributions. See for instance Gen-
naioli et al. (2012).
26 Several authors have proposed welfare criteria for settings with heterogeneous and distorted beliefs.
See for example Brunnermeier et al. (2014) or Bernheim (2009). However, even if an adequate welfare
criteria can be defined, welfare analysis will be complicated to a great extent.
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correct belief is unknown. Besides this, the majority of behavioral finance approaches
focuses on the explanation of stock-market anomalies which are arguably not at the
core of systemic financial crises. Conversely, little attention is devoted to the mechanics
of credit creation within the intermediation sector.
To sum up, limited rationality approaches in their current form are principally able
to explain financial boom-bust cycles, but they nevertheless suffer from both a lack of
analytical rigor and theoretical consistency. In my opinion, it is therefore difficult to
deduce robust policy recommendations from these approaches. Hence, Limited Ratio-
nality Approaches should be regarded as a complement rather than as a centerpiece
for the analysis of systemic risk. In what follows, I will outline the concept of systemic
externalities as an alternative. It traces the emergence of excessive systemic risk back to
specificmarket failures, which allows tomake theoretically well-founded statements on
precisely targeted regulatory measures and their welfare implications. Thus, I consider
this concept to be superior, at least for the analysis of excessive systemic risk.

Chapter 4
Systemic Risk and Systemic
Externalities
Excessive systemic risk can be explained by the presence of externalities on financial
markets.1 If market participants do not account for the systemic implications of their
individual actions, the financial systemmay become inefficiently vulnerable as a result.
In what follows, I first specify the concept of systemic externalities on a general level.
Afterwards, I will elaborate on different forms of potentially relevant market failures.
Laffont (2008) generally defines an externality as follows:
"Externalities are indirect effects of consumption or production activity, that
is, effects on agents other than the originator of such activity which do not
work through the price system. In a private competitive economy, equilib-
ria will not be in general Pareto optimal since they will reflect only private
(direct) effects and not social (direct plus indirect) effects of economic activ-
ity."
A more formal definition of an externality is given by Brunnermeier and Oehmke
(2012). An externality occurs if the action ak of an agent k affects utility ui of an agent i
pursuing some action ai . Hence, the marginal externality ǫ can be expressed as
ǫ =
∂ui(a
i, ak)
∂ak
(4.1)
1 A preliminary and shortened version of the subsequent Chapter was published as a working paper
(Scheffknecht, 2013).
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where agent k imposes a negative (positive) externality on agent i if ǫ is negative
(positive). Importantly, agent k does not internalize the consequences of his actions on
the utility of agent i in his decision making process. Wagner (2010, p. 97) notes that
externalities in the context of systemic risk analysis can be defined as follows:
"An externality [...] is caused by a financial institution and either imposes
costs on other financial institutions or on agents outside the financial sys-
tem. A systemic externality is then an externality whose impact does not
only depend on the institution which poses it, but also crucially depends on
the state of the financial system at the time the externality is posed."
While these definitions serve as a useful starting point, it is necessary to highlight some
peculiarities of externalities within financial systems. The latter are often pecuniary, i.e.,
they operate through prices. At first sight, it is not clear why a price change induced
by actions of some market participant should affect welfare of others.2 Consider the ex-
ample of a distressed bank which is forced to fire-sell assets at short notice. If the bank
consequently sells for a price below the market value, it realizes losses whereas poten-
tial buyers benefit from acquiring these assets with a discount. So far, this amounts to a
mere redistribution of wealth, its net effect on aggregate welfare is zero. It may be even
efficient that the distressed bank incurs losses, given the fact that its business model
seems to be flawed.
However, the induced depression of the market price has higher-order effects. Specif-
ically, it causes the positions of other banks in this asset to decline in value as well.
In the worst case, they may be forced to likewise conduct disordered asset sales and
lose wealth. Thus, the original seller imposes a fire-sale externality on other institu-
tions. The strength of such amplification mechanisms is state-dependent. If banks have
strong balance sheets, they can easily absorb an adverse valuation effect. However,
if balance sheets are fragile, the aforementioned mechanism is likely to become very
powerful. As generally emphasized by Wagner (2010), the financial system is subject
to frictions which may turn a pecuniary externality into a real externality with sizable
welfare effects. In the example above, one could argue that assets have to be sold to
outsiders which are unable to extract their full value and rely on liquidation of the un-
derlying investment projects instead. As a result, the aggregate surplus in the economy
2 Indeed, pecuniary externalities were typically considered to be neutral in their implications for wel-
fare. This understanding can be traced back to Pigou (1920). See also Holcombe and Sobel (2001) for
a treatment relying on modern terminology.
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declines. Alternatively, banks could be subject to collateral constraints. If asset prices
decline due to the original fire sale, the collateral constraint of other banks starts to
bind. They consequently have to cut back lending, and aggregate investment declines.
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012, p. 31) assert that "pecuniary externalities have ef-
ficiency consequences and the competitive equilibrium generally does not lead to an
allocation that is constrained efficient." More generally, the fundamental inefficiency
theorem derived by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) shows that pecuniary externalites
produce non-negligible welfare effects in the presence of incomplete markets and/or
imperfect information. Market equilibria are constrained inefficient so there is scope
for welfare-improving government interventions.3
Private internalization is infeasible if banks are regarded as a continuumof atomistic
agents since they perceive their influence on market conditions to be negligibly small.
For instance, fire-sale prices are regarded as a given, even though they are in fact a
result of collective and non-coordinated actions. Another important example for failed
internalization is the network structure of interbank claims. Banks account for risks
from bilateral exposures, yet they fail to internalize their individual contribution to the
establishment of a fragile financial network. A social planner could hence improve
aggregate welfare. Put differently, financial stability is a public good whose private
provision would be inefficiently low.
Traditional banking supervision measures fail to mitigate systemic externalities as
these measures differ in scope: Microprudential regulation focuses on the soundness
of individual institutions and on the mitigation of intra-bank externalities between dif-
ferent stakeholders. Shareholders have an incentive to take excessive risks, since the
presence of limited liability allows them to boost their expected payoff at the expense
of creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John et al., 1991). In order to prevent risk shift-
ing at the expense of creditors, banks have to fulfill capital and liquidity requirements
which should be generally designed such as to optimally align incentives of sharehold-
ers and creditors.
However, systemic externalities are inter-bank externalities or externalities imposed
on agents outside the financial system. They tend to occur independently from intra-
3 In non-technical terms, market incompleteness is understood as a situation in which agents cannot
perfectly insure against every conceivable risk. Complete risk sharing is hence impossible. Con-
strained efficiency means that the market equilibrium is efficient, yet it is a second-best solution,
for instance due to the presence of a collateral constraint emerging from limited information. Con-
strained inefficiency implies that market equilibria under constraints are inefficient in the sense that
a social planner could improve on private outcomes.
76 CHAPTER 4. SYSTEMIC RISK AND SYSTEMIC EXTERNALITIES
bank mechanisms. Thus, adequate microprudential regulation may be a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for financial stability. Some inter-bank externalities remain
unaddressed. As I will argue later in Chapter 5, the mitigation of inter-bank externalites
should be regarded as the key objective of macroprudential regulation. Unfortunately,
confusion may arise from the fact that the regulation of both intra- and inter-bank ex-
ternalities typically relies on the very same instruments, i.e., capital and liquidity re-
quirements. In some cases, it is therefore difficult to attribute a specific requirement
to the mitigation of a certain externality. In practice, it is even conceivable that strict
microprudential regulation "accidentally" mitigates inter-bank externalities (and vice
versa).
In what follows, I discuss different forms of systemic externalities. There are various
insightful surveys on macroprudential regulation such as Hanson et al. (2011) or Galati
and Moessner (2013). While these elaborate on the general concept of macroprudential
regulation and its practical application, I will rather focus on the concept of systemic
externalities as a theoretical justification. Its importance for explaining systemic risk
has become widely acknowledged in recent years.4
4.1 Interconnectedness
A highly connected financial system has ambiguous welfare implications. On the one
hand, interconnections between financial institutions may enhance the efficiency of the
financial system as they foster the efficient distribution of liquidity within the system
and act as a device for sharing idiosyncratic risks. On the other hand, however, in-
terconnections are an important source of systemic externalities. For instance, Stiglitz
(2010a, p. 388) notes:
"[D]iversification and contagion are different sides of the same coin: greater
financial integration (especially if not done carefully) increases the risk of
adverse contagion in the event of a large negative shock. An analysis of fi-
nancial integration should weigh the costs with the benefits and begin by
asking if there are ways of designing the financial architecture that mini-
mize the downside risk while preserving as much of the upside potential as
possible."
4 See for instance Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012), De Nicoló et al. (2012) and Wagner (2010) for
earlier attempts to survey the literature.
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Interconnections may produce spillovers of financial distress. An example for direct
spillovers is the immediate propagation of losses from one institution to another via
the link of direct interbank claims. Note that direct spillovers do not constitute an
externality as such. However, direct spillovers trigger higher-order effects which may
impose externalities on institutions which are not directly engaged in interbank lending
to a distressed institution. Gallegati et al. (2008) refer to direct spillovers as the outcome
of risk sharing, while indirect spillovers are defined as contagion. In line with Hellwig
(2014), I distinguish between three potential channels for contagion:
(1) Higher-Order Propagation Effects: If creditors of a defaulting institution are forced
to default themselves, their borrowers have to bear losses even though they are not
directly exposed to the original source of distress.
(2) Informational Externalities: If incompletely informed investors infer from the default
of an individual bank that other banks are likewise prone to failure, they will withdraw
their funds. Financial distress may emerge as a self-fulfilling prophecy, even if banks
are fundamentally solvent.
(3) Fire Sales: If borrowers of a distressed institution are forced to fire-sell assets, the
associated decline in asset prices adversely affects other institutions holding similar
positions. Hence, contagion may also operate via prices.
Under risk sharing in a financial network, a shock hitting the network is distributed
among its members while the shock’s original quantity remains constant. By contrast,
contagion multiplies the original quantity of the shock.5 The question of whether risk
sharing yields contagion is a matter of both the size of the shock and of the network
structure of interbank claims. Generally, interbank exposures between two institutions
can impose adverse effects on other agents, which constitutes a systemic inter-bank
externality and may lead to socially inefficient vulnerability to contagious spillovers.
Banks do not internalize the individual contribution of their interconnections to the
fragility of the system. As a result, socially inefficient networks of interbank claims
may emerge. In what follows, I will focus on higher-order propagation effects and
informational externalities. Fire sales will be covered in a separate Section, as contagion
operating via prices is a phenomenon which tends to operate independently from the
actual structure of the financial network.
5 The distinction between risk sharing and contagion has already been depicted in Figure 2.1 in Section
2.3.
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4.1.1 Higher-Order Propagation Effects
Interbank lending acts as a market-immanent insurance device yet the emerging expo-
sures can increase systemic risk. The trade-off between generally beneficial risk sharing
and the risk of contagion is illustrated by Allen and Gale (2000).6 Their model relies on
the classical setup of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In the Diamond-Dybvig model, de-
positors face uncertain liquidity needs as they do not know ex ante inwhich period they
wish to consume. By pooling deposits and thereby achieving diversification, banks are
capable to provide socially valuable liquidity insurance to depositors.
Allen and Gale (2000) extend this setup by splitting the economy into four differ-
ent but same-sized regions. The model considers three periods t = 0, 1, 2. The ag-
gregate shares of late consumers and early consumers are known in the initial period
t=0.7 However, these shares differ between regions and their regional distribution is
not known ex ante. Banks in regions with many early consumers face large deposit
withdrawals in t=1, whereas banks in regions with many late consumers need to cover
large outflows in t=2. Hence, in contrast to the Diamond-Dybvig model, banks are
unable to fully resolve uncertainty with respect to the liquidity shock. They have to ac-
cumulate precautionary liquidity balances and aggregate investment in profitable yet
illiquid long-term projects declines.
Under such circumstances, interbank lending promises efficiency gains as banks
obtain reciprocal insurance against region-specific liquidity shocks. In t=1, banks facing
early withdrawals liquidate their deposits at banks whose depositors turned out to
be primarily late consumers, implying that the latter hold excess liquidity balances in
t=1. Conversely, in t=2, these banks liquidate their deposits at banks whose depositors
turned out to be primarily early consumers, since these banks hold excess liquidity
in t=2. Hence, the decentralized market equilibrium is characterized by efficient risk
sharing. Every bank is able to pay off its depositors in any state, and the need to hold
precautionary liquidity balances is reduced to a great extent.
However, risk sharing may turn out to be detrimental if the system is hit by an
unexpectedly large liquidity shock in t=1. Specifically, it is assumed that one bank
faces unexpected extra withdrawals in t=1. If the liquidity shortage is pronounced,
6 Other models analyzing the role of interbank markets are for instance Rochet and Tirole (1996),
Freixas et al. (2000) and Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007). They similarly acknowledge a trade-off
between ex-ante efficiency gains and an increasing ex-post likelihood of contagious bank failures.
7 Early consumers wish to consume in t=1, whereas late consumers wish to consume in t=2.
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Figure 4.1: Completely Connected Interbank Network
the bank cannot meet withdrawals in t=1 since liquidating the long-term asset entails
considerable costs and the bank is forced into bankruptcy. Hence, depositors (and thus
also other banks) will run. Given liquidation costs, they will realize losses. In that way,
losses spill over to other banks. They may consequently go bankrupt as well which
gives rise to further spillovers. In the end, the initial liquidity shock may trigger a
systemic meltdown.
The systemic implications of liquidity shocks depend on their size and especially
on the interbank market structure. A completely interconnected interbank market (de-
picted in Figure 4.1) is resilient against moderate shocks since liquidation costs are dis-
tributed among several institutions, such that each institution remains solvent. On the
other hand, a pronounced liquidity shock triggers a systemic meltdown as each insti-
tution is exposed to the initial shock. Conversely, a sparsely connected interbank net-
work (see Figure 4.2) is less resilient towards small shocks, as liquidation costs cannot
be properly distributed.8 However, if a large shock occurs, incomplete interlinkages
prevent systemic contagion. As a result, it is difficult to develop an absolute ranking of
network alternatives, since their relative performance is dependent on the nature of the
shock.
Acemoglu et al. (2013) provide amodel of interbankmarkets in which the formation
of the network is endogenized. They show that agents coordinate on socially inefficient
8 Network figures are adapted from Allen and Gale (2000), Allen et al. (2012) and Acemoglu et al.
(2013), respectively. Bi-directional arrows denote reciprocal interbank claims. A uni-directional arrow
from Bank A to Bank B denotes a unilateral claim from Bank A against Bank B.
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Figure 4.2: Disconnected Interbank Network
network structures. Their conclusions concerning the properties of different networks
mostly resemble the findings of Allen and Gale (2000). For small shocks, sparsely con-
nected networks are found to be more fragile than densely connected networks (and
vice versa). The risk of direct spillovers is internalized, as interbank interest rates are
set conditional on the counterparty risk exposure of the borrower out of his own in-
terbank lending activities. However, the risk of indirect higher-order spillovers is not
reflected in the interest rate.9 This constitutes a financial network externality which leads
to the emergence of socially inefficient network structures. Banks do not internalize
the costs of network fragility in the formation of bilateral connections, thereby neglect-
ing the individual contribution of their interbank lending and borrowing to systemic
fragility.
It is further shown that inefficiencies may arise under different setups. In a con-
stellation with fragmented interbank markets and limited lending opportunities for
each bank, interbank lending occurs even though hoarding cash would have been so-
cially preferable and an inefficiently fragile ring network emerges (Figure 4.3). In a ring
network, a shock hitting one institution is gradually transmitted to any other institu-
tion, akin to a domino effect. Hence, the ring network is extremely vulnerable even
in the wake of small shocks. For an integrated interbank market with full lending op-
portunities and a low probability of a large shock, the completely connected financial
network emerges despite being socially inefficient. Social inefficiency arises because
9 For example, if A lends to B, the interest rate will reflect the counterparty risk of B towards his
borrower C. Yet it will not reflect counterparty risk exposure of C against D and its potential feedback
to B.
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Figure 4.3: Ring Network
the expected costs of contagious defaults, which are seldom but especially detrimental
in a complete network, exceed the gains from perfectly diversified interbank lending.
However, agents do not completely account for the former. Hence, the system is char-
acterized by robustness against small and frequent shocks but also by an inefficient
degree of vulnerability against rare and detrimental shocks. It is thus excessively inter-
connected.
Other authors similarly reach the conclusion that the degree of diversification in
the financial system may become inefficiently high, albeit they usually do not model
the emerging network structure as an endogenous outcome. Stiglitz (2010b) provides a
highly stylized example of undesirable diversification. Suppose that in autarky, i.e., in
the absence of interbank linkages, bank profits ΠA are distributed as follows:
ΠA =

 α2 with probability 1− p−α1 with probability p (4.2)
It further holds that
(1− p)α2 = pα1 (4.3)
such that expected profits are normalized to zero. Moreover, it holds that α1 > α2
and hence p < 0.5, which implies that the bad state −α1 happens with a relatively low
probability but is particularly detrimental. It could be thought of as a rare disaster.
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Additionally, the model features bankruptcy. If Π < 0, losses are contained to C < α1
which captures limited liability. Hence, expected profits of the bank are given by
ΠA = (1− p)α2 − pC
= pα1 − pC = p(α1 − C)
(4.4)
Now suppose that two identical banks of this type engage in diversification. It
is assumed that both banks fail if at least one bank realizes the bad state −α1. The
probability that both banks jointly realize the good state α2 is given by (1− p)2. In any
other case, at least one bank fails. Hence, the probability of joint failure is 1− (1− p)2.
Expected bank profits under diversification ΠD are given by
ΠD = (1− p)2α2 − C(1− (1− p)2) (4.5)
which verifies that ΠA > ΠD. Expected profits decrease compared to autarky since
the probability of joint success is smaller. Moreover, diversification increases the prob-
ability of failure due to the spillover effect.10 Clearly, this example rests on restrictive
assumptions. For instance, there are no gains from risk sharing and the possibility of
imperfect diversification (and thus imperfectly correlated failures) is excluded. Stiglitz
(2010a) relaxes these assumptions and allows for gains from diversification and net-
works with more that two agents. Nevertheless, the underlying argument still holds.
Perfect diversification is socially undesirable as long as there is the possibility of seldom
but large adverse shocks which trigger systemic failure.11
Gai et al. (2011) simulate the propagation of liquidity shocks under various network
configurations. If some bank within the network is subject to a liquidity shock, it tries
to obtain liquidity by unwinding its interbank claims. Hence, direct counterparties may
likewise experience liquidity shortages and react by liquidating interbank claims them-
selves. This higher-order effect is referred to as funding contagion. In the worst case, it
can lead to a system-wide liquidation of interbank claims with banks not internalizing
the systemic implications of their individual behavior. The network of liquidity claims
can exhibit two configurations. In a Poisson Network, each bank shows a similar de-
gree of interconnectivity. In a Geometric Network, some banks are more interconnected
10 Formally, it has to hold that p < (1− (1− p)2) which is the case for p < 1.
11 Battiston et al. (2012) deliver a network simulation which equally shows that full diversification is
undesirable as contagion-related losses exceed gains from risk sharing.
4.1. INTERCONNECTEDNESS 83
than others. Particularly connected banks are systemically relevant and play a key role
in system-wide liquidity distribution. In the Poisson Network, forming interconnec-
tions is generally beneficial since it helps to absorb liquidity shocks mutually. In prin-
ciple, the same holds for the Geometric Network, yet it is slightly more vulnerable to
funding contagion. Moreover, the Geometric Network is extremely fragile if liquidity
shocks hit systemically relevant banks. Funding contagion becomes almost inevitable
in this case. Restrictive liquidity requirements, especially for systemically relevant in-
stitutions, considerably reduce the probability of funding contagion.
Caballero and Simsek (2013) emphasize that the individually rational behavior of in-
terconnected financial market participants may increase complexity of the market envi-
ronment, giving rise to a so-called complexity externality. Complexity means that banks
cannot monitor all conceivable higher-order propagation channels of financial distress.
During normal times, banks only care about the financial health of their direct counter-
parties in the financial network. Their financial state can be monitored relatively easy.
However, the financial system can be subject to an unexpectedly large liquidity shock,
where some banks are forced into fire-selling their assets. Nevertheless, they may go
bankrupt which spreads distress to their interbank counterparties. In a large-shock-
regime, a bank cannot rule out to take an indirect hit due to higher-order propagation
effects anymore (as in Acemoglu et al. (2013)). Since it is impossible to monitor all
higher-order interconnections, banks face fundamental uncertainty whether the shock
will eventually affect themselves or their direct counterparties. It is rational for banks
to switch into a so-called liquidity conservation mode in the wake of heightened com-
plexity. That is, banks try to sell assets to hoard liquidity balances as a precautionary
measure. However, this very behavior exacerbates complexity. Since additional asset
sales put further downward pressure on their prices, fire-sale discounts increase. The
increase in fire-sale discounts drives more banks into bankruptcy and increases the risk
of higher-order spillovers and thus complexity. Given the further increase in complex-
ity, hoarding is intensified and an inefficient equilibrium with a large number of costly
bankruptcies is established.
As a common feature, the presented models highlight that higher-order propaga-
tion is an important source of systemic risk. Banks tend to not internalize implications
of their behavior for network fragility, and networks may consequently become inef-
ficiently prone to contagion. The empirical assessment of higher-order propagation is
very difficult as bank failures are extremely rare events and comprehensive data on
84 CHAPTER 4. SYSTEMIC RISK AND SYSTEMIC EXTERNALITIES
interbank exposures is often unavailable. Hence, contagion risks are usually assessed
with the help of counterfactual simulations in which initial network structures are cal-
ibrated on the basis of available data. Furfine (2003) follows this approach for the US
interbank market and finds negligible contagion risks. Upper andWorms (2004) obtain
similar findings for the German interbank market. On the other hand, Iyer and Peydro
(2011) find substantial higher-order propagation when inspecting the actual failure of
an Indian bank along with detailed data on its interbank linkages.
The somewhat inconclusive evidence notwithstanding, it is a robust stylized fact
that interbank lending has gained in importance during recent decades and is typically
characterized by a Geometric Network (Gai et al., 2011). Even if contagious chains of
failure are seemingly rare in the real world, financial networks are nevertheless frag-
ile. Most reciprocal claims are on a short-term basis, implying that liquidity provision
can dry up very quickly in the wake of counterparty risk concerns. Indeed, interbank
markets collapsed several times during the recent crisis and left banks with massive
funding shortages which finally forced central banks to act as lenders of last resort.
4.1.2 Informational Externalities
Allen et al. (2012) stress the importance of informational contagion, which generally
occurs if imperfectly informed creditors infer from the default of one bank that other
banks may likewise be prone to failure.12 The subsequent withdrawal of funding may
trigger a systemic bank run and hence a crisis emerges as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The
model shows that financial networks differ with respect to their vulnerability against
informational contagion. Yet the ex ante network formation is subject to multiple equi-
libria, and banks may coordinate on forming a fragile network.
As in any other model, banks acquire reciprocal claims to achieve diversification.
However, diversification exhibits so-called due-diligence costs which arise because banks
have to acquire costly information about their counterparties. The presence of due-
diligence costs implies that full diversification is undesirable. In a setup with six banks,
it is shown that the optimal trade-off between diversification gains and due-diligence
costs implies that each bank should form two connections.13 This gives rise to two
12 See also Chen (1999) for a model in which informational contagion arises because some depositors
cannot observe the true performance of bank assets.
13 Importantly, claims do not represent debt contracts in this setting. Instead, banks hold direct state-
contingent claims on their respective project payoffs.
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Figure 4.4: Disconnected Sub-Networks
Figure 4.5: Full-Connection Network
possible constellations. First, banks can coordinate on two disconnected sub-networks
(Figure 4.4). Alternatively, banks can form a full-connection network as depicted in
Figure 4.5.
There is no a priori difference between both structures in terms of expected returns,
but they have different informational properties in the crisis case. Banks partly rely
on revolving short-term funding from outside investors. Short-term investors receive
either a good or a bad signal with respect to the solvency of the banking sector. The
bad signal is noisy in the sense that it indicates the insolvency of some bank, yet out-
side investors do not now which bank exactly. They only know whether banks have
coordinated in disconnected sub-networks or in a full-connection network. In the for-
mer case, banks in each sub-network hold perfectly identical portfolios and hence risk
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becomes highly concentrated. Bank portfolios are characterized by a higher degree of
asset commonality and defaults become more correlated. Thus, a default of one bank is
likely to lead to the collapse of its entire associated sub-network. Conversely, risk is
more dispersed in the full-connection network, where, for example, Bank A is not ex-
posed to Bank D. If Bank D defaults due to a failure of its project, losses are absorbed
by Banks C and E, while Bank A stays unaffected.14
This difference crucially matters for the decision of outside investors whether to roll
over short-term debt of the banking sector. The repayment probability of short-term
debt conditional on the bad signal is higher for the full-connection network. It may
hold that short-term funding is rolled over for the full-connection network, whereas
investors refuse to finance banks operating within disconnected networks. In the latter
case, banks are forced into premature and costly project liquidation. The default of a
single bank consequently imposes an informational externality on other banks, mean-
ing they do not receive short-term funding any more despite being principally solvent.
The key inefficiency arises in the ex-ante formation of the network. The full-connection
network is clearly preferable, but banks cannot coordinate on its formation. Building
sub-networks is equally consistent with the optimal number of interlinkages arising
from private optimization.
4.2 Strategic Complementarities
Strategic complementarity arises when an agent’s return for pursuing a certain strategy
increases in the number of agents following this strategy (De Nicoló et al., 2012). Brun-
nermeier and Oehmke (2012, p. 31) offer the following formal definition: An action ai
of an agent i is a strategic complement to the action ak of an agent k if utility ui of agent
i satisfies
∂2ui(a
i, ak)
∂ai∂ak
> 0 (4.6)
implying that pursuing ai conditional on agent k choosing ak raises individual util-
ity. The presence of strategic complementarities constitutes an incentive for coordinated
14 Note that things would turn out differently if interlinkages were formed using debt contracts. In that
case, losses at Bank Cwould trigger default on its liability to B, such that distress is finally propagated
to A. However, B has a direct claim on the project of C, whose performance is unaffected by the default
of D.
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behavior. In the analysis of systemic risk, strategic complementarities are relevant for
the analysis of collective moral hazard, the impact of bank competition on systemic risk
and the incentives which are implied by reputational concerns. Under some circum-
stances, banks may find it optimal to jointly embark on strategies even though they are
socially undesirable because they lead to the build-up of excessive systemic risk. In
that sense, strategic complementarities are important sources for systemic externalities,
which are typically imposed on agents outside the financial system.
4.2.1 Collective Moral Hazard
Situations of collective moral hazard arise if banks have the opportunity to coordinate
on strategies which maximize their individual profits at the expense of systemic sta-
bility. The costs of financial fragility are ultimately borne by taxpayers. Acharya and
Yorulmazer (2007) show that banks have the incentive to pursue identical investment
strategies. In their model, banks can perfectly correlate their investments such that
they either succeed or fail jointly. Joint failures force the regulator to bail out banks,
since liquidating the entire banking sector causes prohibitive costs. If regulators cannot
correct correlation structures in advance, ex-ante commitments towards a non-bailout
strategy suffer from the problem of time inconsistency. Herding is therefore individu-
ally optimal for every bank, since bailouts occur with certainty in the joint-failure state
which drastically contains downside risk for banks. Put differently, banks ensure that
they are too-correlated-to-fail. However, this strategy is socially inefficient as it raises the
probability of systemic crises.
Within a slightly modified setup, Acharya et al. (2010b) show how regulators can
internalize the problem of excessive correlation. The model has three dates t = 0, 1, 2
and is populated by two banks, an outside investor, a continuum of depositors and
a regulator. The regulator insures bank deposits and charges an insurance premium
which is assumed to be paid for by banks out of (past) retained earnings. Banks need
to raise one unit of deposits in each period to be able to invest in a risky project. The
portfolio payoff
∼
R is distributed as follows:
∼
R =

R w.p. α0 w.p. 1− α (4.7)
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Identical Project Different Project
Bank B succeeds Bank B fails Bank B succeeds Bank B fails
Bank A succeeds α 0 α2 α(1− α)
Bank A fails 0 1− α α(1− α) (1− α)2
Table 4.1: Joint Distribution of Payoff Probabilities
It holds that αR > 1 such that the project earns a positive expected return. If banks
decide to invest into identical projects, their returns become perfectly correlated. If
banks choose different projects, their returns are independent. If the project pays off R
in t = 1, the bank continues to operate, again raises deposits in t = 1 and invests into
the risky project once more. If the crisis state occurs, the bank cannot repay the deposits
raised in t = 0 and has to be liquidated. Its liquidation value crucially depends on the
state of the other bank. If the other bank has invested in an identical project, it realizes
zero payoffs as well. In that case, both banks have to be sold to outside investors. If the
project of the other bank succeeds, the latter is able to acquire the failed bank. This is
only possible if banks have invested in different projects.
Table 4.1 depicts the joint distribution of payoff probabilities for two banks A and B.
If banks invest in identical projects, they either succeed or fail jointly with probability α
and 1− α, respectively. If they invest in different projects with independent returns, it
may happen that one banks succeeds and one bank fails with probability α(1− α). The
joint-success probability is α2, and the probability of joint default (1− α)2.
If both banks fail jointly (state FF), they are seized by the regulator who tries to
sell them to outside investors. The outside investor is willing to acquire banks to gain
access to their opportunity to engage in risky projects. However, it is assumed that the
outside investor can only extract a payoff R − ∆ from the project in the good state.15
The outside investor likewise has to attract a unit amount of deposits which are due in
t = 2. Depositors require a zero return because they are fully insured. Hence, outside
investors earn R− ∆− 1 in the good state and zero otherwise. The price pFF an outside
investor is willing to pay for a distressed bank is then given by
pFF = α(R− ∆− 1). (4.8)
15 The underlying assumption is that the investment project is special, i.e., extracting full payoffs re-
quires specific skills regarding valuation, bargaining and monitoring which are primarily found at
banks.
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If banks invest in different industries, there are constellations in which one bank
fails and the other one is successful (states SF or FS). In that case, the surviving bank
acquires the failed bank. The surviving bank is able to extract the full value of the assets
which yields an expected net income and hence a maximum price of
pmaxSF = α(R− 1), (4.9)
which implies that pmaxSF > pFF. This gives rise to a bargaining problem between
the surviving bank and the regulator, as the latter can alternatively sell the bank to the
outside investor. It is assumed that bargaining power is split such that the price ac-
tually paid by the surviving bank (pSF) lies between pmaxSF and pFF, i.e., it holds that
pmaxSF > pSF > pFF. The regulator charges insurance premia from banks to cover
expected compensation payments to depositors ex ante. If banks invest in identical
projects, the actuarially fair insurance premium qs charged from each bank is given by
qs = (1− α)(1− pFF), (4.10)
since the regulator has to pay the difference between the liquidation value of the
bank and the total amount of deposits (which equals unity for each bank) with a prob-
ability of 1− α. If banks invest in different projects, the fair premium qd is given by
qd = α(1− α)(1− pSF) + (1− α)
2(1− pFF). (4.11)
As shown in Appendix A.1, Equation (4.11) can be rearranged to obtain
qd = qs − α(1− α)(pSF − pFF) (4.12)
and since pSF > pFF, it holds that qs > qd. If banks invest in identical projects, joint
failures become more likely. Hence, the regulator charges a higher deposit insurance
premium ex ante.16
As long as no or only one bank fails, there is no need for the regulator to intervene.
If both banks fail, however, the regulator faces a trade-off. He can either sell both banks
16 An additional variant is to assume that one bank is particularly large, such that the smaller bank finds
itself unable to acquire the bank in the default case. The large bank should then be charged with qs in
any case, since a sale to outside investors in the failure case is inevitable.
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to outside investors at their liquidation value or he can bail out banks by injecting ad-
ditional funds. It is assumed that bailouts impose a cost of c per injected unit of funds,
which implies that bailing out both banks produces costs of 2c. If both banks fail, the
regulator tries to maximize total expected output of the banking sector for t = 2 less
any bailout or liquidation costs. Expected output Πl in the liquidation case is given by
Πl = 2[α(R− ∆)− 1]. (4.13)
Expected output Πb in the bailout case is
Πb = 2[αR− 1]− 2c. (4.14)
The sell-off to outside investors is avoided at the expense of the bailout costs 2c.
The regulator has to weigh bailout costs against the lower project payoffs implied by
selling to outside investors. Merging Equations (4.13) and (4.14) yields the no-bailout
condition:
Πl ≥ Πb
2[α(R− ∆)− 1] ≥ 2[αR− 1]− 2c
−2α∆ ≥ −2c
α∆ ≤ c.
(4.15)
Hence, if bailout costs c exceed α∆, which is the expected reduction in project pay-
offs if operated by outside investors, no bailout will take place. Conversely, if α∆ > c,
the regulator will choose the bailout. In that case, an ex-ante commitment towards a
no-bailout strategy is not time consistent.
The derived insurance premia qs and qd serve as an example for microprudential
regulation. Charging banks with qs or qd is sufficient to protect depositors. However,
the costs of a systemic crisis, given either by liquidation or bailout costs, are not cov-
ered. Put differently, these premia do not account for the individual contribution of
each bank to systemic risk, which was defined as the expected cost of a crisis in Sec-
tion 2.1. In order to incorporate crisis costs, insurance premia would have to be set as
follows:
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q∗s = (1− α)
[
(1− pFF) +min{α∆, c}
]
(4.16)
q∗d = α(1− α)(1− pSF) + (1− α)
2
[
(1− pFF) +min{α∆, c}
]
. (4.17)
In the joint-failure case, the regulator chooses the cost-minimizing resolution pro-
cedure which is captured by min{α∆, c}. It continues to hold that q∗s > q
∗
d. However,
it is still not clear how to prevent banks from choosing correlated investment projects,
which is the fundamental inefficiency in the model. Expected aggregate project payoffs
net of crisis costs with identical projects are given by
Πs = 2(αR− (1− α)min{α∆, c}). (4.18)
With diverse projects, it holds that
Πd = 2(αR− (1− α)
2min{α∆, c}), (4.19)
implying that Πs < Πd. Hence, it is indeed desirable to implement an incentive
scheme which guarantees that banks invest in diverse projects. In t = 0, Banks choose
the profit-maximizing correlation ρ ∈ {0, 1}. While bank profits in t = 1 simply depend
on the performance of bank assets, expected second-period profits crucially depend on
the regulator’s decision. In the case of liquidation, bank profits collapse to zero. If
banks are bailed out, they make an expected profit of pmaxSF = α(R− 1). Hence, banks
seek to maximize
E(π1(ρ)) + E(π2(ρ)), (4.20)
where π1 denotes expected profits in t = 1 and π2 expected profits in t = 2, respec-
tively. Since π1 does not directly depend on the correlation structure, only the behavior
of π2(ρ) needs to be examined in detail. Investing in the same industry implies perfect
correlation (ρ = 1), and expected second-period profits are thus given by
E(π2(1)) = απSS2 + (1− α)π
FF
2 − qˆs, (4.21)
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where πSS2 = αR − 1 denotes second-period profits in the joint-success case, π
FF
2
denotes second-period profits in the joint-failure case and qˆs is the incentive-efficient
deposit insurance premium (to be derived yet) ensuring that banks choose ρ = 0. In
the case of different industries, expected second-period returns are
E(π2(0)) = α2πSS2 + α(1− α)π
SF
2 + (1− α)
2πFF2 − qˆd, (4.22)
where it holds that πSF2 = π
SS
2 + (p
max
SF − pSF), since the acquisition of the assets of
the failed bank happens at a discount pmaxSF − pSF, implying that assets can be purchased
for a price below their expected profit πSS2 = p
max
SF = αR− 1 which gives rise to excess
returns. Hence, E(π2(0)) can be rearranged to read
E(π2(0)) = απSS2 + α(1− α)(p
max
SF − pSF) + (1− α)
2πFF2 − qˆd (4.23)
Subtracting (4.23) from (4.21) yields
E(π2(1))− E(π2(0)) = α(1− α)[πFF2 − (p
max
SF − pSF)] + qˆd − qˆs. (4.24)
In order to implement the low-correlation regime, it needs to hold that E(π2(1)) ≤
E(π2(0)), implying that the right-hand side of (4.24) must not exceed zero. Setting
E(π2(1)) = E(π2(0)) and solving for qˆs yields the critical value for the incentive-
efficient insurance premium:
qˆs = α(1− α)[πFF2 − (p
max
SF − pSF)] + qˆd. (4.25)
The incentive-efficient insurance premium crucially depends on whether the no-
bailout-condition (4.15) is fulfilled. If the ex-ante announcement of a no-bailout pol-
icy is time consistent, charging banks with q∗s and q
∗
d implements the low-correlation
regime.17 If no bailout takes place, it holds that πFF2 = 0, which eliminates the incentive
to invest in identical projects given q∗s > q
∗
d . At the same time, q
∗
s and q
∗
d account for
liquidation costs emerging from selling banks to outsider investors. The social costs of
bank failures are fully internalized.
17 This can be verified by setting qˆd = q∗d in (4.25) to solve for qˆs. It turns out that qˆs = q
∗
s .
4.2. STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES 93
However, if the no-bailout condition is violated, banks expect to avoid liquidation
in the joint-failure state in t = 1, which implies that πFF2 = αR− 1 > 0. Charging q
∗
s
would be insufficient to dis-incentivize banks from correlating their projects. Equation
(4.25) shows that if πFF2 > 0, the incentive-efficient insurance premium has to increase
above q∗s . Specifically, it holds that
qˆs = q
∗
s + α(1− α)π
FF
2
= q∗s + α(1− α)(αR− 1)
(4.26)
Optimal regulation is summarized in Table 4.2. In the case of a strict and credible no-
bailout policy, charging q∗s and q
∗
d is sufficient to implement the low-correlation regime.
If bailouts take place, charging qˆs > q∗s and q
∗
d similarly prevents that banks correlate
their investments.
Identical Projects Diverse Projects
No-Bailout Policy (if α∆ ≤ c) q∗s q
∗
d
Bailout Policy (if α∆ > c) qˆs > q∗s q
∗
d
Table 4.2: Incentive-Efficient Insurance Premia
To sum up, the model illustrates several important points. First, strategic comple-
mentarity leads banks to correlate investments, which ultimately gives rise to excessive
systemic risk. Excessive systemic risk imposes an externality on society since aggregate
project payoffs become diminished or taxpayers have to carry bailout costs, respec-
tively. Second, traditional banking regulation is ill-suited to tackle this problem, as de-
positor protection does not imply that systemic risk is efficiently contained. Third, the
instrument of deposit insurance premia now entails both micro- and macroprudential
components, which highlights that bank supervisors can achieve different regulatory
objectives at once with the appropriate calibration of a single instrument.18
Banks deliberately becoming too-correlated-too-fail are also present in other mod-
els. In Farhi and Tirole (2012), banks likewise coordinate on operating with excessive
18 However, this result cannot be generalized. In fact, there may be situations in which micro- and
macroprudential objectives conflict. For example, during a recession, microprudential regulators
seek to increase capital requirements to account for the increasing risk of bank assets whereas macro-
prudential supervisors prefer a relaxation of capital requirements to avoid a further decline in lending
capacity.
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liquidity mismatches and correlated default risks. As in Acharya et al. (2010b), no-
bailout policy may be time-inconsistent and as a result, systemic risk is excessive. In
Cao (2010) as well as Cao and Illing (2011), commercial banks anticipate bailouts and
take excessive liquidity risks which forces the central bank into a "low-interest-trap."
Given prohibitive liquidation costs, the central bank is forced to cut interest rates in
the crisis case. The downside risk for commercial banks is thus effectively eliminated,
however, at the expense of depositors who realize lower interest-rate revenues.
4.2.2 Bank Competition
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) show how strategic interaction between competing
banks can accommodate credit booms and lead to an increase in systemic risk. Credit
markets are characterized by incomplete information since the quality of potential bor-
rowers is partly unknown. Assume a unit mass of known borrowers, whose individual
qualities are known only by some respective bank. Hence, in the presence of N banks,
each bank has full information about a subset of 1/N known borrowers. There is also
a mass λ of entirely unknown borrowers whose true quality is not known to any of
the competing banks. Nevertheless, lending to an entirely unknown borrower is, on
average, profitable. The magnitude of λ should be interpreted as the intensity of credit
demand, i.e., if λ is high, a large amount of unknown borrowers seeks funding.
Depending on λ, the credit market equilibrium can exhibit different characteristics.
For a low level of λ, a separating equilibrium emerges in which each bank only lends
to known borrowers with good quality. Extending credit to unknown borrowers is
deemed unprofitable, since most of the remaining potential borrowers are borrowers
known to other banks, which however were rejected due to their bad quality. The re-
maining pool of potential borrowers is thus affected by adverse selection. A rise in λ
induces a switch towards a pooling equilibrium where banks offer a generic loan con-
tract to every applicant without screening. The intuition is as follows: With an increase
in λ, the pool of loan applicants increasingly consists of entirely unknown borrowers.
This attenuates the adverse selection problem since the market is now to a lesser extent
populated by bad-quality borrowers who were already rejected by other banks. The
prospect of increasing market shares and additional profits leads banks to jointly em-
bark on a strategy of relaxed lending standards, so that unknown borrowers readily
obtain loans.
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While aggregate credit in the pooling equilibrium is considerably higher, bank prof-
its and the average quality of bank portfolios decreases. The latter effects increase fi-
nancial fragility in the case of adverse shocks. Importantly, the probability of a banking
crisis increases with λ. Put differently, a severe credit boom is likely to end in a severe
crisis. Nevertheless, the banking system endogenously switches to the financially more
fragile pooling equilibrium in the wake of rising credit demand, since extending credit
is the optimal strategic behavior under competition. Banks fail to recognize that their
behavior eventually impairs financial stability.
Gorton and He (2008) show that strategic interaction can trigger changes in lend-
ing standards even if exogenous triggers are absent. In their model, the credit market
is likewise characterized by the presence of incomplete information about borrower
quality and hence the problem of adverse selection. Banks can produce information
about loan applicants using a costly screening technology. Under limited competition,
banks coordinate on a collusive strategy of charging high interest rates from potential
borrowers while screening intensity is relatively low. However, this strategy provides
an incentive to deviate. A bank can increase screening intensity, which is assumed to
be unobservable for other banks. It can filter out relatively more borrowers with good
quality this way, which leaves other banks with an adversely selected pool of remain-
ing borrowers. Hence, the deviating bank increases the credit quality of its portfolio
at the expense of its competitors. Deviations become apparent as soon as differences
in the relative performances of banks’ loan portfolios become public information, for
instance through annual reports. Other banks then react by likewise increasing their
screening intensity such that they no longer attract bad quality borrowers from other
banks. Lending standards tighten in aggregate and credit availability decreases. Put
differently, the mere strategic interaction of competing banks can trigger a credit crunch
which is entirely unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals. The authors’ analysis of
the US credit-card market provides supportive evidence for this mechanism.
Ruckes (2004) similarly shows that it is optimal for banks to set lending standards
in a coordinated and procyclical fashion. Banks have to include the screening intensity
of competitors into their decision making in order to account for the so-called winner’s
curse effect. This effect arises if a bank attracts borrowers of unknown type which were
rejected by the other bank due to a bad screening result. The winner’s curse effect is es-
pecially prevalent if the competing bank has a high screening intensity, which enables
her to sort out creditworthy borrowers, thereby leaving the other bank with an ad-
versely selected portfolio of remaining potential borrowers as in Gorton and He (2008).
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The optimal response is to likewise increase screening intensity, which implies that
screening intensity and hence lending standards become positively correlated across
banks. Moreover, as in Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), lending standards decline
during booms, such that the quality of bank portfolios erodes under benign economic
conditions.
To sum up, the dynamics of competition on loan markets under incomplete infor-
mation may have undesirable consequences for systemic risk. Banks coordinate on
business strategies which undermine financial stability. Specifically, lending standards
of banks become highly correlated and procyclical, i.e., they tend to be relaxed during
booms.
4.2.3 Reputational Effects
Rajan (1994) shows that reputational concerns may betray banks into lending policies
which exhibit an expansionary bias and generate excessive systemic risk. The under-
lying crucial assumption is that banks care about their relative performance since the
latter affects reputation which in turn influences funding conditions.
The model setup is as follows: Banks make a single loan in some period t and the
state of the borrowing sector is revealed in the next period. Importantly, banks are het-
erogeneous regarding their ability to select creditworthy borrowers. In the good state,
borrowers of so-called "high-type-banks" repay with a probability of unity whereas the
borrowers of "low-type-banks" repay with some smaller probability. In the adverse
state, any borrower experiences repayment difficulties. Bank financiers can neither ob-
serve the ability of a certain bank nor the state of the borrowing sector, they can only
observe bank earnings.
Publishing lower earnings than the peer group impairs the reputation of a bank. Fi-
nanciers will infer that it generates lower earnings due to its inferior ability in borrower
selection rather than due to generally adverse conditions within the borrowing sector.
Banks thus face the incentive to hide losses from the market by prolonging credit re-
lations with non-performing borrowers, for instance by extending loan maturity. This
strategy - which is coined liberal credit policy - indeed hides losses in the short run but
yields higher losses in the longer term.
Reputational concerns produce a strategic complementarity with far-reaching im-
pact. If a bank believes that its peers will embark on a liberal credit policy, it likewise
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chooses to hide losses. By contrast, if it believes that its competitors pursue a tight credit
policy and recognize losses from non-performing loans, it pursues a tight credit policy
as well. The reason is that if every bank displays losses, the market infers that this is
due to adverse conditions of the borrowing sector and not due to different abilities in
borrower selection. Hence, the model can exhibit multiple equilibria. It is possible that
banks either coordinate on liberal or tight credit policy. However, the driving force is
not a careful assessment of borrower credit quality but rather reputational concerns. In
the case of liberal credit policies, inefficiency arises since bank managers embark on a
strategy which exacerbates losses in the longer-term and hence enhances systemic risk.
The equilibrium allocation depends on the probability π of the adverse state. If π is
low, banks find it optimal to pursue liberal credit policies as overall business conditions
are benign and displaying low earnings impairs reputation. For intermediate values of
π, both liberal and tight credit policies constitute an equilibrium. The selection of an
equilibrium takes places through persistence, i.e., if agents embarked on liberal credit
policies in the past period they will continue doing so. For high values of π, agents
coordinate on tight credit policies, since overall business conditions are gloomy and
low earnings can be reported without losing reputation.19
Rajan (1994) further demonstrates that the predictions of the model are mirrored
in the data. He shows that after a regional US bank located in a state experiencing a
beginning real-estate crisis was forced to extend loan-loss provisions, the bank’s peers
extended loan-loss provisions as well, even though they were not under similarly in-
tense regulatory scrutiny. The regulatory intervention can be interpreted as an exoge-
nous shock verifying that the borrowing sector has entered an adverse state. Hence,
other banks embarked on tight credit policies since recognizing losses was no longer
stigmatized.
4.3 Fire Sales
Fire sales represent a special form of contagion. If agents sell assets in distressed mar-
kets, this exerts an adverse effect on market prices. Any agent with an exposure to this
19 If π depends on the choice of credit policies, an endogenous credit cycle emerges. Suppose that π
increases with the number of banks pursuing liberal credit policies. Low values of π indicate liberal
credit policies and π consequently increases up to the threshold where banks switch to tight credit
policies. The cycle then reverts and π starts to decrease until banks switch back to liberal credit
policies.
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asset will consequently realize a decline in balance sheet valuations regardless of the
network structure of interbank claims and liabilities. Fire sales are contagion effects
operating via prices. Put differently, fire sales can induce systemic repercussions even
if the system is entirely disconnected in terms of direct exposures. Shleifer and Vishny
(2011, p. 30) offer a comprehensive definition:
"[A] fire sale is essentially a forced sale of an asset at a dislocated price.
The asset sale is forced in the sense that the seller cannot pay creditors with-
out selling assets. The price is dislocated because the highest potential bid-
ders are typically involved in a similar activity as the seller, and are there-
fore themselves indebted and cannot borrow more to buy the asset. Indeed,
rather than bidding for the asset, they might be selling similar assets them-
selves. Assets are then bought by nonspecialists who, knowing that they
have less expertise with the assets in question, are only willing to buy at
valuations that are much lower."
However, it is not self-evident why banks should choose to sell assets at dislocated
prices instead of raising new debt or issuing additional equity. According to Hanson
et al. (2011), corporate-finance theory offers two important arguments. One reason
may be that leveraged banks suffer form a debt overhang problem as laid out in Myers
(1977). Debt overhang makes it impossible to issue new debt claims, since potential in-
vestors anticipate that future returns will be mainly appropriated by existing creditors.
Hence, investors deny funding even if banks could undertake projects with a positive
net present value.20 As highlighted by Myers and Majluf (1984), the issuance of equity
is subject to a similar problem. Under asymmetric information, equity issuance is per-
ceived as a signal that the bank management considers the firm to be overvalued and
stock prices drop sharply. Declining stock prices harm existing shareholders and the
management hence refrains from equity issuance even if profitable projects could be
realized.
If obtaining external funding is indeed impossible or carries prohibitive costs, sell-
ing assets to meet (short-term) liabilities is the only remaining solution. However, if fi-
nancial conditions within the banking sector are positively correlated, banks are likely
20 In fact, it may be the fire-sale-related decline in asset prices which erodes net worth and creates the
debt overhang problem in the first place.
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to become finance-constrained simultaneously. Assets are consequently sold to out-
siders at a discount, which may give rise to a self-reinforcing spiral of fire sales and de-
clining asset prices. Outside investors may be unable to extract the maximum possible
payoff from complex assets which creates a further inefficiency besides the contagion
effect. The fire-sale discount may also be due to asymmetric information if outside in-
vestors are uncertain about the true asset value (which is not publicly observable). This
effect gains in importance if assets are complex and hard to value. Furthermore, gen-
uine investment projects of outside investors might be crowded out if the latter choose
to buy distressed banking assets instead. As a result, aggregate investment declines.
To sum up, fire sales can produce inefficiency via various channels. First, they can
generate price-driven contagion within the banking sector. Second, assets may finally
end up with outside investors who are unable to extract their maximum payoff. Third,
crowding out of outsider projects entails a negative aggregate investment externality.
4.3.1 Asset Specificity and Cash-In-The-Market-Pricing
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) provide an insightful framework for understanding fire sales
of leveraged entities. They start by developing a general theory of asset liquidity. One
of the main determinants of asset liquidity is redeployability, which is the possibility
to utilize an asset in alternative (and equally profitable) ways. If an asset can be used
for many different purposes, the set of potential buyers is likely to be large. Hence, it
can be sold with ease and its liquidity (or: its liquidation value) is high. If an asset can
be utilized for only one purpose, and especially if there is the need for specific skills to
extract its full value, its liquidity is likely to be low.21 In a nutshell, liquidity is inversely
related to asset specificity.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) continue by presenting a simple model of an industry
in which two leveraged firms operate specific assets. In an adverse state, both firms
may become finance-constrained simultaneously. Hence, assets have to be sold to non-
specialized outside investors with a low liquidation value. In general, the feasible debt
capacity is positively related to asset liquidity. This may give rise to multiple equilibria.
The mere expectation of benign liquidity conditions induces firms to take onmore debt.
21 For instance, commercial land is highly liquid, since it can be used in various ways by various busi-
nesses. Conversely, an airplane or a pharmaceutical patent is a rather illiquid asset. The scope for
alternative usage is limited and its best use requires specific skills.
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Since this debt is ultimately used to acquire assets, the expectation of ample liquidity
becomes self-fulfilling. However, the realization of an adverse state may then become
more painful as liquidity disappears and firms end up with a severe debt overhang as
well as a stock of illiquid assets. Fire sales at steep discounts are unavoidable then.
Even though this theory was originally applied to real assets, it can also be applied
to financial assets. The key criterion of asset liquidity in this case, however, is not alter-
native usage. After all, every financial asset has the key purpose to deliver cash flows.
Instead, necessary and specific skills to extract the full value of an asset become the cru-
cial factor. While standardized assets such as bank deposits or AAA-rated government
bonds are easy to manage, complex assets such as mortgage-backed securities require
specific skills in valuation as well as monitoring and are prone to adverse selection.
Since these specific skills are scarce, the set of potential buyers is limited and liquidity
and liquidation values of these assets will be low. Having to sell assets to outsiders who
cannot extract their full value therefore leads to inefficiency. The wedge between the
liquidation value and the value in best use can thus be regarded as a measure of asset
illiquidity.
Allen and Gale (1994) introduced a similar framework to understand the implica-
tions of fire sales for asset-price volatility, which they refer to as cash-in-the-market pric-
ing. Their model is populated by investors with uncertain liquidity needs. They differ
in their probability to experience liquidity shocks. Investor group A experiences liq-
uidity shocks more frequently than investor group B. Agents can invest in profitable
long-term assets and/or hold cash. Participating in asset markets entails some fixed
cost. If investors find themselves in need of liquidity, assets are sold at short notice.
The price impact of short-term asset sales crucially depends on whether other investors
in the market stand ready as potential buyers and whether they are sufficiently liquid.
If aggregate liquidity is sufficient, the equilibrium asset price equals the discounted
value of its future cash flows. In the case of a liquidity shortage, however, the asset
price also depends on available liquidity. The scarcer is liquidity, the lower the asset
price will be.
Two types of equilibria may emerge. In the full-participation equilibrium both A and
B enter the market. Investors facing liquidity shocks sell assets at short notice, but the
additional supply gets absorbed by other participants with negligible price impacts.
The full participation equilibrium is only feasible for low participation costs. For higher
participation costs, a limited-participation equilibrium sets in. Investor group A no longer
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participates in the asset market, only Type-B investors continue to participate.22 Since
the latter are less exposed to liquidity shocks and thus hold lower amounts of cash
reserves, aggregate liquidity is low. In this setup, short-term asset sales in the wake of
liquidity shocks have considerable price implications and cash-in-the-market pricing
occurs. Asset-price volatility becomes excessive and prices can deviate considerably
from their fundamental value.23
There is also a range of parameter values producing multiple equilibria. If investors
expect others to participate theywill likewise participate since they expect themarket to
be liquid under all circumstances and the full-participation equilibrium is established
in a self-fulfilling fashion. On the other hand, expectations of non-participation may
give rise to the limited-participation equilibrium. The former constellation tends to be
welfare-superior, which creates the scope for policy intervention so as to push agents
to coordinate on full participation.
4.3.2 The Fire-Sale Model of Stein (2012)
The previous Section tried to clarify that fire sales are inefficient because they foster
price-driven contagion and may lead to a transfer of assets to agents who are incapable
to extract their full value. The model of Stein (2012) shows that banks do not internal-
ize their contribution to adverse fire-sale dynamics. Hence, they decide for a socially
inefficient degree of maturity transformation. By relying on an excessive amount of
non-contingent short-term debt, banks are forced into selling assets in adverse states.
The emerging equilibrium is constrained inefficient and systemic risk, measured by ex-
pected losses in the fire-sale state, is unnecessarily high. A social planner can improve
outcomes as she recognizes that fire-sale discounts are endogenous and depend on the
ex-ante maturity mismatch.
22 Every investor trades off profits from investing in long-term assets against costs of market participa-
tion and the exposure to liquidity risk. The threshold where participation costs become prohibitively
high is lower for Type-A investors since they value trading of illiquid assets less (given their higher
exposure to liquidity shocks).
23 In Allen and Carletti (2008), it is shown that cash-in-the-market pricing and the associated decline in
balance-sheet valuations can trigger insolvencies, whereas accounting at historical costs ensures that
financial intermediaries survive and are able to meet their liabilities. Hellwig (2009) likewise argues
that marked-to-market accounting played in important role in the recent crisis. The general argument
is that accounting at historical costs effectively shuts down price-based contagion. On the other hand,
uncertainty about true asset values may become elevated, which may cause different problems such
as the collapse of short-term funding.
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4.3.2.1 Assumptions and General Setup
The model has three periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. It features households, banks and a regulator.
Households receive an initial endowment of goods in t = 0. Besides from consuming
immediately in t = 0, households can postpone consumption to t = 2 by investing in
either risk-free or risky assets. The risk-free asset should be regarded as money (or a
close substitute) and the risky asset is a long-term bond. By assumption, households
obtain additional, non-pecuniary benefits from holding money due to its no-risk prop-
erty. The utility function of the representative household takes the form of
U = C0 + βE(C2) + γM, (4.27)
where Ct denotes consumption in period t. Consumption in t = 2 is an expected
value as payoffs of the risky asset may vary. M is the amount of money in the household
portfolio and γ determines the marginal utility of holding money. The parameter β is
the discount factor applied to future consumption. These preferences immediately pin
down both the equilibrium interest rates on money and bonds, respectively. The gross
interest rate on risky assets paying off in t = 2 is given by
RB =
1
β
, (4.28)
as the preference structure implies that households are indifferent between consum-
ing β units of goods today and holding a risky claim on one consumption unit in t = 2.
The gross return on holding money is given by
RM =
1
β+ γ
(4.29)
since households are indifferent between consuming an amount β+ γ in t = 0 and
holding a riskless claim on one unit of consumption in t = 2, which delivers consump-
tion utility of β and utility from monetary services of γ. Thus it holds that RM < RB.24
Money offers a convenience yield as it is risk-free and allows to insure against con-
sumption volatility in t = 2.
24 This return spread is assumed to be fixed and independent of the relative quantities of money and
bonds. While this represents a substantial simplification, it leaves the qualitative results of the model
unchanged (Stein, 2012, p. 63).
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Investment is carried out by banks since they possess specific skills in operating
investment projects. Banks invest an amount I in risky projects delivering a state-
dependent payoff in t = 2. In the good state, which occurs with probability p, the
project payoff is given by some concave function f (I) > I. In the bad state, occurring
with probability 1− p, expected output diminishes to λI < I and is either given by
λI/q with probability q or zero with probability 1− q. The actual state is revealed in
the intermediate period t = 1 in which banks have the possibility to sell assets to out-
side investors. However, this is only possible with a fire-sale discount 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 (more
on this below), implying that selling a fraction ∆ of the original investment amount in
the bad state yields total proceeds of ∆kλI.
Banks entirely rely on external funding. They can issue long-term debt maturing
in t = 2, which is risky due to the positive probability of a zero project payoff. They
can also issue short-term debt maturing in t = 1 whose payoff is independent from the
actual state. Insofar, it is essentially risk-free and should be interpreted as an amount of
(private) money M delivering non-pecuniary benefits to its owners (see Equation 4.27).
Money is risk-free because banks can sell assets in the bad state such that depositors
get paid off in any case. Money is a senior claim whereas long-term bonds are a junior
claim.25
If a bank finances a share m of I by issuing short-term debt, the repayment obliga-
tion in t = 1 is mIRM = M. This repayment obligation has to be met in every state.
Selling assets yields ∆kλI and the case of ∆ = 1 implies selling the entire portfolio,
i.e., it denotes the maximal non-state-contingent repayment amount in t = 1. This pins
down the maximally feasible fraction of short-term funding mMAX since it has to hold
that
kλI = mMAX IRM ⇔ mMAX =
kλ
RM
. (4.30)
The maximally feasible share of short-term debt mMAX varies with the fire-sale dis-
count k, the expected payoff λ per unit of investment in the bad state and is inversely
related to the interest rate on money RM. If banks issued relatively more short-term
25 To obtain new funding in t = 1 is impossible due to a debt overhang problem. Newly issued claims
have to be subordinated to long-term debt, which implies that their value is clearly below the amount
which has to be refinanced in the bad state. Note also that selling assets in the good state is not nec-
essary. Since risk is removed in the good state, households are willing to postpone their withdrawals
until t = 2, as they do not wish to consume in t = 1 anyway.
104 CHAPTER 4. SYSTEMIC RISK AND SYSTEMIC EXTERNALITIES
debt, it would lose its no-risk property since selling assets would yield insufficient rev-
enues in the bad state.
In t = 1, banks can sell assets to patient outside investors (POIs). POIs are endowed
with resources of W which they can either use to buy distressed assets from banks
or to invest in "late-arriving" investment projects which yield a concave payoff g(W)
in t = 2. The amount of assets banks are obliged to sell in the bad state amounts
to M, since this is the amount which is required to pay off short-term depositors. If
POIs buy them, their investment in technology g decreases to W − M. No-arbitrage
considerations imply that investing in distressed bank assets needs to yield the same
return as late-arriving investment projects, which endogenously pins down the fire sale
discount to
1
k
= g′(W −M) (4.31)
since the marginal return of buying bank assets 1/k (their fair value in t = 1 is
λI and they trade at kλI) has to equal the marginal return of the alternative invest-
ment project. Importantly, the fire sale discount increases in M. The larger the amount
of assets being sold in t = 1, the less is invested in late-arriving investment projects.
However, the marginal return g′(W − M) increases in M due to the concavity of g,
which implies that buying distressed assets has to yield a higher return, which is in
turn achieved by a decline of k. The key assumption is that banks do not internalize
this mechanism and thus their own contribution to fire-sale dynamics in adverse states.
They regard k as an exogenous parameter. It is subsequently shown that this coordi-
nation failure produces a decentralized market equilibrium which is welfare-inferior
compared to the social planner solution. Banks excessively rely on short-term debt,
which gives rise to fire-sale dynamics and crowding-out of outsider projects in the bad
state.
4.3.2.2 Decentralized Market Equilibrium
Banks seek to maximize expected profits Π while facing the funding constraint m ≤
mMAX. The Lagrangian L B for this problem is given by
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L
B = [p f (I) + (1− p)λI − IRB]
+mI(RB − RM)
− (1− p)zmIRM − η(m−
kλ
RM
),
(4.32)
where the term in the first line denotes expected bank profits if financing were en-
tirely bond-based, the term in the second line captures additional profits driven by
reduced financing costs in the case of short-term funding and the terms in the third
line represent the fire sale-related losses in the bad state and finally the rearranged
constraint multiplied with its shadow price η.26 Banks thus need to trade off cheaper
funding costs and the possibility of fire sale losses in the bad state. Taking the first-order
condition (FOC) with respect to m yields
∂L B
∂m
= I[(RB − RM)− (1− p)zRM]− η != 0
⇔ I[(RB − RM)− (1− p)zRM] = η.
(4.33)
If η > 0, the short-term financing constraint is binding and the corner solution
m = mMAX is the optimum. If η = 0, the constraint is non-binding and banks opti-
mally choose some interior value m < mMAX. The value of the Lagrange multiplier
critically depends on the spread between RB and RM. The left-hand side of Equation
(4.33) increases in RB− RM, implying that a large spread causes banks to exhaust short-
term funding possibilities to the maximally feasible extent, which makes the constraint
binding and yields a positive shadow price η > 0. In contrast, in a low-spread regime
banks are satisfiedwith somemedium amount of short-term funding and the constraint
is hence non-binding. If short-term financing is relatively cheap, banks maximize its
amount within their funding mix at the expense of a potential aggravation of fire-sale
dynamics. The FOC with respect to I is given by
26 Fire-sale losses are in fact a wealth transfer from banks to patient investors. By defining z = 1−kk as
the net excess return for patient investors, they can be expressed as the transfer of this excess return
zmultiplied with the amount mIRM of sold assets.
106 CHAPTER 4. SYSTEMIC RISK AND SYSTEMIC EXTERNALITIES
∂L B
∂I
= p f ′(I) + (1− p)λ− RB +m(RB − RM) − (1− p)zmRM != 0
⇔ p f ′(I) + (1− p)λ− RB = −
(
m(RB − RM) − (1− p)zmRM
)
.
(4.34)
Substituting Equation (4.33) into (4.34) allows to simplify the FOC to
∂L B
∂I
= p f ′(I) + (1− p)λ− RB =
−ηm
I
. (4.35)
For η = 0 and m ≤ mMAX, the amount of I equals optimal investment if financing
were entirely based on bonds.27 For η > 0 and hence m = mMAX, it follows that
p f ′(I) + (1 − p)λ < RB which implies an increase in I and a consequent decline in
f ′(I). Thus, the privately optimal amount of investment in the presence of a high-
spread regime (if RB ≫ RM and thus η > 0 as well as m = mMAX), is higher than in
the low-spread regime. This is due to the fact that banks cannot increase their reliance
on short-term funding by simply rearranging their liability structure while keeping the
balance sheet size fixed. In that case, money would lose its no-risk property since the
constant amount of assets would be insufficient to guarantee complete repayment of
short-term depositors in the bad state. In order to back short-term debt with sufficient
collateral, I has to be expanded instead. Short-term debt M and investment I have to
increase jointly in order to satisfy the collateral constraint.
4.3.2.3 Social Planner Solution
In the next step, it is shown that the decentralized equilibrium features excessive re-
liance on short-term debt in the case of RB ≫ RM. For that purpose, the decentralized
equilibrium is compared to the optimization problem of a benevolent social planner.
The crucial difference is that the social planer recognizes the endogeneity of the fire-
sale discount k as well as the crowding-out of late-arriving investment projects in the
bad state, which implies a loss of potential output. The social planner seeks to maxi-
mize utility of the representative agent. In Appendix A.2 it is verified that social utility
can be expressed as:
27 If financing is entirely bond-based, it holds thatm = 0 and the FOC simplifies to ∂L
B
∂I = p f
′(I) + (1−
p)λ− RB
!
= 0, which states that the expected (marginal) return of investment has to equal (marginal)
funding costs RB.
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U = [p f (I) + (1− p)λI − IRB] + M
(RB − RM)
RM
pg(W) + (1− p)[g(W −M) + M]−WRB.
(4.36)
Importantly, the social planner does not account for fire-sale losses z since the wel-
fare implications of the associated wealth transfer net out in the aggregate. However,
the social planner accounts for crowding-out effects. If POIs acquire existing bank as-
sets instead of investing in their own project, aggregate output is diminished. This is the
key inefficiency the social planner seeks to address. The collateral constraint remains
the same and the Lagrangian L P for the problem becomes
L
P = [p f (I) + (1− p)λI − IRB] + M
(RB − RM)
RM
+ pg(W)
+ (1− p)[g(W −M) + M]−WRB − ηP(m−
kλ
RM
)
(4.37)
Appendix A.2 shows that the FOC with respect to m implies that
I{(RB − RM)− (1− p)zRM} = ηP(1−
g′′(·)
(g′(·))2
λI). (4.38)
Furthermore, the FOC with respect to I is given by
p f ′(I) + (1− p)λ− RB +m(RB − RM)− (1− p)zmRM = −ηP
g′′(·)
(g′(·))2
λm. (4.39)
Now private and social optimality conditions can be compared. In the low-spread
setting where m ≤ mMAX and hence η = ηP = 0, the private and the social optimum
coincide. This can be easily verified by the comparison of the respective FOCs. Com-
paring (4.33) and (4.38) shows that both FOCs are perfectly equivalent for η = ηP = 0.
The same holds when comparing (4.34) and (4.39). Hence, if the spread between RB
and RM is sufficiently small, banks choose the socially optimal amount of both M and
I.
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However, this result no longer holds in the high-spread case withm = mMAX. Equa-
tion (4.39) shows that with ηP > 0, the right-hand side of this Equation becomes posi-
tive since it holds that g′′(·) < 0 as g(·)was defined to be concave. Hence, the left-hand
side has to increase. This is only possible if I is reduced, since f ′(I) is decreasing in
I. The social planner thus chooses a lower amount of I and automatically also a lower
amount of M, since M = mMAXRM I. Put differently, the decentralized equilibrium is
characterized by a socially inefficient amount of investment I and short-term debt M.
Banks conduct too much investment and issue too much short-term debt. They do not
internalize that the fire-sale discount is endogenous and crowds out outsider invest-
ment as a higher-order effect.
Internalization can be achieved via a simple cap on short-term funding, whose so-
cially optimal amount can easily be deduced from Equations (4.38) and (4.39). The ob-
servation of banks’ investment opportunities f (I)might be impossible though. The de-
sired levels of I and M can nevertheless be implemented by a cap-and-trade approach,
akin to the issuance of tradable carbon emission certificates. The regulator grants per-
mits to banks which allow them to issue a certain amount of money. The market price P
of the permission to issue one unit of short-term debt corresponds to the shadow price
of the short-term funding constraint. Even without knowing the exact functional form
of f (I), the shadow price of short-term funding in the social optimum can be calcu-
lated (Stein, 2012, pp. 76-78). As a result, the regulator only has to gradually adjust
the quantity of permits upwards until the permit price P coincides with the socially
optimal shadow price of the collateral constraint.
Other authors have developed similar models where banks’ non-internalization of
the adverse effects of fire-sales lead to constrained inefficient equilibria. In Korinek
(2011), banks likewise rely excessively on debt, making fire sales in adverse states par-
ticularly devastating. He shows that taxing debt issuance can lead to successful inter-
nalization. Similarly, Lorenzoni (2008) shows that non-internalization of fire-sale risks
leads to ex-ante overinvestment and excessive borrowing. Giavazzi and Giovannini
(2010) relate the model of Stein (2012) to a discussion of monetary policy. They argue
that if social inefficiency arises only in regimes in which the spread between long-term
bond rates RB and short-term rates RM is large, the central bank should constantly
compress the term spread to ensure a low-spread regime.
Regarding empirical evidence, Ramcharan and Rajan (2014) document contagious
fire sales for US banks before and during the Great Depression. Cappiello and Supera
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(2014) simulate fire-sale scenarios for the Euro Area banking sector and find that they
would lead to a substantial decline in its aggregate equity position. Coval and Stafford
(2007) detect fire-sale discounts in US equity markets for cases in which mutual funds
are forced to liquidate positions due to large outflows of customer deposits. Campbell
et al. (2009) argue that the default of Lehman Brothers triggeredmassive fire sales of col-
lateral, especially inflation-protected treasuries. For the non-financial sector, Acharya
et al. (2007) find that firm defaults produce lower recovery rates if there is industry-
wide distress, implying that inside investors cannot act as potential buyers and assets
have to be sold to outsiders at a loss.
4.4 Liquidity Externalities
Liquidity externalities emerge if banks’ individually rational decisions on how to man-
age liquidity exacerbate systemic risk. There are several models studying the systemic
implications of bankers’ individual liquidity management policies. They point out var-
ious channels through which individual liquidity management can have adverse sys-
temic repercussions.
4.4.1 Liquidity Hoarding
Gale and Yorulmazer (2013) provide a model of liquidity hoarding. Bank assets are com-
posed of cash and an illiquid asset. Banks are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
If available liquidity is insufficient, illiquid assets have to be sold at secondary mar-
kets, typically with a fire-sale discount. If selling assets generates insufficient revenues,
banks are forced into costly bankruptcy. Hence, every bank trades off returns from in-
vesting in illiquid assets against the risk of fire-sale losses and bankruptcy in the worst
case. There are two motives for banks to hold cash: First, they hold cash for precau-
tionary reasons in order to protect themselves against future liquidity shocks. Second,
banks hold liquid reserves for speculative reasons since the possibility of acquiring illiq-
uid assets at fire-sale prices offers an opportunity to generate large excess returns.
The key result is that these individual incentives prevent the efficient provision and
redistribution of liquidity in the aggregate. Banks with a liquidity surplus tend to be
reluctant to lend to banks experiencing a liquidity shock, both for precautionary and
speculative reasons. Banks subject to a liquidity shock consequently face difficulties
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to obtain cash on the interbank market which implies their default in the worst case.
Illiquid assets provide a zero payoff in the default state. Banks with a liquidity surplus
do not internalize this inefficiency and aggregate payoffs in the market equilibrium
turn out to be lower than compared to a social planner solution with efficient liquidity
redistribution. The social planner solution can also be implemented by the central bank
with a lender-of-last-resort policy. In that case, however, the privatemarket for liquidity
entirely breaks down and the central bank becomes the only provider of liquidity.
Diamond and Rajan (2011) show how liquidity hoarding in conjunction with risk-
taking incentives under limited liability can lead to a constellation in which banks do
not insure themselves against liquidity shocks, even though it would be possible. Banks
choose to pursue a strategy of strategic illiquidity. The setup is as follows: In the initial
period t = 0, banks hold illiquid financial assets paying off in t = 2. Funding is ob-
tained via deposits. In t = 1, banks potentially face a stochastic liquidity shock leading
to a partial withdrawal of deposits. Banks can raise liquidity by selling their assets
to outside investors. In contrast to other models, outside investors are assumed to be
able to extract full payoffs. Banks can sell assets in t = 0, thereby achieving insurance
against a possible liquidity shock. Alternatively, they can sell assets in t = 1 if they are
hit by the liquidity shock. Outside investors face the opportunity to either buy assets
in t = 0 or to buy assets at fire-sale prices in t = 1. Given this choice, outside investors
already demand a discount in t = 0 because they can alternatively rely on speculative
hoarding to buy assets with a discount at t = 1. In this constellation, banks do not
sell assets in t = 0 at all. Hence, even though banks have the possibility to sell assets
in t = 0 and to thereby achieve insurance against liquidity shocks in t = 1, they are
reluctant to do so. The reasoning is as follows: If the liquidity shock does not materi-
alize, the asset pays off regularly in t = 2 and shareholders make profits. If the shock
occurs, the bank is forced to conduct a fire sale in t = 1 and may finally become insol-
vent. Depositors bear the lion’s share of the associated losses. After all, banks find it
preferable to remain exposed to the liquidity shock since liquidity risk is mostly borne
by depositors.
This allocation is inefficient for two reasons. First, banks expose themselves to
avoidable liquidity risks. Second, financial fragility creates special return opportuni-
ties for outside investors and investment in new projects is crowded out just as in Stein
(2012). Public intervention can be conducted in various ways. For example, the regula-
tor could subsidize market prices in t = 0 to incentivize trading with outside investors.
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Alternatively, outside investors can be endowed with additional liquidity in t = 1 to
avoid fire-sale discounts and crowding-out effects.
Regarding empirical evidence, several authors detected liquidity-hoarding patterns
in the recent financial crisis. Acharya and Merrouche (2013) analyze liquidity demand
of UK banks during the immediate aftermath of the interbank market disruptions in
August 2007. They find that demand increased strongly even though market activity
had been restored, which points towards precautionary hoarding behavior to protect
against future liquidity shortages. Similarly, Berrospide (2013) documents precaution-
ary hoarding for US commercial banks in the recent crisis. Hoarding is found to be
increased in anticipation of future losses and liquidity outflows, measured by unreal-
ized write-downs, loan-loss provisions and unused credit lines, respectively. Finally,
Heider et al. (2009, 2015) argue that elevated uncertainty with respect to counterparty
risk after the demise of Lehman Brothers has led to liquidity hoarding by Eurozone
banks.
4.4.2 The Interplay of Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) put forward the concepts of market liquidity and
funding liquidity. They are interdependent and may act in a mutually reinforcing,
destabilizing way. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009, p. 2201), market liquidity is
defined as a property of an asset and reflects "the ease with which it is traded." Funding
liquidity is defined as "the ease with which [market participants] can obtain funding." In
what follows, I highlight the essence of their model with the help of a stylized example.
Market participants (henceforth traders) invest in risky assets and finance them-
selves via capital and collateralized debt. Traders can for instance be interpreted as
investment banks who pledge risky assets as collateral to outside financiers and in turn
receive funding. In order to protect themselves against losses, financiers require the
establishment of a wedge between the current asset price and its collateral value, i.e.,
they demand a haircut h ∈ [0, 1]. If traders want to raise an amount D of collateralized
debt, they have to pledge an amount D/(1− h) of assets as collateral. For example, if a
trader wants to raise 100$ of debt and the haircut is h = 0.2, he needs to pledge assets
which are currently worth 100$/(1− 0.2) = 125$. The asset can consequently decline
in value by 20%, but the financier would still be able to recover the lending amount
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Assets Liabilities
Asset 125 Collateralized Debt 100
Capital 25
Table 4.3: Balance Sheet with Collateralized Funding
by seizing the collateral. Put differently, the haircut is the maximum percentage-point
decline of the asset price before the collateral value falls short of the lending amount.
The prevailing haircut determines the feasible balance-sheet structure of traders. It
determines both the maximally feasible leverage ratio as well as the maximum size of
the balance sheet given an initial capital endowment. The capital ratio always needs
to equal the haircut as a very minimum. Consider an example with a capital endow-
ment of C = 25$ and h = 0.2 for illustration. Market participants are able to buy the
risky asset and obtain the necessary funding by its simultaneous collateralization. The
difference between market price and collateral value has to be covered by capital. The
maximally feasible size of the balance sheet is denoted by S and is given by
C
S
= h⇔ S =
C
h
= 125$. (4.40)
The amount of collateralized funding D is given by
D =
C
h
(1− h) = 100$. (4.41)
Table 4.3 depicts the emerging balance sheet structure. An asset position of S = 125$
is sufficient to support collateralized funding of D = 100$, and the residual needs to be
covered with capital.
Financiers set haircuts in order to protect themselves against losses. Suppose that
they finance an amount Dt in period t, which is collateralized by an amount of assets
being worth Pt = Dt/(1 − h). If the trader repays, the financier receives Dt. If the
trader defaults, the financier seizes the collateral at its next-period price Pt+1. In order
to avoid losses in any state, it needs to hold that
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Assets Liabilities
Asset 100 Collateralized Debt 75
Capital 25
Table 4.4: Balance Sheet after Haircut Increase to h
′
Pt+1 ≥ Dt
Pt+1 ≥ Pt(1− h)
Pt+1 − Pt ≥ −hPt
Pt+1 − Pt
Pt
≥ −h,
(4.42)
implying that the price change of the risky asset must not be lower that the negative
haircut. If h = 0.2, the asset price can decline by 20% before financiers incur losses in the
case of traders defaulting on their obligations. These considerations clarify that prudent
financiers vary the required haircut positively with the riskiness of the collateralized
asset, i.e., with its volatility. If volatility is high, haircuts are tightened to avoid scenarios
in which the collateral value falls short of the lending amount. Hence, funding liquidity
declines with asset price volatility.
In the model, price volatility can increase due to stochastic supply and demand
shocks. Importantly, it is assumed that financiers cannot observe whether the rise in
asset-price volatility is due to a stochastic and temporary shock or whether the asset
has indeed become riskier. Financiers thus react by raising required haircuts. Recall the
balance sheet in Table 4.3 and suppose that the required haircut is increased to h
′
= 0.25.
Both the maximally feasible balance sheet size and the maximally possible leverage ra-
tio decrease. Market participants consequently need to deleverage. If deleveraging
occurs collectively, market liquidity will be impaired to a great extent. The initial de-
cline in market liquidity has led to a decline in funding liquidity which in turn leads to
a further decline in market liquidity.
Table 4.4 depicts the new balance sheet. The required capital ratio has increased
to 25%, in line with the haircut, implying that the balance sheet has to be shrunk to an
amount of 100$. External funding of 75$ has to be collateralized by an asset worth 100$,
and assets worth 25$ must be sold compared to the constellation in Table 4.3.
The pressure to sell assets triggers two amplificationmechanisms: TheHaircut Spiral
and the Loss Spiral. Selling assets puts downward pressure on their market prices such
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Assets Liabilities
Asset 90 Collateralized Debt 75
Capital 15
Table 4.5: Balance Sheet after Asset Price Decline
Assets Liabilities
Asset 30 Collateralized Debt 15
Capital 15
Table 4.6: Balance Sheet after Deleveraging and Further Haircut Increase to h
′′
that their volatility is likely to increase further. Hence, financiers respond with a further
increase of required haircuts, which gives rise to an adverse feedback loop between ris-
ing asset-price volatility and rising haircuts. Moreover, declines in asset prices produce
direct losses and lead to a decline in capital. The decline in capital requires further
deleveraging which produces further losses and further deleveraging.
With respect to the example, suppose that initial asset sales of 25$ trigger a price
decline of 10%. Hence, starting from Table 4.4, the value of assets declines. The new
balance sheet is displayed in Table 4.5. Capital has been diminished to 15$ and the
capital ratio is consequently lower than required by financiers, i.e., 15$/90$ < 0.25. In
order to restore the acceptable leverage ratio, further assets need to be sold. Suppose
additionally that financiers increase the haircut to h
′′
= 0.5 due to the rise in asset
price volatility. Then, the balance sheet needs to decline massively and is finally given
by Table 4.6. Clearly, the necessity to sell assets worth 60$ puts further downward
pressure on prices and enhances volatility. Both spirals act in a self-reinforcing way in
the subsequent rounds of necessary balance sheet adjustment.
As a result, both market and funding liquidity are inherently fragile. Single traders
or single financiers do not internalize that selling assets or tightening funding condi-
tions exacerbate systemic stress. Importantly, funding and market liquidity are inex-
tricably interlinked and reinforce each other. Even small shocks to asset prices and/or
funding conditions can trigger powerful feedback loops which finally lead to a com-
plete market collapse due to the massive decline in traders’ balance-sheet capacity. Fig-
ure 4.6 depicts the interrelations of the haircut spiral and the loss spiral.
The initial volatility shock leads to an increase in haircuts and thus to a decline
in funding liquidity. Traders with a given capital endowment are no longer able to
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Figure 4.6: Destabilizing Interplay of Market and Funding Liquidity
obtain collateralized funding for their current asset positions and experience a funding
shortage. They need to scale back their balance sheet to satisfy the required capital
ratio. This deleveraging process and the associated excess supply of assets trigger price
declines. Decreasing prices have two effects: First, they enhance asset price volatility
further such that financiers tighten haircuts even more (haircut spiral). Second, selling
assets with a loss eats into the capital of traders so that they need to deleverage further
(loss spiral). A disruption of funding liquidity almost inevitably leads to a collapse in
market liquidity (and vice versa).
The empirical relevance of this mechanism during the recent crisis has been inter
alia documented in Gorton (2009), who shows that haircuts for subprime-related secu-
rities skyrocketed after August 2007 so that the ability of intermediaries to raise collater-
alized debt via repurchase agreements (repos) was severely impaired. The significance
of repo markets is documented by Hördahl and King (2008). They estimated their pre-
crisis volume to be roughly $10 trillion for the US and e6 trillion for the Euro Zone,
respectively. Gorton and Metrick (2012) present evidence that US repo markets shrunk
drastically in the crisis, especially due to the retreat of foreign financial institutions
which were no longer willing to provide repo finance to the US intermediation sector.
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4.5 Adverse Selection
The concept of adverse selection was pioneered by Akerlof (1970) and highlights the
inefficiencies which may arise from private information. It is applicable to virtually
any economic situation that suffers from asymmetric information and consequently
also (and maybe especially) to financial markets.
In a well-known paper, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) highlight that adverse selection
can severely impair the functioning of loan markets. If the credit quality of borrowers
is their own private information, lenders charge interest rates dependent on the average
riskiness of the entire borrower population. Hence, solid borrowers have to pay higher
interest rates than under full information whereas risky borrowers can borrow at lower
rates. This implies that risky borrowers impose an externality on solid borrowers. Im-
portantly, this information problem can lead to a market breakdown. If solid borrowers
perceive that the interest rate based on average riskiness is too high, they exit the mar-
ket which leaves lenders with an adversely selected pool consisting of risky borrowers
only. If lending to risky borrowers is deemed unprofitable, no lending will occur at all,
such that profitable investment projects do not receive funding.
Adverse selectionmay also become an issue if banks are selling assets whose quality
is private information. Investors who fear to buy "lemons" are only willing to acquire
assets at a discount. If the discount is large, banks trying to sell solid assets will no
longer participate in the market. Put generally, adverse selection can impair the func-
tioning of important financial-market segments which creates inefficiencies of various
forms and contributes to systemic risk.
4.5.1 Multiple Equilibria on Interbank Markets
Heider et al. (2009, 2015) adapt the concept of adverse selection to interbank markets
and show that asymmetric information may give rise to multiple equilibria with differ-
ent properties in terms of efficiency. In their model, heterogeneous banks are subject to
both idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and shocks to credit quality. Idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks lead to the emergence of an interbank market, which allows banks facing unex-
pected liquidity needs to borrow from banks with surplus liquidity. The functioning of
the interbank market is impaired by adverse selection, which is present because shocks
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to credit quality are private information. Interbank lenders will consequently charge
an interest rate which compensates for the average credit risk of all banks.
If the equilibrium interbank rate is too high, banks with good credit quality and a
liquidity shortage do not borrow on interbank markets but prefer costly liquidation of
their assets. If lending to the adversely selected pool of interbank borrowers is deemed
unprofitable, the interbankmarket entirely breaks down and banks with a liquidity sur-
plus rely on hoarding. The level of the interbank rate and thus the market constellation
is critically determined by both the level and the dispersion of counterparty risk. The
higher the general level of counterparty risk and the higher the differences in credit
quality, the more likely becomes a market breakdown.
Importantly, the model exhibits the possibility of multiple equilibria for a certain
(reasonable) range of parameter values. Banks choose their portfolio composition, i.e.,
the shares of liquid and illiquid assets, conditional on the expected interbank market
constellation in the future. If banks expect that every bank will participate in the inter-
bank market, portfolios are chosen to be relatively liquid in order to exploit profitable
interbank lending opportunities. Conversely, if banks expect adverse selection, they
choose relatively illiquid portfolios and future interbank activity is low or entirely ab-
sent. The expected market constellation thus emerges in a self-fulfilling fashion. Given
the fact that market breakdowns trigger costly and inefficient liquidation, policy inter-
ventions are desirable. For example, imposing liquidity requirements acts as a coordi-
nation device which ensures full participation.
Figure 4.7 depicts market constellations as a function of counterparty risk p and its
dispersion ∆p.28 For high levels of p and a low level of ∆p, full participation represents
the unique equilibrium. If ∆p increases, the full participation equilibrium co-exists with
an adverse selection equilibrium, in which solid banks with liquidity shortages rely on
costly asset liquidation instead of interbank lending. For very high levels of ∆p, full
participation co-exists with a hoarding equilibrium, in which banks with a liquidity
surplus are reluctant to lend to adversely selected borrowers. If p decreases, adverse
selection becomes the unique equilibrium. For higher levels of ∆p, the hoarding equi-
librium sets in, and if ∆p increases further, even risky banks stop demanding interbank
loans which is called the no-borrowing constellation.
28 Formally, p denotes the repayment probability of the risky and illiquid investment project of banks.
Hence, counterparty risk declines in p. The dispersion of counterparty risk ∆p is the difference of
repayment probabilities between banks experiencing favorable and adverse shocks to credit quality.
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Figure 4.7: Counterparty Risk and Interbank Market Constellations
The behavior of interbank markets during the recent crisis is depicted in Figure
4.8 and can be analyzed through the lens of the model. Before August 2007, markets
were characterized by the perception of low risk, and consequently spreads for un-
secured interbank lending were very narrow.29 This constellation corresponds to the
full-participation equilibrium in which asymmetric information is regarded as a mi-
nor problem because of negligible counterparty risk. In August 2007, however, spreads
rose and remained elevated until September 2008. At this time, several European banks
started to report losses on mortgage-related securities, which probably caused a re-
assessment of both the level and the dispersion of counterparty risk. In September 2008,
spreads rose to unprecedented highs and banks started to hoard liquidity as reflected
by the dramatic increase of recourse to the ECB deposit facility, which was essentially
zero before. The demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 seemingly led to a
drastic upward revision of perceived counterparty risk and its dispersion. The increase
in interbank rates mirrors an almost complete collapse of unsecured interbank markets,
29 The Figure is adapted from Heider et al. (2015). Data was obtained from Datastream and the ECB.
The interbank spread is calculated as the monthly average of the difference between the EURIBOR
rate for unsecured interbank lending and the Repo Rate for secured interbank lending (both with a
maturity of three months). Hence, the spread should almost exclusively reflect perceived interbank
credit risk.
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Figure 4.8: Euro Area Interbank Market since 2007
which corresponds to the model’s constellation of liquidity hoarding in the wake of ele-
vated counterparty risk. Spreads started to narrow in 2009 whereas recourse to the ECB
deposit facility remained on a relatively high level. With the intensification of the gov-
ernment debt crisis in mid-2011, both spreads and deposit-facility recourse increased
again.30
4.5.2 The Impairment of Secondary Markets for Opaque Assets
Bolton et al. (2011) analyze how adverse selection can impair secondary markets for
opaque assets. Their model consists of short-term investors (henceforth STIs) and long-
term investors (henceforth LTIs) with a longer time horizon. STIs should be regarded
as banks whereas LTIs can for instance be interpreted as pension funds. LTIs can either
invest in riskless long-maturity assets or they can hold cash. Returns from holding cash
are zero per se, but under certain circumstances, cash can be used to acquire assets
from STIs at potentially favorable prices. These cash balances are referred to as outside
30 However, recourse to the ECB deposit facility cannot be explained exclusively within the model. For
example, the ECB conducted several longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) to reduce liquidity
risk for a dangerously weakened banking system in the years after the Lehman failure. Apparently,
banks obtained funding from LTROs and parked these funds in the ECB deposit facility instead of
lending to other banks or to the non-financial sector. Hence, the ECB created a special opportunity
for precautionary liquidity hoarding which is absent from the model.
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liquidity. STIs can either hold cash (inside liquidity) or invest in risky assets. The latter
are subject to two types of risk. First, payoffs may be delayed. Second, they might
become zero.
Since STIs value early consumption more than LTIs, there is a secondary market for
risky assets. STIs seek to sell assets with delayed payoffs to LTIs in order to obtain liq-
uidity for early consumption. However, this secondary market is subject to an adverse
selection problem. LTIs cannot observe whether the asset has only delayed payoffs or
whether the asset is worthless in the sense that its payoff will be zero. Thus, assets
trade at a discount. Nevertheless, asset trades between STIs and LTIs are generally
welfare-enhancing. Since only STIs have access to the generally superior investment
technology of the risky asset, it is socially desirable to maximize the amount which is
invested into the latter. Put differently, liquidity needs of STIs are most efficiently sat-
isfied by the provision of outside liquidity. However, if the adverse selection problem
is severe, obtaining outside liquidity carries prohibitive costs for STIs and the market
for outside liquidity collapses. Hence, STIs shift towards inside liquidity and aggregate
investment in the risky technology declines.
Chapter 5
The Concept of Macroprudential
Regulation
5.1 Theoretical Foundations of Macroprudential Regulation
The previous Chapters have offered two explanations for an excessive level of systemic
risk: First, systemic risk may be driven by behavior which departs from strict rational-
ity. Second, systemic risk can become inefficiently high due to the presence of systemic
externalities. Given the outlined shortcomings of the limited rationality approach, it ap-
pears more promising to ground macroprudential regulation with its scope to contain
systemic risk on the concept of systemic externalities.
5.1.1 Mitigation of Systemic Externalities
In theory, the ultimate objective of macroprudential regulation is to mitigate systemic
externalities such as to ensure an adequate level of systemic risk. The models discussed
in the previous Chapter consistently demonstrate that systemic risk can reach socially
inefficient levels in the absence of regulatory intervention. Put differently, the presence
of systemic externalities makes financial crises more likely and also more costly.
However, the considered models are highly stylized. While they highlight key
mechanisms leading to excessive systemic risk, they are without doubt too simplistic
to serve as guidance for real-world macroprudential policy measures. Moreover, in a
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real-world setting, externalities may occur jointly and interact with each other, whereas
most models treat specific externalities in isolation. In this respect, Derviz (2013, p. 12)
states that "financial intermediation theory [...] relies on toy models which provide only
very indirect, if any, empirical guidance."
Hence, the mapping of theoretical results into practical policy measures is inher-
ently difficult. For example, it is barely possible to confront the models with real-world
data to obtain socially optimal capital and liquidity requirements. Nevertheless, the
theory of systemic externalities delivers important conceptual underpinnings for prac-
tical macroprudential regulation. Even though the latter offers no quantitative guid-
ance, each measure can be analyzed qualitatively regarding its likely contribution to
the mitigation of systemic externalities. De Nicoló et al. (2012, p. 10) argue that macro-
prudential policy should be viewed "as a tool to correct externalities that create sys-
temic risk. This approach gives more structure to the definition of systemic risk, and
introduces economic rationale into the discussion of macroprudential policy."
5.1.2 Analysis of Potential Instruments
Table 5.1, which closely follows De Nicoló et al. (2012), provides an overview of poten-
tial macroprudential instruments. The first column depicts the five different forms of
systemic externalities which were discussed in the previous Chapter. The five columns
to the right list potential instruments. X indicates whether the respective policy instru-
ment is able in principle to achieve internalization of the externality under consider-
ation. Policy instruments are split into five categories: Capital requirements, liquid-
ity requirements, restrictions on activities, assets and liabilities (henceforth RAALs),
Pigouvian taxation and other measures.1
Externalities related to interconnections can be tackled with stricter capital require-
ments. If banks operate with higher capital cushions, they are more capable to absorb
losses from interbank exposures such that higher-order propagation effects become lim-
ited to a great extent. Alternatively, interbank lending can be quantitatively restricted
1 RAALs can take different forms. First, it is conceivable to impose quantitative limits on exposures
against specific borrowers (or more generally on exposures against specific sectors) and on the is-
suance of certain types of liabilities. Second, RAALs can be qualitative in a sense that lending stan-
dards become subject to some minimum requirements. Third, some activities may be prohibited
altogether.
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with size limits which equally reduces contagion risk. As a last alternative, the forma-
tion of interbank linkages could be subject to (Pigouvian) taxation, which potentially
dis-incentivizes banks from forming financial linkages which exacerbate systemic risk.
Strategic complementarities can be mitigated by higher capital requirements which
make correlated investment strategies unattractive. Moreover, quantitative restrictions
on asset allocation could limit common exposures. With respect to competition dy-
namics and procyclical lending standards, countercyclical capital requirements which
tighten during the boom appear promising. As a complement, regulatory requirements
on lending standards (qualitative RAALs) could be varied countercyclically, for exam-
ple by lowering acceptable debt-to-income ratios of potential borrowers during a boom.
As shown in Acharya et al. (2010b), strategic complementarities can also be mitigated
by charging variable deposit insurance premia (see Section 4.2), which is subsumed
under other measures here.
The risk of fire sales can be likewise contained via capital requirements. If banks
have a sizable capital cushion, they can absorb losses without an impairment of debt
claims. Hence, there is less need to sell assets in adverse states. Moreover, a stronger
capital base makes banks more resilient against adverse valuation effects. Since fire
sales typically arise from a liquidity mismatch, i.e., short-term creditors withdrawing
their funds in the wake of bad news, liquidity requirements may also help to avoid
fire-sale dynamics. Similarly, taxing short-term debt issuance may contribute to the
implementation of a socially efficient amount of maturity transformation.
Liquidity externalities can be tackled with liquidity requirements. If banks are re-
quired to hold sufficient liquidity buffers, they canwithstand adverse scenarios without
relying on socially inefficient hoarding behavior or strategic illiquidity. Alternatively,
liquidity mismatches could be subject to taxation so that their contribution to systemic
risk becomes internalized (Perotti and Suarez, 2011).
Adverse Selection effects can be mitigated by more restrictive capital requirements.
If banks are more capable to withstand losses, it becomes relatively less important
that their individual solvency is private information. If their capital position is strong
enough to render default risk negligible, adverse selection on interbank markets as
in Heider et al. (2009, 2015) should be effectively contained. Alternatively, measures
which enhance market transparency can contain adverse selection problems. For ex-
ample, the involvement of rating agencies in assessing the value of opaque assets can
avoid adverse-selection issues on secondary markets as in Bolton et al. (2011).
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Type of Externality Internalization Strategies
Capital
Requirements
Liquidity
Requirements
RAALs Pigouvian
Taxation
Other
Measures
Interconnectedness X X X
Strategic
Complementarities
X X X
Fire Sales X X X
Liquidity
Externalities
X X
Adverse Selection X X
Table 5.1: Internalization Strategies
Which internalization strategies are best equipped for practical policymaking? It is
apparent that capital requirements can contribute to the mitigation of each externality
except the ones related to liquidity. Pigouvian taxation is also promising from a the-
oretical point of view, yet the proper calibration of such taxes is likely to be difficult
and subject to political constraints. Liquidity requirements are well-suited to deal with
liquidity externalities. RAALs seem appropriate to limit common exposures and the
procyclicality of lending standards. In any case, macroprudential regulation should
rely on a set of instruments. There is no single tool which is capable to mitigate every
form of systemic risk. For example, capital requirements may fail to provide a binding
constraints during booms. Rising asset prices and low default rates tend to increase
capital positions, which facilitates credit expansion even in the case of relatively tight
capital requirements. Hence, they should be augmented with a countercyclical element
or by RAALs which ensure that lending booms are contained.
To sum up, I consider a combination of capital requirements, RAALs and liquidity
requirements to be a more or less comprehensive toolkit to tackle the issue of exces-
sive systemic risk. Potential forms of these instruments and the stage of their practical
implementation are discussed in the following Section.
5.2 Practical Implementation
The recent crisis has triggered a substantial rethinking of policy aimed at financial sta-
bility. The crisis clarified that the attempt to secure individual soundness with micro-
prudential measures is not a sufficient condition for systemic stability (Blanchard et al.,
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2010). Tarullo (2015, p. 2) even claims that "we are all macroprudentialists now." How-
ever, bridging the gap between theory and practice is exceptionally difficult. While
market failures are relatively well understood on the theoretical level, it represents a
substantial challenge to transfer these insights into robust policy frameworks.
Macroprudential regulation is still in its infancy. Its institutional structure, its ob-
jectives and their operationalization as well as its potential instruments and their cor-
rect calibration represent issues which still lack of a definitive answer.2 Nevertheless,
most advanced countries have created macroprudential regulation authorities which
are equipped with specific instruments. It is likely that the experiences yet to be made
will trigger further adjustments and refinements of the setup of macroprudential regu-
lation. In what follows, I briefly discuss the current state of macroprudential supervi-
sion in the Euro Area.
5.2.1 Setup and Objectives of Macroprudential Policy in the EMU
Figure 5.1 depicts the institutional structure of macroprudential supervision in the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union (henceforth EMU). Generally, macroprudential supervision is
located at the level of member states. Most member states have assignedmacropruden-
tial authorities to their national central banks, while some have decided to allocate this
task to separate national supervision authorities.
Macroprudential regulation is conducted in line with the Capital Requirements Di-
rective (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), which were passed
by the European Parliament in 2014. The CRD IV and the CRR basically transfer the
international Basel III agreement on the future of banking supervision into European
law. Moreover, national supervisors are able to implement further measures based on
national law (flexibility clause). Importantly, policy decisions by national supervisors
can be overruled by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM is the newly
founded supervisory body for large banks within the Euro Area which operates under
the roof of the European Central Bank. If the SSM seeks to implement a more restrictive
policy stance than national supervisors, the latter have to comply with SSM recommen-
dations.
2 Various academic and policy-oriented papers have contributed to the debate on practical implemen-
tation. See for instance Aikman et al. (2013), Bank of England (2009, 2011), Claessens (2014), Galati
and Moessner (2013), Hanson et al. (2011), Hellwig (2014) and IMF (2013b). IMF (2011) and Bruno
et al. (2015) provide first empirical assessments of macroprudential policies primarily conducted in
emerging markets.
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Figure 5.1: Institutional Setup of Macroprudential Regulation in the EMU
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is affiliated to the European Central
Bank. It issues recommendations for and opinions on macroprudential policies in the
EMU. They are not legally binding, but national supervisors have to deal with these
recommendations on an act-or-explain basis. If they do not comply, they have to con-
vincingly explain the reasons for deviating from ESRB recommendations.
Of course, the obvious objective of macroprudential policy is to reduce systemic
risk by internalizing systemic externalities. However, the precise operationalization of
this ultimate objective is difficult. With respect to the Euro Area, the ESRB has issued
guidelines on potential macroprudential objectives and instruments. In ESRB (2013, p.
1), the ultimate objective of macroprudential regulation is defined as follows:
"The ultimate objective of macro-prudential policy is to contribute to the
safeguard of the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by
strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-
up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the fi-
nancial sector to economic growth."
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Hence, macroprudential regulation should promote the structural resilience of the fi-
nancial system, i.e., its capability to withstand adverse shocks. Moreover, macropru-
dential policy is supposed to mitigate the build-up of systemic risk during booms by
appropriate countercyclical measures. ESRB (2014b, p. 7) defines four mandatory in-
termediate objectives to operationalize the ultimate objectives from above. These inter-
mediate targets are:
• Prevention of excessive credit growth and leverage
• Prevention of excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity
• Limiting direct and indirect exposure concentrations
• Limiting the systemic impact of misaligned incentives (moral hazard)
These intermediate objectives can be loosely traced back to the theoretical goal
of correcting systemic externalities. For example, preventing excessive maturity mis-
matches is certainly useful to correct fire-sale and liquidity externalities. Limits on
exposure concentrations may help to reduce externalities arising from excessive inter-
connections. Probably the most important factor is limiting leverage (or, equivalently,
raising capital requirements) as such measures contribute to the mitigation of several
systemic externalities at the same time.
5.2.2 Macroprudential Instruments in the EMU
There are various potential instruments at the disposal of macroprudential supervisors
to achieve their intermediate objectives. Figure 5.2 provides a non-exhaustive list. In
what follows, I will give a brief explanation of these measures.
Prevention of Excessive Credit Growth and Leverage: An important instrument is the so-
called Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCB). National authorities can increase capital
requirements by up to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets if credit growth within the national
financial system is deemed excessive.3 A potential indicator of excessive credit growth
is the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its historical trend, as measured by a
3 Capital surcharges are related to risk-weighted assets. To obtain ameasure for risk-weighted assets RW,
an asset position X has to be multiplied with an appropriate risk weight r. Of course, risk weights
vary with the riskiness of assets. Risk weights can be obtained from the so-called standard approach
or by applying internal risk management models. The standard approach maps publicly available
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Figure 5.2: Selected Macroprudential Instruments in the EMU
one-sidedHodrick-Prescott filter (ESRB, 2014a, p. 37). The CCB is complemented by the
leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total non risk-weighted assets to capital. It must
not exceed a value of 33. Equivalently, the ratio of capital to total assets must not be
below 3%. The leverage ratio serves as a backstop, since accumulating large positions of
assets with low or zero risk weights can lead to a dangerous build-up of leverage which
is not reflected in risk-weighted capital adequacy measures, especially if risk-weights
turn out to be undersized (Bundesbank, 2011). Loan-to-value requirements (LTV) are
mainly directed towards residential real-estate financing and stipulate that the loan
amount must not exceed a certain percentage of the property value (for instance 80%).
Loan-to-income requirements restrict the loan amount to not exceed a certain multiple
ratings into specific risk-weights. For example, government bonds issued from countries with an
AAA-rating have a zero risk weight r = 0%. Conversely, a claim on a company rated below BB-
has a risk weight of r = 150%. Each asset has to be multiplied with an appropriate risk weight to
arrive at an aggregate measure of risk-weighted assets. Banks consequently have to fund a certain
share of risk-weighted assets with capital. The Basel III standards, which are supposed to be imple-
mented until 2019, require banks to fund 10,5% of risk-weighted assets with capital (see for instance
Bundesbank (2011, p. 19)). Macroprudentially motivated surcharges will be added to this measure.
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of borrower income.
Prevention of Excessive Maturity Mismatch and Market Illiquidity: As inter alia specified in
Bundesbank (2011), the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is defined as
LCR =
Highly Liquid Assets
Net Outflows under pre-defined Stress Scenario in 30 days
≥ 100% (5.1)
which aims to contain the risks of banks experiencing liquidity shortages under ad-
verse market conditions. It is directed towards short-term liquidity risk management.
Cash and government bonds count as highly liquid assets, whereas private sector as-
sets can contribute to the enumerator only with a steep haircut. The net stable funding
ratio (NSFR) seeks to contain maturity transformation by requiring a certain amount of
stable long-term funding for long-term assets. The Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision (henceforth BCBS) defines the NSFR as
NSFR =
Available amount of stable funding
Required amount of stable funding
≥ 100% (5.2)
where the enumerator is defined "as the portion of capital and liabilities expected to
be reliable over the time horizon considered by the NSFR, which extends to one year."
(BCBS, 2014, p. 2) The denominator is defined to be "a function of the liquidity charac-
teristics and residual maturities of the various assets held by that institution as well as
those of its off-balance sheet (OBS) exposures." (BCBS, 2014, p. 2) The precise definitions
of the involved balance-sheet items are still subject to regulatory debates. In any case,
the NSFR seeks to ensure that funding stability is achieved over a one-year-horizon.
Loan-to-deposit ratios are designed to limit the reliance of banks on potentially frag-
ile funding sources such as repos and unsecured interbank loans. Along similar lines,
haircuts on collateralized financing could become subject to minimum requirements.
Limiting direct and indirect exposure concentrations: Supervisors can implement restric-
tions on large exposures. For example, interbank loans could be restricted to not exceed
a certain share of capital and/or total assets. The same principle could be applied to
exposures towards national governments or large firms. It is also conceivable to limit
sectoral exposures, for instance in the field of real-estate finance.
Limiting the systemic impact of misaligned incentives: Supervisors have the possibility to
impose additional surcharges on systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
130 CHAPTER 5. THE CONCEPT OF MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION
Institutions which are systemically relevant on a global level have to hold additional
capital in the range of 1% and 3,5% of risk-weighted assets (BCBS, 2013).4 It is also
possible to impose capital surcharges of up to 2% of risk-weighted assets on institu-
tions which are systemically relevant from a domestic perspective. Moreover, there is
a flexible systemic risk buffer of up to 3% of risk-weighted assets which can be ap-
plied to all or to a subset of banks. SIFI surcharges are designed to limit the adverse
incentives emerging from the well-known too-big-too-fail problem. Moreover, these
surcharges increase the resilience of SIFIs and contain the risk of potentially disastrous
higher-order propagation effects in case of their default.
The implementation of the aforementioned instruments is an ongoing process. For
example, both the leverage ratio and the liquidity coverage ratio will not be fully oper-
ational before 2019. The same holds for SIFI capital surcharges. The net stable funding
ratio will become a binding standard from 2018. There are various reasons for these
large implementation lags. First, international standard-setting amounts to a difficult
bargaining problem due to often diverging interests of national jurisdictions. More-
over, banks should have the possibility to adjust gradually towards the new regulatory
environment. Furthermore, the definitions of certain measures are still subject to in-
ternational consultation. For instance, there are ongoing debates which balance-sheet
items should count as regulatory capital.5
5.3 Systemic Risk Measurement
The macroprudential toolkit in the EMU and in other jurisdictions will consist of vari-
ous instruments and their proper calibration requires precise measurement techniques
for systemic risk. For this purpose, systemic risk is usually divided into two categories.
The time dimension seeks to track the development of aggregate systemic vulnerabili-
ties over time, whereas the cross-sectional dimension analyzes how systemic risk is dis-
tributedwithin the system at a given point in time (Caruana, 2010; Galati andMoessner,
4 As of 2014, Deutsche Bank is considered to be the only SIFI in Germany with a recommended addi-
tional capital requirement of 2% of risk-weighted assets (Financial Stability Board, 2014).
5 Instruments also differ with respect to their legal basis. Some have been implemented via EU law,
whereas others are proposals whose usage is mainly at the discretion of national authorities. An
introduction to legal details along with legislative references is provided by Angeloni (2014) and
ESRB (2013, 2014b).
5.3. SYSTEMIC RISK MEASUREMENT 131
2013). In what follows, I provide a brief and selective overview on measurement tech-
niques for both dimensions.6
5.3.1 Measurement in the Time Dimension
The development of systemic risk in the time dimension can be analyzed with the
help of early-warning models, as first proposed in Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Rein-
hart and Kaminsky (1999). Generally speaking, early-warning models seek to find
macro-financial indicators which predict future financial distress. Alessi and Detken
(2011) provide an early-warning model which tries to identify indicators which pre-
dict costly asset price booms by using data from 18 OECD countries between 1970 and
2007. An asset price boom is generally defined as a constellation in which an aggregate
asset price index comprising deflated equity and property prices exceeds its recursive
Hodrick-Prescott trend by 1.75 times its recursive standard deviation for three consecu-
tive quarters.7 An asset price boom is defined as costly if cumulative real GDP growth
in the subsequent three years is three percentage points below potential.
An indicator’s performance is assessed on the basis of its ability to issue a warning
signal up to six quarters in advance of costly asset price booms. An indicator issues a
signal if its value exceeds a certain pre-specified threshold. The authors use real and
financial variables such as GDP, investment, different asset prices and interest rates as
well as several types of monetary and credit aggregates as potential indicators. These
variables are also assessed in various transformations, such as year-on-year growth
rates and recursive Hodrick-Prescott trend deviations.
As depicted in Table 5.2, an indicator can generate four outcomes at a certain point
in time. Outcomes A and D imply that the indicator issues correct signals. However,
the indicator might miss a future crisis and fail to issue a warning signal, which is
called type-I error (outcome C in the Table). On the other hand, an indicator can issue
a warning signal even if no crisis occurs in the future, which is labeled as type-II error
and corresponds to outcome B. Alessi and Detken (2011) subsequently define a loss
function of
6 For a much more comprehensive review of systemic risk measures, the reader is referred to Bisias
et al. (2012).
7 The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) Filter generally decomposes a time series into a trend component and
a cyclical component ("gap"). See Neusser (2009) for a textbook treatment. The recursive HP filter
applied in period t only applies current and past values instead of using the entire sample. This
procedure is designed to mimic real-time conditions in period t, where future values of the time
series are unknown.
132 CHAPTER 5. THE CONCEPT OF MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION
Costly boom-bust cycle No costly boom-bust cycle
Signal issued A B
No Signal Issued C D
Table 5.2: Behavior of Early Warning Indicators
L = θ
C
A+ C
+ (1− θ)
B
B+ D
, (5.3)
where the first term C/(A + C) measures how often the indicator fails to issue a
warning signal in relation to the total number of signals issued before a costly asset
price boom. Put differently, this term depicts the relative share of type-I errors. The
second term B/(B + D) displays the relative share of type-II errors, where the indi-
cator issues a signal despite no costly asset price boom takes place. The parameter
θ captures preferences of policymakers. If θ is high, policymakers rather care about
missing a future crisis than receiving false alarms. Vice versa, if θ is low, policymakers
are primarily concerned with the risk of false alarms, where a non-justified tightening
of the macroprudential policy stance would unnecessarily restrict lending and finally
economic activity.
The loss function is minimized conditional on the value of θ by choosing an appro-
priate threshold for which the indicator issues a warning signal. For example, suppose
that the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-run trend is used as an indi-
cator. If θ is high, the optimal loss-minimizing threshold will be low. That is, a warning
signal will be issued already for relatively small upward trend deviations of the credit-
to-GDP ratio. Small upward deviations are not necessarily predicting a crisis with suf-
ficient probability, yet policymakers care less about type-II errors and more about the
risk of missing a crisis. Conversely, if θ is low, the threshold will be high. Policymak-
ers are more concerned with type-II errors, therefore trend deviations of credit need to
become sufficiently large before a warning signal is issued in order to minimize false
alarms. The usefulness U of an indicator is expressed as
U = min[θ; 1− θ]− L. (5.4)
The policymaker can always realize a loss of min[θ; 1− θ] by disregarding the indi-
cator. If θ < 0.5, the indicator is ignored in such a way that no crisis signals are received,
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i.e., A = B = 0 which would imply a loss of θ according to (5.3). If θ > 0.5, the policy-
maker acts as if the signal is issued in any period, such that C = D = 0 and L = 1− θ.
If utilizing the indicator yields to a loss L < min[θ; 1− θ], its usefulness increases. Put
differently, an indicator’s usefulness increases with the reduction of losses compared to
the case when it is disregarded.
Alessi andDetken (2011) find that upward deviations of credit aggregates from their
Hodrick-Prescott trend (henceforth HP-trend) are the most useful indicators for the ma-
jority of countries, followed by upward trend deviations of monetary aggregates.8 In-
terestingly, it is the global gap of private credit-to-GDPwhich delivers themost accurate
results. This could reflect the fact that asset price booms often occur jointly across coun-
tries. As a general observation, it is easier to obtain useful indicators if policymakers
have relatively balanced preferences, i.e., if θ is close to 0.5. If preferences are asymmet-
ric, it is barely possible to find useful indicators. The authors additionally conduct an
out-of sample exercise, with thresholds calibrated on a sub-sample ranging from 1970 to
2002. It is then examined how the indicators perform in predicting the recent financial
crisis. Again, the global gap of private credit-to-GDP performs best whereas monetary
aggregates broadly fail to issue any reliable warning signal. Regarding practical appli-
cations, Behn et al. (2013) assess early-warning models with respect to their usefulness
in calibrating the countercyclical capital buffer and obtain encouraging results.
Borio and Drehmann (2009) perform a methodologically similar analysis which fo-
cuses on the prediction of banking crises instead of boom-bust cycles of asset prices.
They find that upward trend deviations of credit-to-GDP ratios, especially when occur-
ring jointly with property price gaps, are reliable predictors of banking crises with a
forecast horizon of up to three years. Moreover, Drehmann (2013) shows that incorpo-
rating credit aggregates which also capture non-bank loans leads to a further improve-
ment of forecast performance. Hahm et al. (2013) and Shin (2013) demonstrate that
pronounced growth of Non-Core Liabilities of banks is an equally promising early-
warning indicator. Non-Core Liabilities such as repos and interbank obligations are
typically of a short-term nature and inherently fragile. If banks increasingly rely on the
latter, they are more susceptible to funding shortages, which may ultimately give rise
to liquidity externalities and fire sales.
To sum up, there are various reliable early-warning indicators. Most authors em-
phasize the special role of upward trend deviations of credit-to-GDP ratios in this re-
8 A detailed breakdown of results can be found in the working-paper version of their publication
(Alessi and Detken, 2009).
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spect. Figure 5.3 plots credit-to-GDP gaps for selected countries.9 The horizontal line
depicts an early warning threshold, i.e., if the gap exceeds 4%, a warning signal would
be issued. The threshold corresponds to the average of the values employed by Borio
and Drehmann (2009), who varied the latter between 2% and 6%.
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Figure 5.3: Bank Credit-to-GDP Gaps for Selected Countries
Apparently, credit gaps would have issued (strong) warning signals in the run-up
to the crisis. Especially UK and Spain realized unprecedented credit gaps prior to 2007.
For the US, the gap appears less spectacular, but a warning signal would have been
issued as early as 2004 nonetheless.10 It is somewhat surprising that credit expansion
in the US appears to have been relatively mild. The potential reason is that the credit
aggregate under consideration tracks commercial banks only, and therefore does not
cover the enormous increase in credit granted via the shadow banking system. It is
9 Gaps were obtained by de-trending the ratios of outstanding private bank credit to GDP using a
recursive HP-filter with a smoothing factor of λ = 1600, as proposed in Borio and Drehmann (2009).
Data was obtained from FED FRED and is on a yearly basis. Recursive HP-filtering was conducted
with a MATLAB routine provided by Meyer-Gohde (2010).
10 Of course, HP-filtered estimates from small samples should be analyzed with caution, especially
given the fact that the HP-filter suffers from low precision at the end of the sample (St-Amant and
van Norden, 1997). As a partial remedy, the sample could be enlarged by using quarterly data and a
higher smoothing factor (ESRB, 2014a, p. 37). Here, I nevertheless stick to the approach of Borio and
Drehmann (2009) and use yearly data (which is also more readily available). The problems associated
with HP-filtering notwithstanding, the observed pattern is remarkably clear and is therefore likely to
be robust against applying different de-trending methods.
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also interesting to observe that there would have been no warning signal for Germany,
which is at odds with the crisis experience, namely that several banks required gov-
ernment assistance. This can be attributed to the fact that German banks accumulated
large cross-border exposures, especially towards the US housing market, which are not
mirrored in a domestic credit aggregate. Indeed, Borio and Drehmann (2009) argue that
credit aggregates should be adjusted for cross-border exposures, which is unfortunately
very difficult because of data availability constraints.
5.3.2 Measurement in the Cross-Sectional Dimension
Measuring systemic risk in the cross-sectional dimension tries to capture the individual
contributions of financial institutions to systemic risk at a given point in time. While
measurement in the time dimension targets aggregate vulnerabilities, measurement in
the cross-section ideally allows to assess the systemic importance of single institutions
such that institution-specific measures like SIFI capital surcharges can be adequately
calibrated.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) propose a systemic-riskmetric calledCoVaR, which
grounds on the Value-at-Risk (VaR) methodology briefly discussed in Section 3.2.2. As
a first step, the authors estimate the VaR of the weekly growth rate of total assets of
financial intermediaries. If the 95%-VaR of a certain institution in that respect is given
by −5%, this means that total assets will not shrink by more than 5% with a probability
of 95%.11 Focusing on the growth of total assets seeks to capture the risk of shrinking
balance-sheet capacity and thus the risk of deleveragingwith its potential consequences
(such as fire sales).
The CoVaRi,q of a single institution i measures the q%-VaR of the growth rate of
total assets for the entire financial sector conditional on institution i being in distress.12
The lower the CoVaRi,q realization, the higher the risk that distress of institution i will
give rise to systemic deleveraging. In this sense, CoVaRi,q serves as a measure of the
individual contribution of institution i to systemic risk. Consider a numerical example
11 Weekly data on the evolution of total assets is proxied by multiplying current market capitalization
with book leverage, where the latter is defined as the ratio of total assets to equity at book values.
Both VaR and CoVaR are estimatedmaking use of quantile regressions. See Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011, pp. 13-16) for details.
12 Financial distress is defined as an event in which the growth rate of total assets of institution i is lower
or equal to its own q%-VaR, i.e., it is an event in which institution i experiences an abnormally high
decline in total assets.
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for illustration: If CoVaRi,q = - 10%, theweekly growth rate of total assets of the financial
sector decreases by less than ten percent with a probability of q if institution i is in
distress. Hence, the further the CoVaR moves into negative territory, the more likely it
becomes that distress at institution i will give rise to system-wide declines in balance-
sheet capacity.
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Figure 5.4: Average CoVaR for European Banks
Figure 5.4 depicts the average CoVaR for European Banks. Bank-specific data is not
made public for confidentiality reasons and to avoid stigma. Nevertheless, it becomes
apparent that the average CoVaR declines drastically during a crisis, as for instance dur-
ing 2008. Hence, the potential for adverse spillovers and systemic deleveraging is espe-
cially pronounced during a crisis. This result is certainly not surprising. Interestingly,
the individual CoVaR of an institution can be reliably predicted by its balance-sheet
characteristics, especially its size, its leverage and the degree of maturity transforma-
tion at a two-year time horizon. It might thus be possible (in principle) to infer the indi-
vidual contribution of a single institution to systemic risk from its balance-sheet charac-
teristics, which may finally help to calibrate macroprudential measures geared towards
the internalization of individual systemic risk contributions on an ex-ante-basis.
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There is an increasing amount of further cross-sectional systemic risk measures. For
example, Acharya et al. (2010a) propose an alternative measure of cross-sectional sys-
temic risk called Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES), which measures whether individual
institutions tend to experience capital shortfalls in times of systemic stress. The au-
thors emphasize its use for calibrating a macroprudential tax. Drehmann and Tarashev
(2013) propose a measure which relates the systemic importance of individual banks to
the losses they impose on non-bank creditors in a systemic crisis. Chan-Lau (2010) pro-
vides an example for network analysis techniques based on individual balance-sheet
data, which seeks to assess systemic risk arising from interconnectedness.
5.4 Unresolved Issues
Even though macroprudential supervision starts to be operational in most of the ad-
vanced countries, there are several unresolved issues which cast serious doubt on the
ability of current arrangements to effectively contain systemic risk. In what follows, I
will outline various shortcomings of the current state of macroprudential supervision.
5.4.1 Regulatory Arbitrage
An important yet unresolved problem is the risk of regulatory arbitrage. Macropruden-
tial supervision is primarily directed towards the banking system. However, stricter
regulation of banks may trigger a shift of intermediation activities into less regulated
financial market segments or less regulated jurisdictions, respectively.13 Adrian (2014)
argues that regulatory arbitrage is a key motivation for shadow banking activities,
meaning that commercial banks accumulate exposures via off-balance-sheet vehicles
which are subject to less regulatory scrutiny. However, the regulation of shadow bank-
ing activities is still in its infancy. Hence, macroprudential regulation may succeed in
containing systemic risk which arises from traditional banking operations, but vulner-
abilities might continue to develop in other areas of the financial system.
13 Regulatory arbitrage for banks across jurisdictions has been empirically documented by Houston
et al. (2012). Moreover, Aiyar et al. (2012) show for the UK that tightening capital requirements for
domestically regulated banks does not help to restrict aggregate credit supply, since foreign banks
not affected by tighter regulation increase their lending activities in that case.
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5.4.2 Too-Big-Too-Fail Problems
The problem that some institutions are too big and too interconnected to fail continues
to be a pressing concern. While SIFI capital surcharges are a step in the right direction,
they are very likely to be undersized. Haldane and Booth (2014) estimate that SIFI cap-
ital surcharges should be at least in the area of about 7% of risk-weighted assets, which
would correspond to doubling the maximally conceivable amount under current regu-
lation. Furthermore, if an institution is officially declared to be systemically important,
this essentially boils down to an explicit government guarantee, especially given the on-
going lack of global resolution procedures for multinational and highly interconnected
banks. Various authors have found that this translates into a sizable implicit subsidy
which manifests itself in substantially lower funding costs even in an environment of
tighter regulation. For example, the IMF (2012) estimates the amount of this subsidy
for global SIFIs to be in the area of 60-80 basis points while Noss and Sowerbutts (2012)
detect sizable subsidies for banks in the UK. Generally, government guarantees tend to
weaken monitoring incentives and may spur risk-taking (Kareken and Wallace, 1978;
Keeley, 1990). It therefore appears unfortunate that the share of bank liabilities enjoy-
ing either explicit or implicit government backing has increased in trend during the
last decades. For the US, Marshall et al. (2015) estimate that the share of guaranteed
liabilities rose from roughly 45% in 1999 to 60% in 2013. These results strongly suggest
that externalities resulting from interconnectedness and the too-big-too-fail problem in
general are not adequately internalized by the current supervision framework. Hence,
banking supervision continues to suffer from a fundamental time-inconsistency prob-
lem, especially with respect to large and interconnected institutions.
5.4.3 Political Constraints
Macroprudential regulation is countercyclical in its nature. Ideally, the policy stance
should be tightened during the boom and relaxed during the bust. However, tightening
the policy stance during booms may turn out difficult because of political constraints.
The public opinion towards countercyclical measures justified by concerns about sys-
temic risk is likely to be negative, especially since the nature of systemic risk is arguably
more difficult to understand than for example the benefits of price stability. Baker (2015,
pp. 19-23) summarizes this problem as follows:
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"It is that countercyclical measures are most required from the perspec-
tive of the system as whole at precisely the point when there is least political
and social appetite for them, because they appear to the majority, from an
individual perspective, to be unnecessary due to perceived low risks. [...]
The benefits of macroprudential [regulation] relate to reducing the hidden
long term costs generated by systemic risk and financial instability. These
are muchmore difficult to articulate and communicate in terms of near term
individual benefits."
A strict rule-based application of macroprudential instruments would greatly alleviate
this problem. However, there is no widely accepted rule for calibration so far. Indeed,
ESRB (2014a) recommends basing macroprudential policy on the principle of "guided
discretion." Given the relative inexperience with systemic-risk measurement, quantita-
tive recommendations should always be supplemented with supervisory judgment.
This will make it difficult to conduct macroprudential policy free of political influ-
ence.14 Put bluntly, it will be tough to take a stand in a debate against politicians and
industry representatives armed with a one-sided HP filter as the main argument. Hell-
wig (2009, pp. 189-191) additionally stresses the risk of "regulatory capture," meaning
that supervisors might tend to act in the interest of banks instead of society, for in-
stance motivated by political preferences for large domestic banking groups ("national
champions"). Hence, it remains to be seen whether countercyclical policies can be ap-
plied with sufficient rigor. Moreover, policies may be complicated by time lags in data
collection and implementation.
5.4.4 Fundamental Procyclicality
Bank balance sheets behave procyclically by nature. If assets are valued atmarket prices
and liabilities have a fixed nominal value, asset price fluctuations will translate into
fluctuations of the equity base. During an asset price boom, banks’ equity positions are
strengthened almost mechanically, which facilitates an expansion of balance sheets and
14 The advantages of rule-based over discretionary policies have been formalized in an influential con-
tribution by Kydland and Prescott (1977). See also Barro and Gordon (1983) as well as Taylor (2012)
for applications of their insights to monetary policymaking. However, the operating environment of
macroprudential supervision is characterized by enormous complexity and uncertainty. This makes
discretion unavoidable to some extent, at least until policymakers have gained reliable experience
regarding the impact of their instruments.
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further asset price increases (Adrian and Shin, 2010b). Tighter capital regulation can
dampen the amplitude of such effects, but it cannot fully eliminate them. For this rea-
son, Shin (2013) and Cochrane (2014) propose taxing balance-sheet expansions during
asset price booms, especially when funded via inherently fragile Non-Core Liabilities
such as repos and interbank debt. These proposals have not entered the supervisory
toolkit to date.
5.4.5 Flawed Risk-Weighting
The practice of imposing capital requirements based on risk-weighted assets is subject
to increasing criticism. First, risk-weighting makes capital regulation inherently pro-
cyclical (Kashyap and Stein, 2004; Hellwig, 2009). During a boom, credit ratings of bor-
rowers tend to improve which reduces their risk weight and hence the required capital
cushion. In the bust, credit ratings deteriorate, which automatically raises risk weights
and capital requirements precisely when they are most difficult to fulfill. Moreover,
risk weights for some asset classes are regarded to be inadequately low. For example,
domestic government bonds need to backed with zero capital in most jurisdictions. As
emphasized by Weidmann (2012), this very practice made banks within the Euro Area
very vulnerable to solvency problems of governments. It arguably strengthened the
adverse feedback loop between declines in government solvency and increasing bank-
ing distress associated with the need for fiscal support, which is regarded as one of the
key issues in the EMU sovereign debt crisis (Shambaugh, 2012). Furthermore, Scopel-
liti (2014) documents that capital requirements for asset-backed securities have been
very low prior to the crisis.15 Another issue is that banks are allowed to calculate risk
weights according to internal risk-management models. While this practice is useful in
general, Mariathasan and Merrouche (2014) as well as Begley et al. (2015) provide evi-
dence for strategic under-reporting of risks, that is, banks exploit discretionary leeway
in internal risk modeling to obtain artificially low risk weights for the purpose of capital
requirement minimization. Hence, it has to be concluded that the inherent deficiencies
of the risk-weighting approach allow banks to accumulate too much risk with too little
capital.
15 An AAA-rated asset-backed security (ABS) had to be funded with roughly 1% of capital, which (at
least with the benefit of hindsight) appears clearly undersized.
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5.4.6 Excessive Leverage
The risk-weighting approach allows banks to operate with inadequately thin capital
cushions. The Basel III framework addresses this issue by imposing a leverage ratio,
i.e., the ratio of total non-risk-weighted assets to capital must not exceed 33. Put dif-
ferently, roughly 3% of total assets have to be funded with capital. Various authors
consider this requirement to be drastically insufficient. Most prominently, Admati et al.
(2010) and Admati and Hellwig (2013) make the case for a ratio in the range of 20-
30%.16 Miles et al. (2013) conduct a cost-benefit analysis of capital requirements and
conclude that optimal capital ratios should be much higher than envisaged under Basel
III. Specifically, they find that the optimal capital ratio is between 7-10% of total risk
non-weighted assets. However, Hoenig (2015) documents that average capital ratios of
global SIFIs were just below 5% at the end of 2014. Angelini et al. (2015) estimate the
costs of an increase in capital requirements by employing calibrated dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium models (henceforth DSGE-models) for the EMU and the US,
and find that a one percentage point increase leads to a small decline of about 0.1% in
the steady state GDP level. However, they do not account for the indirect benefits of
reduced crisis risk. Hanson et al. (2011) demonstrate that there is no historical correla-
tion between bank capital ratios and lending spreads. Haldane and Madouros (2012)
show that banks’ non-risk-weighted leverage ratios have been a more reliable predictor
of failure during the crisis that the risk-weighted capital ratio. Moreover, the major-
ity of banks which failed during the crisis operated with leverage ratios well below
the new regulatory benchmark of 33. Consistent with this, the IMF (2010) estimates
that the recent financial crisis forced the global banking system to conduct cumulative
write-downs amounting to about 4% of their total assets. To sum up, there are very
convincing theoretical and empirical arguments suggesting that banks are still allowed
16 Moreover, they debunk various claims pertaining to the optimality of high bank leverage. For ex-
ample, it used to be a widely shared position that high leverage is beneficial as it allows banks to
maximize the creation of liquid money-like liabilities. However, their liquidity would actually be
improved if banks become safer by holding more equity (see Admati and Hellwig (2013, ch. 10) and
the references therein). Another popular argument is that holding capital is costly. Raising capital
requirements would raise banks’ funding costs and thus leads to more restrictive lending conditions
which would harm economic growth. However, the cost of capital is not constant. The riskiness of
bank equity decreases with declining leverage, and so does the required return on equity (Admati
and Hellwig, 2013, ch. 7). A counterargument against a strict leverage ratio is brought forward by
Burghof and Müller (2014), who show that leverage ratios tend to reduce specialization in the bank-
ing sector which can lead to correlated portfolios. The latter outcome can adversely affect systemic
risk, as it was discussed in Section 4.2.
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to operate with excessive leverage. Unfortunately, these insights have had very little
policy impact so far.
Hence, I arrive at an unpleasant conclusion: The current state of macroprudential
regulation is insufficient to guarantee the resilience of the financial system and to miti-
gate its inherent procyclicality. Put differently, systemic risk remains excessive and the
associated externalities are not fully mitigated. This result brings off the first part of
my thesis. Given the insufficiency of macroprudential supervision, systemic risk ulti-
mately becomes a concern for monetary policy. The subsequent part explores the nexus
between monetary policy and systemic risk.
Part II
The Nexus of Monetary Policy and
Systemic Risk

Chapter 6
Why is Systemic Risk a Challenge
for Monetary Policy?
Systemic risk materializes in the form of a severe financial crisis and spillovers to the
real economy can adversely affect the central bank’s capability to pursue its essential
objectives. The primary objective for monetary policy is to deliver price stability. Some
emphasis is also put on the stabilization of output and employment, but usually only to
the extent that there is no interference with the primary objective. If macroprudential
regulation fails to mitigate the build-up of systemic risk, the associated risks to price
and output stability inevitably become a concern for monetary policy.
Monetary policy objectives are prominently anchored within central bank laws.
With respect to the European Central Bank, Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union stipulates that "[t]he primary objective of the European
System of Central Banks [...] shall be to maintain price stability." Regarding the Federal
Reserve System, Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act defines "the goals of maximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates."
The actual operationalization of the price stability objective is left to central banks
themselves. The ECB (2014) states that she "aims to maintain inflation rates below, but
close to, 2% over the medium term," where inflation is measured by "a year-on-year
increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area." The
Federal Reserve contends in a statement by the Federal OpenMarket Committee (2014)
that "inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price
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index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run
with the Federal Reserves statutory mandate."
With respect to output and employment stabilization targets, central banks gener-
ally do not provide any explicit guidance. Nonetheless it is often assumed that mon-
etary policy seeks to keep GDP growth close to the growth rate of potential output as
a secondary objective. This holds similarly (and to some extent interchangeably) for
employment, where monetary policy is thought to minimize deviations between the
actual and the "structural" unemployment rate.
Price stability is considered as desirable since inflation produces considerable eco-
nomic and social costs (Fischer and Modigliani, 1978), whereas an output stabilization
objective can be justified theoretically with household preferences for consumption
smoothing (Woodford, 2003). Accordingly, an approach of simultaneously targeting
inflation and (to a lesser extent) the output gap has become the dominant theoretical
doctrine of monetary policymaking before the financial crisis. It is usually referred to
as flexible inflation targeting.1
Theoretical treatments of monetary policymaking usually assume that central banks
seek to minimize a loss function by appropriately using their policy instrument. A
standard central bank loss function for a period t is given by
Lt = (pt − p
∗)2 + λ(yt − y
∗)2 (6.1)
where losses depend on squared deviations of inflation pt from its target p∗ and
on squared differences between actual (yt) and potential (y∗) growth rates of output,
while λ denotes the relative weight of output stabilization. Whereas this type of loss
function is often imposed in an ad-hoc fashion, Woodford (2003) shows that it can be
explicitly derived from a microfounded New-Keynesian model where monetary policy
maximizes social utility for a representative agent. Figure 6.1 provides loss estimates
on a yearly basis for the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England from 1996
up to 2013.2
1 See Svensson (1997) for an early exposition of the inflation targeting approach and Goodfriend (2007)
for a description of the pre-crisis consensus view on monetary policy.
2 Each central bank is assumed to have an inflation target of p∗ = 2, and the weight on output stabiliza-
tion λ is set to 0.5. Data on inflation and output gaps was obtained from OECD Economic Outlook,
Eurostat and FED FRED.
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Figure 6.1: Central Bank Loss Estimates 1996-2013
It is apparent that losses increased considerably with the onset of the financial crisis
in 2007. The fatal and self-reinforcing interplay of increasing financial distress and de-
clining economic activity translated into large output gaps persisting for several years.
Moreover, inflation rates temporarily fell below target in the US and the Euro Area.
Given these adverse environments, policymakers embarked on unconventional pol-
icy measures to an unprecedented extent. Since short-term rates as the traditional
policy instrument had quickly become constrained by their zero lower bound, cen-
tral banks tried to stimulate the economy by means of large-scale asset purchases and
explicit commitments to a prolonged period of very low interest rates.3 Empirical as-
sessments generally attribute some success to the efforts undertaken in the sense that
they prevented a further intensification of the ongoing recessions (Gambacorta et al.,
2012;Moessner, 2013). The beneficial short-run effects notwithstanding, some observers
claim that unconventional policy may have unintended and unfavorable consequences
for financial stability, fiscal discipline and central bank independence in the long run
(White, 2012).
As illustrated by Figure 6.1, financial crises may drastically compromise the ability
of central banks to achieve their objectives. Thus, there should be a vital interest in
3 A useful overview on unconventional policy measures is provided by Borio and Disyatat (2010).
148 CHAPTER 6. SYSTEMIC RISK AS A CHALLENGE FOR MONETARY POLICY
ex-ante-prevention. As argued in Section 5.4, the current state of financial supervision
is likely to leave excessive systemic risk as a mostly unresolved issue. The task of reg-
ulating systemic risk therefore ultimately becomes a concern of the central bank, and it
remains unclear whether monetary policy is able to perform this task without neglect-
ing its other goals. The question of how monetary policy affects systemic risk is thus of
utmost importance and calls for a careful reconsideration of the transmission process
of monetary policy.
Indeed, there has been a lively debate on the question whether US policy rates have
been "too low for too long" in the years prior to the crisis. Most prominently, Taylor
(2007) argues that the level of the US Federal Funds Rate has been inadequately low
between 2002 and 2005 which, in his view, contributed to the boom-bust cycle on US
housing markets. This view is disputed by Bernanke (2010) and Greenspan (2010),
who mainly blame insufficient financial regulation and additionally point out that the
prolonged period of low rates prior to the crisis was justified by downside risks to
inflation.
In general, the transmission of monetary policy impulses has been an important
research topic for decades. Broad consensus has been achieved on the existence of
several transmission channels linking monetary impulses to adjustment processes on
financial markets and finally to aggregate demand and inflation (Mishkin, 1995). Until
recently, however, the established theory on monetary transmission paid little attention
to effects of the policy stance on risk-taking behavior within the financial sector. The
relatively new concept of a risk-taking channel (Borio and Zhu, 2012) sheds light on these
issues, and argues for a nexus between monetary policymaking and the evolution of
systemic risk on financial markets. In the remainder, I will first outline the traditional
understanding of monetary policy transmission. After that, I will extensively discuss
the concept of the risk-taking channel on both a theoretical and an empirical basis.
Eventually, I will highlight potential needs to adjust monetary policy frameworks.
My key hypothesis is that the existence of a risk-taking channel in conjunction with
the insufficient regulation of systemic risk creates a new and challenging policy envi-
ronment in which the central bank faces additional trade-offs. While pre-crisis wisdom
usually suggested that central banks automatically foster financial stability by deliv-
ering price stability (Schwartz, 1995; Issing, 2003), the crisis experience suggests other-
wise. Central banks not only have to trade off inflation and output variability. Financial
stability considerations - and their feedback to the former two aspects - may impose an
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additional constraint on monetary policy. Under some circumstances, the central bank
could become forced to accept a higher degree of macroeconomic volatility in the short
run for the sake of medium-term financial market stabilization.

Chapter 7
Traditional Understanding of
Monetary Policy Transmission
The consensus view of monetary transmission implies that nominal rigidities enable
the central bank to exert short-term influence on real variables (Mishkin, 1995; Tay-
lor, 1995). It is assumed that wages and prices show some degree of stickiness which
allows the central bank to influence real interest rates by varying nominal short-term
rates (Taylor, 1999). Changes in real interest rates ultimately affect agents’ spending
decisions, aggregate demand and eventually inflation.
Importantly, modern frameworks explain nominal rigidities with frictions in the
wage and price-setting process instead of assuming some type of adaptive expectation
formation and/or money illusion.1 This allows to reconcile the sticky behavior of nom-
inal variables with the assumptions of rational expectations and optimizing agents. The
current workhorse model of monetary policy analysis is the so-called New-Keynesian
Model, which is strongly devoted to the idea of microfoundation, that is, macroeco-
nomic dynamics are understood as the aggregation of optimal decisions made by rep-
resentative firms and households. The introduction of wage- and price-setting fric-
tions of various forms gives rise to inflation and output persistence and monetary non-
neutrality in the short run.2
1 Popular models of staggered price setting have been developed by Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg
(1982). A wage setting model in a similar spirit has been proposed by Taylor (1980).
2 See Gali (2008), Goodfriend (2002) and Woodford (2003) for detailed expositions of the New-
Keynesian paradigm.
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The actual transmission of monetary policy impulses takes place via various chan-
nels. In general, changes in short-term interest rates affect the set of (relative) prices on
financial markets which triggers adjustments in agents’ spending behavior and eventu-
ally in aggregate consumption, investment and in the current account. The associated
variation in aggregate demand ultimately affects inflation dynamics.
It is common to categorize transmission channels with respect to their view on the
properties of financial markets. Henceforth, I borrow the terminology of Boivin et al.
(2010) and distinguish between channels which assume perfect financial markets (neo-
classical channels) and channels which recognize the presence of financial frictions (non-
neoclassical channels). The subsequent discussion of neoclassical transmission channels
will be comparably brief. Non-neoclassical transmission channels will be covered in
greater detail, as they represent the natural starting point for an analysis of the risk-
taking channel.
7.1 Neoclassical Transmission Channels
Monetary policy influences interest rates and thus the cost of investment. Standard
neoclassical investment theory derives optimal investment behavior from the intertem-
poral maximization of firm value (Jorgenson, 1963). One of the key determinants of
investment in that respect is the user cost of capital uc, which, according to Boivin et al.
(2010), can be expressed as
uc = pc[{(1− τ)i− πe} − {πec − π
e}+ δ], (7.1)
where pc denotes the relative price of new capital, i the nominal interest rate, πe
expected inflation, πce the expected rate of change in the price of the capital asset, δ
is the capital asset’s depreciation rate and τ is the marginal tax rate which enters the
formula to account for tax deductibility of interest rate expenses. Equation (7.1) can be
decomposed into (i) the opportunity costs of holding capital, which are given by the
real tax-adjusted interest rate (1− τ)i− πe, (ii) expected real capital gains πec − π
e and
(iii) the depreciation rate δ.
User costs and themarginal profitability of investment have to be equal in optimum.
Consequently, the effect of a policy-induced change in the interest rate i on user costs
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uc triggers an adjustment of the capital stock to restore the optimum. For example, if
the interest rate declines, user costs decrease as well. Firms respond with an increase of
their capital stock and its marginal productivity decreases. This process continues until
the optimality condition is restored. Hence, a decline in interest rate triggers additional
investment.
Given the longer-term nature of most investment projects, the actually relevant in-
terest rate in Equation (7.1) is likely to be a long-term rate. Since the instrument of
traditional monetary policymaking is a short-term rate, an additional concept linking
short and long rates is required: The expectation theory of the term structure (ETTS). In its
purest form, the expectation theory links rates of different maturities in a no-arbitrage
condition, that is, a long-term fixed income investment must yield the same return as
a revolving investment in short-term securities. As a consequence, the long-term rate
approximately equals the average value of current and expected short-term rates (see
for example Romer (2012, pp. 518-520)). If the central bankmanipulates current and/or
expected short rates, the long-term rate is pushed into the same direction.3
Another closely related mechanism which enhances the inverse relationship be-
tween interest rates and investment is the q-theory of Tobin (1969). Tobin’s q is the
ratio of the actual market value of capital compared to its replacement costs, that is,
the relative price of new capital or investment.4 The value of q guides the decision of
a firm whether to increase its capital stock via the acquisition of existing capital or by
investment in new capital. Monetary policy indirectly affects q and hence aggregate
investment. If the central bank lowers interest rates, capital asset prices rise for two
reasons. First, lower interest rates reduce the discount factor applied to the valuation
of future cash flows. Second, lowering the yields on fixed income assets triggers port-
folio substitution, which increases demand for capital assets and hence their prices.5
3 This treatment of ETTS is of course incomplete and merely designed to illustrate the proposition that
policy-induced changes of short-term rates do have a concurrent effect on long-term rates. More
sophisticated treatments of ETTS and term structure theories in general can be found for example in
Geiger (2011), Russell (1992) and Shiller and McCulloch (1990).
4 It should be noted that the relative price of capital also figures prominently in the user cost formula
(7.1). This is not a coincidence. Hayashi (1982) shows that the user cost approach and the q-theory
can be reconciled in a generalized framework for optimal investment.
5 This argument is regarded as crucial in the monetarist view of monetary transmission, which empha-
sizes that policy interventions perturb the optimal portfolio choice of households by their effect on
relative yields across the entire spectrum of assets (Meltzer, 1995). For example, a decline in the pol-
icy rate decreases yields on fixed-income assets. Households respond with a reallocation of wealth
towards stocks, which can be simplistically regarded as residual claims on profits from owning and
employing capital assets. If demand for stocks increases, stock prices will rise. So does Tobin’s q,
which renders investment conditions more favorable.
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If capital asset prices increase, q increases as well. Installation of new capital becomes
relatively cheaper and investment consequently increases.
A different avenue for monetary transmission is based on the impact of central bank
operations on consumption via wealth effects, which can be formalized in the life-cycle
model of consumption by Ando and Modigliani (1963). If individuals have the desire
to achieve a steady level of consumption over their lifetime they smooth consumption
across periods, for example with the accumulation of retirement savings. Hence, if asset
prices and thus the value of savings increase due to a decline in the policy rate, a higher
level of (current) consumption becomes affordable.
Another important mechanism similar in spirit is the intertemporal substitution ef-
fect, which figures prominently in the New-Keynesian Model (see for instance Gali
(2008, ch. 2-3)). If interest rates decrease, consuming today becomes more attractive
relative to saving for the sake of future consumption. The optimal trade-off between
consumption now and in the future is determined by the Euler Equation of consump-
tion
uct = β(1+ rt)u
c
t+1, (7.2)
implying that disutility from giving up amarginal amount of consumption uct today
needs to equal the utility from possible future consumption, which is the marginal util-
ity of consumption in the next period uct+1 multiplied with the gross real interest rate
on savings (1+ rt) corrected for the gross time preference rate β. If, other things equal,
rt decreases, agents optimally respond with an increase of current consumption, which
in turn decreases marginal utility uct and restores the optimum.
Monetary impulses also affect relative yields of domestic and foreign assets which
may have implications for the exchange rate and the current account (Mishkin, 1995).
If the central bank decreases interest rates, investors respond with portfolio shifts to-
wards foreign assets. The associated capital outflows go hand in hand with an ex-
change rate depreciation, which ultimately benefits the current account and aggregate
demand. This so-called exchange rate channel gains in relevance with increasing open-
ness towards trade and capital flows.
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The empirical relevance of the aforementioned channels has been documented ex-
tensively. Indeed, it is a common and generally undisputed finding that variations in
the policy rate inversely affect macroeconomic aggregates as well as the inflation rate.6
7.2 Non-Neoclassical Transmission Channels
7.2.1 Incomplete Information and Credit Constraints
The theory of non-neoclassical transmission channels incorporates concepts from the
literature on financial intermediation under incomplete information. In such a setting,
lender-borrower relationships between banks and firms or households are complicated
by various agency problems. The presence of agency problems makes obtaining ex-
ternal funding more costly than internal financing and commands an external finance
premium (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). In the extreme, external finance may become
completely unavailable. As famously shown by Stiglitz andWeiss (1981), this constella-
tion of credit rationingmay emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon, implying that some
borrowers do not receive credit despite they are willing to pay the market interest rate.
Especially small firms and households usually cannot fall back on capital market fund-
ing. They are dependent on bank loans as their only source for external finance.7 Thus,
the presence of agency problems implies that obtaining external funding is particularly
costly or even infeasible. In the latter case, firms and households may become credit-
constrained.
Agency problems on loan markets are closely related to the special incentive struc-
ture associated with limited liability. Limited liability acts like a put option in the sense
that losses of the borrower are limited to his equity stake and/or the amount of pledged
collateral (Jensen andMeckling, 1976). If losses are limited, borrowers can increase their
expected profit by taking on more risk. Particularly good outcomes generate high prof-
its whereas the losses in adverse states are mainly borne by lenders. In the extreme,
6 See Bernanke et al. (2005), Christiano et al. (1999), Mojon et al. (2002) and Romer and Romer (1989)
among others.
7 Diamond (1991) shows that firms without an established reputation have difficulties to receive fund-
ing on capital markets. An alternative reason for a lack of capital market access is an insufficient eq-
uity base (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). In both cases, severe agency problems prevent the issuance of
debt securities. Instead, financing is only possible by banks who mitigate agency problems with the
help of specific screening and monitoring capabilities. A rather practical argument is that presence
on capital markets carries fixed costs, such as rating fees or costs for building an investor-relations
team. These costs may be prohibitively high for small and medium-sized firms.
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it may hold that borrowers prefer a high-risk project with low expected return over a
low-risk project with high returns. In a nutshell, limited liability creates a global (and
often socially inefficient) risk-taking incentive.
The provision of collateral acts as a disciplining device which may align the in-
centives of borrowers and lenders, such that the aforementioned agency problems are
mitigated to a great extent. In general, risk-taking incentives are attenuated if the bor-
rower has enough "skin in the game." The mere possibility that collateral is seized by
the lender in the case of default acts as a sufficiently strong deterrent from taking ex-
cessive risk. Collateral is either of explicit or implicit form: Explicit collateral takes the
form of specific assets such as real estate or government bonds which are handed to the
lender in the case of default. Implicit collateral is the equity position on the borrower’s
balance sheet. The equity position reflects discounted future profits which are lost in
the case of default. Hence, a strong equity base or, equivalently, a low debt-equity ratio
tames risk-taking incentives since future profits only accrue if the firm survives. The
difference between the sum of explicit and implicit collateral and outstanding liabilities
is usually referred to as the net worth of a firm.
Importantly, banks are not only lenders. They are borrowers as well. The refinanc-
ing of modern banking groups heavily relies on non-insured capital market funding.
Hence, banks will likewise be judged with respect to their risk-taking incentives and
their net worth. If the net worth of both firms and banks is reduced, agency problems
may intensify. The possibility of credit rationing reemerges and the external finance
premium likely rises. Both the ability to lend and to borrow decline.
Monetary policy affects the lending capacity of financial intermediaries and the bor-
rowing capacity of firms and households in a procyclical fashion. A rise in interest rates
decreases both the net worth of firms and the net worth of banks, aggregate credit con-
sequently contracts and so does credit-financed spending, i.e., especially investment
and durable consumption. The impact of monetary policy goes beyond the effects of
neoclassical transmission theory. The presence of financial market imperfections am-
plifies the response of aggregate demand to a policy change. In what follows, I briefly
discuss the role of collateral in preventing rationing equilibria. Subsequently, I outline
several approaches linking the stance of monetary policy to the net worth of economic
agents, which determines their ability to lend and to borrow and thereby influences
aggregate spending.
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7.2.2 Credit Rationing and the Mitigating Role of Collateral
Information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers can lead to the problem of
credit rationing. If lenders are unable ex ante to evaluate the riskiness of a potential
borrower and his investment project, a classical problem of adverse selection emerges
and credit rationing may occur as an equilibrium outcome (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). If
lenders are uncertain about the true riskiness of a potential borrower, they charge an
interest rate based on the average riskiness of all borrowers.
Under the presence of limited liability, risky borrowers are willing to pay higher
interest rates. As argued above, the expected payoff for borrowers increases in risk,
which makes a higher interest rate affordable. However, lending to risky borrowers is
less profitable for banks. Hence, the willingness to supply credit starts to decrease for
higher interest rates. Indeed, credit supplymay become backward-bending as in Figure
7.1. If loan demand is sufficiently strong, the market does not clear and excess demand
emerges as an equilibrium phenomenon even though every borrower is willing to pay
the demanded interest rate.
Figure 7.1: Credit Rationing as an Equilibrium Phenomenon
Another variety of credit rationing may occur due to ex post problems related to
moral hazard (Bester and Hellwig, 1987). It is assumed that borrowers may alter the
riskiness of their investment project after they have received funding. They are able
to choose between a safe project and a risky project which yields a very high payoff
if successful but nevertheless has a lower expected profit. It is shown that borrowers
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choose the risky project after the required loan rate exceeds a certain threshold (which
is inefficient). Again, the risk-taking incentive of limited liability serves as an explana-
tion. The moral hazard problem equally gives rise to a backward-bending loan supply
schedule and the possibility of credit rationing in equilibrium.
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems can be mitigated with the help of col-
lateral as a disciplining device. With respect tomoral hazard, the risk of losing collateral
to the lender if payoffs are insufficient may induce borrowers to refrain from choosing
the risky project. With respect to adverse selection, Bester (1985) shows that if lenders
offer different contracts where collateral requirements and interest rates vary, this may
act as a self-selection mechanism where borrowers’ choices automatically reveal their
type. Riskier borrowers prefer higher interest rates and lower collateral requirements
than safer borrowers. Each type of contract ensures that banks recoup their funding
costs and make zero profits in a competitive equilibrium. Thus, the credit market clears
and the rationing problem vanishes.
7.2.3 Borrowing Constraints and the Financial Accelerator
Credit market imperfections imply that some borrowers end up being financially con-
strained if information asymmetries cannot be overcome by pledging a sufficient amount
of collateral. The occurrence of credit rationing may severely diminish aggregate in-
vestment and hence economic activity in general.
In that respect, a simple yet insightful model is laid out in Freixas and Rochet (2008,
ch. 6).8 It considers a firm which transforms input x into output f (x) with diminishing
marginal returns. Input and output prices are both normalized to unity. The firm fi-
nances the acquisition of inputs out of their given wealth positionW and an additional
loan L supplied at the interest rate of r. Profits are maximized by the choice of L. With
complete information, the optimization problem becomes
max
L
f (L+W)− (1+ r)L. (7.3)
The first-order condition is
8 The model originally goes back to Bernanke et al. (1996). The important role of collateral constraints
for macroeconomic dynamics has also been highlighted by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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f ′(L+W) = (1+ r), (7.4)
which yields the result that the level of production is chosen such that marginal
productivity equals the interest rate of the loan. This condition can be regarded as a
simplified corollary of neoclassical investment theory. If r increases, optimality requires
that f ′(L+W) has to increase as well, which can only be achieved by reducing "invest-
ment" in inputs, which in turn establishes a negative link between interest rates and
investment. Under complete information, firms can obtain as much loans as necessary
to implement the optimal level of investment as determined by Equation (7.4).
Now assume that agency problems call for full collateralization of loans. The repay-
ment value of the loan (1+ r)Lmust not exceed the firm’s wealthW, which is expressed
as the volume of the firm’s asset K multiplied with their price q. The investment deci-
sion is now subject to a collateral constraint of the form
L ≤
qK
1+ r
, (7.5)
which states that the maximum loan value is given by the present value of the firm’s
assets. The new optimization problem is given by
max
L
f (L+W)− (1+ r)L
s.t. L ≤
qK
1+ r
.
(7.6)
Taking the first order condition of the respective Lagrangian gives the optimality
condition
f ′(L+W) = 1+ r+ λ, (7.7)
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier, i.e., the marginal increase of profits given
a marginal relaxation of the collateral constraint. If the constraint is binding, λ is posi-
tive and can be regarded as the shadow cost of the collateral constraint. The presence of
a binding collateral constraint leads to credit rationing and decreases investment com-
pared to the unconstrained optimum: Principally profitable investment opportunities
are foregone. Agency problems hence impose a substantial deadweight loss.
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Alternatively, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) consider a model in which borrower net
worth does not determine the availability of external finance per se, but rather its price.9
The key friction is that the outcome of the borrower’s investment project is private
information. Hence, the borrower has the incentive to falsely report a bad outcome in
order to reduce repayments. Lenders can only observe the true project outcome if they
incur verification costs. The presence of this verification cost drives a wedge between
the costs of internal and external funding, the so-called external finance premium (EFP).
Importantly, the EFP is inversely related to borrowers’ net worth. This is due to the
fact that higher net worth reduces the probability of bad outcomes and the associated
verification cost.10 If the EFP declines, more entrepreneurs find it worthwhile to invest
and aggregate demand increases.
What is the role for monetary policy in these frameworks? As argued by Bernanke
and Gertler (1995), monetary policy inversely affects borrower net worth via both direct
and indirect channels. Rising interest rates reduce asset prices and therefore directly
lower the value of potential collateral. Moreover, interest rate expenses go up which
impairs profitability. Finally, since a tighter policy stance decreases aggregate demand,
business conditions and firm profits may deteriorate further.
With its influence on borrower net worth, monetary policy critically affects both the
availability as well as the price of external finance. Monetary policy exerts influence on
investment beyond its effect on user costs, and changes in the policy rate are amplified by
their effects on collateral values and borrowing capacity. The outlined mechanisms are
usually referred to as the financial accelerator. They are certainly not limited to firms, but
to any borrower within the private sector. Thus, they may apply equally to households
and financial intermediaries themselves.
7.2.4 The Traditional Bank Lending Channel
Monetary policy not only affects the borrowing capacity of firms and households but
also the lending capacity of financial intermediaries which gives rise to a bank lending
9 Indeed, the empirical relevance on quantity rationing is mixed. While Bernanke (1983) emphasizes
the important role of rationing in the aggravation of the Great Depression, Berger and Udell (1992)
find no significant macroeconomic effect of credit rationing for the US economy between 1977 and
1988. On the other hand, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) document rationing behavior in the recent
financial crisis. However, it is difficult to assess whether this is due to deteriorating balance sheets of
borrowers or due to liquidity and solvency concerns in the banking sector itself.
10 Bernanke and Gertler (1989) show in detail that the optimal financing contract implies that lenders
pre-commit to stochastic verification in the bad state with some probability p. This ensures that
borrowers do not have the incentive to underreport.
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channel of monetary policy transmission. In its traditional form, the bank lending chan-
nel has been analyzed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), who augment the IS-LM model
with a market for bank loans. Banks raise deposits subject to a minimum reserve re-
quirement from the public and can invest in bonds as well as in loans to the private sec-
tor. The actual portfolio allocation is governed by the relative yields of both investment
opportunities. Importantly, loan demand is modeled to be relatively inelastic, reflect-
ing the notion that some borrowers have difficulties in accessing capital markets. This
assumption provides a simple device for an implicit incorporation of agency problems.
Unlike in the IS-LM model which assumes that all sorts of external financing occur on
some generic bond market, bonds and bank loans are treated as imperfect substitutes.
The presence of a minimum reserve requirement implies that banks are subject to a
balance sheet constraint. Suppose that banks are obliged to keep a share τ of deposits
as minimum reserve. If equity and the possibility to hold excess reserves are neglected,
the balance sheet identity reads
Lt + Bt + Rt = Dt, (7.8)
where Lt denotes loans, Bt denotes bonds, Rt is the stock of reserves and Dt stands
for deposits. The minimum reserve requirement stipulates that Rt = τDt, so that (7.8)
becomes
Lt + Bt = (1− τ)Dt. (7.9)
Monetary policy uses the level of bank reserves as its policy instrument. For exam-
ple, a tightening of the policy stance is achieved by contractionary open market oper-
ations. The central bank sells bonds in exchange for reserves, which reduces reserves
and deposits to the same extent. This has two effects: First, excess bond supply leads
to a decline in bond prices and a corresponding increase in (effective) interest rates on
bonds as in the IS-LM model. Moreover, the decrease in bank reserves tightens banks’
balance sheet constraint.
If Rt declines, the minimum reserve requirement is violated. Hence, banks need to
shrink the size of their balance sheet. Specifically, the necessary adjustment ∆Dt after a
change in the level of reserves ∆Rt is given by
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∆Dt = ∆(Bt + Lt) =
1
τ
∆Rt, (7.10)
implying that banks must reduce deposits and asset holdings overproportionally.
The reduction of loan supply tightens credit conditions. Bank-dependent borrowers
cannot substitute bank loans with capital market funding. The decrease in investment
and spending is consequently stronger than implied by the mere increase in bond rates.
The bank lending channel thus acts as an additional amplifier of monetary policy vari-
ations on the lenders’ side of the credit market.
This form of the bank lending channel has drawn severe criticism. Romer and
Romer (1990) argue that banks can insulate their loan supply from the policy stance
by relying on funding sources without reserve requirements such as time deposits.
However, since alternative funding is typically not covered by deposit insurance, the
issuance of non-insured, risky liabilities may be complicated by the very same agency
problems which impede the borrowing capability of firms and households. For in-
stance, Stein (1998) shows that non-insured bank liabilities command an external fi-
nance premium if the quality of bank assets is non-observable for potential bank cred-
itors. As a result, the policy-induced drain in deposits cannot be fully offset and their
substitution is costly (if possible at all) which reduces the incentive to lend.11
Notwithstanding the dispute over the Romer-Romer argument, there are other ob-
jections against the Bernanke-Blinder conception of the bank lending channel. Most
importantly, adjusting the quantity of bank reserves is no longer a key instrument in
modern monetary policymaking which, as an exact opposite, is characterized by an
elastic reserve supply. Modern central banks use the interest rate on reserve borrow-
ing by commercial banks as their main policy tool (Disyatat, 2008). In line with this,
the importance of minimum reserve requirements as an instrument of regulation has
been greatly reduced. In that respect, an insightful statement has been given by Tucker
(2004, p. 364), who describes policy implementation at the Bank of England as follows
(emphasis added):
11 Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) try to confirm this argument empirically by
showing that small, less liquid and weakly capitalized banks’ loan supply is particularly responsive
to changes in the policy stance. On the other hand, Oliner and Rudebusch (1993) do not find evidence
of a bank lending channel when analyzing changes in the composition of firm debt after a monetary
contraction. They also point out that the empirical distinction between bank lending channel mecha-
nisms and financial accelerator effects is hard to accomplish.
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"In terms of the overriding objective of stabilising ultra-short interest
rates [...], the key is to ensure that we are both the marginal supplier and
taker of "reserves." In theory, there are two possible ways of achieving this.
One is to use OMOs [open-market operations] to adjust the quantity of re-
serves to bring about the desired short-term interest rate, implicitly or ex-
plicitly drawing on an identified demand schedule. Neither in the past nor in
the current review have we even briefly entertained the notion that this is realistic.
The alternative way for the central bank to establish itself as the rate-setter
is to be prepared to supply (or absorb) whatever liquidity the market de-
mands at its chosen rate(s). The most precise way of doing this is through
so-called standing facilities in which the central bank lends (secured) whatever
is demanded at a fixed rate or takes on deposit whatever is supplied at a fixed rate."
Under such a regime, the level of deposits or, more generally, monetary aggregates
are determined endogenously. Banks are essentially able to create deposits by extending
credit to households and firms, whereas eventually arising reserve needs are readily
satisfied by the central bank at the policy rate. As noted by Spahn (2012, p. 24), the
development of monetary aggregates therefore follows loan market dynamics, which
inverts the direction of causality underlying the Bernanke-Blinder model. This position
is neatly summarized by Jakab and Kumhof (2014, p. 4), who claim that
"[i]n the real world, the key function of banks is the provision of financ-
ing, or the creation of new monetary purchasing power through loans, for a
single agent that is both borrower and depositor."
Hence, one is tempted to conclude with Disyatat (2011, p. 716) that "[t]here is no
quantitative constraint as such," which would render the Bernanke-Blinder view of the
bank lending channel essentially irrelevant.12
However, monetary policy potentially influences bank lending behavior even in
the absence of quantitative constraints. Changes in the monetary policy stance affect
the opportunity costs of holding deposits. Rising levels of interest rates may induce
12 The entire controversy hinges on the question whether the availability of deposits is a precondition
for granting loans, or, more fundamentally, whether saving is a precondition for investment. This
issue has been at the center of macroeconomic debates for decades. Yet a coverage of this discussion
is beyond the scope of this work. Jakab and Kumhof (2014, 2015), Spahn (2014) and the references
therein provide an overview.
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households to reallocate their wealth in favor of higher-yielding assets, which leads to
a drain in deposits. As argued by Spahn (2014, pp. 3-4), this is unconvincing: Under
most circumstances, deposits cannot decline in aggregate. Individual efforts of port-
folio substitution lead to a mere redistribution of deposit balances. For example, if
a depositor switches to holding corporate debt securities, the deposit balances of the
corporate sector rise while the aggregate level of deposits remains unchanged. Again,
arguing with quantities appears to be misguided.
Nevertheless, there is still a price-theoretic argument. Consider an initial equilib-
riumwhere the rate on deposits iD is equal to the policy rate i. An increase in the policy
rate to i′ makes central bank funding more expensive (i′ > iD). Banks with refinancing
needs will now try to attract deposits from other banks. The competition for deposits
causes banks to bid up the deposit rate until it holds that iD = i′.13 Due to maturity
transformation, yields on bank assets are relatively sticky. Thus, the average interme-
diation margin is compressed. Banks will react by raising lending rates on new loans
so as to pass on higher funding costs to their borrowers (Ehrmann et al., 2001, p. 20).
Hence, even in the absence of reserve constraints, monetary policy continues to affect
the terms of lending via its influence on the cost of banking.
Yet the borrowing ability of banks depends on a different quantitative constraint:
its equity position. Capital regulation and/or market discipline determine the maxi-
mally feasible loan supply as a multiple of the given stock of bank capital. By their
very nature, banks act simultaneously as borrowers and lenders. For similar reasons
like households and firms, banks are required by their lenders to be endowed with a
certain net worth. Hence, the logic of the financial accelerator equally applies to the
banking sector. Monetary policy systematically influences the capital base of financial
intermediaries through various channels, which gives rise to a distinct bank capital chan-
nel, as emphasized by Van den Heuvel (2002, 2006).
First, a tighter policy stance compresses the intermediation margin which dimin-
ishes future profits and thus the market value of bank equity. Second, a rise in interest
rates triggers price declines of assets which are marked-to-market. The adverse valua-
tion effect causes an immediate decrease of the capital position. Third, a policy-induced
13 Indeed, strength and speed of the pass-through of policy rate changes on both loan and deposit rates
are positively correlated with the degree of competition in the banking sector, as highlighted by van
Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) for the Eurozone.
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decline of economic activity may lead to elevated default rates in banks’ loan portfo-
lios. Decreasing capital forces banks to cut back loan supply, be it because the capital
constraint becomes binding or because of the mere risk of getting there.14
7.2.5 The Revisited Bank Lending Channel
A very insightful reformulation of the bank lending channel has been proposed by
Disyatat (2011). Importantly, his setup recognizes the endogenous nature of deposit
creation and links loan supply decisions exclusively to funding cost and net worth con-
siderations, instead of relying on the notion of a quantitative constraint on reserves
or deposits, respectively. The model features three types of agents in equal number:
Households, banks and firms. Firms require bank loans to finance production, since
households demand the payment of wages before production takes place. After receiv-
ing wage payments, households keep them as deposits within the banking sector. At
the end of the period, households use their deposits to purchase and consume produced
goods. Deposits are consequently transferred back to the firm sector which enables the
final repayment of loans. Hence, the level of deposits is exclusively determined by
the equilibrium quantity of credit. While deposits change hands, they do not leave
the banking system as such and remain constant in level. They circulate between the
various sectors of the economy and serve as means of payment.
Firms produce output with labor as the only production factor. They are risky in
the sense that they may end up with zero output due to an adverse productivity shock.
Their production function is given by
y = Nβ(1+ ǫ) (7.11)
with N representing units of labor employed and 0 < β < 1. There is an aggregate
productivity shock ǫ whose distribution follows
ǫ =

0 w. p. θ−1 w. p. (1− θ) (7.12)
14 A counterargument is that banks can issue additional equity claims. However, equity issuance may
be complicated by agency problems and is therefore very costly (if feasible at all). See Section 4.3 for
a short discussion of this issue.
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implying that output becomes zero with a probability of (1− θ). In that case, the
firmdefaults on its bank obligations. Hence, bank lending is subject to non-diversifiable
credit risk. The output price P and unit labor costs PN are treated as constant. The bank
lending rate is denoted by rL. Thus, expected firm profits are given by
Πe = θ(PNβ − (1+ rL)PNN). (7.13)
Firms maximize profits by optimally choosing N. As shown in Appendix A.3, tak-
ing the FOC yields optimal labor demand:
N∗ =
(
βP
(1+ rL)PN
) 1
1−β
. (7.14)
By assumption, labor is elastically supplied by households at PN . A rise in the
loan rate rL decreases N∗ and thus aggregate output, since financing of the produc-
tion process becomes more expensive. The actually required loan amount is given by
LD = PNN
∗.
Banks are initially endowed with a capital position of ω, which is subject to a uni-
formly distributed shock in the interval [u, u] with −1 < u < 0 < u at the end of the
period.15 Net worth at the end of the period is thus given by
ψ = ω(1+ u). (7.15)
If the firm is hit by the adverse productivity shock, the bank receives a zero payoff
but still has to repay its depositors, i.e., households. Repayment is only possible if the
capital position is sufficiently large. Specifically, it needs to hold that
ψ = ω(1+ u) > (1+ R)L, (7.16)
where R is the interest rate on deposits. The critical value u∗ for the net worth shock
is then given by
15 Disyatat (2011, p. 719) explains the motivation for this assumption as follows: "The idea is that banks
are subject to risks, such as operation risk and risk associated with existing assets and liabilities, in
addition to the marginal risk inherent in new lending. This will be captured by the variable u[.]" In
what follows, the terms capital and net worth will be used interchangeably.
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u∗ =
(1+ R)L
ω
− 1. (7.17)
By applying the cumulative distribution function of the uniform distribution, the
conditional default probability of a bank given the failure of its debtor firm can be writ-
ten as
q ≡ Pr(ψ < (1+ R)L)
= Pr(u < u∗)
=
u∗ − u
u− u
.
(7.18)
The unconditional probability of bank default is the product of the probabilities that
(i) the debtor firm fails and (ii) net worth is insufficient to pay off depositors, implying
that
1− x ≡ (1− θ)q, (7.19)
where x is the probability of repayment. As the model assumes perfect competition,
the lending rate banks charge from firms is determined by a zero-profit condition. Rev-
enues from extending loans have to equal funding costs plus expected costs of default.
Hence, it holds that
θ(1+ rL)L = x(1+ R)L+ (1− x)ψe, (7.20)
where the left-hand-side denotes expected revenues from loan repayments, x(1+
R)L denotes funding costs in the no-default case which accrue with probability x, and
ψe is expected net worth in the default case, which has to be transferred to borrowers
with probability (1− x). The expected net worth in the default scenario is given by
ψe = ω
[
1+
u+ u∗
2
]
, (7.21)
since default implies that the realization of the net worth shock must lie in the in-
terval [u, u∗]. The mean of the shock is easily obtained by taking the average of the
interval’s boundaries.
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In a last step, household behavior needs to be specified. Households are either able
to hold deposits or to invest into some risk-free asset yielding (1+ r f ), where r f is set
by the central bank. The indifference condition which equalizes expected returns reads
(1+ r f )L = x(1+ R)L+ (1− x)(ψ
e − cL), (7.22)
which states that risk-free gross returns need to equal the expected value of repay-
ments from the bank. Importantly, it is assumed that depositors cannot seize bank net
worth to the full extent. Its liquidation entails contract enforcement costs of amount c,
which are proportional to the loan volume L.16 The existence of liquidation costs and
default risks implies that deposits need to carry a premium in order to fulfill (7.22).
Hence, it holds that R > r f .
The loan supply schedule of the bank can be derived in several steps. First, the
household indifference condition needs to be rearranged. Appendix A.3 shows that
this yields
(1− θ)ω(u− u)
2
q2 +
[
(1− θ)cL−ω(u− u)
]
q−ω(1+ u) + (1+ r f )L ≡ 0. (7.23)
From Equation (7.23), one can infer the conditional default probability q of banks for
a given amount of loans L and a given amount of initial capital ω. Put differently, it is
possible to derive the critical value of L for which q becomes non-zero. If L rises relative
to capital ω, the leverage of the bank increases. Hence, at some level of L, the capital
position may turn out to be too small to pay off depositors if the firm is defaulting. This
critical value LL is obtained by setting q = 0 in Equation (7.23), which is subsequently
solved for L:
LL =
ω(1+ u)
(1+ r f )
. (7.24)
As soon as L > LL, the bank will default on deposits with a positive probability
conditional on the failure of the firm. Put differently, it cannot be ruled out that firm
16 Disyatat (2011, p. 720) notes that this assumption "captures the costs associated with bankruptcy
proceedings to claim the net worth of the defaulting bank and can be thought of also as the degree of
financial market imperfection." For example, depositors may face costs for legal counseling.
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bankruptcy in conjunction with a possibly adverse shock to bank capital renders the
bank insolvent. Not surprisingly, LL rises in ω. A stronger capital position can absorb
more losses even when subject to a possible adverse shock, which allows extending
more loans without exposing depositors to default risk.
Equivalently, it is possible to derive the upper threshold for loans by setting q = 1.
If q = 1, banks always default on deposits if the firm declares bankruptcy. Solving
(7.23) for q = 1 yields
LH =
ω(1+ u) +ω(u− u)−
(1− θ)ω(u− u)
2
(1+ r f ) + (1− θ)c
. (7.25)
If LL < L < LH , q increases in L for a given ω. As demonstrated in detail within Ap-
pendix A.3, this result gives rise to a non-linear loan supply schedule of the following
form:
(1+ rL) =


(1+ r f )
θ
+
(1− θ)c
θ
for L ≥ LH and q = 1
(1+ r f )
θ
+
(1− θ)c
θ
q for LL < L < LH and 0 < q < 1
(1+ r f )
θ
for L ≤ LL and q = 0
(7.26)
If q = 0, deposits are not exposed to default risk and are consequently remunerated
at the risk-free rate (1+ r f ). Since expected bank profits are zero in equilibrium, the
loan rate (1+ rL) equals the deposit rate, corrected for the repayment probability of the
firm. Hence, loans are supplied elastically at
(1+r f )
θ for L ≤ LL. If 0 < q < 1, deposits
are no longer risk-free, and funding costs increase in the expected costs of default for
depositors. Default costs are given by the product of the relative default probability
of firms (1−θ)θ , the default probability of banks conditional on firm failure q and the
contractual enforcement cost c. The increase of funding costs is fully reflected in the
loan rate. The loan supply curve thus becomes upward-sloping. If q = 1, the loan rate
becomes constant, albeit on an elevated level, and the supply curve is horizontal again
(Figure 7.2).
Loan demand of firms is determined by their optimal labor demand and decreases
in (1+ rL), since rising loan rates increase the cost of production. The loan demand
function is given by
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Source: Disyatat (2011, p. 722)
Figure 7.2: Loan Market Equilibrium
LD = PNN
∗ = PN
(
βP
(1+ rL)PN
) 1
1−β
, (7.27)
which establishes a negatively sloped demand schedule. Figure 7.2 depicts a graph-
ical exposition of the loan market, where (1+ rL) corresponds to the loan rate in the
q = 0 regime and (1+ rL) to the loan rate which arises if q = 1. Loan market equilib-
rium is given by L∗ and (1+ r∗L). Loan demand behaves straightforward and decreases
in (1+ rL). Loan supply is horizontal if q equals zero or unity, and positively sloped in
the intermediate cases.
How, then, is monetary policy supposed to affect the loan market outcome? Recall
the assumption that the central bank sets r f . Equation (7.26) shows that an increase in
r f uniformly increases loan rates for any quantity of loans. Put differently, loan supply
exhibits an upward shift. A rise in r f raises funding costs, and banks subsequently
charge higher loan rates, as already argued by Ehrmann et al. (2001, p. 20). Yet there is
an additional effect: An increase in r f decreases LL (and LH), that is, deposits become
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Source: Disyatat (2011, p. 724)
Figure 7.3: Effect of a Policy Tightening
exposed to default risk at a lower threshold level of loans. This is due to the fact that
repayment obligations to depositors increase in r f , which, other things equal, implies
that q becomes positive for a lower level of loans (at a given net worth ω). The effect of
a policy tightening is depicted in Figure 7.3.
The loan supply curve changes to L
′
S. As a result, the equilibrium loan rate increases
and the equilibrium quantity of loans declines. Note also that the loan threshold level
has decreased to L
′
L (and L
′
H). Thus, a tightening of the policy stance leads to a supply-
driven decline in aggregate credit and ultimately to a contraction of aggregate output.
An additional amplificationmechanism emergeswhen assuming that bank net worth
ω is inversely related to the policy rate (1+ r f ), which would be tantamount to the in-
clusion of a bank capital channel. Lower net worth implies that the loan threshold level
declines further to L
′′
L, since given an erosion of the capital cushion, depositors start to
become exposed to default risk for an even lower quantity of loans. Loan supply ex-
hibits an additional shift to L
′′
S and credit as well as output consequently contract even
further.
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A possible objection against the outlined mechanisms is the claim that in reality,
deposit insurance removes default risk for depositors. However, the share of deposits
in total bank liabilities decreases. Figure 7.4 depicts the ratio of deposits to total assets
for both the US commercial banking system and the sector of monetary financial in-
stitutions (MFI) in the Euro Area.17 It is apparent that the share of deposits in banks’
funding mix has undergone a secular decline, even though US data shows that deposits
have regained some importance in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
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Figure 7.4: Commercial Bank Deposit Ratios in the US and the Euro Area
These days, banks obtain a sizable amount of funding by issuing non-insured liabil-
ities on capital markets. Being unprotected from default risk, investors will scrutinize
the financial health of banks who seek to obtain funding. To speak within the model,
they will try to estimate q conditional on bank net worth ω and the loan volume L and
will, accordingly, demand an adequate risk premium.18 Hence, in contrast to Romer
17 Data on total assets and outstanding deposits was taken from FED FRED for the US and the ECB
Statistical Data Warehouse for the Euro Area. The substantial difference of deposit shares can be
possibly explained with the different structure of banking markets. The Euro Area is dominated by
large universal banking groups which a strong reliance on capital market funding. Conversely, the
US banking system consists to a large extent of smaller banks with a stronger retail deposit base.
18 Disyatat (2011, p. 716) puts it as follows: "[Banks’] marginal source of funding invariably comes from
the market, where credit risk matters."
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and Romer (1990), the bank lending channel becomes more (not less) relevant if the
capital market reliance of the banking system increases.

Chapter 8
The Risk-Taking Channel of
Monetary Transmission
8.1 Definition
The aforementioned theory of non-neoclassical transmission channels assumes that risk
attitudes of financial intermediaries are constant. More specifically, the presented mod-
els usually presuppose the presence of risk neutrality. This assumption needs to be
relaxed. Instead, it is more plausible to presume that decisionmaking of financial in-
termediaries is governed by aversion towards risk, and that the general risk attitude is
likely to vary over time.
The risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission explicitly recognizes the
importance of fluctuations in risk attitudes. It is noteworthy that the concept of a risk-
taking channel has started to develop not long ago, i.e., only when Borio and Zhu
(2008), in a pioneering contribution, first highlighted its potential relevance. Hence,
it was mainly neglected in the pre-crisis understanding of monetary policy transmis-
sion. Its key hypothesis is that monetary policy systematically affects risk attitudes
within the financial sector in a procyclical manner. If the policy stance is relaxed (tight-
ened), risk attitudes become looser (more conservative). In that respect, Borio and Zhu
(2012, p. 237) define the risk-taking channel as "the link between monetary policy and
the perception and pricing of risk by economic agents." If risk attitudes respond in a
procyclical fashion to monetary impulses, the impact of monetary policy on lending
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dynamics is even stronger than predicted by the theory on the financial accelerator and
the bank lending channel.
In order to precisely describe the risk-taking channel, it is useful to analyze policy
transmission in a graphical exposition of the loan market.1 Taking into account the pre-
vious discussion of the financial accelerator mechanism, loan demand can be expressed
by
LD = LD(rL,Φ(it), η), (8.1)
where rL denotes the loan rate, Φ is the net worth position of borrowers (inversely
related to the policy rate it), and η is a parameter measuring the stringency of collateral
requirements, which is treated as constant for now. Loan demand is downward-sloping
in rL while variations of Φ and η will trigger shifts of the curve as such.
Loan supply is characterized in the spirit of Disyatat (2011) and takes the following
form:
LS = LS
(
rD(it,
L
ω(it)
, α)
)
, (8.2)
where rD denotes funding costs of the bank sector. More specifically, rD should
be viewed as the interest rate banks need to offer financiers when issuing non-insured
(short-term) liabilities. Funding costs rD vary proportionally with the policy rate it,
since the latter represents the benchmark short-term interest rate. Moreover, they in-
crease in the default probability of banks, which is in turn determined by the ratio of
loans L to net worth ω. Similar to borrower net worth, ω is assumed to be inversely re-
lated to the policy rate. A rising volume of (risky) loans at a given net worthω increases
the probability of bank distress, since net worth is less likely to provide a sufficient pro-
tection for bank financiers. The parameter α measures the required marginal increase
in rD for a marginal increase in leverage L/ω and can be regarded as a proxy for the
risk tolerance of bank financiers. To sum up, default probabilities within the banking
sector increase in leverage and thus in L. Hence, loan supply is upward-sloping as the
costs of lending increase in L. The slope is given by α, which denotes the marginal cost
of additional leverage.2
1 Woodford (2010) pursues a similar approach.
2 It is equally conceivable to explain the positively sloped loan supply curve with banks’ profit-
8.1. DEFINITION 177
Figure 8.1: Traditional Policy Transmission on the Loan Market
Figure 8.1 depicts the effect of a decrease in the policy rate as indicated by the the-
ory on non-neoclassical transmission channels. An easing of the policy stance causes a
rise in borrower net worth from Φ to Φ1. The increasing amount of collateral renders
some additional borrowers eligible for a loan, whereas they were collateral-constrained
before the decrease in the policy rate. Hence, loan demand shifts to the right, primar-
ily due to the financial accelerator effect. With respect to loan supply, a decrease in i
proportionally lowers rD. Moreover, it triggers an increase in net worth from ω to ω1.
Thus, bank leverage declines with an increase inω, which further reduces rD as lending
to banks becomes less risky. In a nutshell, banks are able to extend more loans at lower
costs. Loan supply likewise shifts to the right. As a result, the equilibrium lending
volume increases, and so does credit-financed spending.3
If risk attitudes are allowed to fluctuate procyclically in the spirit of the risk-taking
channel, the impact of monetary impulses on lending dynamics will become stronger.
maximizing behavior. If interest rates rise, banks are (ceteris paribus) willing to increase loan supply
due to an increase in the intermediation margin. However, banks in the model of Disyatat (2011)
operate under perfect competition and therefore make zero profits. The slope of the supply curve is
thus exclusively determined by (funding) cost considerations.
3 Note that the net effect on the loan rate r∗L depends on the relative strength of supply and demand
shifts. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that they are of equal magnitude.
178 CHAPTER 8. THE RISK-TAKING CHANNEL OF MONETARY TRANSMISSION
To capture this idea, loan demand is slightly modified such that
LD = LD(rL,Φ(it), η(it)), (8.3)
which implies that the stringency of collateral requirements becomes endogenous.
Specifically, it is assumed that η is inversely related to the policy rate. A decrease in
it triggers looser risk attitudes within the banking sector, and collateral requirements
become relaxed. For example, banks may accept collateral of lower quality and/or a
lower degree of collateralization. Put simply, banks soften their lending standards. This
effectively amounts to a further relaxation of borrowers’ collateral constraints.
In order to analyze the implications for loan supply, I allow that α varies with the
policy stance. Loan supply is then given by
LS = LS
(
rD(it,
L
ω(it)
, α(it))
)
. (8.4)
I assume that ∂α(it)
/
∂it > 0. If the policy rate decreases, bank financiers loosen their
risk attitudes and are willing to tolerate higher leverage in the banking system. Put
differently, the required marginal risk compensation for a marginal increase in leverage
declines. As a result, the supply curve becomes flatter.
Hence, the risk-taking channel can be crudely captured by modeling η and α as
variables which are endogenous to the policy stance. As a consequence, the response of
lending dynamics to amonetary impulse is altered. Figure 8.2 depicts comparative stat-
ics in the presence of this additional amplificationmechanism. The dashed lines L1D and
L1S correspond to loan supply and loan demand responses implied by the bank lend-
ing channel and the financial accelerator, respectively (see Figure 8.1). The inclusion of
the risk-taking channel triggers a further shift of loan demand to L2D (dotted line). The
collateral requirement η endogenously declines to η1, since lower policy rates motivate
banks to soften their lending standards. Moreover, the loan supply becomes flatter and
is now given by L2S (dotted line). Risk tolerance of bank financiers increases, which im-
plies that α decreases to α1. As a result, lending increases more strongly and the loan
rate declines to r2∗L . This pattern is broadly consistent with available evidence on the
risk-taking channel, which will be presented in detail in Section 8.7.
Yet this stylized exposition of the risk-taking channel leaves several important ques-
tions unanswered. For instance, the notion of a certain "risk attitude" is very fuzzy and
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Figure 8.2: Policy Amplification by the Risk-Taking Channel
deserves clarification. The subsequent pages will be devoted to this task. Moreover, the
supposedly procyclical response of risk attitudes to the policy stance is so far a mere
ad-hoc assumption. Fortunately, detailed models of banks’ risk-taking incentives and
their relation to monetary policy have been developed in recent years. They will be
extensively discussed in the remainder. These models consistently predict that a re-
laxation of the policy stance motivates banks to (i) increase their leverage, to (ii) take
additional credit risk and to (iii) rely more strongly on potentially unstable funding
sources. Hence, the qualitative implications of the stylized exposition of the risk-taking
channel above tend to be in line with more sophisticated approaches.
8.2 General Determinants of Risk Attitudes
8.2.1 The Semantics of Risk
In order to attain a precise picture of the risk-taking channel, it is necessary to clarify
the determinants of attitudes towards risk on a general level. The attitude towards risk
determines the desired compensation for risk-taking and thus the prices of risky assets
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along with their desired risk premium. A useful decomposition of the factors determin-
ing attitudes towards risk is given by Gai and Vause (2006, pp. 167-172). As a start, they
define the risk premium of an asset as its expected excess return over some risk-free as-
set being required by investors to bear its additional risk. Risk premia depend on both
asset-specific and general factors. They are positively related to the individual quantity
of risk of a given asset - for instance measured by the volatility of its price and its pay-
offs - but also to the general price of a unit of risk on financial markets. The price of risk
is inversely related to investors’ general risk appetite. Risk appetite in turn is thought to
decrease in risk aversion, which indicates the degree of dislike for uncertain outcomes,
and in the level of macroeconomic uncertainty.4 Following Gai and Vause (2006, p. 169),
a visualization of the interplay of these factors is provided in Figure 8.3.
Figure 8.3: Decomposition of Risk Premia
At first sight, fluctuations of risk premia can occur for several reasons. However,
risk aversion is usually modeled to be a "deep" parameter, which is embedded in the
utility function of economic agents as a preference specification and does not vary over
time. If the quantity of risk of an asset is also constant, fluctuations in its risk premium
can only be explained by changes in the level of macroeconomic uncertainty and its
4 In what follows, macroeconomic uncertainty is (sloppily) identified with macroeconomic volatility,
i.e., the volatility of output and inflation. Even though this is quite common in the literature, it should
be noted that uncertainty (if properly defined) is in fact a concept which is distinct from the notion of
risk and volatility (Sauter, 2014).
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associated impact on risk appetite and, eventually, the price of risk.
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Figure 8.4: BBB US Corporate Bond Spread over Treasuries
However, it is unrealistic to assume that the riskiness of an asset does not vary over
time. For example, default risk arguably fluctuates with the business cycle and, con-
sequently, so will required risk premia on assets carrying credit risk. Nevertheless,
Figure 8.4 tries to provide an example of a risk premium primarily driven by fluctua-
tions in risk appetite. It depicts the spread between the Merrill Lynch index measuring
the yields of BBB-rated US corporate bonds and the yield of presumably risk-free US
treasuries. This spread represents the excess return and hence the risk premium which
is required by investors. As an approximation, the quantity of (credit) risk of the un-
derlying assets can be regarded as constant over time. If the credit quality of an issuer
changes, its rating is adjusted and its bonds will be removed from the index. Despite
an approximately constant quantity of risk, the spread shows considerable fluctuations.
By elimination, they have to be driven exclusively by changes in risk appetite. If risk
aversion is assumed to be constant as well, the only remaining variable is macroeco-
nomic uncertainty. For example, spreads rose dramatically after 2008, when the Great
Recession has arguably increased macroeconomic uncertainty. Put more generally, this
example suggests that macroeconomic conditions affect the general price of risk and
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thus risk premia on any given asset. Since monetary policy critically affects macroeco-
nomic outcomes, it might exhibit influence on the price of risk within the economy and
thus on general risk attitudes of economic agents. In what follows, I will explore the
possibility of such a mechanism in more detail.
8.2.2 Risk Attitudes in the Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Model
The decomposition of risk premia into asset-specific and general factors appears sensi-
ble, but calls for an explicit formal representation. This can be achieved with the help
of the consumption-based asset pricing model (CCAPM) going back to Lucas (1978). In
what follows, I refer to its treatment in Cochrane (2001, ch. 1).
Agents receive a stochastic endowment in each period. This endowment can be
used for immediate consumption. Alternatively, agents are able to save and postpone
consumption by investing into assets with different risk characteristics. In its simplest
form, the model describes an exchange economy and is hence entirely formulated in
real terms. Agents have intertemporal utility functions given by
U = Et
∞
∑
t=0
βtu(ct) (8.5)
Per-period utility concavely increases in consumption and future consumption is
discounted with a (gross) time preference parameter β. The concavity of the utility
function implies that agents are risk averse in the sense that they prefer smooth con-
sumption streams over volatile ones. Intertemporal optimization gives the basic pricing
equation of an asset:
pt = β
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
xt+1. (8.6)
The pricing equation ensures that marginal disutility of foregone consumption im-
plied by a marginal investment in the asset, which is the current asset price pt mul-
tiplied by marginal utility of consumption u′(ct), equals the expected marginal util-
ity gain of consumption in the next period, which is the asset’s expected payoff xt+1
multiplied by expected future marginal consumption utility u′(ct+1) which has to be
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discounted with β.5 Simplification is possible by defining the stochastic discount factor
(SDF) mt+1 as
mt+1 = β
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
(8.7)
and the pricing equation can now be written in a more compact form as
pt = mt+1xt+1. (8.8)
The utility function is specified as
u(ct) =
c
1−γ
t
1− γ
(8.9)
with γ > 0 as the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Risk aversion and hence
the desire to smooth consumption streams increases in γ.6 Calculating marginal utility
from (8.9) and plugging it into (8.7) yields
mt+1 = β
(
ct+1
ct
)−γ
. (8.10)
The discount factor, and hence asset prices, vary positively with β. For low β, in-
vestors are impatient so that postponing consumption has to be rewarded with higher
returns. Additionally, the SDF decreases in expected consumption growth ct+1/ct. This
is due to the desire for consumption smoothing embedded in the utility function. If
consumption growth is expected to be low or even negative, investors strongly desire
to smooth out fluctuations in consumption with the help of future asset payoffs which
drives up current asset prices.
Moreover, the stochastic discount factor pins down the level of the economy’s gross
risk-free rate R f . To see why, consider an asset with a certain unit payoff in the next
period. By use of Equations (8.6) and (8.8), it is possible to write
5 For the sake of notational simplicity, I refrain from using expectation operators when possible. Vari-
ables indexedwith t+ 1 are rational expectations based on available information in the current period
t, unless specified otherwise.
6 Technically, the concavity of u(ct) increases in γ. A function is concave if its first derivative declines
monotonously, which holds true in this case since u′(ct) = c
−γ
t and u
′′(ct) = −γc
−γ−1
t < 0, with the
latter term decreasing in γ.
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pt = mt+1xt+1
pt = mt+1
1
pt
=
1
mt+1
= R f
(8.11)
Rewriting the pricing equation using the covariance decomposition cov(mt+1, xt+1) =
E(mt+1xt+1)− Et(mt+1)Et(xt+1) allows to look at the pricing of risky assets in more de-
tail:
pt = Et(mt+1)Et(xt+1) + cov(mt+1, xt+1)
=
xt+1
R f
+ cov(mt+1, xt+1).
(8.12)
The first term denotes the asset price under risk neutrality, which is the expected
payoff discounted with the risk-free rate R f . The second term adjusts for risk. Asset
prices decrease if the SDF and the asset payoffs have a negative covariance: Equation
(8.10) implies that the SDF decreases in consumption growth. Hence, if consumption
growth and payoff move in line, the covariance of the SDF and the asset payoff becomes
negative, which reduces asset prices. This result is again due to the desire for consump-
tion smoothing. An asset whose payoff co-varies positively with consumption growth
produces undesired volatility of the consumption stream. Therefore, investors are only
willing to buy this asset at a lower price. Vice versa, assets whose payoffs are negatively
correlated with consumption (implying positive covariance between SDF and payoff)
trade at higher prices since they carry the additional benefit of smoothing consumption
across states. Put generally, assets with procyclical payoffs command lower prices and
hence higher returns than assets with countercyclical payoffs.
The risk premium of an asset i can be obtained with a further rearrangement of
Equation (8.8):
pit = Et(mt+1x
i
t+1). (8.13)
Dividing by pit yields
1 = Et(mt+1Rit+1), (8.14)
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where Rit+1 denotes the asset’s gross return. Making use of the covariance decom-
position and Equation (8.11) gives
1 = Et(mt+1Rit+1)
1 = mt+1Rit+1 + cov(mt+1,R
i
t+1)
Rit+1 − R
f = −R f cov(mt+1,Rit+1).
(8.15)
Equation (8.15) clarifies that assets with procyclical payoffs - which implies a nega-
tive covariance of SDF and return - need to carry a risk premium such that investors are
compensated for the likely increase in consumption volatility that comes with investing
in this specific asset. In a final step, (8.15) is multiplied by σ2m/σ
2
m and σR/σR, where σ
2
m
denotes the variance of the SDF and σR stands for the standard deviation of the asset
return. This yields
Rit+1 − R
f = −R f cov(mt+1,Rit+1)
= −
cov(mt+1,Rit+1)
σ2m
σ2mR
f
= −
cov(mt+1,Rit+1)
σ2m
σR
σR
σ2mR
f
(8.16)
Exploiting the definition the correlation coefficient allows a final and insightful re-
arrangement of (8.16).7 The risk premium of an asset i can be ultimately expressed
as
Rit+1 − R
f = −
cov(mt+1,Rit+1)
σ2m
σR
σR
σ2mR
f
= −ρm,R
σR
σm︸ ︷︷ ︸
βi
σ2mR
f︸ ︷︷ ︸
λt
(8.17)
where the terms summarized by βi denote the risk quantity of the asset. If the
correlation of SDF and asset return ρm,R is negative, the return is procyclical and the
asset thus carries more risk. Additionally, the quantity of risk increases in the ratio of
return volatility to SDF volatility. As indicated by (8.7), the latter depends positively
on the volatility of consumption growth and can thus be interpreted as a proxy for
7 The correlation coefficient of two variables x and y is given by ρxy =
cov(x,y)
σxσy
.
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macroeconomic volatility. In a nutshell, an asset’s quantity of risk increases if returns
are procyclical and if their volatility rises relative to macroeconomic volatility.
The price of risk is denoted by the terms included in λt. It depends on risk aversion
and the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty. As argued in Cochrane (2001, p. 19),
an analytical solution for λt can be derived under the assumption that consumption
growth is log-normally distributed. It then holds that
λ = γσ2t (∆ct+1). (8.18)
Recall that γ is risk aversion parameter in the utility function which governs the
strength of the consumption smoothing motive. The term σ2t (∆ct+1) is the volatility
of consumption growth which proxies macroeconomic uncertainty. Since risk aversion
is assumed to be constant, the price of risk co-varies positively with macroeconomic
volatility. Interchangeably, risk appetite as the inverse of the price of risk (cf. Figure
8.3) is negatively related to macroeconomic volatility. To sum up, the risk premium can
be formally decomposed into the product of the asset-specific quantity of risk and the
general price of risk as suggested by Gai and Vause (2006). The price of risk is crucially
dependent on macroeconomic volatility.
8.3 Risk Attitudes and the Role of the Monetary Regime
8.3.1 Policy Objectives, Strategies and the Price of Risk
Given the predictions of the CCAPM, monetary policy affects the pricing of risk on fi-
nancial markets by its influence on macroeconomic volatility. Importantly, this holds
even when risk aversion and individual riskiness of assets are regarded as being un-
related to monetary policy. Central banks critically affect risk appetite and hence the
general price of risk by their preferences with respect to the relative importance of in-
flation and output stabilization objectives. Moreover, the price of risk is also affected
by the general strategy the central bank chooses to achieve its ultimate objectives. For
example, I will demonstrate that the price of risk differs depending on whether mon-
etary policy acts under discretion or whether the central bank commits to a decision
rule. Thus, the choice of the policy regime has secular consequences for the pricing of
risk.
8.3. RISK ATTITUDES AND THE ROLE OF THE MONETARY REGIME 187
It is well-known from the literature on optimal monetary policy, that policymakers
face a trade-off between inflation volatility σπ and output volatility σy which is man-
aged according to the relative importance attached to the stabilization of each measure.
Taylor (1979) was first to show that optimal policy in a reduced-form rational expecta-
tions model can be formulated as the minimization of an intertemporal loss function.
A central bank loss function in this spirit is
Lt = Et
∞
∑
i=0
βt
(
(πt+i − π
∗)2 + α(yt+i − y
∗)2
)
(8.19)
indicating that monetary policy seeks to minimize current and expected deviations
of inflation π and output growth y from their target values (denoted with an asterisk).
The relative importance of both objectives is governed by α. Stronger (weaker) prefer-
ences for relative output stabilization lead to higher (lower) inflation variability. This
trade-off can be depicted by plotting the so-called efficient policy frontier (Gertler et al.,
1999). Conditional on the value of α, optimal monetary policy delivers an outcomewith
a specific combination of inflation and output volatility (Figure 8.5).8
Hence, central bank preferences may exert decisive influence on output and con-
sumption volatility. Recalling Equations (8.17) and (8.18), it is tempting to assume that
a strong focus on output stabilization is likely to decrease the price of risk and hence
risk premia due to the reduction of output volatility. However, nominal assets such as
bonds may suffer from the associated increase in inflation volatility.
As shown by Sarte (1998) and others, the CCAPM can be extended to account for
nominal assets. Unlike real assets, nominal assets deliver fixed repayments, but their
real value may be impaired by unexpected inflation.9 Thus, investors require a com-
8 In a consistently micro-founded New-Keynesian model, the loss function emerges from the maxi-
mization of social utility of the representative household. The value of the parameter α is, inter alia,
governed by the degree of risk aversion embedded into the household utility function (which is per-
fectly similar to the one used within the CCAPM). If risk aversion increases, the household attaches
higher value to smooth consumption streams. Hence, α increases since output stabilization decreases
the volatility of consumption. See Woodford (2003, ch. 6) or Gali (2008, pp. 111-112) for detailed
treatments. In this sense, central bank preferences reflect the preferences of the representative house-
hold.
9 Within the CCAPM framework, real assets are usually considered as claims on (uncertain) future con-
sumption. Their nominal payoff varies with the business cycle but also with the price level. Hence,
payoff volatility rises in output volatility but not in inflation volatility. Conversely, nominal assets
deliver nominally fixed repayments which insulates them from output volatility. However, the real
value of payoffs varies with inflation. For example, stocks are real assets. Their dividend streams
vary with macroeconomic conditions, but their real value is protected from inflation since firms pre-
sumably adjust prices (and hence nominal profits) with the price level. Conversely, credit claims are
nominal assets. The principal and coupon payments are usually fixed in value.
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Figure 8.5: Efficient Policy Frontier
pensation for inflation risk. In a stylized form, the required (net) return on nominal
assets iNt can be expressed by a slightly modified Fisher Equation and reads
iNt = r
f + Etπt+1 + f (σπ) (8.20)
where r f denotes the risk-free real return, Etπt+1 is expected inflation and the term
f (σπ) with ∂ f (σπ)/∂σπ > 0 indicates that nominal assets carry an inflation risk pre-
mium which increases in inflation volatility.
A careful examination of the implications of monetary policy preferences for risk
premia has been undertaken by Söderlind (2006). He derives analytical solutions for
consumption and inflation volatility as a function of monetary policy preferences. It
is shown that a strong preference for inflation stabilization increases the variance of
output and thus risk premia on real assets. Conversely, if monetary policy focuses on
the stabilization of output at the expense of heightened inflation volatility, risk pre-
mia on real assets decrease but inflation risk premia on nominal assets go up. Hence,
monetary policy preferences carry important implications for the relative riskiness of
nominal and real assets and their corresponding risk premia.
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The policy strategy may have equally important implications for the price of risk.
The choice of a certain strategymay affect the location of the efficient policy frontier and
hence the feasible set of combinations for σy and σπ.10 Conditional on the characteristics
of the policy strategy, the trade-off between inflation and output volatility may improve
(worsen), which is reflected by a shift of the policy frontier towards (away from) the
origin.
Welfare analysis based on the New-Keynesian model shows that central banks can
improve the policy trade-off compared to policy based on discretion if they pursue
a so-called commitment strategy (McCallum and Nelson, 2004). Under this strategy,
the central bank credibly commits to a state-contingent plan. That is, the central bank
credibly announces how it plans to respond to changes in macroeconomic conditions.
If the central bank promises to react decisively in the wake of inflationary pressures, it
achieves the stabilization of inflation expectations.11 In this case, the policy trade-off
becomes more benign. If inflation increases unexpectedly, the stabilization of inflation
by a tightened policy stancemay exhibit adverse effects on output. Under commitment,
the mere threat of harshly increasing the policy rate in the wake of inflation shocks
generates the (initial) expectation of a sharp decrease in output. To see that, consider
the standard New-Keynesian Phillips Curve which is given by
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ(yt − y
∗) + επt (8.21)
If an inflation shock επt hits the economy, the policy-induced expectation of weak
economic activity leads to an automatic decline in expected inflation Etπt+1.12 Since
actual inflation πt critically depends on expected inflation, the impact of the inflation
shock on current inflation is mitigated. If the response of actual inflation to the inflation
10 Very generally speaking, a monetary policy strategy is the policy framework which is chosen by the
central bank to achieve its ultimate objectives. In reality, it involves various factors such as quanti-
tative definitions of ultimate objectives, the specification of potential intermediate targets, the choice
of the policy instrument, pre-defined procedures for the evaluation of the adequate policy stance and
a coherent communication policy. Comprehensive discussions of modern monetary policy strategies
are given by Mishkin (2007, 2011) and Spahn (2012, ch. 5). In the subsequently discussed New-
Keynesian model, policy strategies are treated in a highly simplified fashion. Essentially, the central
bank chooses between discretionary and rule-based policy.
11 In order to maintain the golden thread, I do not lay out the formal properties of the commitment
solution in detail. For that purpose, the reader is referred to Gertler et al. (1999), McCallum and
Nelson (2004) or Gali (2008) among others.
12 Forward iteration of (8.21) in isolation verifies that inflation depends on current and expected future
values of the output gap (yt − y∗) (Gertler et al., 1999, p. 1667).
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shock is weakened, the central bank has to contract output by less to bring inflation back
to target. Hence, the impact of the inflation shock on both output and inflation is muted.
Put differently, macroeconomic volatility triggered by unexpected inflation goes down.
Note that this effect is entirely due to the beneficial expectation effect implied by the
commitment strategy.
Figure 8.6: Improvement of the Policy Trade-Off under Commitment
Figure 8.6 depicts the implications for the policy trade-off. Commitment attenuates
the impact of inflation shocks on macroeconomic volatility. Hence, for a given variance
of επt , a switch towards the commitment strategy improves the policy trade-off. The ef-
ficient policy frontier consequently shifts towards the origin, as depicted by the dashed
line in Figure 8.6. Given that both inflation and output volatility tend to decline, risk
premia on nominal and real assets can be expected to decrease uniformly. Thus, the
success of the policy strategy in containing macroeconomic volatility critically affects
the general price of risk.
8.3.2 The Paradox of Credibility
The previous reflections help to shed light on an empirical phenomenon which could
be observed from the middle of the 1980s until the beginning of the financial crisis in
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2007. During this time, risk premia on equity, government bonds, corporate bonds
and real estate uniformly declined in almost any advanced economy, as shown for in-
stance in Trichet (2008). Simultaneously, the volatility of consumption and inflation
along with other macroeconomic aggregates decreased markedly. These developments
were documented, inter alia, by Stock and Watson (2003) for the US economy. They
coined the term "Great Moderation" in that respect. The CCAPM indeed predicts a
decreasing price of risk and hence falling risk premia in the wake of declining macro
volatility. With respect to the sources of the Great Moderation, Stock andWatson (2003)
and Benati and Surico (2009), among others, find that improvements in the practice of
monetary policy have been critical.13 Changes in both the theory and the practice of
monetary policy beginning in the 1980s involved clear commitments to price stability,
increased transparency with respect to intended policy actions and a growing recog-
nition of the importance of influencing private sector expectations (Goodfriend, 2007).
Hence, these developments may be interpreted as a step in the direction of the commit-
ment solution with its beneficial effects on the policy trade-off.
But is the secular decrease of macroeconomic volatility and the price of risk dur-
ing the Great Moderation unambiguously a good thing? To the extent that it can be
ascribed to less severe supply shocks and improved policy practices, this question is
usually answered positively. Trichet (2008, p. 11) claims that "a significant part of the
decline in macroeconomic uncertainty is no windfall for modern societies: it is the fair
and expected reward for institutional reform." Moreover, pre-crisis wisdom suggested
that delivering price stability more or less automatically benefits financial stability. For
instance, Bordo et al. (2002, p. 537) declares that "a monetary regime that produces
aggregate price stability will, as a byproduct, tend to promote stability of the finan-
cial system." Similarly, Issing (2003, p. 22) states that "in general price stability fosters
financial stability."
Quite to the contrary, some authors warned that the apparent success of monetary
policy comes with a potential downside for financial stability. In particular, Borio and
Lowe (2002) and Borio and White (2004) have argued that the very success in stabi-
lizing inflation and the business cycle by employing a credible and transparent policy
framework promotes the build-up of systemic risk on financial markets and increases
13 Another important contributor was the absence of severe macroeconomic shocks. This finding is
equally in line with New-Keynesian models of optimal policy. In the previous example, a decline in
macroeconomic volatility can also occur due to a decrease in the variance of the inflation shock επt .
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the likelihood of financial crisis episodes. They dubbed this apparently contradictory
hypothesis the paradox of credibility.
As empirically documented by Borio and Lowe (2002, p. 19), boom-bust cycles on
financial markets may very well occur in the presence of subdued output volatility
and low and stable inflation rates. Note that this observation drastically contradicts
the CCAPM, which predicts a low and stable price of risk under calm macroeconomic
conditions. Policy credibility may play an important role in the explanation of this phe-
nomenon (Borio and Lowe, 2002, pp. 21-22). If inflation expectations are well-anchored,
price andwage contracting tends to take place on a longer-term basis. In this case, infla-
tion and wages become less sensitive to excess demand which may temporarily boost
corporate profitability and hence asset prices. Thus, inflationary pressures manifest
themselves in asset price increases rather than in price inflation of goods and services.
Given the relative stability of goods price inflation, there is no real reason for central
banks to immediately tighten the policy stance when facing asset price inflation. Thus,
booms on asset markets - often accompanied by amarked and eventually unsustainable
expansion of credit - can unfold in a mostly unimpeded manner. This mechanism may
be facilitated by a perceived asymmetry in the conduct of monetary policy, giving rise
to moral hazard problems (Borio and Lowe, 2002, pp. 26-27). If policy does little to
contain the boom but reacts with decisive support when the inevitable bust eventually
threatens macroeconomic stability, this amounts to an effective protection of financial
market participants from the downside of excessive risk-taking in the boom phase. This
perceived insurance effect can create an upward distortion of risk-taking incentives.14
Moreover, if a focus on price stability makes nominal assets less risky, financing
schemes may rely more heavily on debt instruments. The previous discussion of sys-
temic risk clarified that debt, especially if issued excessively, gives rise to various forms
of fragility. Hence, there may be an adverse effect on financial stability as a by-product.
Albeit highly speculative in nature, this argument fits neatly with the accelerated in-
crease of aggregate debt burdens observable in almost any advanced economy, as doc-
umented for instance in Buttiglione et al. (2014).
Hence, as noted by Borio and White (2004, p. 22), "the credibility of the central
bank’s anti-inflation commitment can be a double-edged sword" in the sense "that the
14 Monetary policy in the US was explicitly committed to such a "mopping-up approach." For instance,
Greenspan (1999) notes with respect to the danger of asset price bubbles that "[i]t is the job of eco-
nomic policymakers to mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the
next expansion."
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central bank can be a victim of its own success." The possibility of such an unintended
by-product of successful macro stabilization calls for a modification of the policy frame-
work, for example with amore pronounced role for propermacroprudential regulation.
Moreover, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 11, an explicit monetary policy re-
action to the build-up of systemic risk might be in order.
To sum up: Risk attitudes need to be carefully decomposed into their underlying
factors. The structure of monetary policy preferences and its general strategy affect
the pricing of risk. Modern monetary policy frameworks may have ambiguous im-
plications. On the one hand, as indicated by the CCAPM and the theory on optimal
commitment policy, delivering price stability is beneficial for macroeconomic stability
and the price of risk should thus be low and stable. On the other hand, as argued by
the proponents of the paradox of credibility, rigid anti-inflation policy may have the
unintended consequence of enhancing systemic risk.
However, the nexus between monetary policy and risk-taking is still incomplete.
This Section discussed issues of longer-term nature, since the implementation of a cer-
tain monetary regime with its respective objectives and the corresponding strategy rep-
resents a fundamental policy choice which is unlikely to vary at short notice. Hence, the
short-term link between monetary policy and risk attitudes still needs to be explored.
Put differently, the question how short-term variations in the policy stance affect the (ar-
guably cyclical) properties of risk-taking on financial markets has not been answered
yet.
For that purpose, the simplified framework of the CCAPM is no longer suitable,
not least because it neglects special issues related to financial intermediation.15 Indeed,
as suggested in Section 8.1, the majority of the potential responses in risk-taking to an
altered policy stance are likely to take place within the financial intermediation sector.
Changes in monetary conditions affect an important set of constraints and incentive
schemes guiding risk-taking decisions within the latter. In order to model these mech-
anisms, an explicit treatment of banks is needed. The following Sections 8.4 - 8.6 aim
to explore the short-term nexus between policy rate variations, risk-taking behavior
15 The CCAPM in its basic form is useful to think about risk and risk attitudes in a macroeconomic
context, yet it performs rather poorly in explaining empirical regularities of asset prices. For instance,
as shown by Mehra and Prescott (1985), it cannot explain the historical risk premium on US stocks
without assuming an implausibly high degree of risk aversion. Moreover, the price of risk exhibits
large cyclical fluctuations in spite of relatively stable consumption growth. See Campbell (2003) and
Ludvigson (2011) for insightful surveys on these empirical puzzles and the associated challenges for
the CCAPM framework.
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within the intermediation sector and the cyclical properties of the pricing of risk in
more detail.
8.4 Risk-Taking andActive Balance SheetManagement (ABSM)
An important and powerful mechanism which links the stance of monetary policy to
risk-taking behavior of financial intermediaries is the concept of Active Balance Sheet
Management (ABSM). The ABSM concept predicts that a relaxation of the policy stance
triggers a decline in required risk compensation, an increasing reliance on unstable
funding sources and, under some circumstances, a higher amount of leverage within
the intermediation sector. Its macroeconomic implications have been highlighted in a
series of influential publications by Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin (with varying
co-authors). ABSM is a rather general term reflecting the notion that intermediaries
actively adjust size, composition and leverage of their balance sheets in response to
changing asset prices and market conditions. The various ABSMmechanisms are espe-
cially pronounced if balance sheet accounting occurs on amark-to-market basis. The ef-
fect of the policy rate on asset prices and market conditions gives rise to a transmission
channel running from policy rate variations to intermediary balance sheet adjustments
and consequently their risk-taking behavior.
8.4.1 The Adrian-Shin ABSMModel
The model of Adrian and Shin (2010b) highlights a mechanism where a positive policy
shock leads banks to expand their balance sheets. This goes hand in handwith a decline
in the required risk compensation and a likely increase in both leverage and the share
of unstable funding. The model is static and takes a partial-market perspective. There
is a risky asset traded in period t = 0 at price p which delivers an expected payoff in
the subsequent period t = 1. The payoff is a random variable w˜ which is uniformly
distributed over the interval [q− z, q+ z]. It therefore follows that mean and variance
of the payoff are given by
E(w˜) = q (8.22)
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σ2w˜ =
1
12
[q+ z− (q− z)]2 =
1
12
(2z)2 =
z2
3
. (8.23)
There is also a risk-free security paying an interest rate of i with certainty. Consider
a passive and non-leveraged sector of risk-averse portfolio investors with an equity
endowment e. It buys y units of the risky asset at price p and allocates the remaining
endowment e− py to the risk-free asset. Its expected payoff E(W) is then given by
E(W) ≡ qy+ (1+ i)(e− py)
= (q− (1+ i)p)y+ (1+ i)e
(8.24)
where (q − (1+ i)p)y is the risky excess return and (1+ i)e the riskless return on
equity. Passive investors seek to maximize a mean-variance utility function of the form
U = E(W)−
1
2τ
σ2W , (8.25)
which implies that utility increases in the expected portfolio payoff and decreases
in its variance. The strength of the latter effect is scaled by the constant τ, which depicts
investors’ risk tolerance. Investors’ choice variable is y, the amount of risky assets the
sector is willing to hold. Plugging (8.24) into (8.25) gives
U = (q− (1+ i)p)y+ (1+ i)e−
1
6τ
y2z2 (8.26)
= (q/p− (1+ i))py+ (1+ i)e−
1
6τ
y2z2 (8.27)
where (q/p− (1+ i)) is the expected excess return of investing in the risky asset.16
The FOC delivers optimal demand yP for the risky asset and is given by
∂U
∂y
= (q/p− (1+ i))p−
1
3τ
yz2 = 0⇔ yP =
3τ
z2
(q− (1+ i)p) (8.28)
The interpretation is straightforward. Other things equal, demand for the risky
asset increases in risk tolerance τ and decreases with z, which gives the width of the
16 Note also that the portfolio variance follows from σ2W = y
2σ2w˜ = y
2 z2
3 .
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interval of possible payoffs and hence should be regarded as a proxy for the asset’s
risk. Demand is also increasing in the excess return and collapses to zero as soon as
q ≤ p(1+ i), ergo if the excess return becomes zero.
Finally, there is a sector of risk-neutral active investors who operate with leverage,
which are supposed to represent a stylized intermediation sector. Active investors are
risk-neutral but operate under a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. The VaR constraint
stipulates that the equity endowment of the intermediation sector needs to be suffi-
ciently large to ensure a zero default probability under all conceivable circumstances.17
This carries the implication that liabilities are risk-free and thus act as a perfect money
substitute. Importantly, assets enter the balance sheet with a mark-to-market valuation
rather than at historical costs. Intermediaries invest an amount py in risky assets only.
It is financed by the equity endowment eb and debt issuance of the amount eb − py.
Their optimization problem is given by
max
y
E(W) s.t. VaR ≤ eb. (8.29)
If it holds that p < q/(1+ i), the discounted payoff of the risky asset exceeds its
price and delivers an excess return. Under that circumstances, the expected portfolio
payoff E(W) strictly increases in y, which implies that the VaR constraint is always
binding. Risk neutral intermediaries seek to exploit excess return opportunities to the
maximally feasible extent, i.e., they will always choose the highest possible amount of
total assets.
The worst case payoff of a unit of the risky asset is q− z where it is assumed that
q > z to ensure positive payoffs. In addition, creditors have to be repaid with the
amount p(1+ i), since p is precisely the amount of financing required to buy a unit of
the risky asset. Therefore, the VaR constraint reads
(p(1+ i)− (q− z))y ≤ eb, (8.30)
stating that the gap between the payment obligation to creditors py(1+ i) and the
received worst case payoffs from the risky asset (q − z)y always needs to be smaller
17 The VaR constraint is imposed ad hoc in the setting under consideration. However, in a different
paper, Adrian and Shin (2013) show that VaR constraints can emerge endogenously as the optimal
solution of a contracting problem under incomplete information between bank owners and bank
financiers. See also Section 3.2.2 for a brief discussion of the VaR methodology.
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than the equity cushion eb, such that creditors can be repaid every time. Since the
constraint always binds, (8.30) can be solved to obtain optimal asset demand of the
intermediation sector as
y =
eb
p(1+ i)− (q− z)
(8.31)
which delivers the result that asset demand increases in q and in the equity endow-
ment e, whereas demand declines in p. Again, the analysis is straightforward. A rise in
q and/or a decline in p boosts excess returns which fosters demand. So does an increase
of the equity endowment eb via a relaxation of the VaR constraint. An increase in the
dispersion of payoffs, as measured by z, tightens the VaR constraint and reduces asset
demand. For the same reason, demand declines in i.
Aggregate demand for the risky asset is now given by the sum of optimal demand
by each sector. The risky asset is available in fixed supply S. The market clearing
condition is then
y+ yP = S (8.32)
The market clearing process is depicted graphically in the left panel of Figure 8.7.
The intersection of sector-specific demand curves delivers the market-clearing price
and determines the asset holdings of each sector. Passive investor demand is linear with
an intercept of p = q/(1+ i) and subsequently increases with a reduction of the asset
price. In line with (8.31), active investor demand is eb/z for p = q/(1+ i). Demand
is critically governed by the tightness of the VaR constraint. The worst possible lower
deviation of the asset’s payoff compared to its expected value is z. For each unit y of the
asset, this potential loss has to be covered by the equity cushion. For instance, if eb = z,
it is only possible to demand the amount y = 1. A decrease of p gradually relaxes the
VaR constraint and leads to a non-linear increase in demand.
It is now interesting to analyze the implication of an increase from q to q′, which
can be regarded as an improvement in the asset’s fundamental value. It is depicted
in the right panel of Figure 8.7. The demand curve of passive investors simply shifts
up. The response of the intermediation sector is more complex. First, intermediaries
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Source: Adrian and Shin (2010b, pp. 610-611)
Figure 8.7: Market Clearing and Adjustment
benefit from a valuation gain on their existing stock of assets. Suppose the final new
market clearing price is p′. Since valuation gains directly translate into equity increases
under mark-to-market accounting, Equation (8.31) allows to express the new amount
of equity e′b as
e′b = (p
′(1+ i)− (q− z))y, (8.33)
which corresponds to the balance sheet in the middle of Figure 8.8. The associated
relaxation of the VaR constraint (and the continued presence of excess return oppor-
tunities) motivates intermediaries to increase their asset holdings until the constraint
becomes binding again. The final situation after adjustment is represented by the bal-
ance sheet on the right-hand side of Figure 8.8. Specifically, it needs to hold that
e′b = (p
′(1+ i)− (q′ − z))y′. (8.34)
Merging (8.33) and (8.34) yields
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Source: Adrian and Shin (2010b, p. 611)
Figure 8.8: Balance Sheet Adjustment after a q-Shock
(p′(1+ i)− (q′ − z))y′ = (p′(1+ i)− (q− z))y
y′ =
(p′(1+ i)− (q− z))
(p′(1+ i)− (q′ − z))
y
y′ =
(p′(1+ i)− (q+ q′ − q′ − z))
(p′(1+ i)− (q′ − z))
y
y′ =
(p′(1+ i)− (q′ − z) + (q′ − q)
(p′(1+ i)− (q′ − z))
y
y′ = y
(
1+
q′ − q
p′(1+ i)− q′ + z
)
(8.35)
implying that intermediaries seek to extend their asset position for q′ > q (and
vice versa). The leveraged intermediation sector amplifies the initial improvements
in fundamentals.18 A passive investor would take the increase in equity to e′b simply
as given. In stark contrast, leveraged intermediaries now find themselves with spare
balance sheet capacity since the equity position e′b exceeds the necessary VaR implied
by the current asset position p′y. As the risky asset still promises excess returns, they
18 The necessary condition for the existence of the amplification process is that p′(1 + i) − q′ + z >
0. This holds by assumption, since the asset price p′ always exceeds the present value of its worst
possible payoff q
′−z
1+i . In that case, an increase in q always leads to balance sheet expansion with y’ >
y.
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take on additional debt to purchase further assets until the VaR constraint binds again
at y′ > y. Thus, demand is increased despite an increase in the asset price.
Consider again the right panel of Figure 8.7 depicting the constellation after the in-
crease from q to q′. While passive investors adjust demand only moderately, demand of
the intermediation sector exhibits an overproportionally strong response. As a result,
the asset price displays a marked increase. Moreover, relative asset holdings of the in-
termediation sector rise as well. This is due to the additional demand motive triggered
by the relaxation of the VaR constraint.
Very importantly, it can be proven that the net effect on the risk premium is nega-
tive (Adrian and Shin, 2010b, pp. 612-613). The change in the asset price is larger than
implicated by its fundamental improvement which implies that the required compen-
sation for risk-taking decreases. This holds even though intermediaries are assumed
to be constantly risk neutral. Their balance sheet adjustment nevertheless compresses
the price of risk (which is equivalent to an increase in risk appetite, or to an equiva-
lent decrease in the price of risk, cf. Figure 8.3). Note that the mere presence of a VaR
constraint is sufficient to generate a procyclical response of the price of risk. There is
no need to assume a variation in underlying preferences towards risk. In that respect,
Adrian et al. (2010, p. 10) state (emphasis added):
"The terminology of risk appetite is intended to highlight the apparent
change in preferences of the banking sector. We say apparent change in
preferences, since the fluctuations in risk appetite are due to the constraints faced
by the banks rather than their preferences as such. However, to an outside ob-
server, the fluctuations in risk appetite would have the outward signs of
fluctuations in risk preferences of the investor."
A further inspection of Equation (8.35) shows that the strength of the amplification
mechanism - measured by the size of y′ − y - increases for low values of z. The parame-
ter z measures payoff dispersion and hence fundamental asset risk. A lower value of z
decreases the VaR and supports a higher degree of leverage. With higher leverage, val-
uation gains lead to a proportionally higher increase in equity which ultimately gives
rise to a stronger expansion of the balance sheets.
The decisive link to monetary policy emerges from the interpretation of the q shock
as the outcome of a looser policy stance. A decreasing interest rate is likely to boost
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the values of both q and p, whereas the risk-free rate i is decreasing. Therefore, expan-
sive monetary policy measures are strongly amplified by the leveraged intermediation
sector. The model highlights some potential mechanics of the risk-taking channel. Eas-
ing the policy stance has four consequences: (i) Leveraged intermediaries expand their
balance sheets, (ii) their outstanding level of debt increases, (iii) the required risk com-
pensation for risky assets decreases, and (iv) intermediary leverage is likely to become
procyclical. The last claim hinges on the assumption that asset risk z declines after a
monetary expansion, for example due to an increase in expected economic activity and
an associated decline in expected payoff volatility. Procyclicality means that leverage
varies inversely with the policy rate or, put differently, that it varies positively with
economic activity.
8.4.2 The Nexus of Policy Rate, Term Spread and Balance Sheet Dynamics
The discussion of the ABSM model clarified that monetary policy critically affects the
pricing of risk via its influence on p and q, i.e., on the balance sheet conditions of in-
termediaries operating under mark-to-market accounting. Yet Adrian and Shin (2010b,
pp. 636-640) highlight an additional, reinforcing effect of monetary policy on the eq-
uity endowment e. The latter can be regarded as the discounted value of future bank
profits. They are not only determined by variations in q and p, but also by the prof-
itability of maturity transformation, which is governed by the net interest margin, i.e.,
the difference between the average return on assets and the average cost of funding.
In the model, this effect would correspond to a decline in i. Since intermediaries tend
to borrow short and lend long, the term spread as the difference between some bench-
mark long-term rate and the policy rate provides a good indication for the profitability
of banking operations. An increase in the term spread should therefore boost the value
of bank equity, which further magnifies the previously discussed amplification process.
The term spread is almost exclusively determined by the policy rate. To see that,
it is useful to revert to the expectation theory of the term structure. It claims that the
long-term interest rate int approximately equals the sequence of current and expected
short-term rates iet+j. Following Romer (2012, pp. 518-520), this implies that
int ≈
1
n
n−1
∑
j=0
iet+j (8.36)
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The term spread ζt can be expressed as
ζt = int − it =
1
n
n−1
∑
j=0
iet+j − it (8.37)
Taking the partial derivative with respect to the current short rate it yields
∂ζt
∂it
=
1
n
− 1 =
1− n
n
(8.38)
where it holds that ∂ζt∂it ≈ −1 if n becomes sufficiently large. Hence, variations in the
policy rate should inversely affect the term spread on an almost one-to-one basis. The
level of the policy rate per se is thus an important driver of bank profitability via its im-
pact on the term spread and the price of leverage.19 This contrasts with the traditional
view of monetary policy transmission, where the economic significance of short-term
rates was mainly seen in the fact that they affect the actually relevant long-term rates
via the term structure.
Again following an approach of Adrian and Shin (2010b), the impact of policy rate
changes on the term spread can be analyzed with simple least squares regressions, in
which the cumulative four-quarter change of the term spread ∆ζ4q is regressed on the
cumulative four-quarter change of the policy rate ∆i4q. I performed this exercise for the
US, the Euro Area and the UK. Results for the US and the Euro Area are displayed in
Figure 8.9.20
The universally negative slopes of the regression lines reveal that policy rate vari-
ations inversely affect the term premium in each of the regions under consideration.
This is formally confirmed when inspecting regression results in Table 8.1, where I also
included the UK for comparison.
19 It is plausible to assume that the policy rate provides the all-important benchmark for bank funding
costs, since the forces of arbitrage keep money market rates always close to the policy rate. Leaving
risk considerations aside, a positive spread between money market rates and the policy rate causes
intermediaries to conduct refinancingmainly via central bank facilities. Moneymarket funds are thus
in excess supply, which will quickly decrease the spread.
20 Data was obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The term spread was calculated as the differ-
ence between the yield on government bonds with a maturity of ten years and the respective policy
rate. For the Euro Area, Datastream provides a synthetic bond yield constructed from GDP-weighted
country-specific yields. County-specific samplesizes differ due to varying data availability. While
each sample ends in Q4 2014, the US sample begins in Q4 1983, the UK sample in Q3 1986 and the
Euro Area Sample in Q1 1999.
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Figure 8.9: Policy Rate Changes and the Response of the Term Spread
∆ζ4q US UK EMU
∆i4q -0.581*** -0.723*** -0.657***
Standard Error (0.058) (0.046) (0.069)
Constant -0.165* -0.176** 0.099
Observations 123 110 60
R2 0.450 0.690 0.610
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance on the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level.
Table 8.1: Term Spread Regression Results
For each region, the term-spread response to a cumulative one percentage point
increase of the policy rate is significantly negative. The effect is most pronounced for
the Euro Area and the UK, and slightly weaker for the US.21 Even though the term
spread responses are smaller than expected, they are nevertheless clearly negative. This
lends support to the notion of a channel running from policy rate variations to banking
profitability via the term spread.22
21 Adrian and Shin (2010b) find an almost perfect negative one-to-one relationship for the US. How-
ever, they calculate the term spread as the difference between ten year government bonds and three-
month treasuries and use a sample with a different timeframe. The differingmagnitude of coefficients
notwithstanding, the result are qualitatively similar. To be sure, the term spread is also influenced by
other factors, such as the term structure of inflation expectations and the relative supply of long-term
government bonds. Moreover, the current policy stance is likely to affect expected future short rates,
which may give rise to a level shift of the yield curve. The latter effect might weaken the relation
between the current short rate and the term spread.
22 Another argument enhancing the importance of the short-term policy rate relates to the changing
structure of financial intermediation. As argued by Adrian and Shin (2010a), market-based financial
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More direct evidence of ABSM can be obtained by analyzing the evolution of in-
termediary balance-sheet aggregates. For that purpose, it is helpful first to consider
a numerical example such as in Adrian and Shin (2010c): The initial balance sheet on
the left-hand side of Table 8.2 consists of an asset position with an initial value of 100
which is financed by a combination of debt and equity. Leverage l is given by the ratio
of total assets to equity and equals 10. The asset price now increases by 10 percent and
leads to the balance sheet on the right-hand side of Table 8.2, where valuation gains on
the asset position led to a one-to-one increase of the equity base. Importantly, leverage
has decreased to l = 110/20 = 5.5. Taking this development as given without further
adjustment establishes a negative relationship between asset growth and leverage.
Assets Liabilities
Assets 100 Debt 90
Equity 10
Assets Liabilities
Assets 110 Debt 90
Equity 20
Table 8.2: Passive Balance Sheet Management
Consider now the balance sheet adjustment depicted in Table 8.3, which shall resem-
ble the behavior of the leveraged intermediary sector. Active investors do not accept
the decline in leverage. It enhances balance sheet capacity and allows to take on addi-
tional debt until the initial leverage ratio is restored.23 Active investors therefore raise
additional debt of 90 and buy additional assets in equal amount. In the end, the desired
leverage ratio is restored. The strength of this amplification mechanism is impressive:
The initial ten percent increase of assets caused the active investor’s balance sheet to
double in size.
It is easily conceivable that this strong additional demand impulse causes further in-
creases of the asset price, giving rise to a powerful feedback loop of rising asset prices, a
systems are characterized by lengthened intermediation chains. Funds flowing from ultimate savers
to ultimate borrowers undergo several intermediation steps. The intermediation margin is thus split
between various participants. Given this structural decline in profitability, business models likely
have become increasingly sensitive towards policy-induced changes in funding costs.
23 Targeting a constant leverage ratio may result from the fact that the VaR constraint starts to bind at
l = 10 for a given asset risk. In reality, regulatory capital constraints may be the more relevant ones.
Anyway, the nature of the capital constraint is of minor relevance for the workings of this mechanism.
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Assets Liabilities
Assets 100 Debt 90
Equity 10
Assets Liabilities
Assets 110 Debt 90
Equity 20
Assets Liabilities
Assets 200 Debt 180
Equity 20
Table 8.3: Active Balance Sheet Management
relaxation of balance sheet constraints and additional asset demand. This already holds
when leverage is kept constant, but would be enhanced even further when leverage is
procyclical.
Adrian and Shin (2010c) provide evidence for the relevance of this mechanism by
comparing quarterly growth rates of total assets and leverage for various sectors in
the US. The household sector is found to be the only one conducting passive balance
management, in line with the pattern described in Table 8.2. Changes in households’
total assets are associated with declines in leverage. By contrast, non-financial firms
and commercial banks appear to manage their balance sheets actively, which is derived
from the fact that, on average, leverage is kept constant while total assets vary, which
corresponds to the balance sheet adjustments depicted in Table 8.3.
It is useful to make a further distinction within the intermediation sector between
commercial banks and market-based financial intermediaries.24 As shown by Adrian
and Shin (2009), among others, the funding of the latter is almost entirely market based
and mostly of very short-term nature. On the asset side, market-based intermediaries
do not hold credit claims emerging from relationship lending as commercial banks do,
but rather hold marketable assets such as bonds and asset-backed securities which are
valued at market prices. Hence, ABSM can be expected to be more prevalent in the
market-based intermediation sector. Adrian and Shin (2010b) show that this sector has
grown at an extremely fast pace within the last 30 years, almost reaching the size of the
commercial banking sector prior to the crisis. Hence, it is plausible to assume that the
macroeconomic relevance of ABSM has increased considerably.
Figure 8.10, taken from Adrian and Shin (2010c, p. 422), plots growth rates of total
assets against growth rates in leverage for the commercial banking sector and the bro-
ker dealer sector in the US. It can be seen that commercial banks tend to keep leverage
24 Market-based intermediaries are for instance broker dealers (investment banks) and issuers of asset-
backed securities. Put differently, market-based intermediaries are "shadow banks," i.e. entities which
conduct intermediation business without relationship-based lending and the issuance of retail de-
posits. Moreover, market-based intermediaries are less regulated than commercial banks and do not
have access to lender of last resort facilities. See Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) or Poschmann (2012) for
detailed overviews on the structure of the shadow banking sector.
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Figure 8.10: ABSM in the US Intermediation Sector
constant, even when total assets vary. The broker dealer sector (representing an impor-
tant part of market-based intermediation) tends to increase leverage with the growth of
total assets. Leverage thus exhibits a procyclical pattern. Nuño and Thomas (2013) and
Jakab and Kumhof (2014) present similar evidence of ABSM for the US.
With respect to the Euro Area, ABSM seems to be equally prevalent. Figure 8.11
plots changes in total assets and changes in leverage forMonetary Financial Institutions
(MFI) in the Euro Area.25 Apparently, asset and leverage growth are related positively,
pointing to procyclical leverage.
Somewhat surprisingly, commercial banks in the Euro Area seem to manage their
balance sheets more actively than their US counterparts.26 Baglioni et al. (2010) reach
the same conclusion from their investigation of disaggregated balance sheet data for
13 large European banking groups.27 They explain their findings with the different
structure of the European banking market. In Europe, banking tends to be organized
25 Data was obtained from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. The Sample starts in Q1 1998 and ends
in Q4 2014. Leverage was calculated as the ratio of total assets and capital. The definition of MFI in-
cludes credit institutions (basically commercial banks) and money market funds. Commercial banks
constitute the overwhelming majority of the MFI sector. For instance, in 2013 total assets of the
banking sector were about 97% of the MFI sector. See ECB (2012) for further details on collection
procedures, precise definitions of balance sheet items and institutional classifications.
26 Interestingly, Panetta et al. (2009) find a slightly negative relation between total assets and leverage
growth rates on the national level for Germany, Italy and France.
27 It should be noted, however, that their results are not perfectly comparable due to the inclusion of
banks from Switzerland and the UK.
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Figure 8.11: ABSM in the EMU Intermediation Sector
in universal banks which merge commercial and investment banking activities. Since
these universal banks are typically very large, their activities figure prominently in the
MFI statistics. Consequently, so do their (significant) investment banking operations,
which may help to explain the procyclical pattern of leverage in the aggregate. Another
potential reason are differences in regulation. Goodhart (2011) points out that the reg-
ulation of US commercial banks prior to the crisis involved an upper limit to leverage,
while such a limit was absent for European banks.
The presence of ABSM as such says little about its macroeconomic relevance. How-
ever, the ABSM model predicts that strong intermediary balance sheet growth should
go hand in hand with declining risk premia. In a further paper, Adrian et al. (2010)
provide supportive evidence for this mechanism. To do so, they construct a Macro Risk
Premium (MRP)which can be interpreted as the required average excess return on risky
assets. The MRP is a weighted average of various yield and credit spreads, weights for
which are obtained from a linear regression of GDP growth on these spreads. This im-
plies that the MRP can be viewed as the required risk premium of a portfolio which
is tracking real GDP growth and therefore represents a claim on macroeconomic per-
formance. Their key finding is that the size of the MRP is inversely related to GDP
Growth. This holds not only for the US, but also for Japan, the UK and Germany. It
is further shown that the size of the MRP in turn depends on a so-called intermediary
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risk appetite factor, which in itself is driven by balance sheet growth of the financial
sector.28 These results, depicted in Figure 8.12 for the US, support the hypothesis of a
transmission channel running from an increase in intermediary balance sheet growth -
potentially caused by monetary expansion - to a decline in risk premia and a rise in real
activity.
Figure 8.12: Macro Risk Premium, Risk Appetite and Real Activity in the US
8.4.3 Financing of Balance Sheet Expansions
Being of a partial-equilibrium nature, the ABSM model is silent on how the expansion
of balance sheets is financed. It implicitly assumes that additional financing is sup-
plied elastically and at fixed cost. Yet it is an open and arguably important question
which market participants are willing to hold additional claims against an expanding
intermediation sector.
Shin and Shin (2011) argue that balance sheet expansion can be financed via an in-
crease in net capital imports. They document such a pattern for the economy of South
Korea. Moreover, Bruno and Shin (2015) show that unexpected decreases in the US
policy rate and the ABSM-driven response of US broker dealers trigger cross-border
28 The risk appetite factor is constructed from growth rates of lagged financial sector balance sheet
aggregates with particular predictive power for a change in themacro risk premium. Relativeweights
are determined in a similar fashion as for the MRP. See Adrian et al. (2010, pp. 191-96) for details.
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banking flows, indicating that balance sheet expansion partly takes places in foreign
assets. Hence, an easing of monetary conditions in the US spills over to financial sys-
tems throughout the world, which points towards an international dimension of the
ABSM mechanism or the risk-taking channel in general. However, such arguments are
less convincing on a global level, where net capital flows should cancel out by defini-
tion.
As an alternative, Shin and Shin (2011) point out that financing may occur via an
increase in interbank claims and interbank liabilities, respectively. Put bluntly, the in-
termediation sector is self-financing its balance sheet expansion. Shin and Shin (2011,
pp. 9-10) state that
"banks draw on retail deposits to lend to ultimate borrowers. They can
also hold claims against each other, if they so choose. Imagine a boomwhere
the assets of [...] banks double in size, but the pool of retail deposits stays
fixed. Then, the proportion of banking sector liabilities in the form of re-
tail deposits must fall. In other words, rapidly expanding bank assets is
mirrored by the increased cross-claims across banks."
In what follows, I will examine this mechanismwith the help of a simple accounting
exercise. Essentially, the banking sector issues additional deposits to attract additional
assets from the non-leveraged sector. Note that this is in line with the Adrian-Shin
ABSM model which predicted that relative holdings of assets by the intermediation
sector increase in the wake of a balance sheet expansion after a favorable shock (see
Section 8.4.1). Table 8.4 depicts the initial balance sheets of banks A and B.
Bank A
Assets Liabilities
Assets 100 Deposits 90
Equity 10
Bank B
Assets Liabilities
Assets 100 Deposits 90
Equity 10
Table 8.4: Initial Balance Sheets
Now suppose that Bank A borrows an amount of 100 from Bank B in the interbank
market. Bank A consequently has an interbank liability (IL) to bank B, but also a cor-
responding balance of interbank deposits (IBD), representing a claim against Bank B.
Conversely, Bank A has an interbank claim (IC) whereas the creation of an interbank
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Bank A
Assets Liabilities
Assets 100 Deposits 90
IBD 100 Equity 10
IL 100
Bank B
Assets Liabilities
Assets 100 Deposits 90
IC 100 Equity 10
IBD 100
Table 8.5: Balance Sheets after Interbank Lending
deposits implies that its liabilities increase by an corresponding amount. The modified
balance sheets are depicted in Table 8.5.
In a final step, Bank A uses its interbank deposit balance to buy additional assets,
for instance from some passive outside investor. Final balance sheets are given in Table
8.6. Note that the balance sheet of Bank B is omitted since it does not change any more
compared to Table 8.5.
Outside Investor
Assets Liabilities
IBD 100 Equity 100
Bank A
Assets Liabilities
Assets 200 Deposits 90
Equity 10
IL 100
Table 8.6: Balance Sheets after Asset Purchase
The consolidated balance sheet of the banking sector after all of the aforementioned
transactions is given in Table 8.7. The interbank claim and the interbank liability net
out. In the end, balance sheet expansion is facilitated by the issuance of additional
interbank deposits.
Banking Sector
Assets Liabilities
Assets 300 Equity 20
Deposits 180
IBD 100
Table 8.7: Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking Sector
Hence, balance sheet expansion for the sake of purchasing existing assets is con-
ducted in a similar fashion as in the process of private credit creation, where banks
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extend loans and credit the corresponding amount as a deposit to the borrowers. How-
ever, the latter case involves the creation of retail deposits. In the case here, balance
sheet expansion goes along with the creation of interbank deposits, which is a subtle
yet important difference. The outsider, who receives a payment for selling his asset to
the bank, does not discriminate between different forms of deposits. To him, deposits
represent an ultimate claim on currency in any case.
However, the rise in interbank deposits increases the fragility of the system. While
retail deposits are a relatively stable funding source which does not decline in aggre-
gate under most circumstances, interbank funding can turn out to be very volatile and
may disappear quickly. Suppose that Bank B starts to doubt the solvency of Bank A.
It will then refuse to roll over its interbank claim on the latter. Bank A now faces a
funding shortage and has to react by selling assets, which, at short notice, may involve
a discount. Thus, Bank A may partly default on its interbank obligation and Bank B
consequently realizes losses as well. As a result, the increase in balance sheet capacity
may reverse quickly and is inherently unstable.
This is yet another manifestation of the argument that a financial system with pro-
nounced and inherently fragile interconnections and strong reliance on short-term debt
is prone to systemic risk. Put differently, loose monetary policy triggering ABSM-
driven balance sheet expansion potentially aggravates systemic externalities associated
with interconnectedness and fire sales (see Sections 4.1 and 4.3). In that respect, Shin
and Shin (2011) have introduced the concept of Non-Core-Liabilities, which comprises
various forms of interbank liabilities.29 If the share of Non-Core Liabilities increases -
as it arguably happens in a boom in which retail deposits grow slower than bank bal-
ance sheets - systemic risk is enhanced. Indeed, Hahm et al. (2013) and Shin (2013)
show that the evolution of Non-Core Liabilities is a reliable predictor for future finan-
cial stress. Thus, a looser monetary policy stance induces not only a decline in desired
risk compensation for assets, it additionally leads to an increasingly fragile refinancing
structure within an expanding banking sector.
Figure 8.13 depicts Non-Core Liability Growth (defined in Appendix B) for US com-
mercial banks. It is apparent that Non-Core Liabilities exhibit strong cyclical fluctua-
tions. They consistently grew at double-digit rates prior to the crisis, and started to
collapse drastically after the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Note also
that their average growth rate is at about 6%, which indicates that the reliance on non-
core funding is increasing in trend.
29 See Shin and Shin (2011, p. 15) for a precise definition.
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Figure 8.13: Non-Core Liability Growth for US Commercial Banks
Probably due to the recognition of the risks of large interbank exposures, financing
via Non-Core Liabilities is often secured by collateral. However, this does little to mit-
igate the underlying procyclicality. For example, Shin and Adrian (2008, p. 299-300)
neatly describe the peculiarities of collateralized finance via repurchase agreements:
"[R]epurchase agreements (repos) [...] are the primary source of fund-
ing for market-based banking institutions. In a repurchase agreement, the
borrower sells a security today for a price below the current market price
on the understanding that it will buy it back in the future at a pre-agreed
price. The difference between the current market price of the security and
the price at which it is sold is called the "haircut" in the repo and fluctu-
ates together with funding conditions in the market. The fluctuations in
the haircut largely determine the degree of funding available to a leveraged
institution. The reason is that the haircut determines the maximum permis-
sible leverage achieved by the borrower. If the haircut is 2%, the borrower
can borrow $98 for $100 worth of securities pledged. Then, to hold $100
worth of securities, the borrower must come up with $2 of equity."
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Figure 8.14: Haircuts on Asset-Backed Securities During the Crisis
While collateral may be useful in mitigating counterparty risk, it is no remedy for the
fragility of refinancing structures mainly relying on Non-Core Liabilities. The key point
is that haircuts can vary. In a crisis, the value of assets become uncertain. Haircuts will
consequently rise or, even worse, some securities will no longer be accepted as collat-
eral at all. Hence, funding will dry up even in the presence of collateralization which
gives rise to an adverse feedback loop between declining market liquidity and declin-
ing funding liquidity (see Section 4.4.2). Figure 8.14 shows the development of haircuts
for asset-backed securities. They were considered safe prior to the crisis, and hence
haircuts were close to zero. Especially haircuts for subprime-related products skyrock-
eted, reaching a level of 100% in late 2008. A haircut of 100% implies that this type of
securities is no longer accepted as collateral. Thus, Figure 8.14 gives an impression on
the funding strains which were present in the financial system during the crisis. These
problems triggered massive fire sales leading to an adverse feedback loop between as-
set price declines and a gradual collapse of important funding markets.30
30 For a detailed account of the behavior of collateralized funding markets during the financial crises,
the reader is referred to Gorton (2010) and Gorton and Metrick (2010).
214 CHAPTER 8. THE RISK-TAKING CHANNEL OF MONETARY TRANSMISSION
8.5 Monetary Policy and Risk-Taking via Asset Substitution
The model of Adrian and Shin (2010b) with its focus on ABSM has shown that a looser
policy stance is likely to decrease the required risk compensation and to increase fund-
ing fragility. Yet it is subject to an important simplification. By assumption, banks only
invest into one generic risky asset. In reality, however, portfolios consist of a variety of
assets with different risk and return characteristics. It is therefore necessary to examine
a potential response of banks’ portfolio composition to variations in monetary policy.
Rajan (2005) stresses the importance of a so-called search-for-yield effectwhich creates
a strong incentive for additional risk-taking if interest rates decline. If the duration
of liabilities exceeds the duration of assets, a decline in the policy rate will gradually
decrease returns on assets while liabilities still have to be served at the higher interest
rates levels which prevailed in the past. In that situation, intermediaries cannot honor
their commitments unless they increase the return on assets. This is only possible if the
portfolio composition is modified such that it includes a greater share of risky assets.
Intermediaries hence perform asset substitution, increasing their holdings of relatively
risky assets at the expense of relatively safe assets.31
8.5.1 A Simple Example of Search-For-Yield Behavior
I formalize search-for-yield behavior with a simplified example of portfolio theory
along the lines of Markowitz (1952). Suppose that an agent faces the problem of in-
vesting in a portfolio which consists of a risky and a risk-free asset. The risk-free asset
has a certain net return of r f , and its payoff is uncorrelated with the risky asset’s payoff.
The risky asset has an expected return E(r) = r > r f with a variance of σ2R. The share
of the risky asset in the portfolio is given by α, and the share of the risk-free asset is
given by (1− α), respectively. The expected net portfolio payoff per unit is denoted by
E(R) = R = αr + (1− α)r f . Akin to the passive investor in Adrian and Shin (2010b),
the agent maximizes a mean-variance utility function of
31 Empirical evidence for search-for-yield behavior in the presence of low policy rates has been provided
by Becker and Ivashina (2013) for US insurance companies. Gungor and Sierra (2014) detect search-
for-yield patterns for Canadian fixed-income funds. The behavior of funds, however, is unlikely to
be driven by funding cost pressures. Instead, additional risk-taking in low-rate environments may
be governed by concerns about the relative performance with respect to competing funds. In fact,
Morris and Shin (2014) show that such coordination elements may give rise to increasing risk-taking
within the fund industry if policy rates decline. Hence, the policy stance is likely to affect risk-taking
behavior of both leveraged and non-leveraged investors.
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U = E(R)− cσ2P = αr+ (1− α)r f − cα
2σ2R, (8.39)
where c denotes the risk-tolerance coefficient and σ2P = α
2σ2R is the portfolio vari-
ance.32 The investor seeks to maximize utility via the optimal choice of α. Taking the
FOC of (8.39) yields
∂U
∂α
= r− r f − 2αcσ
2
R = 0 ⇔ α
∗ =
r− r f
2cσ2R
. (8.40)
Interpretation is straightforward: The optimal weight of the risky asset α positively
depends on the risky asset’s expected excess return r− r f and is negatively related to its
variance and also negatively related to an increasing c (which implies decreasing risk
tolerance).33 The expected return of the optimal portfolio is
R∗ = α∗r+ (1− α∗)r f . (8.41)
Suppose further that the liability structure of the agent imposes the additional con-
straint of a target return: E(R) = R∗ has to be achieved at the very minimum. This
requirement does not pose a problem in the initial situation. However, consider a pol-
icy innovation which uniformly decreases the returns on risk-free and risky assets by
−ǫ. The return of the initially optimal portfolio becomes
Rǫ = α
∗(r− ǫ) + (1− α∗)(r f − ǫ) = R
∗ − ǫ. (8.42)
One needs to bear in mind that the optimal portfolio weight α∗ remains unchanged
due to the constant yield spread. Quite trivially, the portfolio return declines precisely
by the amount ǫ. Since Rǫ < R∗, the target-return constraint now becomes binding. The
32 The general expression for the variance of a weighted portfolio of two assets x and y is σ2xy =
α2σ2x + (1− α)
2σ2y + 2α(1− α)σ
2
xy. The variance of the risk-free asset’s payoff is zero. So is the payoff
covariance σ2xy. The expression therefore simplifies accordingly.
33 It is immediately apparent from (8.40) that (ceteris paribus) a decrease in r f increases α∗. Formally, it
holds that ∂α
∗
∂r f
= − 12cσ2R
< 0. An increase in the excess return r− r f makes risk taking more attractive
and hence increases the optimal share of the risky asset. However, I assume that the yield spread
r − r f is constant, which renders this channel ineffective. Put differently, a change in r f should be
understood as a level shift of yields across the entire spectrum of assets.
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investor has to readjust the portfolio by choosing a new portfolio weight αǫ in order to
satisfy
αǫ(r− ǫ) + (1− αǫ)(r f − ǫ) = R
∗ (8.43)
Inserting (8.41) and collecting terms yields
αǫ(r− ǫ) + (1− αǫ)(r f − ǫ) = α
∗r+ (1− α∗)r f
αǫ(r− r f ) = α
∗(r− r f ) + ǫ
αǫ = α
∗ +
ǫ
r− r f
(8.44)
which formally establishes the result that the share of the risky asset increases after
a cut of the policy rate, i.e., αǫ > α∗. The investor has no choice but to increase his
holdings of the risky assets in order to meet the return requirement. The strength of the
effect increases in the magnitude of the rate cut ǫ and decreases in the (constant) yield
spread r− r f . If the latter is large, less risky assets need to be added to boost expected
returns. As Rajan (2005) stresses, such a mechanism may be of particular importance
for insurance companies because they tend to make very long-term commitments with
the promise of a constant interest rate. If average asset returns fall below that rate,
searching for yield almost becomes a necessity.
However, it is hard to generalize this argument for the entire intermediation sector.
Banks’ balance sheets, for instance, exhibit a different structure: The duration of assets
is typically exceeding the duration of liabilities. Under these circumstances, policy-rate
cuts are beneficial for profitability which should decrease the incentive to take addi-
tional risks. The impact of policy variations on the riskiness of intermediary portfolios
may therefore be heterogeneous. Furthermore, the decision on optimal portfolio risk is
likely to interact with the choice of balance sheet size and leverage as well as with the
choice on the optimal structure of funding.
As a preliminary result, the response of portfolio composition to policy variations
should not be regarded in isolation. Interest rate changesmay exhibit countervailing in-
centives on portfolio risk-taking, which has been neglected in the simple formalization
of the search-for-yield problem. In what follows, I present the model of Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez (2013), who recognize that the policy rate and portfolio risk-taking are
8.5. MONETARY POLICY AND RISK-TAKING VIA ASSET SUBSTITUTION 217
interrelated through various channels which oppose each other. They nevertheless find
that the net effect of a policy expansion on portfolio risk-taking is positive.34
8.5.2 The Dell’Ariccia-Marquez Model
Banks invest in a portfolio of risky loans with a certain repayment probability and ob-
tain financing from a mix of equity and deposits. They are subject to limited liability
and deposits are thus only repaid if the portfolio investment succeeds. Policy variations
affect banks’ risk-taking incentives via two countervailing mechanisms.
First, monetary policy affects banks’ funding costs and thus banking profitability
via its influence on the intermediation margin (see Section 8.4.2). This gives rise to a
risk-shifting effect. In general, limited liability creates a powerful risk-taking incentive.
Shareholders are willing to take enormous risks since the downside is mostly borne by
depositors. However, if the profitability of successful banking operations is high per se,
this risk-taking incentive is reduced. If the intermediation margin is high, shareholders
are less willing to put the possibility of future profits at stake by taking unnecessary
default risks. If profitability is low, optimal risk-taking increases since preserving the
chance for (lower) future profits is considered less important. In isolation, a policy-rate
increase fosters risk-taking due to a compression of the intermediation margin.
Second, monetary policy induces a leverage effectwhich indirectly affects risk-taking
incentives via its impact on the optimal capital structure. A policy tightening increases
funding costs. Since these are partly risk-sensitive, banks choose a safer capital struc-
ture to compensate their rise: They increase the reliance on equity and decrease their
leverage. Importantly, the optimal amount of risk-taking decreases in the share of eq-
uity. If shareholders have to bear relatively more losses, they take less risks. Hence, an
increase in the policy rate reduces risk-taking incentives.
Monetary policy has countervailing effects on bank risk by affecting both profitabil-
ity and funding costs. The question about the net effect of the risk-shifting and the
leverage effect on bank risk-taking after a policy variation can only be answered when
inspecting the model in detail: Banks set the loan rate rL and are confronted with a
highly simplified loan demand schedule of
34 For the subsequent discussion of the model, I also relied on the previous working paper version of
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010) which covers the technical details more extensively.
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LD =

L if rL ≤ R0 if rL ≥ R (8.45)
implying that borrowers demand a fixed loan amount of L, as long as the loan rate
rL does not exceed their reservation rate R. Loans are risky and banks rely on a moni-
toring technology with scalable effort q, where q also represents the probability of loan
repayment.35 Monitoring produces quadratic costs of 12cq
2 for each loan unit. Banks
thus trade off ensuring an acceptable repayment probability and economizing on mon-
itoring costs. The actual monitoring effort should be interpreted as ameasure for banks’
portfolio risk.
Bank owners finance a share k of loans with equity. The remaining share 1 − k
is financed with uninsured deposits. Despite the intensity of monitoring (and thus
the repayment probability) is private information, depositors can calculate the optimal
monitoring effort qˆ, since it is governed by the capital structure, which is observable.
The rate r∗ is the risk-free rate which should be regarded as the policy rate. Depositors
consequently demand a rate
rD =
r∗
E(q|k)
(8.46)
where E(q|k) is the repayment probability of the bank, conditional on its choice of
the capital structure k. The opportunity costs of equity are given by
rE =
r∗ + ε
q
> rD, (8.47)
implying that ε can be regarded as a stylized equity risk premium. The model is
decomposed in three stages. In stage 1, banks choose the capital structure k and de-
positors choose rD accordingly. In stage 2, banks set the loan rate rL. In the last stage,
banks decide on their optimal monitoring effort qˆ. The model is solved via backward
induction. That is, the first problem is to derive qˆ while taking all other variables as
given. Expected profits Π are given by
35 This model features only one generic asset. However, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010, p. 8) argue that "[a]n
alternative interpretation of this assumption is that banks have access to a continuum of portfolios
characterized by a parameter q ∈ [0, 1], with returns rL − 12 cq
2 and probability of success q."
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Π =
(
q(rL − rD(1− k)− rEk)−
1
2
cq2
)
L (8.48)
where the bank receives a return of rL (per loan unit) net of its weighted average
capital costs with probability q. Monitoring costs accrue in any case. The profit function
can be rearranged to
Π =
(
q(rL − rD(1− k))− (r∗ + ε)k−
1
2
cq2
)
L. (8.49)
Taking the FOC yields
∂Π
∂q
= (rL − rD(1− k)− cq) L = 0. (8.50)
Since loan demand is assumed to be non-zero for meaningful parameter constella-
tions, the FOC is satisfied if
qˆ =
rL − rD(1− k)
c
. (8.51)
After the derivation of optimal monitoring effort qˆ, banks have to choose the opti-
mal loan rate. This is trivial, since under entirely inelastic loan demand it is optimal to
choose rˆL = R. Optimal monitoring is then given by
qˆ =
R− rD(1− k)
c
. (8.52)
Since rational depositors form model-consistent expectations E(q|k) = qˆ, the de-
posit rate can be substituted out of (8.52) by using rD = r∗/qˆ. Solving (8.52) for the
equilibrium level of monitoring yields
qˆ =
1
2c
(
R+
√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
)
. (8.53)
The detailed derivation is devoted to Appendix A.4.36 Other things equal, (8.53)
reveals that monitoring effort decreases in r∗. This is the risk-shifting effect. Since
36 Basically two possible solutions for qˆ emerge. The selection procedure is simply to take the larger
value (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2010, p. 22). This can be justified with the argument that a value consider-
ably below unity for qˆ is at odds with historical default rates of bank loan portfolios.
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R is constant, an increase in r∗ compresses the intermediation margin and decreases
banking profitability. With lower profitability, banks have the incentive to take more
risk since limited liability assigns downside risks primarily to depositors. The strength
of this effect increases for a lower amount of k, which corresponds to a higher share of
deposit financing.
So far, the idea of the risk-taking channel is contradicted since the model so far pre-
dicts that a relaxation if the policy stance, i.e., a decrease in r∗, would reduce risk-taking.
However, the model is still incomplete as the endogenous choice of the capital structure
- the first-stage problem - is not yet taken into account. Bank profits conditional on the
capital structure are given by
Π =
(
qˆ(R− rD(1− k))− (r∗ + ε)k−
1
2
cqˆ2
)
L
=
(
qˆR− r∗ − kε−−
1
2
cqˆ2
)
L.
(8.54)
Plugging (8.53) into (8.54) and taking the FOC with respect to k yields
r∗R
2
√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
− ε−
1
2
r∗ = 0. (8.55)
After solving for k, it is possible to express the optimal capital ratio as
kˆ = 1− R2
ε(r∗ + ε)
cr∗(r∗ + 2ε)2
, (8.56)
where it holds that the optimal capital ratio increases with rising policy rates, i.e.,
∂kˆ/∂r∗ > 0. Substituting the optimal capital ratio kˆ back into (8.53) yields
qˆ = R
r∗ + ε
c(r∗ + 2ε)
(8.57)
which is the final expression for optimal monitoring effort. Incorporating the deci-
sion on the optimal capital structure now indicates that the optimal monitoring effort
increases in r∗.37
37 See Appendix A.4 for the detailed derivation of kˆ and qˆ. Note also that for ∂qˆ∂r∗ > 0, it is necessary that
c < 2, which holds for reasonable parameter constellations.
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Thus, tightening the policy stance increases the capital ratio and reduces credit risk-
taking. Vice versa, it can be stated that a decline in the policy rate causes banks to (i)
reduce monitoring efforts and to take more credit risk as well as (ii) to increase their
leverage. The net effect of a policy expansion on bank risk-taking is therefore positive,
which ultimately supports the notion of a risk-taking channel. While the risk-shifting
incentive is attenuated, the decrease in funding costs calls for higher leverage and hence
less monitoring. The leverage effect dominates the risk-shifting effect.38
8.6 The Policy Stance and its Impact on Funding Risk
8.6.1 The Term Spread as an Incentive for Maturity Transformation
If short-term interest rates decrease after a monetary expansion, banks have the incen-
tive to rely more strongly on short-term debt since the increased term spread makes
short-term funding relatively cheaper (Stein, 2012). As a consequence, the maturity
mismatch of balance sheets increases. Funding long-term assets with short-term debt
makes banks vulnerable against a sudden withdrawal of short-term funding (see Sec-
tions 4.3 and 4.4). Thus, if a looser policy stance indeed increases the incentive for more
aggressive maturity transformation, there is a direct link frommonetary policy to bank-
ing fragility via its effect on funding risk. This mechanism has been briefly discussed
within the context of the ABSMmodel in Section 8.4.3. Angeloni and Faia (2013a) carry
out a detailed model-based examination of this channel; they confirm that a policy ex-
pansion triggers (i) an increasing reliance on short-term funding and (ii) a net increase
in funding risk. I will sketch out the key mechanism in the remainder.
8.6.2 The Angeloni-Faia Model
The model is of the New-Keynesian DSGE type and is augmented with a banking sec-
tor.39 Banks invest in a large number of uncorrelated investment projects Lt (each of
38 This result is robust against various modifications such as a change in the structure of loan demand
or the introduction of deposit insurance. See Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2013, pp. 133-135) and
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2010) for detailed discussions and proofs.
39 The following discussion will be limited to the banking sector. In general, the model features four
sectors: Banks, households, final good producers and capital good producers. The latter sectors are
modeled as is common in the DSGE literature. See Angeloni and Faia (2013a,b) for details.
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unit size) in the capital-goods production sector whose price is given by Qt. Loans in
the aggregated bank balance sheet are thus QtLt. Banks receive funding from house-
holds who operate partly as equity investors (bank capitalists, at amount BKt) and
partly as depositors (amount Dt). The non-contingent deposit rate is denoted by Rt
and equals the policy rate. The ratio of deposits to total assets is dt = Dt/QtLt. Impor-
tantly, the deposit ratio is a proxy for both the amount of leverage and the fragility of
the funding structure. The balance sheet identity reads
QtLt = BKt + Dt (8.58)
Banks are run by managers who operate on the behalf of both bank capitalists and
depositors. Their task is to find the optimal capital structure which maximizes the
combined expected payoff of both investor groups. Deposits can be withdrawn on a
first-come-first-serve basis. This gives rise to a bank run as in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), as soon as depositors realize that payoffs from loans are insufficient to repay
the entire outstanding amount of deposits. If a bank run occurs, investment projects
have to be liquidated at a loss. Liquidation receipts are distributed pro rata amongst
depositors while bank capitalists receive a zero payoff.
Investment projects are risky. Their expected return is given by RAt plus a random
shock xt, which is assumed to follow a uniform distribution across the interval [−h; h].
Furthermore, it assumed that the bank manager acquires special knowledge about the
investment project which is supposed to mirror the idea of relationship-based lending.
The manager is able to extract a higher payoff from the project, compared to the case
where it is liquidated by outside investors on their own. Outside liquidation lowers
the payoff by some parameter 0 < λ < 1. Given his special capability, the manager is
able to demand a fee for his help in the process of payoff extraction. In any case, a bank
run causes a general decrease of the project’s payoff due to its disordered liquidation.
It is measured by the coefficient 0 ≤ c < 1. As an overview, Table 8.8 shows the three
possible return constellations.
If the project payoff RAt + xt is below the promised return on deposits, i.e., if R
A
t +
xt < dtRt, a bank run occurs with certainty and the project is liquidated. Liquidation
receipts are transferred to depositors. The bank manager engages in project liquidation
in exchange for a share of the additional payoff (1 − λ)(1 − c)(RAt + xt) he helps to
generate (see Table 8.8 for a comparison). It is assumed that additional payoffs are split
evenly. Depositor payoffs are then given by
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Constellation Project Payoff
No Bank Run RAt + xt
Bank Run, Liquidation with Bank Manager (1− c)(RAt + xt)
Bank Run, Liquidation without Bank Manager λ(1− c)(RAt + xt)
Table 8.8: Conditional ex-post Project Return
λ(1− c)(RAt + xt) +
1
2
(1− λ)(1− c)(RAt + xt)
=
1
2
(1+ λ)(1− c)(RAt + xt)
(8.59)
An intermediate case emerges if λ(RAt + xt) < dtRt ≤ R
A
t + xt. In this scenario,
a bank run can only be prevented if the investment project is liquidated by the bank
manager (which will happen in equilibrium). Additional payoffs are again split evenly,
but now between the manager and bank capitalists. Depositors receive the full amount
Rtdt.
If Rtdt < λ(RAt + xt), a bank run will never happen. Depositors receive Rtdt and
the bank capitalist ends up with λ(RAt + xt)− Rtdt in the worst case. Again, the bank
manager is able to boost payoffs and they are split evenly between him and the share-
holders. Table 8.9 summarizes the payoff structures in each scenario. The case of a
certain bank run is shown in the upper row, the intermediate case in the middle row,
and the no-run case in the bottom row. Summing up payoffs yields RAt + xt if the run
is avoided and (1− c)(RAt + xt) if the run occurs. The distribution of project payoffs
between stakeholders differs between scenarios.
Scenario Depositor Payoff Shareholder Payoff Manager Fee
Certain Bank Run 12 (1+ λ)(1− c)(R
A
t + xt) 0
1
2 (1− λ)(1− c)(R
A
t + xt)
Intermediate Case Rtdt 12 (R
A
t + xt − Rtdt)
1
2 (R
A
t + xt − Rtdt)
No Bank Run Rtdt 12 (1+ λ)(R
A
t + xt)− Rtdt
1
2 (1− λ)(R
A
t + xt)
Table 8.9: Ex-post Payoffs for Bank Stakeholders
The ex-ante optimization problem for the bank manager is to choose dt so as to
maximize the combined expected payoffs EtΠt+1(dt) for shareholders and depositors.
They are given by
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EtΠt+1(dt) =
1
2h
∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
(1+ λ)(1− c)(RAt + xt)
2
dxt
+
1
2h
∫ Rtdt
λ −R
A
t
Rtdt−RAt
(RAt + xt) + Rtdt
2
dxt
+
1
2h
∫ h
Rtdt
λ −R
A
t
(1+ λ)(RAt + xt)
2
dxt.
(8.60)
The first integrand denotes outsider payoffs in the bank-run case. Integration occurs
over xt since the shock realization determines which constellation emerges. Hence, the
upper limit of the first integral has to be xt = Rtdt − RAt . If xt ≤ Rtdt − R
A
t , it holds that
RAt + xt ≤ Rtdt which is the condition for the bank-run scenario. The integral limits
belonging to the remaining scenarios are constructed accordingly (Angeloni and Faia,
2013a, p. 314). The integrands denote cumulated outsider payoffs in the respective
scenario, as depicted in Table 8.9.
A lengthy proof shows that the value of dt which maximizes expected payoffs for
outsiders has to be in the interval λ(RAt + h) < Rtdt < R
A
t + h.
40 In this interval,
the no-run case is ruled out. Even in the best case with a positive shock realization
of h, liquidation receipts without involving the bank manager are insufficient to cover
deposits. It is therefore always optimal to allow a non-zero amount of funding fragility.
Expected payoffs within this interval are then given by
EtΠt+1 =
1
2h
∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
(1+ λ)(1− c)(RAt + xt)
2
dxt
+
1
2h
∫ h
Rtdt−RAt
(RAt + xt) + Rtdt
2
dxt
(8.61)
As shown in Appendix A.5, tedious expansion of the integral and taking the FOC
with respect to dt yields
(1− c)(1+ λ)Rtdt + h− 3Rtdt + RAt = 0 (8.62)
Solving the FOC for dt produces the optimal deposit ratio
40 The proof is included in an online appendix (Angeloni and Faia, 2013b). The expected payoff function
is split into various intervals. If Rtdt < λ(RAt + h), it can be verified that EtΠt+1 strictly increases in
dt. For λ(RAt + h) < Rtdt < R
A
t + h, payoffs become inversely U-shaped in dt. For Rtdt > R
A
t + h,
payoffs strictly decrease in dt. Hence, the optimal value of dt can be determined by finding the local
payoff maximum in the interval λ(RAt + h) < Rtdt < R
A
t + h.
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dˆt =
1
Rt
h+ RAt
2− λ+ c(1+ λ)
, (8.63)
fromwhich it is apparent that dˆt increases if the policy rate Rt declines. Other things
equal, a run becomes less likely due to lower obligations to depositors, which raises the
optimal deposit ratio. Banks thus increase their reliance on short-term funding in re-
sponse to a policy expansion. Moreover, the optimal deposit ratio increases in RAt since
a rise in expected asset payoffs allows to increase leverage (for similar reasons). Like-
wise, dˆt increases in λwhichmeasures the relative efficiency of outsider liquidation and
is thus positively linked to outsider payoffs in adverse states. Hence, dˆt also decreases
in c which measures the inevitable decline of project payoffs in a bank-run scenario.
Somewhat surprisingly, dˆt also increases in the dispersion of payoffs: An increase in h
raises expected shareholder returns in the no-run case, whereas depositor payoffs are
independent of dt in the run scenario as they receive the entire project payoff anyway
(Angeloni and Faia, 2013a, p. 315).
Unfortunately, the net effect on funding fragility cannot be judged by inspecting the
banking sector in isolation since there are two countervailing effects. A decrease in Rt
increases dˆt, but also contributes to a decrease in the probability of a bank run as a lower
policy rate effectively decreases banks’ repayment obligations to depositors. However,
the simulation of the model reveals that the first effect is stronger. In sum, lowering
the policy rate causes both an increase in dˆt and a rise in the bank-run probability. A
decrease in the policy rate therefore enhances funding risk.
8.7 Overview on Empirical Evidence
Since the concept of the risk-taking channel is relatively new, its empirical analysis
is still in its infancy compared to other transmission channels. However, the empirical
literature is growing at a fast pace and generally verifies the existence of a quantitatively
significant risk-taking channel. The literature can be best categorizedwith respect to the
characteristics of the underlying data sets. Some studies use panels comprising data on
large amounts of individual banks or individual loans, respectively, while other focus
on aggregated macro time series.
In any case, the empirical identification of the risk-taking channel is complicated
by various problems. First, it is questionable to treat monetary policy as an exogenous
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factor for the banking sector. Causality may also work in reverse with central banks
responding to financial conditions. This gives rise to potential endogeneity problems
which have to be addressed appropriately within the estimation procedure.
Second, when analyzing bank loans and their response to policy variations, it is
also inherently difficult to distinguish between supply and demand-driven adjustment
processes. One identification strategy is the analysis of loan rate adjustments after a
policy rate cut. If loan rates decrease, this rather points to supply shifts. Vice versa,
raising rates indicate that demand shifts dominate.
Third, the impact of the risk-taking channel needs to be separated from the influence
of other bank-based transmission channels. This problem is tackled with appropriate
control variables such as property and stock prices to account for changing collateral
values of potential borrowers. With respect to the bank-lending channel, several studies
control for banks’ refinancing structure in order to account for the sensitivity of their
funding costs to policy variations. Controlling for economic activity and inflation is
equally important.
Fourth, bank-specific characteristics also matter. Studies employing bank-level and
loan-level data therefore control for factors such as bank size, liquidity, capitalization
and cost efficiency. These measures may provide risk-taking incentives independent of
the policy stance. Some studies use additional proxies for the degree of bank competi-
tion and the intensity of supervision.
8.7.1 Studies with Micro-Level Data
Studies using panels with bank-level or loan-level data constitute the majority of avail-
able empirical research on the risk-taking channel. For example, Jiménez et al. (2014)
analyze the Spanish market for bank loans from 2002 until 2008. They use a data set
which covers bank loans to Spanish non-financial corporations with detailed informa-
tion on the loan application process, the final loan volume and information on collat-
eral requirements and the borrower’s credit history. ECB policy is treated as exogenous
since its policy stance is assumed to remain unaffected from Spanish loan market dy-
namics. As a key result, a decline in the policy rate causes banks to grant riskier loans at
greater volume and with lower collateral requirements.41 Banks hence engage in asset
41 Loans are considered risky if the firm has a history of non-performing loans over the last four years.
Moreover, the sample is restricted to "unknown" borrowers who do not have an existing business
relationwith the bank under consideration. The data set does not contain information on loan pricing,
implying that potential effects on credit risk premia are omitted from the analysis.
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substitution as predicted by the model of Dell’Ariccia andMarquez (2013). The effect is
stronger for weakly capitalized banks, which points to the existence of risk-shifting ef-
fects. It is further shown that loans are not only more risky from an ex-ante perspective,
but that they indeed have a higher probability of default in the future.
Altunbas et al. (2014) study a cross-country panel of banks from Europe and the US
ranging between 1999 and 2008. They proxy individual bank risk with their Expected
Default Frequency (EDF).42 The stance of monetary policy is measured by country-
specific gaps between the actual real short-term rate and a measure of the natural real
short-term rate.43 They find a negative relation between the interest-rate gap and the
EDF. Accommodative policy thus increases the default probability of banks. Interest-
ingly, a decline in the level of the policy rate per se leads to further increases of bank
risk. Furthermore, the risk-taking channel is reinforced when monetary conditions are
expansive for a prolonged period of time.
Ioannidou et al. (2009) study the behavior of Bolivian banks from 1999 to 2003. They
use a data set covering every bank loan that was originated within this period, includ-
ing detailed information on price and non-price terms as well as future performance.
They use the US federal funds rate as an exogenous indicator of the policy stance, since
the Bolivian Peso was pegged to the Dollar at that time. Moreover, an overwhelming
part of the banking system was dollarized. They find that a decrease in the US policy
rate increases the riskiness of newly granted bank loans. Loan riskiness is measured
by estimates of ex-post default probabilities and ex-ante measures such as borrower
default history. Interestingly, default probabilities of outstanding loans are reduced.44
With respect to loan pricing, it is shown that required loan spreads decrease after a pol-
icy expansion, supporting the idea that desired credit risk premia decline when mone-
tary conditions are relaxed.
There are various additional studies using bank-level or loan-level data, all of which
are broadly in favor of the risk-taking channel. Ozsuca and Akbostanci (2012) find that
Turkish banks increase risk-taking when short-term rates are relatively low. Gaggl and
42 EDF is an expected probability of default estimated for various time horizons with information
from balance sheet items, stock-market data and a database on historical defaults. It is provided
by Moody’s.
43 As an alternative measure, they use the difference between the actual policy rate and the rate pre-
scribed by some version of the Taylor Rule (Taylor Residual). Results remain unchanged.
44 Thus, it would be highly interesting to analyze the net effect on the riskiness of the entire loan port-
folio. This is not done in their paper, probably since the bank-specific aggregation of loan-level data
is prohibitively time-consuming.
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Valderrama (2010) detect a similar pattern for Austrian banks while Bonfim and Soares
(2014) provide supportive results for Portugal. Delis and Kouretas (2011) and Delis
et al. (2011) provide evidence for the risk-taking channel by inspecting separated panels
of banks within the Euro area and the US, respectively. Further evidence for the US is
delivered by de Nicolò et al. (2010) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2013).
8.7.2 Studies with Macro-Level Data
Studies using macro-level data are clearly in the minority, yet their results tend to be
equally in favor of the risk-taking channel. For instance, Maddaloni and Peydró (2011)
analyze the relation between the policy stance and bank lending standards for a cross-
country macro-panel including Euro Area countries and the US from 2002 to 2008.
Measures for lending standards are obtained from survey data, in which banks report
whether lending standards have been tightened or softened in the current period. The
policy stance is measured by Taylor Residuals and accommodative policy is found to
soften lending standards. The effect is amplified if banking supervision is less restric-
tive and if banks engage more heavily in securitization. Moreover, the relaxation of
lending standards is especially pronounced if policy rates remain accommodative over
an extended period.
Angeloni et al. (2015) estimate a vector autoregression model for the US economy
from 1980 to 2008 which includes various measures of aggregate bank risk-taking.
Lending risk is proxied by the levels of outstanding debt of non-financial firms and
households, assuming that they are inversely related to their aggregate creditworthi-
ness.45 Funding risk is measured by a proxy for the outstanding level of potentially un-
stable Non-Core Liabilities, which comprises, for instance, liabilities from repurchase
agreements. In addition, stock price volatility of the banking sector is included as an
indicator for total bank risk. As a result, expansive policy shocks are found to increase
each proxy of bank risk, the effect on funding risk being quantitatively most significant.
Adrian and Shin (2008) deliver a similar result by showing that, for the US interme-
diation sector from 1991 until 2007, the growth rate of outstanding repurchase agree-
ments accelerates when monetary policy is expansive. And as mentioned in Section
8.4.2, Adrian et al. (2010) demonstrate that intermediary risk appetite increases after an
45 While (more granular) market-based risk measures are principally available, it is argued that they fail
to reflect the build-up of financial fragility (Angeloni et al., 2015, p. 288).
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expansive policy shock. Moreover, de Nicolò et al. (2010) find that aggregate lending
standards for US banks decline in the policy rate. Finally, Peersman and Wagner (2014)
show that securitization activities of US banks increase after an expansive policy shock.
This possibly points to search-for-yield behavior by non-bank market participants who
seek to substitute lower-yieldings assets with risky tranches of asset-backed securities,
which are in turn supplied by banks via additional issuance.
To the contrary, Buch et al. (2014) find only limited support for a risk-taking channel
in the US over the period from 1997 to 2008.46 They employ a factor-augmented vec-
tor autoregression (FAVAR), which augments an otherwise standard macroeconomic
VAR model with factors summarizing information from the Survey of Terms of Busi-
ness Lending (STBL).47 With respect to results, it is found that large commercial banks
do not change the riskiness of their lending behavior after an easing of monetary con-
ditions. Only smaller banks behave as suggested by the risk-taking channel and in-
creasingly extend loans to riskier borrowers. Consistent with other studies, it is found
that prolonged periods of low policy rates enhance the potency of risk-taking channel.
If rates are low for a longer time, foreign commercial banks operating on US markets
tend to increase their risk-taking as well.
46 It should be noted that their sample is confined to business lending of commercial banks, while the
lion’s share of risk-taking prior to the crisis arguably took place in mortgage markets. They argue that
the focus on business lending is advantageous since mortgage market dynamics have been highly
distorted by political intervention. On the other hand, the exclusion of the mortgage sector possibly
underestimates the strength of the risk-taking channel.
47 In the STBL, about 400 commercial banks report extensively on price and non-price terms of newly
originated business loans.

Chapter 9
Empirical Examination of the
Risk-Taking Channel with a VAR
Analysis
In what follows, I estimate a Vector Autoregression Model (henceforth VAR) for the
US macroeconomy which is augmented with additional proxy variables for risk-taking
behavior within the financial sector. The main result is that risk-taking responds pro-
cyclically to a monetary policy shock, which corroborates existing findings on the risk-
taking channel. Risk-taking is measured by various proxies which aim to reflect the
evolution of credit risk and the evolution of funding risk, respectively. It is found that
the US banking sector tends to loosen lending standards and to increase its reliance on
short-term non-core-funding in the wake of an expansionary monetary policy shock.
The technique of Vector Autoregressions has been popularized by Sims (1980). VAR
models extend the framework of a univariate AR-process to a multivariate setting.
Thus, VARs are essentially systems of simultaneous difference equations. Every in-
cluded variable is treated as fully endogenous without any restrictions imposed a pri-
ori. Clearly, these feature make VARs a natural candidate for the empirical analysis of
monetary policy transmission with its time lags and the likely feedback effects between
macroeconomic aggregates.1
1 Discussions of VAR-based monetary policy analysis are given in Christiano et al. (1999) and Stock
and Watson (2001) among others.
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9.1 Methodology
A reduced-form VAR model in matrix notation is given by
Yt = µ+ A1Yt−1 + A2Yt−2 . . .+ ApYt−p + εt, (9.1)
where Yt, . . . ,Yt−p are n × 1 vectors of endogenous variables and their respective
lagged realizations, µ is an n× 1 vector of constants and A(1), . . . , A(p) are n× n co-
efficient matrices.2 Thus, any endogenous variable depends on its own lags as well as
the lagged realizations of all other variables. Estimation can be conducted separately
for each equation by using ordinary least squares (OLS).
Each element in the n × 1 vector of disturbances εt has a zero mean and follows
a white noise process with finite variance. Importantly, the single disturbances are
typically correlated with each other. It holds that
E(εt) = 0, (9.2)
and the variance-covariance matrix (VCM) is characterized by
E(εtε
′
s) =

Σ if t = s0 if t 6= s (9.3)
which implies that residuals may be correlated in the same period according to the
contemporaneous VCM Σ but not across time. Thus, there is a serious limitation to
the reduced-form representation of a VAR since residuals do not represent structural
shocks. Instead, theymerely represent forecast errors. While impulse-response analysis
in the reduced-form framework is still useful for forecasting, it is rather pointless for
the analysis of genuine shocks to the endogenous variables.
As an example, consider a reduced-form VAR comprising unemployment, inflation
and the policy rate. The residuals of the policy rate equation are not policy shocks.
Given contemporaneous correlation, these residuals may likewise be influenced by
2 The methodological discussion heavily relies on Becketti (2013, chap. 9) and Hamilton (1994, chap.
10-11).
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shocks to inflation and unemployment. However, in order to analyze monetary pol-
icy transmission, it is necessary to uncover a distinct shock to the policy rate per se
which needs to be unrelated to the shocks to other endogenous variables.
Fortunately, VAR analysis offers various possibilities to uncover these structural
shocks. As shown in Hamilton (1994, pp. 259), a dynamically stable VAR model can be
rewritten in its moving-average (MA) form
Yt = ν+
∞
∑
i=0
Ψiεt−i, (9.4)
where ν is a vector of constants and Ψi is an n × n matrix measuring the impact
of non-structural shocks on the vector of endogenous variables.3 It is now possible to
obtain the structural shocks from the MA representation of the reduced-form VAR: By
using the Choleski Decomposition, the variance-covariance-matrix Σ of the reduced-
form residuals can be decomposed in the product of a lower-triangular matrix P and its
transpose, implying that
Σ = PP
′
⇔ P−1ΣP
′−1 = I. (9.5)
The reduced-form VAR is subsequently rearranged as follows:
Yt = ν+
∞
∑
i=0
ΨiPP
−1εt−i = ν+
∞
∑
i=0
Ξivt−i, (9.6)
where Ξi = ΨiP and vt = P−1εt. This modified representation is called a recursive
VAR. The VCM of vt is
E(vtv
′
t) = P
−1εtP
′−1ε
′
t = P
−1εtε
′
tP
′−1
= P−1ΣP
′−1 = P−1PP
′
P
′−1 = I,
(9.7)
which verifies that vt is a vector of uncorrelated random disturbances, since the
non-diagonal elements of its VCM are zero. Hence, vt is the vector of structural shocks
and Ξi measures their impact on Yt, further implying that Ξt determines the shape
3 Technically, it holds that ∂Yt+i∂εt = Ψi (Hamilton, 1994, p. 318). The sequence of ∑
n
i=0 Ψi thus pins
down the reduced-form impulse-response functions for a time horizon of n periods, i.e., the response
of endogenous variables to a one-time transitory shock to an element of εt.
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of the orthogonalized impulse-response functions (OIRFs) of the system after a one-time
structural shock to some element of vt.
Multiplying vt = P−1εt with P yields Pvt = εt. In a three-variable case it holds that


p11 0 0
p21 p22 0
p31 p32 p33




v1t
v2t
v3t

 =


ε1t
ε2t
ε3t

 (9.8)
It is now possible to see how structural shocks affect Yt via their influence on εt.
Apparently, the structural shock v1t to the variable in the upper row has an instanta-
neous effect on any variable within the system. Conversely, the structural shock v3t to
the variable in the bottom row has no immediate effect on ε1t and ε2t. Put generally,
a structural shock vjt has an instantaneous effect on the variables ordered in and be-
low the j-th row. Hence, the order of variables is anything but innocuous. Choosing
a specific order is inextricably linked to making an assumption about the direction of
causality in the model. Thus, the ordering of variables should ultimately be guided by
theory.
Consider again the VAR model comprising unemployment, inflation and the pol-
icy rate. Theory decidedly suggests that monetary policy reacts contemporaneously to
movements in inflation and employment, for instance by following a reaction function
such as the Taylor Rule. Therefore the policy rate should be ordered last, which implies
the assumption that shocks to inflation and unemployment have an immediate impact
on the policy rate. On the other hand, given nominal rigidities, it is unlikely that infla-
tion displays an immediate response to unemployment and policy shocks. Therefore,
inflation should be ordered first. As a rule of thumb, a variable which is responding
quickly to changes in macroeconomic conditions should be ordered rather at the bot-
tom whereas a variable which tends to show delayed responses should be ordered at
the top.
Applying a VAR setup for monetary policy analysis goes hand in handwith making
an implicit assumption about the structure of the central bank’s reaction function. In a
VAR, the policy rate depends on its own lags and lags of any other endogenous vari-
able. Monetary policy is thus regarded to be backward-looking and to pursue some
kind of interest rate smoothing. Some possible interpretations of the structural policy
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shock are offered by Christiano et al. (1999, pp. 71-73). According to them, a pol-
icy shock may inter alia reflect shocks to central bank preferences with respect to the
relative importance of output stabilization or measurement errors in preliminary data
available at the time of the policy decision.
9.2 Data and Model Specification
The VAR is estimated with quarterly data from Q1 1983 until Q2 2007. The reason for
truncating the sample in Q2 2007 is the beginning of the financial crisis, when mon-
etary policy began to increasingly rely on unconventional instruments, implying that
the Federal Funds Rate is no longer a reliable proxy for the policy stance. The exclusion
of observations prior to Q1 1983 is due to a likely regime switch of monetary policy
in the beginning of the 1980s. It is widely argued that the experience of double-digit
inflation rates in the 1970s eventually caused the Fed to switch towards a rigid anti-
inflation strategy in 1979, which led to a painful disinflation process in the subsequent
years.4 Following Stock andWatson (2001), inflation is measured by the annualized rate
of change of the GDP deflator and economic activity is tracked by the civilian unem-
ployment rate. Monetary policy is captured via the quarterly average of the Effective
Federal Funds Rate.
Risk-taking of financial market participants is gauged by the Credit Subindex of
the Chicago Fed National Financial Condition Index (CCI) as proposed by Brave and
Butters (2011, 2012). The index is constructed to have a zero mean and a unit vari-
ance. Negative values of the index correspond to credit conditions being looser than
the historical average and positive values indicate relatively tight credit conditions.5
The merit of the CCI lies in its generality: It captures credit conditions for the entire
financial system and is not confined to a certain segment. Moreover, Brave and Butters
(2012) demonstrate its predictive power for financial market stress. For a descriptive
4 This regime switch is often attributed to the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman in August
1979. Goodfriend and King (2005) argue that the so-called "Volcker Disinflation" was painful in real
terms due to its initial lack of credibility. Therefore, I consider it advisable not to start the sample
before 1983, i.e., until the credibility of the new regime has arguably become more or less established.
5 The index is constructed by employing a dynamic factor model with various input variables such
as survey-based measures of lending standards, an extensive amount of different credit spreads and
credit aggregates as well as several non-performing loans ratios. See Brave and Butters (2011, 2012)
for further details.
236 CHAPTER 9. VAR ANALYSIS OF THE RISK-TAKING CHANNEL
4
6
8
1
0
C
i
v
i
l
i
a
n
 
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
R
a
t
e
 
(
i
n
 
%
)
1983q1 1989q1 1995q1 2001q1 2007q1
Civilian Unemployment
1
2
3
4
5
A
n
n
u
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
L
o
g
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
G
D
P
 
D
e
f
l
a
t
o
r
1983q1 1989q1 1995q1 2001q1 2007q1
Inflation
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
C
h
i
c
a
g
o
 
F
e
d
 
N
F
C
I
 
C
r
e
d
i
t
 
S
u
b
i
n
d
e
x
1983q1 1989q1 1995q1 2001q1 2007q1
Credit Condition Index
0
5
1
0
E
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
F
e
d
 
F
u
n
d
s
,
 
Q
u
a
r
t
e
r
l
y
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
1983q1 1989q1 1995q1 2001q1 2007q1
Effective Fed Funds
Figure 9.1: Time Series Plots
overview, time series plots of the data are displayed in Figure 9.1 and summary statis-
tics are reported in Table 9.1.6 All series are obtained from the Economic Data Service
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED).
Clearly, there are a lot of additional variables which are likely to be relevant for
macroeconomic dynamics such as the exchange rate, wages and measures for the fiscal
policy stance. However, the inclusion of several further variables would reduce the
remaining degrees of freedom to a prohibitive extent. This is because a VAR model
with n variables and a lag length of p requires that (n× p) + n parameters have to be
6 The mean of the Credit Condition Index is non-zero since I use a subsample of the index which goes
back to 1973. This is an interesting observation in its own right: Credit conditions seem to have been
relatively loose on average over the entire period under consideration.
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Inflation Unemployment Credit Condition Index Fed Funds
Mean 2.52 5.87 -.327 5.48
σ .92 1.29 .45 2.46
Min .65 3.9 -1.05 1
Max 4.68 10.4 1.1 11.39
Table 9.1: Summary Statistics
estimated. Given the naturally small sample size in macroeconometric applications,
VAR models should thus be kept as parsimonious as possible.
The choice of the optimal lag length is usually made with the help of various model
selection criteria which trade off the need for parsimony and the desire to enhance the
goodness-of-fit.7 The VAR is estimated for various lag lengths and the emerging model
selection criteria are then compared in value. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
suggests an optimal lag length of p = 4, while the Hannan and Quinn information
criterion (HQIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion of Schwartz (SBIC) suggest
p = 2. I choose the higher lag length, since only with p = 4 the residuals of the esti-
mated reduced-form equations become white noise, which is verified with a Lagrange
multiplier test for residual autocorrelation as described in Johansen (1995).
While textbook treatments require all underlying time series of the endogenous
variables to be stationary, the applied VAR literature tends to refrain from differenc-
ing or de-trending data even when their stationarity is questionable. I therefore equally
abstain from any transformation of the data, in line with Stock and Watson (2001).8
Moreover, a post-estimation stability test of the VAR system as explained in Becketti
(2013, pp. 309) fails to detect dynamic instability for any of the model specifications
under consideration, implying that using the data in its original form is unproblematic.
The variables in the baseline case are ordered as follows: Inflation, Unemployment,
CCI, Fed Funds. Thus, I assume that Fed Funds react instantaneously to shocks in
7 An extensive discussion of lag selection criteria is provided in Luetkepohl (2005, ch. 4).
8 Unit root testing indeed produces ambiguous results. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects unit
roots for every variable. Conversely, the modified Dickey-Fuller test of Elliott et al. (1996) cannot
reject a unit root for all series except for inflation. Details are provided in Appendix B. A thor-
ough discussion of the properties of VAR models including non-stationary time series is provided
in Hamilton (1994, pp. 549-557), where it is argued that the integrity of the estimation results is not
materially affected. In that respect, see also Enders (1995, p. 301) and the references therein for a
defense of VARs employing non-stationary series.
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any other variable. Credit Conditions respond immediately to shocks to inflation and
unemployment but not to policy shocks. This ordering is generally consistent with
other VAR studies such as Angeloni et al. (2015) and is also suggested by theory, as
it was discussed in the methodological introduction. The only ambiguity arises with
respect to the ordering of Fed Funds and Credit Conditions. It is equally conceivable to
order credit conditions last, implying that they show an immediate reaction to policy
shocks. This is done as a robustness check, but results remain basically unaffected.
9.3 Results
The main interest lies in the shape of the orthogonalized impulse response functions
(OIRFs), which depict the system’s response to structural shocks to the included vari-
ables. OIRFs are displayed for a time horizon of 20 quarters and the grey-shaded area
depicts the 68% confidence interval as in Stock and Watson (2001).9
As the key result, Figure 9.2 depicts the response of the Credit Condition Indicator
to a contractionary shock to the policy rate with a magnitude of about 33 basis points.10
An unexpected policy contraction causes a tightening of credit conditions which re-
mains elevated for several quarters and fades out after about three years. Conversely,
an expansive policy shock would cause a relaxation of credit conditions which I view
as further empirical support for the existence of a risk-taking channel.
The question whether the CCI response can really be attributed to the risk-taking
channel deserves further comments. The indicators which receive the most prominent
weights in the CCI are survey-basedmeasures tracking the evolution of loans’ price and
non-price terms across various sectors. In line with the focus of the risk-taking channel,
the CCI is thus primarily tracking supply-side conditions of the US loan market and its
response indicates that lending standards decline after an expansive policy shock. This
fits neatly with the asset substitution argument which was laid out in Section 8.5. How-
ever, the CCI also includes various credit spreads which may, at least in principle, react
to policy-induced changes in loan demand as stressed in the credit channel literature.
9 The main OIRFs for the risk-taking response of the financial sector also remain significant at a confi-
dence level of 90%. They are depicted at the end of Appendix B for the sake of completeness.
10 Unfortunately, the STATA software package I use does not allow to switch the sign of the structural
shock. An expansive policy shock would produce the axisymmetrical mirror image of the OIRF
corresponding to the contractionary shock.
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Figure 9.2: Policy Shock and Credit Conditions
To address this concern, I re-estimated the model and additionally included a property
price variable to control for changing collateral values as proposed by Angeloni et al.
(2015).11 The response of the CCI to policy shocks remains unaffected. All in all, I con-
sider the CCI to be a meaningful proxy which is well-suited to gauge financial market
adjustments related to the risk-taking channel.
Figure 9.3 displays the response of unemployment and inflation to a policy shock.
Unemployment starts to increase after about one year, peaks after three years and con-
verges back to its initial level afterwards. The short-term response of inflation is some-
what ambiguous, yet after about six quarters inflation modestly decreases and remains
persistently below its initial level before eventually converging.
11 Property price developments are measured with the Real Residential Property Price Index con-
structed by the Bank for International Settlements. Specifically, I use the cyclical component of the log
of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered index (λ = 1600) as a measure of the percentage deviation of property
prices from their long-run trend. The chosen lag order is p = 4 as indicated by AIC, HQIC and the
Johansen test for residual autocorrelation.
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Figure 9.3: Macro Response to Policy Shock
It should be noted that small-scale VAR models tend to produce counterintuitive
responses of inflation to a policy shock at short time-horizons almost by construction.
It is a common finding that inflation first tends to increase after a contractionary policy
shock, which is clearly at odds with theoretical predictions. There are various sugges-
tions how to explain and eventually overcome this "price puzzle." A serious problem
of the VAR setup is its negligence of the forward-looking nature of monetary policy,
since interest rate setting is modeled to be driven by lagged variables only. It is how-
ever very likely that monetary policy is tightened when expected inflation increases. If
future actual inflation does not become fully stabilized by this behavior, the correlation
of today’s policy rate and future inflation becomes positive, which is then mistakenly
regarded as a policy shock outcome.12
In that respect, Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) demonstrate that the additional in-
clusion of expected inflation measures reduces the price puzzle considerably. So does
Sims (1992) by using commodity price inflation as a control variable for supply shocks.
In general, the inclusion of omitted variables which (i) are currently observable for
policymakers and (ii) carry potential information on future inflation should bring the
inflation response closer to theoretical predictions. Since the precise modeling of infla-
tion dynamics is of minor interest here, I accept the moderate price puzzle in my VAR
specification and do not explore this issue any further.
Figures 9.4 and 9.5 depict the impact of an unexpected tightening of credit condi-
12 This is in fact akin to the story of a supply shock in theNew-Keynesianmodel, wherewe see a positive
correlation of inflation and the policy rate, yet this certainly does not imply causality running from
contractionary policy innovations to an increase in inflation.
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Figure 9.4: Credit Condition Shock and Fed Funds
tions. The policy rate shows a considerable and persistent decline, which can be inter-
preted such that the Fed reacts to headwinds on financial markets by relaxing its policy
stance, probably since a shock to credit conditions also leads to an increase in unem-
ployment as depicted in Figure 9.5. The pattern of inflation is hard to interpret. While
there seems to be a short-term spike, the medium-term response of inflation is barely
distinguishable from zero.
The graphs showing the OIRFs for inflation and unemployment shocks are deferred to
Appendix B. They are basically in line with theoretical predictions: A positive inflation
shock triggers an immediate and persistent increase in the Federal Funds Rate and a
mild increase in unemployment in the medium term. Credit conditions also become
moderately tighter. In the case of an unemployment shock, the Federal Funds Rate is
reduced, which can be interpreted as an implication of the Fed’s dual mandate. In-
flation only declines in the first three quarters. Credit conditions are loosened a bit,
probably as a by-product of the policy easing.
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Figure 9.5: Macro Response to Credit Condition Shock
9.4 Extensions and Robustness Checks
I carried out various robustness checks to explore whether the results are sensitive to
changes in the model specification, the sample length or the underlying data. I ex-
tended the sample back to Q1 1973, which represents the CCI base period. Moreover, I
included the period until Q3 2008, after which Fed Funds hit their lower bound. Fur-
thermore, I replaced the unemployment rate with the growth rate of real GDP as an
alternative proxy for economic activity andmeasured inflation with the consumer price
index (CPI) instead. Results do not differ materially in any case. The respective OIRFs
are depicted in Appendix B.
With respect to model specification, I varied the lag length and re-estimated the
model for both p = 2 and p = 3. I also swapped the ordering of CCI and Fed Funds,
since theory does not stipulate a clear causal direction between these two variables.
Moreover, to address concerns about unit root implications, I also estimated the model
with de-trended series for Fed Funds and unemployment.13 None of these modifi-
cations had a significant effect on the main result, which allows to conclude that my
finding of a risk-taking channel for the US economy is robust against re-specification of
the model.
As a last exercise, I used different risk-taking proxies. Angeloni et al. (2015) use
the level of outstanding debt of households and non-financial firms as a measure for
13 I used the cyclical component of the Hodrick-Prescott filter for that purpose. The smoothing parame-
ter is set to λ = 1600 in any case, as it is proposed for quarterly data by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) among
others.
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Figure 9.6: Time Series Non-Financial Leverage
credit risk, implicitly arguing that increasing private sector debt burdens after a policy
shock are the outcome of a relaxation of loan supply conditions. I adopt this approach,
however, I use the Chicago Fed Non-Financial Leverage Index (NFLI) by Brave and
Butters (2012) instead of debt levels. Like the CCI, it is designed to have zero mean and
unit variance. Various measures of household and firm leverage enter with a positive
weight, implying that positive values of the index correspond to historically higher
levels of non-financial leverage and vice versa. The index is plotted in Figure 9.6. Note
its unprecedented increase in the years prior to the financial crisis.
Replacing the CCI with the NFLI does not change the responses of unemployment and
inflation to the policy shock to a meaningful extent. Figure 9.7 depicts the response of
the NFLI to a contractionary policy shock. Non-financial leverage shows a considerable
decline and remains persistently below its initial value.14 Vice versa, an expansive pol-
icy shock is found to cause a persistent surge in the NFLI. This result is likewise in favor
14 Compared to the baseline case, I reduced the lag length to p = 3, since both model selection criteria
and the residual autocorrelation test suggest doing so. The strong persistence and the slow conver-
gence in the NFLI response should be interpreted with caution, as they could be driven by the high
persistence of the original NFLI series itself. However, applying the Eigenvalue-based test verifies
that the VAR as such is stable.
244 CHAPTER 9. VAR ANALYSIS OF THE RISK-TAKING CHANNEL
−.2
−.15
−.1
−.05
0
0 5 10 15 20
Non−Financial Leverage Response to Policy Shock
Quarters
Figure 9.7: Policy Shock and Non-Financial Leverage
of risk-taking channel effects. Moreover, Brave and Butters (2012) stress the strong pre-
dictive power of the NFLI for financial stress over longer time horizons.15 Therefore,
one can draw the conclusion that an expansive policy shock enhances the risk of future
financial instability. Put differently, an unexpected policy expansion is likely to cause
an increase in systemic risk. This result continues to hold when controlling for house
price growth. This is of particular importance since house price changes directly affect
private sector balance sheets and thus their leverage.
As a further alternative, I rely on the credit spread indicator for US corporate bonds
developed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). This indicator can be further decomposed
into a component reflecting firm-specific variations in financial health and another com-
ponent reflecting time-varying attitudes of investors towards default risk. The latter
component is called the excess bond premium (EBP) and represents a measure for gen-
eral credit risk appetite. Figure 9.8 depicts the EBP response to a contractionary policy
15 This corroborates the much-noticed work of Mian and Sufi (2010, 2014), who emphasize the key role
of rising household debt prior to the financial crisis.
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Figure 9.8: Policy Shock and Excess Bond Premium
shock.16 Apparently, an unexpected policy tightening leads to an increase in the EBP.
Conversely, a policy expansion increases investor appetite for credit risk. This result is
likewise robust to the inclusion of house price growth. In addition, I augmented the
baseline model with two proxies that seek to capture funding risk in the intermediary
sector. Once again I draw on Brave and Butters (2012) and use their "risk index" for that
purpose, which is designed to capture funding conditions in US financial markets.17
I find that funding conditions tighten for about one year after a contractionary policy
shock, yet there seems to be no significant response over longer time horizons (see Fig-
ure 9.9). Conversely, a policy expansion leads to a short-term increase in funding risk.
I also use a measure tracking the evolution of refinancing via run-prone Non-Core Li-
abilities. Following Angeloni et al. (2015), I use the year-on-year growth rate of a Non-
16 Selection criteria suggested a lag length of p = 3. Medium-term macro responses remain in line with
theoretical predictions, whereas short-term responses show some ambiguity.
17 Its construction is akin to the other indicators. Negative values indicate loose funding conditions and
vice versa. For instance, growth rates of outstanding repos and commercial paper enter with nega-
tive weights whereas various spreads on short-term refinancing instrument carry a positive weight.
With respect to model specification, I ordered the funding risk index last since I assume that funding
conditions show an immediate reaction to policy innovations.
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Figure 9.9: Policy Shock and Funding Risk
Core Liability aggregate as originally proposed by Hahm et al. (2013).18 In line with
Angeloni et al. (2015), I find that an unexpected contractionary policy shock decreases
the growth rate of non-core liabilities (see Figure 9.10). Argued the other way around,
an expansive policy shock increases the reliance on potentially unstable non-core fund-
ing.
To sum up, the VAR analysis provides robust evidence for the existence of the risk-
taking channel in the US. Policy shocks are found to have significant procyclical effects
on various proxies for credit and funding risks of the intermediation sector. Several of
these proxies have strong predictive power for future financial market stress. Therefore,
an unexpected policy expansion is likely to increase systemic risk and to enhance the
probability of a financial crisis at longer time horizons. The conduct of monetary policy
thus carries direct implications for financial stability.
18 The aggregate comprises large time deposits and repo liabilities of commercial banks as well as
money market assets. The reason for including the latter is that money market funds typically invest
in short-term bank debt such as commercial paper. Data is taken from the US Flow of Funds statistic.
I use year-on-year growth rates to mitigate seasonality effects. Importantly, Hahm et al. (2013) find
that Non-Core Liability growth is a good indicator for the build-up of financial vulnerabilities.
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Chapter 10
A Reduced-FormMacro Model with
a Risk-Taking Channel
This Chapter presents a macroeconomic model which is augmented with a stylized
intermediation sector where banks pursue active balance sheet management (ABSM)
in the spirit of Adrian and Shin (2010b). The model’s macro block closely resembles
the log-linearized version of the New-Keynesian benchmark model, as for instance dis-
cussed in Gertler et al. (1999) and Gali (2008). The inclusion of ABSM behavior allows
for a stylized representation of an important element of the risk-taking channel (see Sec-
tion 8.4). Furthermore, the model features a simplified version of banking regulation,
represented by an exogenous equity constraint for financial intermediaries.
Simulation exercises and simple welfare analysis deliver a variety of important re-
sults. First, the intermediation sector tends to amplify macroeconomic shocks. Second,
the procyclical behavior of the intermediation sector considerably worsens the trade-
off between inflation and output variability. Third, optimal monetary policy responds
countercyclically to intermediary balance sheet growth. Fourth, tighter financial regu-
lation is able tomitigate the impact of intermediary behavior onmacroeconomic volatil-
ity.
The model is of a reduced-form type in the sense that it abstracts from an explicit
microfoundation of macro relations. This approach is less common these days.1 How-
ever, it should be noted that appropriately specified reduced-form models are very
1 The question whether this development is a blessing or a curse is lively debated. See for instance
Spahn (2009) andWren-Lewis (2009) for detailed and forceful criticism on the microfoundation of the
New-Keynesian workhorse model.
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similar to the log-linearized versions of micro-foundedmodels. Hence, omitting micro-
foundations seems tolerable in my view, since the fundamental compatibility between
both modeling approaches is essentially preserved. While providing microfoundations
would be nevertheless desirable, it is beyond the scope of this work.2
In the literature, there are only few contributions studying the properties of reduced-
form macro models with a financial sector. For instance, Friedman (2013) models ag-
gregate demand as being dependent on a risky long-term rate instead of the policy rate.
The risk premium of the long-term rate in turn depends on the relative supply of risky
assets and a catch-all disturbance term which is designed to capture financial shocks.
The approaches of Spahn (2013, 2014) augment a macro model with a stylized aggre-
gated banking sector, which allows for the analysis of various feedback mechanisms
and policy instruments such as a Taylor Rule responding to financial conditions or var-
ious macroprudential instruments. A different approach is pursued by De Grauwe
and Macchiarelli (2013), Lengnick and Wohltmann (2013) and Scheffknecht and Geiger
(2011), who study the interplay betweenmonetary policy, financial markets and the real
economy in reduced-form models where expectation formation is subject to bounded
rationality.
10.1 Model Setup
The model can be split into a macro block and an intermediary block. The intermedia-
tion sector pursues ABSM in the sense of a constant leverage target, which gives rise to
procyclical fluctuations of balance sheet aggregates and risk premia. The macro block
is set up in a standard fashion, except for the fact that aggregate demand is dependent
on a risky interest rate as in Friedman (2013). Hence, the model establishes a link run-
ning from balance sheet dynamics and their impact on risk premia to economic activity,
similar to Adrian et al. (2010). Vice versa, balance sheet dynamics are critically affected
by changes in the policy rate, as they carry a decisive influence on intermediaries’ net
worth and thus on their leverage. Since changes in the policy rate are mostly motivated
by macroeconomic shocks, the intermediation sector equally responds to changes in
economic conditions.
2 A micro-founded model with a resemblant representation of the intermediation sector reaching sim-
ilar conclusions is provided by Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014). Aside from that, see Cúrdia and
Woodford (2009, 2010) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) among others for examples of fully-fledged
New-Keynesian DSGE models augmented with a financial sector.
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10.1.1 Intermediary Block
The intermediation sector is modeled in the form of an aggregated balance sheet. It is
highly stylized and consists of only four types of balance sheet items. Financing occurs
either via equity Et or deposits Dt. On the asset side, banks hold marketable risk-free
securities At and risky loans Lt. The balance sheet in period t then reads
At + Lt = Dt + Et, (10.1)
While loans are valued at historical costs, assets are valued at market prices given
by
At =
1
1+ it
+ εat , (10.2)
where it denotes the monetary policy rate and εat is a disturbance term. At can be
interpreted as a position in risk-free, liquid assets such as government bonds or other
assets with equivalent risk characteristics, whose payoff has been normalized to unity.
Their market price is determined by the policy rate which equals the relevant risk-free
discount rate. Note that Equation (10.2) should not be viewed as a formal asset pricing
equation. It rather seeks to capture the negative relation between the policy rate and
asset prices in a qualitative fashion.3 Following Adrian and Shin (2010b), I assume that
valuation effects immediately affect the equity position. Its law of motion is then
Et = Et−1 + At − At−1. (10.3)
I further assume that the banking sector is targeting a constant equity ratio which
can be regarded as an exogenously imposed capital requirement by banking supervi-
sion authorities, implying that
Et
At + Lt
= τ, (10.4)
3 Providing a formally consistent asset pricing formula would require to account for term structure
dynamics and arbitrage relations between loans and marketable securities. This would complicate
the structure of the model considerably, yet without changing the qualitative relation between asset
prices and the policy rate. Hence, I consider this simplification as an acceptable shortcut.
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where τ denotes the capital requirement in relation to total assets. Importantly,
a change in the value of At inevitably leads to a deviation from the leverage target.
Banks respond to an observed deviation by adjusting the volume of loans Lt, such that
the desired equity ratio is restored.4 This necessary adjustment yields the law of motion
for loans:
Lt = Lt−1 +
1− τ
τ
(Et − Et−1) = Lt−1 +
1− τ
τ
(At − At−1). (10.5)
An increase (decrease) in At triggers a sizable balance sheet expansion (contrac-
tion) via the adjustment of loan supply. Following the argument of Jakab and Kumhof
(2014), balance sheet expansion is effectively self-financing, since additional loans im-
ply the creation of additional deposits. Furthermore, I assume that adjustment of the
actual towards the desired balance sheet size takes place in a gradual fashion. Jakab
and Kumhof (2014, pp. 26) offer "institutional lags" as an explanation. Finding new
borrowers or terminating existing borrowing relationships is likely to take time and
probably carries adjustment costs. The final law of motion for loans is then
Lt = σ
(
Lt−1 +
1− τ
τ
(Et − Et−1)
)
+ (1− σ)Lt−1, (10.6)
where σ serves as a smoothing parameter. From a microeconomic perspective, σ
can be regarded as the optimal speed of balance sheet adjustment which minimizes
total costs from (i) balance sheet adjustment and (ii) the temporary violation of the
supervision requirement.5
This setup of the intermediation sector is capturing the ABSM channel highlighted
in Section 8.4 in a very stylized fashion. As discussed in Adrian and Shin (2010b),
changes in the policy rate affect intermediary net worth and trigger subsequent balance
sheet adjustments, which ultimately carry implications for the desired risk compensa-
tion. To be sure, I am aware that this setup lacks important details. There is no rigorous
modeling of loan supply and loan demand. In fact, I assume that loan supply is primar-
ily driven by ABSM considerations. Furthermore, I abstract from a detailed treatment
4 A numerical example for this mechanism is given in Section 8.4.2.
5 Insofar, this mechanism is akin to models on optimal investment, where the adjustment of the capital
stock towards its optimal value likewise occurs incrementally in the presence of adjustment costs.
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of the portfolio decision of the intermediation sector. Moreover, it would make sense to
tie the evolution of balance sheet items directly to the level of macroeconomic activity.6
Notwithstanding the possibility of plausible extensions, the intermediation sector as
described here captures a key element of the risk-taking channel: Market-based finan-
cial intermediaries pursuing ABSM show an inherently procyclical response to changes
in the policy stance. The proposed setup is able to illustrate this feature in a parsimo-
nious manner.
10.1.2 Macro Block
As in Friedman (2013), the macroeconomy is characterized by four key equations. First,
there is a standard forward-looking Phillips Curve which reads
πt = Etπt+1 + κyt + ε
s
t, (10.7)
where πt denotes the current inflation rate, Etπt+1 is (rationally) expected inflation
for the next period and yt is the output gap, which is the difference between actual and
potential output growth. Furthermore, there is an additive disturbance term εst which
is usually referred to as a cost-push shock. The aggregate demand relation is given by
yt = g+ Etyt+1 − δ(rt − Etπt+1) + ε
d
t , (10.8)
where g denotes autonomous spending, rt denotes a risky interest rate and εdt repre-
sents an additive demand shock.7 Thus, I assume that spending decisions are governed
by a risky rate instead of the policy rate as in Friedman (2013). The policy rate is never-
theless critical for the level of the risky rate. Specifically, the risky rate follows
rt = it + θ − αlt + ε
r
t, (10.9)
6 See Spahn (2014) for a richer setup, where an upward-sloping loan supply schedule is derived from an
optimization problem of the banking sector, while loan demand is tied to macroeconomic conditions
and inversely depends on the loan rate.
7 Macro relations of a very similar nature arise from the micro-founded New-Keynesian model (Gali,
2008, ch. 2-3). The Phillips Curve emerges from the profit maximization of a representative firm
facing monopolistic competition and stochastic price rigidity. The aggregate demand relation is ob-
tained as a log-linearized version of the representative household’s Euler Equation, and therefore
reflects the optimal allocation of consumption across time.
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where θ is the risk premium prevalent in the steady-state equilibrium, it is the pol-
icy rate and lt is the growth rate of loans compared to the previous period. Hence, the
risky rate decreases in credit growth as in Adrian and Shin (2010b). The strength of this
effect is determined by the parameter α. I likewise include a shock term εrt to capture
unexpected shifts in the risky rate, for instance due to varying market sentiment. This
equation eventually relates balance sheet dynamics to economic activity as in Adrian
et al. (2010). An increasing loan supply is associated with a decline in desired risk pre-
mia, which lowers funding costs for the private sector and boosts aggregate demand.
The model is closed with a rule for the interest-setting behavior of monetary policy,
which takes the form of a standard Taylor Rule given by
it = R
∗
t + γπt + ϕyt + ε
i
t, (10.10)
where γ and ϕ determine the policy reaction to deviations of inflation and output
gap from their steady state values. Moreover, there is the possibility of a policy shock
εit. The risk-free "natural" rate R
∗
t is given by
R∗t =
g
δ
− θ (10.11)
since it has to be corrected for the steady state risk-premium.8 Each disturbance
term in the model follows an AR(1) process of the form
εt = ρεt−1 + ζt, (10.12)
where ζt is a white noise process with finite variance. Hence, shocks exhibit persis-
tence and its strength is governed by the value of ρ.
For computation I use Dynare, which is a plug-in for the Matlab software pack-
age and especially suited for the analysis of DSGE models. Dynare automatically log-
linearizes the model around its steady state with the help of a Taylor Approximation,
solves for the rational expectation equilibrium and computes the policy functions, i.e.,
8 The steady state values of yt and πt are normalized to zero. From Equation (10.8), it follows that
r∗t = g/δ. Plugging this result into Equation (10.9) yields i
∗
t = g/δ− θ, since credit growth is zero
in steady state. Eventually, Equation (10.10) stipulates that i∗t = R
∗
t for zero inflation and a closed
output gap.
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the law of motion for each endogenous variable dependent on past realizations and ex-
ogenous disturbances. Moreover, Dynare calculates theoretical moments for each vari-
able such as unconditional mean and variance. It is also possible to generate impulse-
response functions in order to analyze model dynamics in the wake of a specific shock.
10.2 Simulations
The simulation exercise analyzes the model response to a transitory cost-push shock, a
demand shock, a shock to the risky rate, a policy shock and a shock to asset valuations.
Specifically, there is a one-time disturbance ζ in the initial period whose impact persists
for several periods according to Equation (10.12).
Before that the model needs to be parameterized. Table 10.1 depicts the parameter
choices for the macro block. The parameters κ, δ, γ and ϕ are taken from Gali (2008).
The steady-state risk premium θ is set to 0.0221 such that it matches the average spread
of the US Moody’s Baa corporate bonds index over treasuries, which historically has
been 2.21%.9 The reaction of the risky rate to credit growth is set to α = 0.25. The pa-
rameter depicting autonomous expenditure g is set to 0.0421 such that Equation (10.11)
delivers a risk-free natural rate of two percent as originally advocated by Taylor (1993).
For the shock persistence, I choose ρ = 0.8, except for the policy shock which is mod-
eled to be less persistent with ρi = 0.33.10 The standard deviation of the white noise
innovation ζ is 0.01 in any case, implying that the standard shock size amounts to one
percentage point.
Table 10.2 shows the parameterization of the intermediation sector. Since the size
of the balance sheet in the steady state is not explicitly determined within the model,
I have to specify appropriate steady state values. As indicated by Equation (10.2), the
steady state value of the asset position is its unit payoff discounted with the steady
state policy rate i∗t . For simplicity, I assume that the steady state loan position has the
same value. The positions on the liability side follow directly from the specification of
A∗t and L
∗
t , since the equity constraint is fulfilled in the steady state.
9 The spread is taken from FED FRED from Q1 1973 until Q4 2014 (series title: BAA10YM).
10 This is in line with Angeloni and Faia (2013a), who model the policy shock with comparably low per-
sistence. Since a policy shock in the model represents a policy error, for example due to measurement
problems, it is reasonable to assume that it will fade out rather quickly.
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Symbol Parameter Description Parameter Value
κ Output Gap Elasticity of Inflation 0.5
g Autonomous Expenditures 0.0421
δ Risky Rate Elasticity of Aggregate Demand 1
γ Taylor Coefficient on Inflation 1.5
ϕ Taylor Coefficient on Output Gap 0.5
θ Steady-State Risk Premium 0.0221
α Credit Growth Coefficient on Risky Rate 0.25
R∗t Steady State Natural Rate 0.02
i∗t Steady State Policy Rate 0.02
Table 10.1: Parameterization and Steady State Values of the Macro Block
Symbol Parameter Description Parameter Value
τ Equity Ratio Target 0.2
σ Balance Sheet Adjustment Smoothing Parameter 0.5
L∗t Steady State Loan Volume 1/(1+i
∗
t )
A∗t Steady State Marketable Asset Volume 1/(1+i
∗
t )
D∗t Steady State Deposit Volume (1-τ)(L
∗
t + A
∗
t )
E∗t Steady State Equity Base τ(L
∗
t + A
∗
t )
Table 10.2: Parameterization and Steady State Values of the Intermediary Block
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Figure 10.1: Simulated Cost-Push Shock
Figure 10.1 shows the model response to a transitory cost-push shock. The cost-
push shock triggers an immediate spike in inflation and the central bank responds with
an increase of the policy rate. This causes an adverse valuation effect for the asset po-
sition of intermediaries and a consequent cutback of loan supply. The loan rate rises
sharply both due to the policy rate increase and the negative growth in loans. The
impact on the real loan rate rt − Etπt+1 is moderated by the increase in inflation ex-
pectations, but it nevertheless increases by about 0.6%. As a result, aggregate demand
declines and both actual and expected output gap become negative. The supply shock
subsequently fades out and every variable reverts back to steady state within about 15
periods.
The dynamics of an unexpected increase of the risky rate are depicted in Figure
10.2. Interestingly, the policy response is so strong that the risky rate declines as a net
effect. The central bank responds with a decisive cut of the policy rate of about 1.5%,
which is mostly motivated by the initial decline in both actual and expected inflation.
This boosts asset valuations in the intermediation sector and thus loan growth, which
puts additional downward pressure on the risky rate. In sum, the risky rate declines
by about 1.2%. The response of the real loan rate is negative on impact, but turns to
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Figure 10.2: Simulated Loan Rate Shock
be mildly positive after two periods. The output gap initially turns negative, declines
to about -0.3% and starts converging back to zero after about 3 periods. To sum up,
monetary policy counteracts the risky rate shock with a policy rate cut and achieves a
relative stabilization of the real loan rate and thus aggregate demand. Yet the central
bank is less successful in stabilizing inflation.
Figure 10.3 depicts the model dynamics in the wake of a valuation shock to the asset
position of the banking sector. Assets and loans increase on impact. While there is an
immediate (yet moderate) reaction of the policy rate, the net effect on both nominal
and real loan rate is nevertheless negative. The output gap initially increases by some
modest 0.2%. This effect fades out rather quickly. Output gap and inflation show (very
small) negative values in the subsequent periods, which motivates the central bank to
cut the policy rate slightly. All in all, the impact of the valuation shock on output and
inflation is comparably small.
A demand shock is shown in Figure 10.4. The policy rate strongly increases in re-
sponse by about 1.5% and asset holdings as well as loan growth decline. Both the
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Figure 10.3: Simulated Asset Valuation Shock
nominal and the real loan rate increase as well, which attenuates the impact of the de-
mand shock on the output gap. Conversely, actual and expected inflation rise by a full
percentage point on impact. Again, monetary policy is successful in stabilizing output
and less successful in stabilizing inflation.
Figure 10.5 shows the effect of a policy shock. The increase of the policy rate triggers
a decline in asset values which translates into negative loan growth. Both effects lead
to a rise in the loan rate and a simultaneous decrease in output and inflation. Given the
modest persistence of the shock, these effects fade out rather quickly after roughly five
periods. Note that the model response is qualitatively similar to the VAR results in the
previous Chapter, where I found that a contractionary policy shock leads to tightened
credit conditions, a contraction of economic activity and a small drop in inflation over
the medium term.
10.3 Welfare Analysis
The simulation exercise has explored the dynamics of the model and it became clear
that the intermediation sector tends to amplify macroeconomic shocks and is a gen-
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Figure 10.4: Simulated Demand Shock
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Figure 10.5: Simulated Policy Shock
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uine source of shocks with a macroeconomic impact in its own right. Against this
background, the welfare effects of financial sector procyclicality deserve a closer ex-
amination. For that purpose, I compare the baseline model with a model in which the
feedback between financial and real sector is not present. Setting α = 0 breaks the link
between balance sheet dynamics, fluctuations of the risky rate and aggregate demand
and effectively shuts down the risk-taking channel (henceforth RTC). Figure 10.6 now
compares the response to a cost-push shock in both models with respect to the output
gap and inflation. The baseline model with an active risk-taking channel shows larger
deviations of inflation from the steady state. Regarding output, the gap in the baseline
model is more negative on impact but converges marginally quicker back to the steady
state. All in all, the inclusion of the intermediation sector magnifies the impact of the
supply shock.
The analysis of Taylor Curves for both models in Figure 10.7 gives a more detailed
impression of welfare implications. To obtain Taylor Curves, each model was simu-
lated over a grid of policy coefficients. While keeping γ constant at 1.5, I varied the
output gap parameter ϕ in the Taylor Rule between zero and unity with an interval
of 0.05. Each variant of the policy rule delivers a specific combination of inflation and
output gap volatility. With rising values of ϕ, output volatility declines at the expense
of heightened inflation volatility. Insofar, the model replicates the well-known trade-
off between output and inflation variability, as discussed in Section 8.3.1. It should be
noted, however, that a weak response to the output gap is always suboptimal. For con-
stellations with a low value for ϕ, which corresponds to the area in the upper left, the
slope of the Taylor Curve is not strictly negative. In that case, an increase in ϕ is clearly
beneficial as it allows tomove closer to the origin, i.e., to achieve a simultaneous decline
of both inflation and output volatility. The comparison of both Taylor Curves delivers
a clear result. If the risk-taking channel is active, the Taylor Curve shifts to the right.
The policy trade-off becomes less favorable, and policymakers have to accept a higher
degree of macroeconomic volatility.
To support this conclusion, I simulated the model under optimal rule-based policy.
Optimal rule-based policy means that the central bank sets the reaction coefficients γ
and ϕ such that to minimize a loss function L given by
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Figure 10.6: Supply Shock with and without Risk-Taking Channel
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Figure 10.7: Comparison of Taylor Curves
min
ϕ,γ
L = σ2y + σ
2
π, (10.13)
where σ2y and σ
2
π denote the unconditional theoretical variances of inflation and
the output gap, respectively. Minimizing these variances is equivalent to minimizing
deviations of inflation and output gap from their steady-state values. Dynare computes
the solution with a numerical optimization method initially proposed by Sims (1999).
In order to facilitate comparability between model variations, I have excluded the
possibility of shocks to asset valuations and the risky rate since these shocks do not
generate meaningful dynamics in the model if the risk-taking channel is inactive. The
valuation shock simply has no impact due to the fact that α = 0, while the shock to the
risky rate is akin to a simple demand shock. Results for optimal rule-based policy are
given in Table 10.3.
Optimal policy within the baseline model responds stronger to inflationary pres-
sure than implied by the initial parametrization. The reaction coefficient roughly dou-
bles to 3.139. The earlier analysis of the impulse-response functions with the baseline
parametrization revealed that the central bank has difficulties in bringing inflation back
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γ ϕ σπ σy Total Loss (×10−3)
Baseline Model 3.139 0.185 0.0089 0.0322 1.117
RTC inactive (α = 0) 2.616 0.199 0.0112 0.0311 1.093
Table 10.3: Optimal Policy Rule Comparison
to target quickly. Therefore, a more aggressive response to inflation under optimal pol-
icy is not surprising. Indeed, the unconditional standard deviation of inflation declines
to 0.89%, whereas output volatility remains relatively elevated at 3.22%. A comparison
with themodel variant in which the risk-taking channel is inactive shows that losses are
higher. In sum, the amplification mechanisms within the intermediation sector increase
macroeconomic volatility and reduce welfare, even when monetary policy follows an
optimal rule.
It is also interesting to analyze to role of banking regulation, which is represented
in a stylized fashion by the equity ratio τ. For that purpose, I simulated the model over
a grid of different values for τ and compared the respective results for inflation and
output volatility. Specifically, I varied τ between 0.1 and 0.4 with an interval of 0.02.
Figure 10.8 displays the results. A rise in τ implies moving along the curve towards the
origin. Hence, a more restrictive capital requirement dampens macroeconomic volatil-
ity. Equation (10.6) shows that an increase in τ attenuates the strength of the balance
sheet adjustment process. Therefore, amplification within the intermediation sector is
weakened and the risk-taking channel become less potent. Tighter financial regulation
is seemingly able to mitigate the impact of intermediary behavior on macroeconomic
volatility.
Table 10.4 shows the outcome of two optimal policy simulations with varying val-
ues for τ. Inflation volatility increases with a rise in τ whereas output volatility de-
creases. As a net effect, an increase in τ slightly lowers the loss associated with macroe-
conomic volatility. This is broadly in line with the findings in Figure 10.8 under stan-
dard Taylor Policy.
In addition, I allow for the possibility that monetary policy responds directly to
credit growth, which can be seen as a stylized version of a "leaning-against-the-wind-
policy" under which the central bank actively reacts to financial market developments.
The policy rule then changes to
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Figure 10.8: Equity Constraint and Macro Volatility
γ ϕ σπ σy Total Loss (×10−3)
Baseline Model (τ = 0.2) 3.139 0.185 0.0089 0.0322 1.117
Baseline Model (τ = 0.4) 2.763 0.189 0.0105 0.0315 1.1105
Table 10.4: Optimal Policy with Varying Equity Requirement
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Figure 10.9: Taylor Curve With and Without Credit Growth Reaction
it = R
∗
t + γπt + ϕyt + ηlt + ε
i
t, (10.14)
implying that for η > 0, the central bank exerts additional tightening in the wake
of positive credit growth (and vice versa). Figure 10.9 plots the Taylor Curve of the
baseline model versus the Taylor Curve of a policy with η = 0.5. Again, the models
were simulated over a grid of different values for ϕ. Clearly, the inclusion of an active
response to credit market developments shifts the Taylor Curve to the left. Leaning-
against-the-wind-policy (henceforth LATW policy) reduces macroeconomic volatility
to a considerable extent.
The benefits of this policy can be further analyzed by deriving a modification of the
optimal policy rule, this time with the difference that η becomes an additional choice
variable for the policymaker. Table 10.5 shows the respective results. It is optimal to
respond to credit dynamics, as indicated by the positive vale of η = 0.800. Losses
decrease compared to the baseline case.11
11 Losses are even lower than in the case where the risk-taking channel is inactive. However, these con-
stellations are not really comparable due to the different policy rules and varying shock implications.
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γ ϕ η σπ σy Total Loss (×10−3)
Baseline Model 3.139 0.185 - 0.0089 0.0322 1.117
LATW policy (η > 0) 2.4545 0.229 0.800 0.0125 0.0299 1.053
Table 10.5: Optimal Policy With and Without Credit Growth Reaction
As a last step, Table 10.6 compares losses under different policy mixes. In particular,
I analyze optimal policy with a credit growth reaction for different values of the equity
ratio. The credit reaction parameter η decreases as the capital requirement tightens.
This points to some degree of complementarity between monetary policy and banking
regulation with respect to the stabilization of the intermediation sector. Thus, tighter
banking regulation may be genuinely beneficial in a sense that it relieves monetary
policy (at least partly) from the necessity to react to financial market developments.
This may be particularly important if the volatility of the policy rate as such represents
a concern for policymakers, for example due to the risk of unintended short-term effects
on aggregate demand. On the other hand, losses increase slightly with a rising capital
ratio which could imply that monetary policy on its own is equipped best to contain
financial procyclicality.
Another intriguing reason could be that the existence of an additional amplification
mechanism turns out as beneficial if shocks push the output gap and inflation in the
same direction, which is true for the demand shock and the policy shock. In such a
case, monetary policy gains additional grip on the economy and is potentially able to
engineer a quicker reversion to the steady state. A tighter capital constraint weakens
this effect by reducing the strength of the amplification mechanism. Thus, the optimal
way of policy coordination is likely to be critically dependent on the relative impor-
tance of the various shocks, an issue well-known in monetary policy analysis since the
important contribution of Poole (1970).
Yet it would be exaggerated to claim that tighter capital constraints decrease wel-
fare. The analysis under Taylor policy - which is arguably the empirically relevant
benchmark - has clearly shown the benefits of an increasing equity ratio. Moreover,
higher equity ratios have benefits in their own right which are not captured within
the model (see Chapter 5). In any case, the analysis shows that monetary policy and
banking regulation need to be carefully coordinated.
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γ ϕ η σπ σy Total Loss (×10−3)
LATW policy (τ = 0.2) 2.4545 0.229 0.800 0.0125 0.0299 1.053
LATW policy (τ = 0.3) 2.5055 0.214 0.732 0.0119 0.0304 1.064
LATW policy (τ = 0.4) 2.537 0.207 0.674 0.0116 0.0306 1.074
Table 10.6: Losses with Different Policy Mixes
To sum up, the welfare analysis has delivered several interesting results. I have
found that the procyclical behavior of the intermediation sector worsens the trade-off
between inflation and output variability. Hence, optimal monetary policy should re-
spond countercyclically to intermediary balance sheet growth. Tighter financial regula-
tion is able to mitigate the impact of intermediary behavior on macroeconomic volatil-
ity under a Taylor policy, but seems slightly counterproductive in an optimal-policy
setting, where the central banks on its own performs best in stabilizing the financial
sector and the macroeconomy.
Chapter 11
Implications for Monetary Policy
Shouldmonetary policymandates be extended to include a financial stability objective?
In an ideal world, this question should be denied. If macroprudential regulation is
successful in mitigating the build-up of systemic risk, there is no reason for central
banks to incorporate financial stability considerations into their policy decisions. In this
case, price stability and (to a lesser extent) sustainable growth and employment remain
the central bank’s only concerns. Put differently, effective macroprudential regulation
acts as a shield in two directions: First, it ensures that systemic risk is not a concern
for monetary policy. Second, it mitigates unintended consequences from the monetary
policy stance on systemic risk. For example, if macroeconomic conditions call for an
easy policy stance, macroprudential regulation can ensure that prolonged periods of
monetary expansion - warranted by weak aggregate demand or subdued inflation - do
not lead to an increase of systemic risk as a by-product. Such a setting would satisfy
the well-known Tinbergen Principle, which states that each policy objective should be
pursued with one specific instrument.
Figure 11.1 provides a graphical exposition. Macroprudential regulation which
adequately contains systemic risk insulates monetary policy from the adverse real-
economy spillovers of a financial crisis which impair the central bank’s ability to fulfill
its primary objectives. On the other hand, macroprudential regulation can mitigate the
unintended consequences monetary policy has on systemic risk. Nevertheless, mone-
tary policy and macroprudential regulation cannot be regarded as completely separate
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Figure 11.1: First-Best Policy Arrangement
policy areas. Monetary policy affects financial market dynamics just as well as macro-
prudential regulation affects economic activity via its impact on loan supply. Therefore,
monetary policy and macroprudential regulation should be carefully coordinated. The
discussion of this issue is postponed to Section 11.4.4.
However, as argued in Section 5.4, macroprudential regulation in its current form
suffers from various shortcomings. It is therefore unlikely that it is capable to shield
monetary policy and systemic risk from each other. Thus, systemic risk becomes a
concern for monetary policymakers. First, real-economy spillovers of a potential crisis
adversely affect the primary objectives of monetary policy (see Chapter 6). Second,
as discussed in Chapter 8, monetary policy might influence the build-up of systemic
risk via the risk-taking channel. Systemic risk is hence endogenous to monetary policy
which indicates that central banks should respond to its build-up on an ex-ante basis.
Figure 11.2 depicts the policy arrangement in the case of insufficient macroprudential
regulation. In this case, monetary policy has to account for its influence on systemic risk
and the associated risk of adverse real-economy spillovers arising from future crises.
Does this policy arrangement pose a problem? After all, it is argued that mone-
tary policy pursuing a price stability objective automatically fosters financial stability
(Bordo et al., 2002; Issing, 2003). However, if there are constellations in which the anal-
ysis of economic conditions and the monitoring of systemic risk deliver diverging rec-
ommendations for the policy stance, the policy trade-off becomes more complicated.
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Figure 11.2: Second-Best Policy Arrangement
Balancing output and inflation variability (see Section 8.3.1) may become more chal-
lenging as systemic risk considerations may introduce an additional constraint. Hence,
assigning financial stability objectives to monetary policy should not be regarded as
a beneficial improvement of the institutional framework. Financial stability objectives
are a burden for monetary policy, potentially distracting it from pursuing its macroe-
conomic goals. Such an arrangement is nothing but the unfortunate consequence of
insufficient financial regulation.
In what follows, I discuss constellations in which monetary policy potentially faces
a trade-off between achieving price stability and containing systemic risk. After that,
I contrast several popular arguments in favor of and against monetary policy having
an eye on financial stability. Especially, I sketch out how the recent crisis has changed
views on that matter. I then review model-based representations of monetary policy
that take financial stability considerations into account. Finally, I highlight possible ad-
justments of practical policy frameworks and discuss the issue of optimal coordination
between monetary policy and macroprudential regulation.
11.1 Is there a Trade-Off between Price Stability and Financial
Stability?
What are potential constellations under which the analysis of systemic risk andmacroe-
conomic conditions deliver diverging recommendations for the policy stance? Table
11.1 depicts the responses of macroeconomic variables and systemic risk to various
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forms of shocks along the lines of the model presented in Chapter 10. It is henceforth
assumed that systemic risk increases in positive values of the output gap and in nega-
tive deviations of the policy rate from its steady-state value. More specifically, balance
sheet expansions of the financial sector can be regarded as a proxy for an increase in
systemic risk.
Shock Output Gap Inflation Systemic Risk Policy Response
Demand Shock + + + it ↑
Negative Cost-Push Shock - + = it ↑
Positive Cost-Push Shock + - + ?
Technology Shock ? - + ?
Financial Shock + = + ?
Table 11.1: Macroeconomic Shocks, Systemic Risk and Policy Trade-Offs
Demand shocks do not give rise to a policy trade-off. Output and inflation rise
simultaneously and, due to the positive output gap, so does systemic risk. Hence,
tightening the policy stance is unambiguously beneficial. Negative cost-push shocks
do not pose a trade-off between price and financial stability either. Given inflationary
pressure, the central bank contracts output by raising interest rates, such that systemic
risk remains unaffected or even decreases. Things change in the wake of a positive
cost-push shock, i.e., an unexpected decline in inflation. The associated undershooting
of the inflation target calls for a lower policy rate, however, this will come along with
a positive output gap and a likely increase in systemic risk. Positive cost-push shocks
thus give rise to a trade-off between monetary policy and financial stability, and the
optimal policy response is not clear.
Figure 11.3 depicts the OIRFs for an unexpected increase in inflation from the VAR
model estimated in Chapter 9. By construction, the response to an unexpected decline
in inflation (positive cost-push shock) is depicted by the axisymmetrical mirror image
of the impulse-response functions in Figure 11.3. A positive cost-push shock triggers
a decline in the Federal Funds Rate as well as a modest decrease in unemployment.
However, the credit condition indicator also declines, implying that credit is granted
more freely which potentially increases systemic risk. The model simulations in Chap-
ter 10 draw a similar picture: An unexpected decline in inflation leads to a decline in
the policy rate in line with the Taylor Rule, while the output gap becomes positive.
Moreover, the balance sheet of the financial sector expands, which might contribute to
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the build-up of systemic risk.1 Hence, both the empirical results obtained in Chapter 9
as well as the model simulations conducted in Chapter 10 tend to support the view that
benign cost-push shocks create a trade-off between price stability and the containment
of systemic risk.
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Figure 11.3: VAR Impulse-Response Functions for an Inflation Shock
Figure 11.4, adapted from De Grauwe and Gros (2009), depicts comparative statics in
the case of a benign technology shock in a simple AS-ADmodel. The initial equilibrium
is depicted by point A. Output is at its potential Y∗ and the price level equals its target
value P∗.2 A benign technology shock is assumed to increase productivity and asset
prices, with the latter decreasing firms’ cost of capital. Thus, the supply curve shifts to
the right (from AS to AS′). Moreover, the technology shock is supposed to trigger a shift
of the aggregate demand curve from AD to AD′. It is argued that "[n]ew technologies
create new products and thus lead consumers to spend more" (De Grauwe and Gros,
1 The response of the model economy to a negative cost-push shock is depicted in Figure 10.1. As in
the VAR analysis, the impact of a positive cost-push shock corresponds to the axisymmetrical mirror
image.
2 The argument remains valid if it is assumed that central banks target a specific inflation rate instead
of a specific price level (De Grauwe and Gros, 2009, p. 3).
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2009, p. 3). Furthermore, the supply shift is supposed to be stronger in magnitude than
the demand shock. The new temporary equilibrium is in point B at a lower price level
and at an increased potential output of Y∗∗. Since the price level in point B undershoots
the central bank’s price level target, monetary policy will relax the policy stance. This
shifts the AD curve further to the right (AD”) and leads to the new temporary equilib-
rium C. However, point C is not sustainable. Even though the desired price level has
been restored, monetary policy accommodation increases the risk that asset prices de-
velop into an eventually unsustainable bubble. If it bursts, aggregate demand declines
sharply and the economy finds itself in point D, which is below potential output Y∗∗
and also below the price level target P∗. The key point is that the central bank either has
to accept the decline in the price level associated with point B, or it can push the price
level back to target at the expense of a potential asset price bubble which increases sys-
temic risk. In this sense, a benign technology shock likewise creates a trade-off between
price stability and financial stability.
Figure 11.4: Impact of a Technology Shock on Economic Conditions and Systemic Risk
Figure 11.5, again adapted from De Grauwe and Gros (2009), represents compar-
ative statics in the case of a positive financial shock, i.e., an increase in asset prices
and/or a decline in external finance premia. Both effects lower firms’ cost of capital
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which shifts the AS curve to the right. Moreover, the rise in asset prices (or the greater
availability of credit) boosts aggregate demand. The AD curve consequently shifts to
the right as well. As a result, the economy realizes an output level above potential
at an unchanged price level, accompanied by an increase in systemic risk (point F).
Monetary policy can counteract the build-up of systemic risk by tightening the policy
stance which shifts the AD curve to the left. However, this comes along with a de-
cline in the price level. Hence, financial shocks are another possible manifestation of
the trade-off between price stability and financial stability. Interestingly, this constel-
lation is partly mirrored in the responses to an asset valuation shock in the model of
Chapter 10, in which an unexpected increase in asset valuations triggers balance-sheet
expansions whereas inflation and output respond only moderately (see Figure 10.3).
Figure 11.5: Impact of a Financial Shock on Economic Conditions and Systemic Risk
Hence, there are various constellations in which the analysis of economic activity
and the surveillance of financial-sector developments can deliver contradicting recom-
mendations for the policy stance. Adrian and Liang (2014) argue that such constella-
tions imply that monetary policy faces a risk-return trade-off between easing financial
conditions today (for the sake of short-term macro stability) and the risks which may
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arise due to an increase in future financial vulnerability. This trade-off complements
the trade-off between inflation and output variability. Generally, declines in inflation
appear to be particularly relevant in this respect. Moreover, credit or asset price booms
which are not mirrored in the inflation rate can create trade-off situations as well. Borio
and Lowe (2002) and Borio and White (2004) argue that positive supply-side develop-
ments can mask inflationary pressure on goods markets, whereas asset prices increase
strongly (see also Section 8.3.2). Drehmann and Juselius (2012) show that the upswing
of a financial boom-bust cycle is often preceded by positive supply shocks. Moreover,
global economic integration may exert downward pressure on inflation in advanced
countries, be it via cheap imports or the intensification of competition.3 If monetary
policy responds to these developments by easing the policy stance (instead of taking
them for granted as a secular trend), systemic risk may increase as an unintended con-
sequence.4 In summary, it can be concluded that trade-offs between price stability and
financial stability are likely to have considerable relevance for practical policymaking.
11.2 The Leaning-versus-Cleaning Debate Revisited
The question whether monetary policy should react to financial imbalances in a pre-
emptive fashion was lively debated in the early 2000s. Those in favor advocated ex-
ante policy responses which are usually dubbed as "leaning against the wind" (LATW).
On the other hand, opponents of the LATW-approach preferred to not react to financial
imbalances unless they signal near-term inflationary pressure. If a financial crisis mate-
rializes nevertheless, the central bank should mitigate real-economy spillovers with de-
cisive accommodation. The latter strategy is often termed the "mopping-up approach"
or "cleaning view," respectively. The Leaning-versus-Cleaning Debate appeared to be
settled prior to the crisis: The majority of policymakers and academics agreed on the
premise that financial market developments should enter the central bank’s reaction
3 See for instance Bernanke (2007) and Rogoff (2006) for extensive reflections on potential relations
between globalization and subdued inflation in advanced countries. On the other hand, Ball (2006)
argues that the inflation impact of globalization is transitory at most because declines in the relative
price of imports should be offset by price increases in other sectors if central banks target the evolution
of a general consumer price index.
4 Borio et al. (2013, p. 6) state that "[i]t is no coincidence that the financial booms that preceded the
recent financial crisis went hand in hand with the globalization of the real side of the world economy
and the entry of China and other former communist countries into the global trading system. No
doubt this represented a major string of positive supply side shocks."
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function only to the extent that they carry some information for the inflation outlook.
Bernanke and Gertler (2001, p. 253) summarize this proposition as follows:
"The inflation-targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question
of how central bankers should respond to asset prices: Changes in asset
prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the
central bank’s forecast of inflation. To a first approximation, once the predic-
tive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for, there should
be no additional response of monetary policy to asset-price fluctuations."
The cleaning view is justified by the argument that asset price bubbles or financial im-
balances in general are difficult to identify in real time. Even if a bubble is detected,
pricking it might require sharp increases in the policy rate which possibly imposes
large collateral damage on the broader economy (Posen, 2006). Put differently, the pol-
icy rate is too blunt a tool to tackle financial imbalances. Hence, proactively leaning
against bubbles should not become a task of the central bank. If at all, financial regula-
tion is in charge to enhance the resilience of the financial system against large swings
in asset prices (Bernanke, 2002). Moreover, Svensson (2013) argues that LATW policy is
counterproductive as it in fact raises the indebtedness of the private sector. If monetary
policy tightens the policy stance to mitigate the build-up of systemic risk, nominal GDP
will fall. While tighter policy will discourage agents from accumulating new debt, the
existing stock of outstanding debt is likely to respond very sluggishly. Hence, if the
stock of outstanding debt remains approximately constant but nominal GDP declines,
private sector debt ratios increase.5 The cleaning view was supported analytically by
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), whose model simulations showed that a policy of
aggressive inflation targeting delivers the best outcomes, even in the presence of exoge-
nous asset price bubbles.
The advocates of LATW policy stress that bursting asset price bubbles cause enor-
mous macroeconomic costs so that monetary policy should have a vital interest in ex-
ante prevention. While bubbles are indeed difficult to detect, there are nevertheless
5 The argument of Svensson (2013) explicitly refers to the economy of Sweden. By contrast, the VAR
analysis in Chapter 9 shows for the US that an unexpected contraction of the policy stance leads
to a decline in the measure of private sector leverage (see Figure 9.7). Moreover, it is conceivable
that debt ratios rise even more in the absence of a contractionary policy stance. Nevertheless, it has
to be admitted that the treatment of debt as an important nominal rigidity is often absent from the
discussion of monetary policy transmission. A notable exception is Iacoviello (2005), who shows that
inflation-driven redistribution effects between borrowers and lenders amplify demand disturbances
but dampen cost-push shocks.
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promising indicators that signal substantial asset price misalignments or financial mar-
ket overheating in general (Borio and Lowe, 2002). Moreover, the argument of un-
reliable measurement is deemed inconsistent since virtually any relevant variable for
practical policymaking is subject to measurement problems, most notably the output
gap (Cecchetti et al., 2000). Disyatat (2010) argues that even if bubble identification is
subject to uncertainty, monetary policy should still react to mispricing signals. How-
ever, this should occur in a gradual and careful fashion, in line with the Brainard Princi-
ple. Besides, an asymmetric cleaning approachwhich lets bubbles unfold but decisively
tries to mitigate the consequences of their inevitable collapse may induce moral hazard
within the financial sector (Roubini, 2006). Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Filardo (2001,
2004) conducted simulation exercises which demonstrate the optimality of preventive
reactions to asset price booms. More recently, Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014) have
shown that LATW is beneficial in case of supply shocks, even if the central bank does
not have a distinct financial stability objective. My own simulation results obtained
in Chapter 10 likewise point to the benefits of LATW policy. Furthermore, as outlined
in Section 8.3.2, some authors claim that the very credibility of monetary policy which
is necessary to successfully pursue an inflation-targeting approach might have unin-
tended and adverse consequences for financial stability.6
As is apparent from the references so far, the leaning-versus-cleaning debate mainly
took place in the early 2000s. It therefore stood under the impression of the dotcom-
bubble on US stock markets. Indeed, it was mainly centered around the question
whether monetary policy should respond to "asset price bubbles." In this respect, expe-
rience supported the cleaning view since the recession following the crash of US stock
markets had been relatively mild. One possible reason for this is that stock market ex-
posures at the time were debt-financed to a relatively low extent, which left the banking
sector more or less unaffected. Of course, the bursting bubble destroyed an enormous
amount of private sector wealth, however, it did not trigger widespread defaults on
debt obligations. Moreover, the connection between household wealth and aggregate
6 Another argument for the relevance of asset price inflation has been made by Alchian and Klein
(1973). They highlight that a price index should be based on the price of both current and future
consumption, given that individuals obtain utility from an intertemporal consumption path. Since
prices of future consumption are typically unobservable, asset prices which represent prices of claims
on future consumption should be taken into account when constructing a price index. If, other things
equal, asset prices rise, future consumption becomes more expensive and the price index rises. If
inflation would be measured by such a price index, central banks would respond mechanically to
asset price inflation. However, while theoretically appealing, such a price index possibly including
highly unstable asset prices wouldmake interest-rate setting by the central bank prohibitively volatile
(Goodhart, 2001).
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demand is supposedly weak. For instance, Catte et al. (2004) estimate that the marginal
propensity to consume out of housing wealth or financial wealth for OECD countries
lies consistently below ten percent.
Of course, the experience of the current crisis has revived interest in the question
whether monetary policy should lean against the wind. The boom-bust cycle on US
housing markets has been fundamentally different from the dotcom-bubble as it was
mainly financed with debt. House price collapses made households default on their
mortgage payments causing distress in the financial sector, which has evolved into a
state of fragility during the pre-crisis years. The subsequent global amplification of
financial strains triggered a massive macroeconomic fallout. Hence, the developments
during the recent crisis lend some support to the LATW position.
In my view, the focus on the (inevitably fuzzy) concept of asset price bubbles unnec-
essarily blurred the debate. Indeed, monetary policy should not be in the business of
spotting bubbles. Instead, central banks should devote their attention to the emergence
of potentially fragile financing schemes of whatever assets, be it stocks, real estate or
anything else. Put differently, it is about preventing that assets are financed by exces-
sive leverage. As shown in Section 8.4 and Chapter 10, the short-term interest rate is
a powerful tool to affect balance sheet dynamics in the financial sector. Hence, even
small changes in policy rates may have large consequences for leverage or, more gen-
erally, the total amount of outstanding debt, which renders sharp contractions in order
to prick asset price bubbles unnecessary. Importantly, it is not the boom-bust cycle of
asset prices per se which inflicts damage to the economy. Instead, it is the painful un-
winding of financing schemes which turn out to be unsustainable ex post.7 This point is
illustrated by Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2014), who conduct an extensive historical
analysis of asset price bubbles and find that the costs of a bubble do not depend on the
particular asset class, but rather on whether it is financed with debt. Woodford (2012,
p. 5) puts it as follows:
"The real issue, I would argue, should not be one of controlling the possible
mis-pricing of assets in the marketplace - where the central bank has good
reason to doubt whether its judgments should be more reliable than those
7 Koo (2013) has coined the term "balance sheet recession" for a constellation in which the private sector
is forced to deleverage after a financial crisis. Deleveraging can only be achieved by an increase in
saving activity, which is, however, self-defeating on an aggregate level as it diminishes aggregate
demand and hence income ("paradox of thrift").
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of market participants - but rather, one of seeking to deter extreme levels
of leverage and of maturity transformation in the financial sector. Once the
problem is recast in this way, the relevance of interest-rate policy decisions
- whether to exacerbate the problem or to mitigate it - is more obvious."
It is also noteworthy that the claim that interest rate variations are a rather blunt way to
influence financial market dynamics has undergone some reconsideration. It is exactly
this bluntness of an interest-rate reaction to the build-up of financial imbalances that
can be an advantage because it affects the costs of leverage for any entity relying on
short-term debt. It is therefore immune against regulatory arbitrage, which constitutes
a key improvement over macroprudential measures. In this respect, Stein (2013, p. 17)
notes:
"[W]hilemonetary policymay not be quite the right tool for the job, it has
one important advantage relative to supervision and regulation - namely
that it gets in all of the cracks. The one thing that a commercial bank, a
broker-dealer, an offshore hedge fund, and a special purpose ABCP [Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper] vehicle have in common is that they all face the
same set of market interest rates. To the extent that market rates exert an
influence on risk appetite, or on the incentives to engage in maturity trans-
formation, changes in rates may reach into corners of the market that super-
vision and regulation cannot."
What do these considerations imply for practical policymaking? If monetary policy
takes the LATW approach seriously, the objective of preventing the build-up of sys-
temic risk overrules the objective of short-term price stability under the circumstances
discussed in Section 11.1. Eichengreen et al. (2011, p. 30) recommend to proceed as
follows (emphasis added):
"Instead of seeking to identify bubbles, the authorities should simply
ask whether current financing conditions are raising the likelihood of sharp
reversals in asset prices that are disruptive to economic activity. [...] Where
the answer to the aforementioned question is yes, central bankers should
then lean against the wind using a combination of the tools at their disposal,
turning first to nonmonetary micro- and macroprudential tools, but also to
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monetary policy tools when necessary. If this results in periods when, in the
interests of financial stability, the central bank sets policies that could result
in deviations from its inflation target, then so be it."
This view seems to become increasingly embraced by policymakers, as exemplified
by the subsequent quotation of FED chairwoman Janet Yellen (2014, pp. 1-2):
"How should monetary and other policymakers balance macropruden-
tial approaches andmonetary policy in the pursuit of financial stability? [...]
I believe a macroprudential approach to supervision and regulation needs
to play the primary role. [...] I am also mindful of the potential for low inter-
est rates to heighten the incentives of financial market participants to reach
for yield and take on risk, and of the limits of macroprudential measures
to address these and other financial stability concerns. Accordingly, there
may be times when an adjustment in monetary policy may be appropriate
to ameliorate emerging risks to financial stability."
It is important, however, to note that the central bank does not target systemic risk in
its own right. Monetary policy responds to systemic risk as its build-up poses the threat
of negative output gaps and weak inflation in the medium term. In this sense, LATW
policy is by no means inconsistent with price-stability orientation. In fact, it extends the
safeguarding of price stability to a longer time horizon. For example, Disyatat (2010)
stresses that assigning a distinct financial stability objective to central banks is only
necessary if macroeconomic implications of financial crises cannot be incorporated in
conventional forecasts of inflation and output.
Figure 11.6 tries to illustrate this point by plotting hypothetical paths for inflation
and the policy rate under both an LATW and a cleaning-up policy. Suppose that in
t = 2, systemic risk warning indicators signal the build-up of potentially dangerous
financial imbalances which possibly trigger a crisis starting in t = 6. LATW policy
reacts by raising the policy rate such as to contain systemic risk even though inflation
falls below the target value of two percent during that period. If LATW policy success-
fully contains systemic risk, it can prevent the crisis and inflation is back to target from
t = 6.8
8 The output gap is omitted from the graph for the sake of simplicity. It is however reasonable to
assume that it co-moves with inflation.
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Figure 11.6: Stylized Paths of Inflation and the Policy Rate
To the contrary, cleaning-up policy does not react preemptively. If the crisis ma-
terializes ex-post, policy rates are cut until the zero-lower bound becomes binding,
yet this does not prevent inflation from falling below target.9 Hence, cleaning-up pol-
icy achieves short-term stability at the expense of a later crisis whereas LATW policy
sacrifices short-term stability to prevent a future crisis. Giving up on short-term sta-
bility makes perfect sense if the medium-term forecast signals significant downside
risks to inflation due to a likely materialization of systemic risk. However, incorpo-
rating downside risks in the distant future warrants LATW policy responses today,
even though macroeconomic conditions appear in line with primary objectives.10 In
a nutshell, LATW policy trades off short-term and medium-term macro stability. Im-
portantly, this trade-off vanishes if macroprudential regulation effectively mitigates
medium-term downside risks stemming from systemic risk. In this case, deviating
9 The risk of reaching the zero-lower bound is an additional argument in favor of LATW. If the real-
economy spillovers from a financial crisis are severe, conventional interest rate policy can provide
only limited stimulus since nominal rates cannot become negative. Some authors have alternatively
proposed higher inflation targets to reduce the risk of such constellations (Ball, 2014; Blanchard et al.,
2010).
10 Note the importance of the forecast horizon in this respect: If the central bank did not account for
likely macroeconomic developments after t = 5, LATW and cleaning-up policy would be in fact
identical.
11.3. MODELING LEANING-AGAINST-THE-WIND POLICY 283
from the inflation target in the short term would be obsolete. Hence, this example
illustrates how ineffective macroprudential regulation creates additional challenges for
monetary policy. Technically, insufficient macroprudential regulation shifts the Taylor
Curve away from the origin as it forces the central bank to either accept near-term infla-
tion volatility or the build-up of systemic risk associated with future macro-volatility.
11.3 Modeling Leaning-Against-The-Wind Policy
11.3.1 Formal Challenges
Modeling LATW policy in a consistent manner is inherently difficult because it requires
the development of a macroeconomic model augmented with a crisis-prone financial
sector. Moreover, the vulnerability of the financial sector should be modeled as a
(partly) endogenous outcome, ideally due to the presence of systemic externalities (see
Chapter 4). Consider the following description of a financial boom-bust cycle given by
Fisher (1933, p. 339):
"[W]hen a debtor gets "broke," or when the breaking of many debtors
constitute a "crash," [...] there is no coming back to the original equilibrium.
[...] [S]uch a disaster is somewhat like the "capsizing" of a ship which, un-
der ordinary conditions, is always near stable equilibrium but which, after
being tipped beyond a certain angle, has no longer the tendency to return
to equilibrium, but, instead, a tendency to depart further from it."
It is quite apparent that modeling such processes is hard to accomplishwithin DSGE
models. Most of them are centered around a stationary steady-state with fluctuations
only occurring in its neighborhood. Moreover, dynamics are introduced by fundamen-
tally exogenous shocks. There may be frictions within the model which amplify shocks
and affect their persistence, yet an endogenous build-up of systemic risk is usually
not present. For example, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011)
provide fully-fledged DSGE models augmented with a detailed financial sector, yet
disruptions to financial intermediation are modeled as conventional exogenous shocks.
However, several authors have proposed methodological innovations which make
DSGE models more flexible (albeit at the cost of decreasing tractability). For example,
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Krishnamurthy and He (2015) provide a model in which systemic risk is captured as
an occasional state with the financial sector experiencing binding balance sheet con-
straints. Moreover, the model features multiple steady states with steady-state values
of production and investment considerably lower in the systemic risk state. Brunner-
meier and Sannikov (2013, 2014) propose models of a similar type which are capable
of endogenously replicating non-linear crisis events and prolonged economic slumps.
Importantly, these models are not linearized around the steady-state. Instead, they al-
low for an analysis of global dynamics. In what follows, I will briefly review the model
of Woodford (2012), which captures systemic risk by an endogenous regime-switching
mechanism and studies implications for optimal monetary policy.
11.3.2 The Regime-Switching Model of Woodford (2012)
The model of Woodford (2012) abstracts from explicit microfoundations and consists of
reduced-form equations describing aggregate demand, aggregate supply and a regime-
switching mechanism which allows for an endogenous transition from a "normal" state
to a crisis state (and vice versa). The aggregate demand relation reads as follows:
yt − gt + χΩt = Et[yt+1 − gt+1 + χΩt+1]− σ[it − Etπt+1]. (11.1)
The output gap is denoted by yt and the inflation rate by πt. Moreover, there is an
exogenous demand disturbance gt, which for instance reflects shocks to government
expenditures and it corresponds to the market interest rate which can be directly influ-
enced by monetary policy. The variable of particular importance is the credit spread
Ωt which can take two values: If Ωt = Ω, the credit spread is relatively low which
corresponds to the normal state in which financial intermediation operates smoothly.
If Ωt = Ω, the credit spread is high which corresponds to a crisis state in which finan-
cial intermediation is severely impaired.11 When isolating yt on the left-hand-side of
11 The model setup loosely relies on Cúrdia and Woodford (2009), which is a fully microfounded DSGE
model with a financial sector. It is constructed under the assumption of heterogeneous time prefer-
ences within the household sector which implies that patient households lend to impatient ones. By
assumption, lending and borrowing takes place via financial intermediaries. The cost of intermedi-
ation as well as the possible existence of a risk premium give rise to a credit spread Ωt. A positive
credit spread represents a deadweight loss, since it impedes the provision of consumption to those
households who currently value it most. Technically, the credit spread is proportional to the differ-
ence in the marginal utility of consumption of impatient and patient households, respectively. With
frictionless financial markets, credit would flow to impatient households until marginal utilities are
equated (Cúrdia and Woodford, 2009, p. 18).
11.3. MODELING LEANING-AGAINST-THE-WIND POLICY 285
Equation (11.1), it is apparent that aggregate demand decreases in Ωt, since a higher
credit spread tightens financing constraints for potential borrowers. The same holds on
expectation for future values of yt and Ωt.
The credit spread endogenously switches between its two possible realizations ac-
cording to Table 11.2. If the model is in the normal state with Ωt = Ω, the credit spread
switches to the crisis value with probability γt or remains on its normal level with prob-
ability 1− γt, respectively. In this sense, γt can be regarded as the probability of a crisis
or, equivalently, as a proxy for systemic risk. If the model has reached the crisis state,
the latter persists with probability 1− δ. Transition back to the normal state occurs with
probability δ.
To Ω To Ω
From Ω 1-γt γt
From Ω δ 1-δ
Table 11.2: Transition Probabilities of the Credit Spread
The key point is that the crisis probability γt is modeled as an endogenous variable.
Specifically, γt satisfies the conditions γt(Lt),γ
′
t(Lt),γ
′′
t (Lt) > 0, where Lt is a proxy for
leverage within the financial sector. Hence, the crisis probability is strictly convex in
Lt and therefore displays a non-linear increase in leverage. The evolution of leverage
itself is coupled with economic activity and follows
Lt = ρLt−1 + ξyt + vt, (11.2)
implying that a positive output gap leads to an increase in leverage, for instance due
to the relaxation of balance sheet constraints (as discussed in Section 8.4). Moreover,
leverage exhibits persistence and is subject to a stochastic disturbance term vt.
The aggregate supply relation takes the form of a standard New-Keynesian Phillips
Curve, except for the fact that the credit spread enters with a positive sign. This is due
to the following mechanism: A rising credit spread hampers the efficient allocation of
consumption and decreases the average marginal utility of income across households
under reasonable parameter constellations (Woodford, 2012, pp. 10-11). The latter effect
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increases real wages and hence marginal costs of firms which translates into higher
inflation.12 Hence, the modified New-Keynesian Phillips Curve is given by
πt = κyyt + κΩΩt + βEtπt+1 + ut (11.3)
where ut denotes a cost-push shock. The central bank minimizes the following loss
function:
1
2
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
π2t + λyy
2
t + λΩΩ
2
t
]
, (11.4)
where steady-state values of (target) inflation and potential output growth have
been normalized to zero. The central bank also tries to minimize fluctuations of the
credit spread due to its distortionary effect on consumption.13 Woodford (2012, pp.
31-33) shows that the FOC of optimal monetary policy under commitment is given by
λyyt − κyϕt = βρEt{λyyt+1 − κyϕt+1} − βξXt, (11.5)
where ϕt denotes the Lagrange Multiplier associated with the constraint that the
Phillips Curve (11.3) imposes on central bank optimization. The variable Xt denotes
marginal crisis risk and is defined as
Xt ≡ γ
′
t(Lt)∆Vt+1|t (11.6)
where ∆Vt+1|t is the expected increase in future central bank loss conditional on a
crisis outbreak. Formally, it holds that
∆Vt+1|t ≡ E
[
Vt+1|Ωt+1 = Ω
]
− E
[
Vt+1|Ωt+1 = Ω
]
. (11.7)
Hence, Xt can be regarded asmarginal systemic risk. It is the product of themarginal
increase in the crisis probability γt for amarginal increase in leverage and the additional
12 The equilibrium real wage in the New-Keynesian model equals the ratio of marginal disutility from
supplying labor and the marginal utility of income (see for instance Gali (2008, ch. 2)). If the latter
decreases, the real wage consequently rises.
13 Cúrdia and Woodford (2009) show that minimizing (11.4) maximizes social utility in their setup with
explicit microfoundations of the credit spread.
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central bank loss a crisis produces on expectation.14 Equation (11.5) indicates that the
central bank should lower current output if the marginal crisis risk is high, since lever-
age as the key driver of the crisis probability varies with the output gap.
The first-order condition can be rearranged to obtain a generalized price-level target
criterion (Woodford, 2012, pp. 18-19). It is given by
pt + φyyt + φXEt
∞
∑
T=t
(βρ)T−tEtXT = p
∗ (11.8)
with φX = βξ/κy and φy = λy/κy. The actual price level is denoted by pt while p∗
is defined as its respective target value. It is useful to rewrite Equation (11.8) in terms
of the gap between actual and desired price level:
pt − p
∗ = −φyyt − φXEt
∞
∑
T=t
(βρ)T−tEtXT. (11.9)
The central bank tolerates deviations from the target price level for two reasons:
First, if the output gap becomes negative (positive), the policy stance is relaxed (tight-
ened) to smooth output fluctuations at the expense of deviating from p∗. By recalling
that φy = λy/κy, it becomes apparent that the willingness to accept price level devia-
tions for the sake of output stabilization positively depends on λy, which is the weight
placed on output stabilization in the loss function (11.4). Moreover, the central bank al-
lows the price level to decline below target if the sum of current and discounted future
marginal crisis risks Et ∑∞T=t(βρ)
T−tEtXT increases. A switch of the credit spread to its
crisis value has two unfavorable implications: It depresses the output gap and raises in-
flation. In that sense, its effects on the economy are akin to a cost-push shock. However,
the credit spread may remain elevated for a prolonged period of time, conditional on δ,
which is the transition probability back to the normal state. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that the adverse effects of a crisis are more persistent than a cost-push shock.
The expectation of persistently negative output gaps and inflationary pressure cre-
ates the case for LATW policy similar to the stylized example given in Figure 11.6. The
central bank will tighten the policy stance with an increase in Xt, such that the price
level temporarily undershoots p∗ and the output gap declines. According to Equation
14 Note that this definition of systemic risk corresponds closely to the definition of systemic risk as the
expected cost of a financial crisis (see Section 2.1).
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(11.2), the latter effect reduces leverage in the financial system and hence the crisis prob-
ability. Generally, the magnitude of the policy response depends on the expected loss
of a crisis ∆Vt+1|t as well as on the degree of leverage in the financial system. Since γt
is assumed to be a strictly convex function, γ
′
t(Lt) increases in leverage, implying that
monetary policy tightens the policy stance if leverage exceeds its "normal" level.
Hence, the model provides a relatively tractable and insightful formalization of
LATW policy. However, this comes at the cost of considerable simplification. First,
given the lack of a microfounded financial sector, the build-up of leverage is not mod-
eled explicitly. Second, it would be interesting to incorporate other drivers of crisis
probabilities, for instance measures of liquidity mismatches and, most importantly, the
policy rate such as to capture the risk-taking channel.15 Third, the transition probability
from the crisis back to the normal state could be endogenized as well, for example as
being related to the state of financial sector balance sheets. Fourth, the role of macro-
prudential regulation should be included. Nevertheless, I consider the model to be a
useful starting point for further model-based investigations of the LATW approach.
11.4 Policy Adjustments in Practice
11.4.1 Systemic Risk as an Intermediate Target
How should practical policy frameworks be adjusted to incorporate the idea of LATW
policy? If it were possible to precisely estimate the impact of systemic risk on future
paths of inflation and output, a slight modification of the inflation targeting framework
as in Woodford (2012) would be sufficient. If an increase in systemic risk signals risks
for output and inflation in the medium-run, the central bank would lean against the
wind to contain systemic risk in order to ensure that inflation and output forecasts are
in line with their target values.
However, it is difficult (if not impossible) to precisely assess the macroeconomic
impact and the timing of a financial crisis. Inflation and output forecasts conditioned
on systemic risk are therefore likely to be unreliable. As an alternative, systemic risk
could become an intermediate target for monetary policy. An intermediate target has to
15 As an avenue for future research, Woodford (2012, p. 21) proposes to replace Lt with a vector of finan-
cial risk factors whose interrelation with crisis risk and macroeconomic variables could be estimated
by (yet to be developed) structural econometric models.
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satisfy two criteria: First, it needs to be controllable in a reliable manner by the policy
instrument. Second, the intermediate target has to display a stable relationship with
the ultimate objectives of price and output stability. Both conditions arguably hold true
for systemic risk. It can be influenced by the policy rate via the risk-taking channel and
empirical evidence shows that the materialization of systemic risk is associated with
output losses and declining inflation.
A directly related question is how to define the intermediate target. Systemic risk is
a multifaceted phenomenon which cannot be grasped by any single indicator. As de-
scribed in Section 5.3, there are various systemic risk indicators which appear promis-
ing. Especially, credit-to-GDP gaps and Non-Core-Liability aggregates seem to be use-
ful measures. Even slight variations in the policy rate affect the price of short-term debt
for any leveraged entity which should profoundly affect balance sheet dynamics in the
financial sector and hence these very indicators. By contrast, cross-sectional systemic
risk measures are less useful as the policy rate does little to affect the distribution of
systemic risk within the financial system. In any case, systemic risk analysis should be
guided by a variety of indicators.
De Grauwe and Gros (2009) and Galí (2010) propose to implement LATW policy
via a modification of the ECB’s two-pillar strategy. In its original form, this strategy
includes an economic pillar and a monetary pillar. The economic pillar uses vari-
ables on real activity and financial conditions such as wages, commodity prices, ca-
pacity utilization and bond yields to assess the short-term inflation outlook whereas
the monetary pillar analyzes the development of monetary and credit aggregates to as-
sess medium-term risks to price stability, exploiting the assumed long-run relationship
between monetary aggregates and prices. The monetary pillar is regarded as a cross-
checking device, verifying whether decisions made according to the economic pillar
are in line with medium-term inflation risks. For instance, persistent trend deviations
of money growth could signal misperceptions of potential output which may lead to
an inflation bias (Beck and Wieland, 2007).16
According to De Grauwe and Gros (2009) and Galí (2010), the two-pillar strategy
could be modified as follows: The purpose of the monetary pillar has to be changed
16 See ECB (2015) for a more detailed description of the two-pillar strategy. The ECB’s reliance on the
monetary pillar has been criticized for various reasons. On theoretical grounds, it has been shown
that an appropriate interest rule is sufficient to provide a nominal anchor. Given stable money de-
mand, the close correlation of money and prices is therefore a mere equilibrium phenomenon with-
out any distinct informational value. Moreover, it is unclear how the ECB should respond if the two
pillars deliver diverging recommendations for the policy stance. See Galí (2010) and the references
therein for further elaborations on these points.
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from a tool to assess medium-term inflation risks from monetary aggregates to a tool
used for systemic risk diagnosis. This systemic risk pillar can likewise be used as a cross-
checking device, which could signal the need for an upward adjustment of the interest-
rate recommendation derived from the economic pillar in the wake of rising systemic
risk. Figure 11.7 provides an illustration: Conditional on the available information set,
policymakers assess inflation risks posed by economic conditions and systemic risk.
Note that the analysis within the systemic risk pillar tends to be of a medium-term
horizon, just as it was the case with the monetary pillar. An overall assessment eventu-
ally leads to the formulation of the desired policy stance.17
Figure 11.7: Modified Two-Pillar Strategy
Of course, some of the general objections held against the two-pillar strategy con-
tinue to be relevant. For example, it is questionable whether the two pillars are really
17 The ECB tended to emphasize that the monetary pillar already acts as a device to track financial im-
balances, since credit growth is mirrored in the growth rates of broad money (Issing, 2002). However,
the course of events has shown that monitoring monetary aggregates is insufficient to capture the
build-up of systemic risk, probably since conventionally defined monetary aggregates track credit
expansion within the financial sector only to a limited extent. In that respect, Schularick and Taylor
(2012) show that monetary aggregates have little predictive power for future crises, whereas credit
aggregates display very promising forecasting abilities.
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independent. After all, economic activity and financial market dynamics influence each
other via several channels. Hence, it appears implausible to disregard information on
economic conditions in systemic risk analysis (and vice versa). Moreover, the question
how decisions are made in the case of diverging recommendations for the policy stance
is still on the table. Besides that, it is not clear which indicators should be used for
systemic risk analysis. This could impede the anticipation and the understanding of
policy actions.18
11.4.2 Extension of the Instrument Toolkit
Under LATWpolicy, the short-term interest rate serves the dual purpose to deliver price
stability and to contain systemic risk. Section 11.1 provided examples in which such a
constellation gives rise to trade-offs between short-term and medium-term inflation
variability. Hence, it is natural to ask whether monetary policy can be equipped with a
second instrument to account for systemic risk concerns, such that the policy rate can
be set in an unconstrained fashion. In fact, there are various proposals for additional
policy instruments. Generally, these potential instruments seek to impose a binding
quantitative constraint on balance sheet expansion of the financial sector, yet without
affecting the use of the policy rate as an instrument for delivering price stability.
Spahn (2010) argues that the policy rate and themoney supply can become indepen-
dent policy tools if the money market is organized as a floor system. In such a setting,
the central bank flexibly supplies reserves M at a given policy rate i. Importantly, de-
posits at the central bank are remunerated at the policy rate as well, such that the policy
rate sets a lower bound for money-market rates. It is reasonable to assume that money
demand of the banking system is downward-sloping in the policy rate for low levels
of M and becomes horizontal afterwards. If money demand is horizontal, the central
bank can vary M without any implication for i. Thus, variations in reserves M can
be used to affect liquidity conditions in the banking system. For example, if balance
sheet expansion leads to an increase in systemic risk, decreasing M tightens liquidity
conditions and curbs lending dynamics by imposing a quantitative constraint. Hence,
reserve variations can be an independent instrument, potentially usable for systemic
risk management. However, this approach may not work if the desired reduction of M
18 A practical issue is that bank-level data submitted to central banks and supervisory agencies is usu-
ally treated as confidential, which effectively rules out that market participants can analyze systemic
risk as thoroughly as the central bank.
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is large. In this case, reducing M to a great extent may imply that money supply and
money demand intersect in the region where money demand is downward-sloping in
the interest rate. As a result, the policy rate increases and M and i are no longer inde-
pendent instruments.
Along similar lines, Stein (2013) points to the use of open-market operations as an
additional policy tool. In general, central banks can buy (sell) government bonds or
private sector assets, which comes along with an increasing (declining) money sup-
ply. More specifically, he discusses the possibility to adjust the composition of the cen-
tral bank balance sheet in response to increasing systemic risk. If the central bank
sells short-term assets and simultaneously buys longer-term securities, the yield curve
should flatten and the term spread declines. Decreasing term spreads reduce the in-
centive for maturity transformation or balance sheet expansion in general (see Section
8.4.2). However, the associated price increases in longer-term assets may act as a coun-
tervailing effect since they potentially encourage balance sheet expansion due to favor-
able valuation effects. In my view, it appears more intuitive to sell long-term assets
without sterilization, such as to reduce liquidity within the system in conjunction with
asset price declines. Suchmeasures could even be targeted at specific sectors. Yet again,
the net effect on financial sector risk-taking is unclear, due to the likely rise in the term
spread. Moreover, in order to be able to engineer contractionary open market opera-
tions, the central bank has to own the respective assets in the first place. That is, the
central bank needs to hold a stock of public and possibly also private sector assets as
"ammunition." While generally conceivable, this comes along with credit risk expo-
sures and potentially adverse consequences for central bank independence. Moreover,
permanent market interventions of the central bank could distort price discoverymech-
anisms, so that some asset prices no longer exclusively reflect market expectations.
Ashcraft et al. (2011) provide a model which highlights the use of haircuts as a po-
tential policy instrument. As discussed in Section 4.4.2, haircuts represent an impor-
tant financing constraint for leveraged intermediaries. If the economy is hit by a crisis,
central-bank lending against low but prudent haircuts helps stabilizing aggregate de-
mand. Importantly, lowering interest rates is less effective since it does little to ease
financing constraints. While the model focuses on managing an actual crisis, its in-
sights can also be applied to potential crisis prevention. Raising haircuts for collateral-
ized central-bank refinancing operations during a boom tightens financing constraints
andmay therefore restrict balance sheet expansion without relying on policy-rate varia-
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tions. With respect to the Eurozone, Brunnermeier (2012) advocates the use of country-
specific haircuts to account for national differences in business cycles and systemic risk.
Alternatively, De Grauwe and Gros (2009) suggest the countercyclical adjustment of
minimum reserve requirements. As shown in Section 7.2.4, tightening minimum re-
serve requirements constrains loan supply which may help to reduce excessive credit
growth in the boom phase.
To sum up: There are various additional instruments at the disposal of central
banks. They are principally capable to affect quantitative constraints in the financial
sector, possibly without influencing the policy rate. Hence, these instruments could
be used for systemic risk management such that interest-rate setting can be focused
on price stability in an unconstrained manner. However, some of these instruments
come along with serious drawbacks. Moreover, their implementation would represent
a step into unknown territory and their impact on market outcomes as well as possible
unintended consequences are uncertain.
11.4.3 Financial Factors and Output Gap Measurement
An interesting way to systematically incorporate financial factors into monetary pol-
icy has been put forward by Borio et al. (2013). They propose to augment measure-
ment procedures for the output gap with financial factors such as credit and property-
price growth. Periods characterized by strong financial booms are then associated with
higher output gaps than under conventional measurement. If monetary policy reacts
to the output gap, for instance in line with a Taylor Rule, it automatically reacts to the
build-up of financial imbalances. In this sense, an augmented measure of the output
gap provides an elegant way for the implementation of LATW policy which potentially
circumvents the problems associated with the modified two-pillar strategy or, more
generally, a strategy which relies on systemic risk as an intermediate target.
The authors justify the inclusion of financial variables in output gap measurement
as follows: Typically, a constellation in which actual equals potential output is associ-
ated with the absence of inflationary pressure. However, potential output should be
regarded more broadly as a measure of sustainable output. If financial imbalances build
up in a low-inflation environment, output may well be on an unsustainable path de-
spite inflation seemingly being on track. The output gap is estimated on a quarterly
basis as
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yt − y
∗
t = β(yt−1 − y
∗
t−1) + γ2∆crt−k + γ3∆pht−k + εt,1, (11.10)
where yt− y∗t denotes the log difference between actual and potential output, ∆crt−k
denotes the deviation of real credit growth from its time-varying mean and ∆pht−k de-
notes the respective mean deviation of house prices. Financial variables are included
with a lag of up to k = 4 such that the model fit is maximized. Moreover, the lagged
value of the output gap is included to account for its persistence. The sample ranges
from Q1 1980 to Q4 2012.19 Hence, unlike with the univariate HP-filter, the output gap
is modeled to be driven by additional economic variables. The authors show that finan-
cial variables are capable to explain a substantial portion of the cyclical component in
output. Importantly, their method produces lower estimates of potential output during
booms and consequently higher estimates of the finance-neutral output gap, since unusu-
ally strong growth rates in credit or property prices signal a potentially unsustainable
path for output.
Figure 11.8 compares the finance-neutral output gap with HP-filtered industrial
production as a (crude) alternative measure for deviations between actual and potential
output for the United States.20 While both measures show close co-movement in the
1990s, the finance-neutral output gap remains clearly positive in the 2000s, reflecting
strong credit and property-price growth. By contrast, HP-filtered industrial production
indicated a negative output gap until 2005. After the crisis, the finance-neutral output
gap remains persistently negative, which can be explained with subdued credit and
house-price dynamics. This can be interpreted as indicating a prolonged slump due
to a "balance sheet recession," characterized by deleveraging of the private sector and
weak aggregate spending (Koo, 2013).
Relying on such an output-gapmeasure could have profound implications for mon-
etary policy. Figure 11.9 depicts the actual Federal Funds Rate in comparison with Tay-
lor Rates implied by the output-gap measure based on industrial production (IP) and
19 Technically, this setup corresponds to a multivariate Hodrick-Prescott filter in state-space form. Po-
tential output growth is modeled to follow a stochastic trend, i.e., ∆y∗t = ∆y
∗
t−1 + εt,0. It has to hold
that the ratio of the variance of the output gap estimate to the variance of the second difference in
potential output growth equals 1600, which corresponds to the common smoothing parameter for
quarterly data in the univariate HP-filter setup. The estimation is conducted with Bayesian methods.
See Borio et al. (2013, pp. 9-11) for details.
20 I am grateful to Piti Disyatat for sharing data and MATLAB routines to calculate finance-neutral
output gaps. Data on industrial production was obtained from FED FRED.
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Figure 11.8: Comparison of Output Gap Measures
the finance-neutral output gap (FN).21 While Taylor Rates and the actual Federal Funds
Rate moved closely together until 2001, the actual policy rate subsequently declined
whereas Taylor Rates remained relatively elevated. While both versions of the Taylor
Rate generally indicate that monetary policy was too loose, the Taylor Rate computed
with the finance-neutral output gap suggested an even tighter policy stance, being at
least one percentage point higher than the IP-based Taylor Rate until 2007.
Hence, the finance-neutral output gap would have called for substantially higher
policy rates prior to the crisis, thereby supporting the view of Taylor (2007) who claims
that interest rates have been "too low for too long." Moreover, an additional benefit of
this output-gap measure is given by its robustness against mis-measurement problems.
As shown in Borio et al. (2013), finance-neutral output gap estimates do not differ much
when either estimated with available real-time data or ex post for the entire sample.
11.4.4 Coordination of Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Regulation
Monetary policy andmacroprudential regulation do not operate in isolation. Variations
in the policy stance affect risk-taking within the financial sector. Vice versa, variations
21 The Taylor Rate iTt is computed as: i
T
t = r
∗ + π∗ + 1.5(π− π∗) + 0.5(yt − y∗) with r∗ = p∗ = 2. Data
on CPI inflation was taken from FED FRED.
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Figure 11.9: Fed Funds and Counterfactual Taylor Rates
in macroprudential regulation may influence macroeconomic dynamics via their influ-
ence on lending dynamics. In order to simultaneously achieve an optimal degree of
macroeconomic and financial stability, both policies should be closely coordinated.
In recent years, several authors have conducted model-based examinations of var-
ious coordination schemes.22 For example, Angelini et al. (2012a) simulate a DSGE-
model augmented with banks that are subject to an exogenous capital constraint under
different policy frameworks. Monetary policy follows a Taylor-type rule such as to
minimize the unconditional variance of output, inflation and the policy rate itself. Its
loss function is given by
LCB = σ2π + ky,CBσ
2
y + kiσ
2
∆i, (11.11)
where ky and ki denote the weights put on output stabilization and interest-rate
smoothing. The macroprudential authority sets the capital constraint for the banking
sector such as to minimize the variance of the loan-to-output ratio, the variance of out-
put and the variance of the capital requirement as such. The loan-to-output ratio is
regarded as a proxy for the financial cycle. Positive steady-state deviations indicate
financial booms and vice versa. The corresponding loss function reads
22 For a detailed overview on the literature, the reader is referred to Angelini et al. (2012b) and the
references therein.
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LMP = σ2L/y + ky,MPσ
2
y + kvσ
2
∆v (11.12)
with σ2L/y denoting the variance of the loan-to-output ratio L/y and σ
2
∆v denoting
the variance of the capital requirement v. The parameters ky,MP and kv are the weights
put on output stabilization and capital-requirement smoothing.
If policies are coordinated, this amounts to the central bank simultaneously choos-
ing both instruments i and v to minimize the sum of both loss functions LCB and LMP.
If policies are non-coordinated, each authority minimizes its own loss function while
taking the policy of the other authority as given. The latter arrangement is clearly inef-
ficient, especially if objective variables develop into different directions.
For example, in the wake of an adverse technology shock, output declines while
inflation as well as the loan-to-output ratio increase. The central bank relaxes its policy
stance to smooth output fluctuations. However, the macroprudential regulator tightens
capital requirements due to the increase in the loan-to-output ratio. Hence, the attempt
of monetary policy to stabilize aggregate demand is counteracted by the procyclical
response of macroprudential regulation. As a result, welfare decreases. By contrast,
under coordination the capital requirement is relaxed which enables the policy rate to
remain effectively constant. In the case of an adverse shock to banks’ capital, inflation,
output and the loan-to-output ratio decrease simultaneously. Hence, there is no funda-
mental conflict between authorities. Coordination generally improves welfare. Specif-
ically, it is shown that the central bank supports stabilization of the financial sector at
the expense of slightly higher inflation volatility in the optimum.
Smets (2014) focuses on the game-theoretic interactions between authorities. He
similarly shows that policy coordination by minimizing a joint loss function delivers
superior results compared to a setup in which each authority pursues its own objec-
tive. Under coordination, the central bank reaches its inflation target and the macro-
prudential authority sets its instrument such as to balance output stability and the risks
of debt accumulation within the financial sector. By contrast, if macroprudential policy
is modeled to be the Stackelberg leader, welfare declines. Macroprudential policy is set
to boost output at the expense of strong debt accumulation within the financial sector
by taking into account the reaction function of the central bank. The central bank is
then forced to allow inflation to reduce the real debt burden. As a result, an inflation
bias emerges in equilibrium.
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What do these findings imply for the desired institutional setup in practice? The
theoretical results highlighting the benefits of close coordination suggest that the task
of macroprudential regulation should be assigned to the central bank. However, such
a solution has its drawbacks as well.23 From an organizational perspective, the dele-
gation of macroprudential supervision to central banks appears reasonable. By nature,
central banks are experienced in assessing macroeconomic and macro-financial devel-
opments. Moreover, there would be no need for potentially time-consuming exchanges
of data and expertise between two different institutional bodies. On the other hand,
financial stability objectives are hard to define and therefore difficult to communicate,
which could potentially impair central bank credibility. Moreover, a macroprudential
mandate implies that central banks have to deal with solvency problems of banks (and
potentially even governments). Hence, macroprudential policy has a quasi-fiscal di-
mension which may raise the issue of the central bank’s democratic legitimation. Fur-
thermore, it cannot be ruled out that interest-rate setting becomes influenced by macro-
prudential concerns. For example, interest rates could be kept too low for too long
(from a price-stability perspective) after a financial bust. This problem can be tackled
by the implementation of separate decision-making structures and distinct communi-
cation channels. All in all, I consider the idea of assigning macroprudential supervision
to the central bank to be the most reasonable institutional setup, which, however, has
to be implemented with an eye on the aforementioned drawbacks.
The institutional frameworks actually implemented differ between countries. In
the United Kingdom, the macroprudential mandate has been assigned to the Bank of
England. Hence, both monetary and macroprudential policies are carried out by the
central bank. By contrast, the United States have implemented the Financial Stability
Oversight Council for the implementation of macroprudential policies. Its voting coun-
cil consists of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and
various chairpersons of different regulatory agencies. Thus, the central bank’s influ-
ence on macroprudential regulation in the US is rather limited. An intermediate way
is pursued in the Euro Area. Macroprudential regulation is basically carried out on
the national level. Nevertheless, the Single Supervisory Mechanism as the newly im-
plemented supranational banking-supervision department of the ECB can decide on
macroprudential measures with which national authorities have to comply (see Section
5.2.1).
23 The following collection of arguments heavily relies on IMF (2013a) and Bundesbank (2015).
Chapter 12
Conclusion and Outlook
In the introduction of my thesis, I have raised two key issues. First, I posed the question
whether financial markets are inherently unstable and whether their regulation should
be reconsidered. Second, it was asked whether monetary policy should play a more ac-
tive role in stabilizing financial markets. Taking into consideration the acquired results,
I conclude that the first question should be answered positively without qualification.
With respect to the second question, I conclude that monetary policy should stabilize
financial markets, yet this is mainly due to the deficiencies of financial regulation and
should not be regarded as beneficial in its own right.
Systemic risk on financial markets is inefficiently high in the absence of adequate
macroprudential regulation. This is strongly suggested by both the approaches stress-
ing limited rationality as well as the ones highlighting the importance of systemic exter-
nalities. While I consider systemic externalities as the superior concept, it is neverthe-
less telling that both approaches reach similar conclusions. If anything, this strengthens
the case for appropriate macroprudential regulation. It is also important to note that
the endogenous build-up of systemic risk can be reconciled with the notion of rational
agents. It is not necessary to depart from mainstream paradigms, except for the fact
that the role of externalities needs to be recognized more prominently.
Systemic risk is a multifaceted phenomenonwhich can be explained by the presence
of various forms of systemic externalities. Specifically, banks tend to not internalize
the potentially adverse consequences of their interconnectedness. Moreover, choices
of business models as well as lending standards may become strategic complements,
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leaving the financial system with poorly diversified intermediaries and procyclical dy-
namics of loan supply. Furthermore, individually prudent behavior such as selling
assets or hoarding liquidity in crisis states exacerbates systemic stress via fire-sale ex-
ternalities and the aggravation of aggregate liquidity shortages. Last, the presence of
asymmetric information can give rise to the collapse of important market segments due
to adverse selection.
In my view, the theoretical case for regulating systemic risk is very convincing.
However, bridging the gap between the theoretical analysis of systemic risk and prac-
tical macroprudential policymaking remains challenging. Given the stylized nature of
most of the theoretical models, policy conclusions are primarily of a qualitative nature.
Hence, the conduct of macroprudential policy is guided by a mix of qualitative theoret-
ical prescriptions, mostly non-structural techniques to measure systemic risk and a con-
siderable amount of discretion based on supervisory judgment. Thus, the development
of empirically applicable systemic risk models which incorporate systemic externalities
in their various forms appears to be an important avenue for future research.
Especially, more sophisticatedmodels could further substantiate the claim thatmacro-
prudential regulation in its current form is insufficient. The key concern is that finan-
cial intermediaries are still allowed to operate with excessive leverage. Moreover, it
is highly doubtful if countercyclical macroprudential measures will be applied with
sufficient rigor, especially when taking into account political constraints. It would be
highly desirable to increase the structural resilience of the financial sector by imposing
substantially higher capital requirements. They have the particular benefit of being ca-
pable to internalize several forms of systemic externalities at the same time. Liquidity
requirements and restrictions on activities as well as on the composition of assets and
liabilities of financial intermediaries can serve as important complements. Moreover,
increasing structural resilience decreases the need for countercyclical measures, which
are difficult to calibrate and probably politically infeasible. However, the current state
of macroprudential regulation offers little reason for being optimistic. In its current
form, it can hardly mitigate systemic risk in an effective manner.
This intermediate result carries direct implications for the second key question of
whether monetary policy should play a more active role in financial market stabiliza-
tion. Given insufficient macroprudential regulation, systemic risk becomes a concern
for central banks due to its potential of causing adverse spillovers to the real economy in
the crisis case. On the other hand, the policy stance affects the level of systemic risk via
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the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission. The theoretical and empirical
examination of the latter reveals that a looser policy stance leads the financial sector to
takemore credit risk, to lower required risk compensation, to increase its reliance on un-
stable short-term funding and to increase its leverage. Yet the mere fact that monetary
policy is capable to influence systemic risk does not imply that this is beneficial per se.
There are various constellations under which short-term macroeconomic stability and
medium-term financial stability considerations may call for a different policy stance.
In such cases, monetary policy either needs to accept short-term deviations of inflation
and output from their respective target values or an increase in systemic risk. Hence,
burdening monetary policy with systemic risk management can give rise to an increase
in macroeconomic volatility. Yet this policy arrangement seems unavoidable, given the
insufficiency of macroprudential regulation. Put bluntly, I consider leaning-against-
the-wind policy as a necessary evil resulting from the inability of financial regulation to
tackle systemic risk at the source. Generally, the crisis forced central banks into the role
of a "policymaker of last resort," which poses long-term challenges for their indepen-
dence and the priority of price stability. In the Euro Area, the ECB has been burdened
with additional implicit objectives such as easing fiscal pressure on southern member
states and alleviating the vicious circle between declines in government solvency and
systemic stress in the financial sector. At the same time, significant measures to fix the
inherent flaws of the EMU are still lacking to a great extent. Therefore, it has to be
doubted whether the ECB will regain the independence associated with its clear-cut
price stability objective prior to the crisis.
If one accepts that macroprudential regulation in its current form has its deficien-
cies, the question is how to incorporate systemic risk considerations into the strategy of
monetary policy. It seems most natural to define systemic risk as an intermediate tar-
get and to base its measurement on a variety of different indicators. Hence, short-term
macroeconomic analysis should be complemented with an analysis of medium-term
threats to financial stability. If systemic risk builds up, the policy stance should be
tightened, even if this amounts to sacrificing short-term macroeconomic stability. The
modification of the ECB’s two-pillar strategy by changing the purpose of the mone-
tary pillar into a tool for systemic risk diagnosis appears to be a promising framework
in this respect. An interesting alternative is to incorporate the stage of the financial
cycle into output gap measures, which would yield an automatic reaction to financial
imbalances without the disadvantages of an intermediate target approach. Moreover,
there are various proposals to equip monetary policy with a second instrument, which
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would enable central banks to use the policy rate for macroeconomic stabilization and
the second instrument for systemic risk management.
Several of the aforementioned aspects deserve further research in the future. For
instance, the exploration of the risk-taking channel and the mechanisms linking the
policy stance to financial risk-taking is still at an early stage. So far, there are only few
examples of models explicitly embedding the risk-taking channel into a fully-fledged
macro-financial setup. However, it would be highly informative for policymakers to be
able to rely onmore detailed and empirically applicable models of the risk-taking chan-
nel. Moreover, it is desirable to merge the modeling of the risk-taking channel with a
rigorous representation of systemic externalities. Besides, it is equally important to pur-
sue further research on optimal monetary policy in a leaning-against-the-wind context
to provide policymakers with additional guidance on how to optimally trade-off short-
term price stability and medium-run systemic risk management. Likewise, a more de-
tailed analysis of the potential risks and benefits of conceivable additional instruments
is necessary. In addition, the interaction betweenmonetary policy andmacroprudential
supervision should be scrutinized in more detail. Especially the macroeconomic effects
of a change in the macroprudential policy stance and its implications for monetary pol-
icy deserve closer theoretical and empirical examination. All in all, it can be conjectured
that the question of how to optimally incorporate financial stability considerations into
monetary policy frameworks will be a significant part of the future research landscape.
Part III
Appendix

Appendix A
Selected Proofs and Derivations
A.1 Acharya-Santos-Yorulmazer Model
Equation (4.12) in the main text can be obtained by rearranging Equation (4.11).
qd = α(1− α)(1− pSF) + (1− α)
2(1− pFF)
= (α− α2)(1− pSF) + (1− 2α+ α2)(1− pFF)
= α− α2 − αpSF + α
2pSF + 1− 2α+ α2 − pFF + 2αpFF − α2pFF
= 1− α+ 2αpFF − pFF + α2pSF − αpSF − α2pFF
= 1− α+ αpFF − pFF + αpFF − αpSF + α2pSF − α2pFF
= (1− α)(1− pFF)− α(pSF − pFF) + α2(pSF − pFF)
= (1− α)(1− pFF) + (α2 − α)(pSF − pFF)
= (1− α)(1− pFF) + α(α− 1)(pSF − pFF)
= (1− α)(1− pFF)− α(1− α)(pSF − pFF)
(A.1)
Finally, since Equation (4.10) implies that qs = (1− α)(1− pFF), it holds that
qd = qs − α(1− α)(pSF − pFF) (A.2)
which replicates Equation (4.12) in the main text.
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A.2 Fire-Sale Model of Stein
The social utility function (4.36) in the main text is obtained in several steps (Stein, 2012,
p. 17). First, it is assumed that households have a fixed endowment of Y, from which I
is allocated to banks andW to patient outside investors. Therefore it holds that
C0 = Y− I −W. (A.3)
Expected consumption in t = 2 is given by
E(C2) = p( f (I) + g(W)) + (1− p)(λI + g(W −M) + M). (A.4)
In the good state with probability p, projects by banks and POIs deliver steady pay-
offs and consumers receive the proceeds f (I) + g(W). In the bad state occurring with
probability (1− p), investment projects by banks only make λI on expectation. More-
over, households receive M and the payoff g(W − M) from outside investor projects.
The latter decrease in M since outside investors partly acquire bank projects instead of
investing in their own projects. Recall that Equation (4.27) defines household utility as
U = C0 + βE(C2) + γM. (A.5)
Substituting for C0 and C2 yields
U = Y− I −W
+ β
(
p( f (I) + g(W)) + (1− p)(λI + g(W −M) + M)
)
+ γM
(A.6)
In a last step, Y can be dropped as it is a constant. Moreover, each term is multiplied
with RB = 1/β to express utility uniformly in terms of consumption in t = 2. This
yields
U = −RB I − RBW
+
(
p( f (I) + g(W)) + (1− p)(λI + g(W −M) + M)
)
+ γRBM
(A.7)
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Recall that RB = 1/β and RM = 1/(β + γ). A last rearrangement step is then to
express γRB as follows:
γRB =
γ
β
=
β+ γ− β
β
=
1
β −
1
β+γ
1
β+γ
=
RB − RM
RM
.
(A.8)
Collecting terms gives
U = {p f (I) + (1− p)λI − IRB}+ M
(RB − RM)
RM
pg(W) + (1− p){g(W −M) + M} −WRB,
(A.9)
which corresponds to the social utility function (4.36) in the main text.
Derivation of the FOCs for the Social Planner
The social planner likewise has to account for the collateral constraint m ≤ kλ
RM
. The
Lagrangian L P reads as follows:
L
P = {p f (I) + (1− p)λI − IRB}+ M
(RB − RM)
RM
pg(W) + (1− p){g(W −M) + M} −WRB − ηP(m−
kλ
RM
),
(A.10)
where ηP henceforth denotes the LagrangeMultiplier of the social planner problem.
First, the FOCwith respect to m is derived. For that purpose, it needs to be recalled that
M = mRM I. Moreover, the social planner endogenizes the fire sale discount, such that
k =
1
g′(W −M)
=
1
g′(W −mRM I)
(A.11)
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which again clarifies that the fire sale discount is actually a function of M, i.e., the
reliance on short-term debt. The Lagrangian can consequently be rewritten as follows:
L
P = {p f (I) + (1− p)λI − IRB}+mI(RB − RM) + pg(W)
+ (1− p){g(W −mRM I) +mRM I} −WRB
− ηP(m−
λ
RM
1
g′(W −mRM I)
).
(A.12)
Taking the FOC with respect to m gives
∂L P
∂m
= I(RB − RM) + (1− p)RM I − (1− p)g′(W −mRM I)RM I
− ηP + ηP
λ
RM
g′′(W −mRM I)RM I(
g′(W −mRM I)
)2 = 0. (A.13)
The term (1− p)RM I − (1− p)g′(W −mRM I)RM I can be written more compactly
as follows:
(1− p)RM I − (1− p)g′(W −mRM I)RM I
= (1− p)I(RM − g′(W −mRM I)RM)
= (1− p)I(RM −
1
k
RM)
= (1− p)I(RM
k− 1
k
)
= −(1− p)I
1− k
k
RM.
(A.14)
For a last step, recall that the net excess return for patient investors was defined as
z = (1− k)/k, which allows to simplify notation further to
−(1− p)IzRM. (A.15)
Hence, the FOC can be finally simplified to
I{(RB − RM)− (1− p)zRM} = ηP(1−
g′′(·)
(g′(·))2
λI) (A.16)
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which corresponds to (4.38) in the main text. Taking the FOCwith respect to I yields
∂L P
∂I
= p f ′(I) + (1− p)λ− RB +m(RB − RM)
+ (1− p)mRM − (1− p)g′(W −mRM I)RMm
+ ηP
λ
RM
g′′(W −mRM I)RMm(
g′(W −mRM I)
)2 = 0
(A.17)
Akin to the former derivation, the term (1− p)mRM − (1− p)g′(W −mRM I)RMm
can be rewritten to −(1− p)mzRM. Hence the FOC simplifies to
p f ′(I) + (1− p)λ− RB +m(RB − RM)− (1− p)mzRM = −ηP
g′′(·)(
g′(·)
)2λm (A.18)
which is (4.39) in the main text.
A.3 Disyatat Model
The Optimal Demand for Labor and Loans by the Firm
Expected profits are
Πe = θ(PNβ − (1+ rL)PNN) (A.19)
and firms maximize profits by optimally choosing N. Differentiation of Πe with
respect to N:
∂Πe
∂N
= βθPNβ−1 − θ(1+ rL)PN = 0 (A.20)
Simplification gives
βPNβ−1 = (1+ rL)PN (A.21)
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Nβ−1 =
(1+ rL)PN
βP
(A.22)
N =
(
(1+ rL)PN
βP
) 1
β−1
(A.23)
N =
(
βP
(1+ rL)PN
) 1
1−β
(A.24)
Nominal loan demand LD = PNN equals the nominal wage bill.
Rearrangement of the Household Indifference Condition
Equation (7.23) is derived as follows: It starts from Equation (7.22) which is
(1+ r f )L = x(1+ R)L+ (1− x)(ψ
e − cL) (A.25)
As a first step, x is substituted out with by using Equation (7.19), which implies that
x = 1− (1− θ)q.
(1+ r f )L = (1− (1− θ)q)(1+ R)L+ (1− θ)q(ψ
e − cL)
= (1+ R)L− (1− θ)q(1+ R)L+ (1− θ)q(ψe − cL)
= (1+ R)L+ (1− θ)q [ψe − cL− (1+ R)L]
(A.26)
As shown in Disyatat (2011, pp. 720), ψe is can be expressed as
ψe = ω
[
1+
∫ u∗
u ug(u)du
G(u∗)
]
(A.27)
where g(u) is the density function of u, and G(u) denotes the cumulative distribu-
tion function of u.1 It can be exploited that G(u∗) = Pr(u < u∗) = q to obtain
1 Expanding the integral and subsequent simplification gives (7.21) in the main text. In general, the
probability density function of a continuous random variable u which is uniformly distributed over
some interval [u, u] is given by g(u) = 1u−u . The cumulative distribution function at some point u
∗ is
given by u
∗−u
u−u . See for instance Balakrishnan and Nevzorov (2004, pp. 107).
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ψe = ω
[
1+
∫ u∗
u ug(u)du
q
]
. (A.28)
Plugging (A.28) into (A.26) gives
(1+ r f )L = (1+ R)L− (1− θ)qcL
+ (1− θ)q
[
ω
(
1+
1
q
∫ u∗
u
ug(u)du
)
− (1+ R)L
] (A.29)
which completes the first step of rearrangement. Equation (7.17) in the main text
implies that (1+ R)L = ωu∗ + ω. This expression is used to rearrange the last term of
the right-hand-side of (A.29) as follows:
(1− θ)q
[
ω
(
1+
1
q
∫ u∗
u
ug(u)du
)
− (1+ R)L
]
= (1− θ)q
[
ω
(
1+
1
q
∫ u∗
u
ug(u)du
)
−ωu∗ −ω
]
= (1− θ)qω
[
1
q
(∫ u∗
u
ug(u)du
)
− u∗
]
= (1− θ)ω
[(∫ u∗
u
ug(u)du
)
− u∗q
]
(A.30)
Since q = G(u∗) =
∫ u∗
u g(u)du, a further simplification is given by
(1− θ)ω
[(∫ u∗
u
ug(u)du
)
− u∗q
]
= (1− θ)ω
[∫ u∗
u
ug(u)du− u∗
∫ u∗
u
g(u)du
]
= (1− θ)ω
[∫ u∗
u
(u− u∗)g(u)du
] (A.31)
Equation (A.31) can be simplified further if the integral is expanded. Note that the
density function of u is g(u) = 1u−u .
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(1− θ)ω
[∫ u∗
u
(u− u∗)g(u)du
]
= (1− θ)ω
[∫ u∗
u
ug(u)du−
∫ u∗
u
u∗g(u)du
]
= (1− θ)ω
([
1
2
1
u− u
u2
]u∗
u
−
[
1
u− u
u∗u
]u∗
u
)
= (1− θ)ω
[
1
2
1
u− u
u∗2 −
1
2
1
u− u
u2 −
1
u− u
u∗2 +
1
u− u
u∗u
]
= −
1
2
(1− θ)ω
[
1
u− u
u∗2 +
1
u− u
u2 −
1
u− u
2u∗u
]
= −
1
2
(1− θ)ω
1
u− u
[
u∗2 − 2u∗u+ u2
]
= −
1
2
(1− θ)ω
(u∗ − u)2
u− u
(A.32)
In a last step, q = G(u∗) = u
∗−u
u−u allows to write
−
1
2
(1− θ)ω
(u∗ − u)2
u− u
= −
1
2
(1− θ)ω(u− u)q2 (A.33)
Taking this term back to (A.29) yields
(1+ r f )L = (1+ R)L− (1− θ)cqL−
(1− θ)ω(u− u)
2
q2 (A.34)
Rearranging terms gives
(1− θ)ω(u− u)
2
q2 + (1− θ)cqL− (1+ R)L+ (1+ r f )L = 0 (A.35)
Using (1+ R)L = ωu∗ + u∗ once more yields
(1− θ)ω(u− u)
2
q2 + (1− θ)cqL−ωu∗ −ω+ (1+ r f )L = 0 (A.36)
Finally, using u∗ = q(u− u) + u from Equation (7.18) delivers Equation (7.23) in the
main text:
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(1− θ)ω(u− u)
2
q2 + (1− θ)cqL−ωu∗ −ω+ (1+ r f )L
=
(1− θ)ω(u− u)
2
q2 + (1− θ)cqL−ω(q(u− u) + u)−ω+ (1+ r f )L
=
(1− θ)ω(u− u)
2
q2 +
[
(1− θ)cL−ω(u− u)
]
q−ω(1+ u) + (1+ r f )L
= 0
(A.37)
From this expression, one can finally infer the critical loan quantities LL and LH , as it is
outlined in the main text.
Derivation of the Loan-Supply Schedule
The loan-supply schedule has to be specified for three constellations, namely q = 0,
q = 1 and 0 < q < 1. For this purpose, Equations (7.20) and (7.22), which have to be
jointly satisfied in equilibrium, are used to solve for the loan rate (1+ rL). Recall that
(7.20) and (7.22) are the zero-profit condition for banks and the indifference condition
for households, respectively, and are given by
θ(1+ rL)L = x(1+ R)L+ (1− x)ψe (A.38)
(1+ r f )L = x(1+ R)L+ (1− x)(ψ
e − cL) (A.39)
Case 1 (L ≤ LL) : q = 0⇔ x = 1
If x = 1, (A.38) simplifies to
θ(1+ rL)L = (1+ R)L (A.40)
Equivalently, (A.39) becomes
(1+ r f )L = (1+ R)L (A.41)
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Substitution and eliminating L yields
(1+ rL) =
1+ r f
θ
(A.42)
implying that for q = 0 and hence L ≤ LL credit is supplied elastically at the loan
rate depicted in (A.42).
Case 2 (LL < L < LH) : 0 < q < 1⇔ x = 1− q+ θq
If x = 1− q+ θq, (A.38) transforms to
θ(1+ rL)L = (1− q+ θq)(1+ R)L+ (q− θq)ψe (A.43)
and (A.39) consequently reads
(1+ r f )L = (1− q+ θq)(1+ R)L+ (q− θq)(ψ
e − cL) (A.44)
Merging (A.43) and (A.44) yields
θ(1+ rL)L− (q− θq)ψe = (1+ r f )L− (q− θq)(ψ
e − cL)
θ(1+ rL)L = (1+ r f )L+ (q− θq)cL
(1+ rL) =
1+ r f
θ
+
c(1− θ)
θ
q
implying that for LL < L < LH the loan rate increases in q (and thus in L), i.e. the
loan supply curve becomes positively sloped.
Case 3 (L ≥ LH) : q =1⇔ x = θ
If q = 1, the bank defaults with certainty if the borrower firm defaults. Hence, the
repayment probability x of the bank is equal to θ, the repayment probability of the
firm. If x = θ, (A.38) and (A.39) are given by
θ(1+ rL)L = θ(1+ R)L+ (1− θ)ψe (A.45)
A.4. DELL’ARRICIA-MARQUÉZ MODEL 315
(1+ r f )L = θ(1+ R)L+ (1− θ)(ψ
e − cL) (A.46)
and by substitution, one obtains
(1+ rL) =
1+ r f
θ
+
(1− θ)c
θ
(A.47)
fromwhich it follows that loan supply again becomes horizontal at the rate specified
in (A.47). Please see the main text for a detailed interpretation in conjunction with a
graphical exposition.
A.4 Dell’Arricia-Marquéz Model
Monitoring Decision
The level of monitoring in (8.53) is obtained as follows: Optimal monitoring is given by
(8.52), which is
qˆ =
R− rD(1− k)
c
(A.48)
Since rational depositors form model-consistent expectations E(q|k) = qˆ, the de-
posit rate can be substituted out by using rD = r
∗
qˆ . This yields
qˆ =
R− r
∗
qˆ (1− k)
c
(A.49)
which subsequently needs to be solved for qˆ.
qˆ =
R− r
∗
qˆ (1− k)
c
0 = cqˆ− R+
r∗
qˆ
(1− k)
0 = cqˆ2 − Rqˆ+ r∗(1− k)
(A.50)
Taking roots of the quadratic equation gives two solutions
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qˆ1 =
1
2c
(
R+
√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
)
(A.51)
qˆ2 =
1
2c
(
R−
√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
)
(A.52)
As explained in the main text, qˆ1 is chosen as the relevant solution.
Optimal Leverage
The optimal capital structure as depicted by kˆ in (8.56) is derived in several steps. First,
Bank profits conditional on the choice of the capital structure k are written as
Π =
(
qˆ(R− rD(1− k))− (r∗ + ε)k−
1
2
cqˆ2
)
L
=
(
qˆ(R−
r∗
qˆ
(1− k))− (r∗ + ε)k−
1
2
cqˆ2
)
L
=
(
qˆR− r∗ + r∗k− r∗k− kε−
1
2
cqˆ2
)
L
=
(
qˆR− r∗ − kε−
1
2
cqˆ2
)
L
(A.53)
which corresponds to (8.54) in the main text. Plugging in the expression for equilib-
rium monitoring yields
Π =
[
1
2c
(
R+
√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
)
R− r∗ − kε
−
1
8c
(
R+
√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
)2]
L
=
[
1
2c
R2 +
1
2c
R
√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)− r∗ − kε
−
1
8c
(
R2 + 2R
√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k) + R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
)]
L
(A.54)
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Now, taking the derivative with respect to k gives
∂Π
∂k
=
(
r∗R
1√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
− ε
−
1
2
r∗R
1√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
−
1
2
r∗
)
L
=
(
r∗R
1
2
√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
− ε−
1
2
r∗
)
L = 0
(A.55)
Since L is non-zero for meaningful parameter constellation, the FOC is only satisfied
if the term in brackets equals zero, which can be exploited to solve for the optimal level
of k:
r∗R
1
2
√
R2 − 4cr∗(1− k)
= ε+
1
2
r∗
r∗2R2
1
4(R2 − 4cr∗(1− k))
= (ε+
1
2
r∗)2
r∗2R2
1
4R2 − 16cr∗ + 16crk
= ε2 + rε+
1
4
r2
r∗2R2 = (4R2 − 16cr∗ + 16cr∗k)(ε2 + rε+
1
4
r2)
r∗2R2 = 4R2ε2 + r∗4R2ε+ r∗2R2
− 16cr∗ε2 − 16cr∗2ε− 4cr∗3
+ 16cr∗kε2 + 16cr∗2kε+ 4ckr∗3
(A.56)
Collecting terms gives
16cr∗kε2 + 16cr∗2kε+ 4ckr∗3
= 16cr∗ε2 + 16cr∗2ε+ 4cr∗3 − 4R2ε2 − r∗4R2ε (A.57)
A helpful factorization is
16cr∗ε2 + 16cr∗2ε+ 4cr∗3
= 4cr∗(4ε2 + 4εr∗ + r∗2)
= 4cr∗(2ε+ r∗)2
(A.58)
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and hence
4cr∗(2ε+ r∗)2k = 4cr∗(2ε+ r∗)2 − 4R2ε2 − r∗4R2ε
k = 1− R2
4ε2 + 4εr∗
4cr∗(2ε+ r∗)2
= 1− R2
ε(r∗ + ε)
cr∗(2ε+ r∗)2
(A.59)
which finally replicates (8.56) in the main text.
Optimal Monitoring Level
The finally optimal monitoring level depicted in (8.57) is obtained by the substitution
of (8.56)/(A.59) back into (8.53)/(A.49) which gives
q =
1
c
(
R− R2
ε(r∗ + ε)
cq(2ε+ r∗)2
)
=
R
c
− R2
ε(r∗ + ε)
c2q(2ε+ r∗)2
0 = q−
R
c
+ R2
ε(r∗ + ε)
c2q(2ε+ r∗)2
= c2(2ε+ r∗)2q2 − Rc(2ε+ r∗)2q+ R2ε(r∗ + ε)
(A.60)
Solving the quadratic equation yields the following term
qˆ1,2 =
cR(2ε+ r∗)2 ±
√
c2R2(2ε+ r∗)4 − 4c2(2ε+ r∗)2R2ε(r∗ + ε)
2c2(2ε+ r∗)2
(A.61)
The square root can be simplified as follows:
√
c2R2(2ε+ r∗)4 − 4c2(2ε+ r∗)2R2ε(r∗ + ε)
=
√
c2R2(2ε+ r∗)2
(
(2ε+ r∗)2 − 4ε(r∗ + ε)
)
= cR(2ε+ r∗)
√
(2ε+ r∗)2 − 4ε(r∗ + ε)
= cR(2ε+ r∗)
√
4ε2 + 4εr∗ + r∗2 − 4εr∗ − 4ε2
= cRr∗(2ε+ r∗)
(A.62)
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Again, the solution qˆ1 is chosen such that
qˆ =
cR(2ε+ r∗)2 + cRr∗(2ε+ r∗)
2c2(2ε+ r∗)2
=
(2ε+ r∗)R+ r∗R
2c(2ε+ r∗)
=
2εR+ 2r∗R
2c(2ε+ r∗)
=
R(r∗ + ε)
c(r∗ + 2ε)
(A.63)
which finally corresponds to (8.57) in the main text.
A.5 Angeloni-Faia Model
Optimal Deposit Ratio
As argued in the main text, the optimal value of the deposit ratio dt lies in the interval
λ(RAt + h) < Rtdt < R
A
t + h. The precise value of dt can be determined by finding the
maximum of the payoff function. Conditional on the choice of the interval, payoffs are
given by (8.61) and read
Π(xt) =
1
2h
∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
(1+ λ)(1− c)(RAt + xt)
2
dxt
+
1
2h
∫ h
Rtdt−RAt
(RAt + xt) + Rtdt
2
dxt
(A.64)
In a first step, the integral has to be expanded. Expansion of the first integral by
using τ = (1+ λ)(1− c) for notational simplicity gives:
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∫ Rtdt−RAt
−h
τ(RAt + xt)
2
dxt
=
[
τRAt
2
xt +
τ
4
x2t
]Rtdt−RAt
−h
=
τRAt
2
(Rtdt − R
A
t ) +
τ
4
(Rtdt − R
A
t )
2 +
τRAt
2
h−
τ
4
h2
=
τ
2
RAt Rtdt −
τ
2
(RAt )
2 +
τ
4
R2t d
2
t
−
τ
2
RAt Rtdt +
τ
4
(RAt )
2 +
τRAt
2
h−
τ
4
h2
=
τ
4
R2t d
2
t −
τ
4
(RAt )
2 +
τRAt
2
h−
τ
4
h2
(A.65)
Expanding the second integral yields
∫ h
Rtdt−RAt
(RAt + xt) + Rtdt
2
dxt
=
[
1
2
RAt xt +
1
4
x2t +
1
2
Rtdtxt
]h
Rtdt−RAt
=
1
2
RAt h+
1
4
h2 +
1
2
Rtdth
−
[
1
2
RAt (Rtdt − R
A
t ) +
1
4
(Rtdt − R
A
t )
2 +
1
2
Rtdt(Rtdt − R
A
t )
]
=
1
2
RAt h+
1
4
h2 +
1
2
Rtdth
+
1
2
RtR
A
t dt +
1
4
(RAt )
2 −
3
4
R2t d
2
t
(A.66)
Adding up both integrals in their expanded form gives payoffs as a function of dt:
Π(dt) =
1
2h
(
τ
4
R2t d
2
t −
τ
4
(RAt )
2 +
τRAt
2
h−
τ
4
h2
+
1
2
RAt h+
1
4
h2 +
1
2
Rtdth
+
1
2
RtR
A
t dt +
1
4
(RAt )
2 −
3
4
R2t d
2
t
) (A.67)
It is now possible to take the FOC with respect to dt:
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∂Π
∂.t
=
1
2h
(
τ
2
R2t dt +
1
2
Rth+
1
2
RtR
A
t −
3
2
R2t dt
)
= 0 (A.68)
It is convenient to simplify the expression via multiplication with 4hRt to obtain
τRtdt + h+ R
A
t − 3Rtdt = 0 (A.69)
Reintroducing τ = (1+ λ)(1− c) yields
(1+ λ)(1− c)Rtdt + h+ RAt − 3Rtdt = 0 (A.70)
which corresponds to (8.62) in the main text. In a last step, one needs to solve for dt
(1+ λ)(1− c)Rtdt + h+ RAt − 3Rtdt = 0
Rtdt(1− c− cλ+ λ− 3) = −h− RAt
Rtdt(2− λ+ c+ cλ) = h+ RAt
dt =
1
Rt
h+ RAt
2− λ+ c(1+ λ)
(A.71)
which is (8.63) in the main text.

Appendix B
Additional VAR Results
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
Funding Risk Indicator -0.37 0.407 -1.03 1.13 98
Non-Financial Leverage Indicator 0.102 0.867 -1.77 2.46 98
HP-filtered RRPPI 0 2.583 -11.363 6.237 98
Excess Bond Premium -0.058 0.396 -0.892 0.881 98
Non-Core Liability Growth (yoy) 8.535 7.839 -8.199 22.8 98
Real GDP growth 3.373 2.198 -3.42 9.029 98
CPI inflation 3.047 1.521 -1.95 6.850 98
Note: RRPPI = Real Residential Property Price Index, yoy = year-on-year, HP-filtered = Hodrick-Prescott
filtered.
Table B.1: Additional Summary Statistics
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Figure B.1: Additional Time Series Plots
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Figure B.2: Eigenvalue-Based Stability Test of the Baseline VAR
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Figure B.3: Inflation Shock in the Baseline VAR
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Figure B.4: Unemployment Shock in the Baseline VAR
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Figure B.5: Policy Shock with Alternative Ordering
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Figure B.6: Policy Shock in VAR augmented with Property Prices
−.5
0
.5
1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
Credit Condition Response Fed Funds Response
Inflation Response Unemployment Response
Figure B.7: Policy Shock with Extended Sample (Q1 1973 - Q3 2008)
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Figure B.8: Policy Shock in Baseline VAR with p = 3
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Figure B.9: Policy Shock in Baseline VAR with p = 2
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Figure B.10: Policy Shock in VAR with HP-detrended Series
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Figure B.11: Policy Shock with Different Macro Variables
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Figure B.12: Policy Shock with Different Risk-Taking Proxy (NFILEV)
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Figure B.13: Policy Shock with NFILEV and Property Price Control (p = 4)
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Figure B.14: Policy Shock with Different Risk-Taking Proxy (EBP)
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Figure B.15: Policy Shock in VAR augmented with Funding Risk Indicator
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Figure B.16: Policy Shock in VAR augmented with Non-Core Liabilities (p=3)
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Figure B.17: Policy Shock and Credit Condition Response with 90% Confidence Band
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Figure B.18: Policy Shock and Non-Financial Leverage Response with 90% Confidence Band
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Figure B.19: Policy Shock and Excess Bond Premium Response with 90% Confidence Band
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Figure B.20: Policy Shock and Funding Risk Indicator Response with 90% Confidence Band
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Figure B.21: Policy Shock and Non-Core Liability Growth Response with 90% Confidence
Band
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Variable Source Mnemonic Transformation
Funding Risk Indicator FED FRED NFCIRISK none
NFLI FED FRED NFCINONFINLEVERAGE none
RRPPI FED FRED QUSR628BIS CHP of Log Level * 100
EBP Gilchrist et al. (2012) - -
Non-Core Liabilities US Flow of Funds - yoy growth
Real GDP FED FRED GDPC96 LD * 400
CPI FED FRED CPIAUCSL LD * 400
Note: NFLI = Non-financial leverage indicator, LD = Log Difference, CHP = cyclical component of HP-filter (λ = 1600 as
proposed by Ravn and Uhlig (2002)). Non-Core Liabilities consist of three sub-aggregates, with the following Mnemon-
ics in the US flow of funds database: Z1/Z1/FL763135005.Q (Large Time Deposits), Z1/Z1/FL762150005.Q (Repo Liabili-
ties) and Z1/Z1/FL634090005.Q (Money Market Fund Assets). The URL for the web appendix of Glichrist et al. (2012) is:
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2012/20100787_data.zip
Table B.2: Data Sources and Transformations
Variable ADF statistic p-value DF-GLS statistic
GDP Deflator (ann. %chg) -2.528∗∗∗ 0.0066 -2.054∗∗
Unemployment Rate -1.764∗∗ 0.0406 -1.829
Federal Funds Rate -2.525∗∗∗ 0.0067 -2.899∗
CCI -2.999∗∗∗ 0.0018 -1.156
Funding Risk Indicator -1.525∗ 0.0654 -1.246
Non-Financial Leverage Indicator -1.853∗ - -1.498
HP-filtered RRPPI -4.203∗∗∗ - -4.009∗∗∗
Excess Bond Premium -1.846∗ - -2.128∗∗
Non-Core Liability Growth (yoy) -1.814∗∗ 0.0366 -2.163∗∗
Real GDP growth -3.903∗∗∗ 0.0001 -3.273∗∗∗
CPI inflation -3.358∗∗∗ 0.0006 -2.020∗∗
Note: The ADF test was conducted with a lag order of p = 4 and critical values are obtained from Elliott et al. (1996).
A drift term was included for any variable where a non-zero mean cannot be ruled out. The DF-GLS test was run with
up to 4 lags, and the optimal lag order was chosen according to the criterion proposed by Ng and Perron (1995). For
fed funds and the unemployment rate, trend stationarity was used as the alternative hypothesis. One asterisk denotes
statistical significance at the 10%-level, two asterisks at 5% and three asterisks at the 1% level, respectively.
Table B.3: Unit root Tests
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Lag Order p AIC HQIC SBIC LM (1) LM (2)
1 1.64621 1.86479 2.18734 0.00000 0.00017
2 1.12052 1.51395∗ 2.09455∗ 0.14505 0.03444
3 1.04407 1.61236 2.451 0.01506 0.20895
4 1.01975∗ 1.76291 2.85958 0.35777 0.12236
Note: Asterisks mark the optimal lag length according to the respective selection criterion. The columns LM(1) and
LM(2) display the p-values of the test of Johansen (1995) for first-order and second-order residual autocorrelation. Note
that the null hypothesis is that residuals are not autocorrelated. The p-values reveal that the null is always rejected at
some order for p < 4.
Table B.4: Lag Selection Criteria for the Baseline Model
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